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9i n t r o d u c t i o n
 1 1  Introduction
Prior to the emergence of the modern welfare state, agencies taking care of the poor 
sometimes drew up ‘rules of relief’. A Dutch written code dating from 1817 is exemplary 
in this respect. These ‘Regulations governing the provision of care to the home-dwell-
ing poor in the town of Den Bosch’ established the conditions for local poor relief 1. In 
order to obtain support, residents had to have been affected by certain specific events. 
The Regulations stated that a permanent need for municipal assistance could be due to 
“advanced age and physical defect, which either in whole or in part makes the person 
unsuitable for the performance of labour”. Temporary need might arise in the event of 
“illness of short duration, cessation of work due to the season, women in times of con-
finement, and funeral expenses”.
However, not everyone who became destitute due to such circumstances was entitled 
to poor relief. The local officials caring for the poor (armverzorgers) could only nominate 
people for support after they had ensured that the other conditions set out in the guide-
lines had been met as well. Above all, they had to ascertain the “virtuous conduct” of 
those requesting help; though interestingly enough, the Regulations failed to specify 
precisely what criteria should be applied in making such a judgement. In addition, to be 
eligible for help people had to have no ways of obtaining adequate means of subsistence 
from their blood relatives, from their town of birth if this was somewhere other than Den 
Bosch, or from other funds and subsidies. The armverzorgers also had to assess the degree 
of “industriousness” displayed by applicants in partially meeting their needs themselves, 
as well as whether their income could not be increased by “diligent labour”.
Following the preliminary investigation by the officials, the poor were “sampled”. 
Twice a year the regents of the municipal poor relief board, the auditors, and the masters 
of the ten local districts paid joint house calls to needy persons. Subsequently, the Coun-
cil of Regents decided which individuals and families would receive support, and how 
much this would amount to each week in the coming summer or winter season. The arm-
verzorgers were responsible for the distribution of weekly poor relief; and they were only 
allowed to increase the amounts set by the Council if unforeseen and exceptional costs 
arose. In their contacts with the poor, however, these local officials had considerably 
more latitude. They could restrict support as they saw fit, and largely at their own discre-
tion. Poor relief could be withheld for one or more weeks if the recipients “display con-
tinuous bad behaviour, or show carelessness towards their children, or on other grounds 
which are deemed valid by the Lord Guardians of the Poor”.
As time passed the protection against the consequences of old age, illness, unemploy-
ment and similar risks came more and more to be regarded as a national responsibility. 
The government was given a core task in safeguarding the living conditions of its citi-
zens. In order to achieve this, the favours granted by municipal poor houses and church 
organisations to the deserving poor were gradually converted into the rights of the wel-
fare state, and enshrined in national law. De Swaan (1988: 218-257) discusses this histori-
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1 cal transition “from charity to social consciousness” extensively. In his view changing 
social circumstances – in particular the introduction of capitalist production methods, 
the ongoing “civilising process”, the growth of the state apparatus, and innovations in 
administrative techniques – went hand-in-hand with changes in the configuration of 
influential social groups (the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, employers’ organisa-
tions). The contesting elites went in search of new, stable ways to resolve the social issues 
of their age, building on what had already been achieved.
De Swaan stresses the importance of the increasingly long chains of interdepend-
ence in this regard. Economic markets were no longer local or regional, but acquired 
a national or even transnational character. On the social front, large-scale migratory 
movements, the erosion of the traditional structure of social estates (nobility, clergy, 
commoners), and the emergence of the nation-state meant that the mutual ties between 
individuals extended over greater geographical and social distances than previously. This 
growth of interdependence implied that solutions for the problems social security aimed 
to solve – especially the economic, political and health threats originating from a large 
group of urban poor – had to be sought at ever higher levels of abstraction. Initially the 
local parishes and guilds bore the brunt of this collective effort; later the burden shifted 
to the municipal authorities and national mutualités, before finally ending up with the 
modern welfare states, as yet the climax of the historical development.
Through this “collectivisation of care”, the rules of relief became more comprehensive 
over the years. Not only did their number and complexity increase2, but above all their 
scope. As before, the government took responsibility for the alleviation of severe cases of 
indigence; but it also began guaranteeing its citizens rights to a certain level of income, 
medical assistance, employment counselling, social work, etc.
In essence, however, the main components of the rules have not changed. Just as in 
the Den Bosch Regulations from 1817, they indicate which events entitle people to a cer-
tain benefit or provision, and how far those rights extend. And the contemporary ‘rules 
of relief’ also still contain clauses on job search requirements, on means testing, on the 
administrative procedures to be followed, and on the sanctions that officials are empow-
ered to impose. It is modern social security rules such as these that form the subject of 
this study.
To be more precise, the core focus is on the societal consequences of the institutions of 
modern social security. Institutions are regarded here as socially constructed rules which 
set out the rights and obligations of actors, and the associated conditions and sanctions. 
These rules may be formalised in laws or government regulations, or laid down in con-
tracts between the different parties involved. They may also be more informal in nature 
and usually remain unwritten: people’s mutual views on what constitute correct forms of 
behaviour in particular circumstances.
On the one hand, institutions are a collective given. People cannot choose the his-
torically developed rules of the society into which they are born, and may find it difficult 
to extricate themselves from their controlling force – especially when they perceive the 
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 1 rules as self-evident. On the other hand, institutions are also a collective product. Rules 
are made by people, and often reflect the goals, interests, etc., of their compilers. Their 
continued existence depends on social recognition and acceptance: institutions which 
are not endorsed or observed do not achieve what they were intended to, and may eas-
ily become meaningless. Since they are socially constructed, institutions can in theory 
be revised, though in practice this may not be realised without a struggle. Institutional 
change generally requires complex negotiations between stakeholders, with the formal 
legislative process in political democracies being the characteristic example. Actors are 
moreover not always free to develop entirely different sets of rules. They often reason 
from the basis of existing institutions, which may appear to them as a natural order, the 
abolition of which could entail high material or social costs.
Since institutions lay down the rights and obligations of actors, they influence the interac-
tions of people and organisations. This has consequences both for those directly involved 
(their social standing, professional career, income, profit, etc.) and for the community 
within which the rules apply (the relationships between social groups, crime rates, the 
education level of the population, etc.). Modern social security institutions are of par-
ticular importance for two reasons. First, current ‘rules of relief’ are large in number and 
control the behaviour of many actors: benefit claimants, contributors, benefits agencies 
and business organisations. For that reason, they may have far-reaching consequences 
for society. Social security institutions can exert a major influence on the economy, being 
reflected in the nation’s wealth, the level of consumption and business investments. But 
there may be other implications, too: the degree of poverty and inequality, the health 
status of the population, the demographic profile, political relationships and the occur-
rence of social unrest can all be affected by the way in which the social security system is 
configured.
Secondly, modern social security rules are very deliberate social constructs. They 
are the outcome of an intensive and lengthy process of political decision-making which 
is aimed at realising certain collective goals that are perceived as desirable. That makes 
the field a suitable domain for investigating the nature of institutions and their social 
impact.
Research questions
There are two types of question at stake in this study. The first concerns the theoretical 
status of social security institutions, the second their empirical impact in modern socie-
ties. From a theoretical point of view it is essential to start by analysing in general terms 
what institutions are, how they may arise and influence people’s behaviour, and what 
consequences they may have for the actors involved and their community. The obvious 
follow-up question concerns the applicability of such general notions to the domain of 
social security.
Once these theoretical questions have been dealt with, it is important to investigate 
what influence social security institutions actually have in practice. There are many ways 
to assess this, both in terms of potential causes (various social security rules) and pos-
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1 sible effects (different types of outcome). The empirical analyses performed here home 
in on the causal relationship between coherent systems of formal social security institu-
tions – or ‘regimes’ – and two macro-level outcome indicators: benefit dependency and 
poverty.
Chapter 2 looks at general theoretical issues, aiming to clarify the nature of institutions 
on the basis of the following questions:
– What does the notion ‘institution’ entail?
– What kinds of institutions can be distinguished, and how do they relate to each 
other?
– How do institutions give direction to social interaction, and which actors may be 
involved in this?
– What consequences can rule-driven interactions have?
– Under what conditions do institutions come into being, and what causes them to 
change?
Chapter 3 explores the main topic of this study, social security, once again from a theo-
retical perspective. First the meaning of the concept in the scientific literature is sub-
jected to critical analysis, resulting in an institutional definition of social security. The 
same questions are then asked as in the preceding chapter, but this time specifically for 
social security rules. Attention focuses particularly on the ‘interaction structure’ of dif-
ferent types of social security schemes, and on the societal effects that social security can 
theoretically bring about.
The next three chapters concentrate on the empirical significance of modern social secu-
rity regulations. The main question is consistently concerned with the collective results 
social security rules actually generate. The emphasis is on formal institutions: social 
security rules that are drawn up or ratified by governments. As De Swaan (1989: 11, 13) 
observes, such rules are currently structured largely at national level, and shielded from 
outside influences:
Welfare states are national states, which are concerned with the care only of their own citi-
zenry. [...] States erect borders between their territory and that of other states, and welfare 
states seal off their domain of care just as securely from foreign people. [...] The welfare state 
is by nature exclusive and anti-international3.
In view of this national structuring of formal social security schemes, the obvious proce-
dure is to investigate their impact by means of a country comparison. The focus of inter-
est here will not be the significance of separate rules or regulations, such as the benefit 
conditions in unemployment insurance or the level of early retirement pensions. Rather, 
the objective is to answer a more generic question: what results do the diverse formal 
national systems of social security achieve not in theory (de jure) but in practice (de facto)?
Chapter 4 first explores the existence of such systems empirically. The leading ques-
tion is whether a quantitative analysis of a large number of formal social security institu-
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 1 tions reveals any country clusters that are based on fundamentally diverging principles. 
If this is the case, we may speak of different types of social security regimes. Such regime types 
can be regarded as abstract models of institutional variety. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
distinction between corporatist, social-democratic and liberal ‘worlds of welfare’ has 
become famous in recent years. The empirical adequacy of the typology has been tested 
previously by many authors, but often not in an entirely satisfactory way. One major 
problem is the limited number of formal institutions that are included in these analyses, 
which probably implies that the various national social security systems have been repre-
sented only partially. The main aim of the chapter is to provide a more elaborate empiri-
cal test, by investigating whether a wide selection of formal institutional traits shows 
any consistent clustering across 11 nations. Of these countries, the systems of Belgium, 
France, and Germany are regarded as corporatist regimes in Esping-Andersen’s analysis. 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are examples of his social-democratic type; and the usa, 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom theoretically represent the liberal model. The 
Netherlands is also included in the empirical analysis, as an example of a social security 
system which is difficult to classify from a theoretical point of view.
In addition to this, several other interesting issues will also be examined in some 
degree. Are regime types stable over time? Are they mainly confined to social security, 
the labour market and the tax system, or are regimes more general, in the sense that 
national institutions in the fields of health, education etc. show a similar pattern of 
country clusters? And finally: to what extent do the formal regime types coincide empiri-
cally with informal institutions, or the prevailing notions on social security, labour and 
taxation among the population?
Attention then turns to whether social security regimes produce divergent collective out-
comes. Chapter 5 introduces a very direct output indicator: the volume of social security ben-
efits in various countries. The degree of ‘benefit dependency’ is an interesting dependent 
variable, as it is closely connected to the rights and duties attributed in social security 
regulations, and because it may affect economic growth, labour market behaviour, pov-
erty, inequality, etc.
The key question is whether social security regimes differ in the number of benefit 
recipients they generate, in line with theoretical expectations. This issue will be explored 
for the same set of countries representing the various regime types (except Norway), on 
the basis of comparative benefit dependency data covering a twenty-year period (1980-
1999). First, the theoretical relationship between regime types and the production of 
benefits is discussed and cast in a number of hypotheses. These refer to three aspects of 
benefit dependency: the relative volume (the share of the population receiving benefit); 
the annual rate of growth in the number of benefits; and the composition of the total 
benefit volume in terms of various social risks (old age, unemployment, disability etc.). 
The theoretical expectations are then submitted to an empirical test. The first issue at 
stake here is whether there is a direct link between the various regime types and the 
three forms of benefit dependency. After completing these descriptive analyses, and hav-
ing discussed the implications in terms of the hypotheses, a stricter empirical test is per-
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1 formed. A multivariate model is developed, which makes it possible to assess empirically 
whether regime types contribute to the production of benefits after controlling for the 
influence of other factors, such as demographic differences between countries.
Chapter 6 looks at the relationship between regime types and another outcome indica-
tor, the degree of poverty across countries. Combating poverty is a major objective of most 
social security systems; and the various regime types choose different strategies in order 
to realise this goal. Does this imply that the degree of poverty brought about by the three 
‘worlds’ (plus the Netherlands) differs as one would theoretically expect?
Since poverty is a more complicated construct than the number of benefit recipients, 
the analysis starts with a demarcation of the phenomenon. How is poverty best conceived 
of from a theoretical point of view? Once this has been ascertained, various operational 
poverty lines are discussed and evaluated; and following this assessment a new criterion 
is proposed, which will be used for an empirical comparison of poverty in the same coun-
tries as in the previous chapters. The aim is to test a number of specific hypotheses on the 
relationship between social security regime types and poverty. Do the exponents of the 
corporatist, social-democratic and liberal regime types selected here vary in the degree 
of poverty they bring about, and do they do so in a way one would theoretically expect? 
Once again, this issue is first pursued in a descriptive manner, by inspecting the bivari-
ate relationship between regime types and various poverty indicators. Subsequently the 
hypotheses are tested in a more rigorous way, by applying multi-level analysis to the data. 
Using this method enables the unique contribution of the regime types to the degree of 
poverty to be determined, controlling for the effects of other factors at the micro- and 
macro-level.
Chapter 7 brings together the main findings, and discusses some of the results and their 
implications for social science and policymaking. This overview attempts to elucidate the 
principal motif of the study: the collective significance of social security institutions.
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2  Institutional theory
This chapter discusses institutions from a general conceptual and theoretical perspective, 
following the questions formulated in the Introduction. First a description is given of the 
way in which the concept is interpreted in the scientific literature, with an emphasis on 
the ‘new institutionalism’ in the social sciences (§2.1). Subsequently Douglass North’s 
theory is considered, which views institutions mainly in a historical economic perspec-
tive (§2.2). Building on these insights, §2.3 outlines a general figural model of institu-
tions and their social context. Its different elements are then treated in more detail in 
separate sections.
The idea that institutions should be seen as socially constructed rules is elaborated 
in §2.4. It will be argued that they encompass a social consensus on rights, duties, condi-
tions and potential sanctions. The next two sections briefly describe the various types of 
formal and informal institutions (§2.5), as well as how they theoretically relate to each 
other (§2.6).
The actors for whom the social rules are intended, and their motivations and mutual 
relationships, are the focus of §2.7. Subsequently, §2.8 is concerned with the way in 
which institutions may influence the behavioural interchange of actors, and the results 
to which this leads. A special form of such rule-driven interaction is also discussed in this 
section, namely the way in which actors acquire rules.
Institutions are not unchangeable givens, but the product of the behaviour of actors 
in certain historic circumstances. The theoretical mechanisms underlying this rule gen-
eration process are the focus of §2.9. The chapter ends with a number of conclusions.
2.1 Institutions and the ‘new institutionalism’
In everyday parlance the term ‘institution’ often refers to agencies with a social purpose. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the term inter alia as “a society or organization 
founded especially for the promotion of science, education, etc”. In the social scientific 
counterpart to this, reference is often made to entities which fulfil core social tasks: mar-
riage, family, the Church, voluntary associations, political parties, and so on. Zijderveld 
(2000: 33) gives an example based on anthropological functionalism, and also indicates 
the limitations of this teleological approach:1
There are basic biological and social needs which are satisfied through actions. These actions 
are permanently needed for the satisfaction of the needs, and will in time become schematic. 
That is, they gradually grow into collective habits and patterns of behavior. There is, for exam-
ple, the biological need for sexual intercourse. The behavior that satisfies this need, grows 
into a regular pattern – the institution of marriage.
This is, of course, a rather a-historical and instrumental explanation of the origin of institu-
tions. The original motive of this institution may have been the societal regulation of sexual 
intercourse, but when the institution exists as an objective and autonomous structure, it will 
trigger and then regulate other, possibly quite different needs – such as, for instance, the need 
to stabilize emotions of love and affection, and the need to dispose of a stable parenting facil-
ity. Solidly objectified and autonomous institutions may even liberate individuals from their 
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primary needs, set them free to design motives and aims which in turn may create or trigger 
new needs. For instance, the goal of a formal dinner party is usually not the satisfaction of the 
need for food. [...] It is, in a sense, a Leerform, an empty form which is filled with other motives 
and aims, such as networking, flirting, gossiping, forging political compromises, and making 
Mafia deals.
In the lemma that Eisenstadt (1968: 409) wrote for the International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, he first discusses the standard functionalist interpretation of institutions:
Social institutions are usually conceived of as the basic focuses of social organization, com-
mon to all societies and dealing with some of the basic social problems of ordered social life. 
Three basic aspects of institutions are emphasized. First, the patterns of behavior which are 
regulated by institutions … deal with some perennial, basic problems of any society. Second, 
institutions involve the regulation of behaviour of individuals in society according to some 
definite, continuous, and organized patterns. Finally, these patterns involve a definite norma-
tive ordering and regulation; that is, regulation is upheld by norms and by sanctions which are 
legitimized by these norms.
In this approach the institutional domain of family and kinship provides the solution for 
the social tasks of reproduction and the initial socialisation of children. The institu-
tion of education is the answer to the social problems associated with the transformation 
from children to adults and with the transfer of cultural heritage. The institutions of the 
economy regulate the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. 
Political institutions control the use of force, maintain internal and external order on a 
society’s borders, and take responsibility for the achievement of collective goals (viz., the 
definition of those objectives, as well as the mobilisation and allocation of the necessary 
resources for their achievement). Cultural institutions are concerned with the creation 
and preservation of religious, scientific and artistic products (‘artefacts’), and with their 
dissemination. Finally, there is a separate institution focusing on stratification: the distri-
bution of positions, rewards and resources among individuals and social groups.
Eisenstadt then distances himself from this functionalist approach, however. In his 
view institutions do not exist because they meet the needs of individuals or societies, or 
because they reflect universal psychological or ecological tendencies. Such an approach 
too easily assumes that needs are homogenous, rather than acknowledging that they can 
differ or even conflict between groups, or between individuals and society as a whole. In 
addition, little attention is given to the socially optimal degree of the fulfilment of needs, 
and to alternative institutional solutions which may be effective in similar historical cir-
cumstances. Finally, functionalist theories have difficulty in explaining institutional 
change. All too often it is assumed that the same conditions that lead to the creation of 
certain institutions also ensure that they will continue to exist ad infinitum. This need not 
be the case, however: changes in the nature of the needs, or in the historical and struc-
tural context, can cause institutions to become dysfunctional. The theoretical task is to 
indicate under which circumstances they survive, change or vanish; but this question is 
frequently not asked in functionalist approaches.
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According to Eisenstadt, institutions are not “given, constant, self-contained enti-
ties”; he prefers to speak of a dynamic process of institutionalisation. This is not an expres-
sion of abstract social functionality, but refers to the sustained regulation of exchange 
between actors. Institutionalisation can be seen as (Eisenstadt, 1968: 414)
A process of continuous crystallization of different types of norms, organizations, and frame-
works which regulate the process of exchange of different commodities.
The exchange relates to different goods in the various institutional domains: in the 
economy, for example, it refers to the strengthening or loss of market positions; in the 
political field it has to do with the power that people acquire, the support they generate 
and the compromises they are able to achieve. Institutionalisation of social exchange is 
expressed among other things in legislation, communications systems, the administra-
tive organisation, and the regulation of economic and political markets.
In Eisenstadt’s vision institutional change is not a blind, unfocused process. It is instead 
one which constantly builds on existing institutions (Eisenstadt, 1968: 415):
The concrete organizational structures in the preceding situation [...] create the conditions 
for their own change.
Exchange theory states that ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ play a key role in the process 
of institutionalisation. These are people with a particular ability to articulate new goals 
and norms, to set up new organisations and to mobilise the resources needed to ensure 
their functioning. Their institutionalising capability is related to the control they have 
over key positions and resources; however, having a high degree of control does not auto-
matically mean that they are influential in shaping institutions. Of crucial importance is 
whether they are sensitive to societal needs, and that they are able to ensure that their 
own solutions to those needs prevail. Institutional entrepreneurs attempt to achieve this 
through a mix of coercion, manipulation and persuasion. They are not entirely free in the 
choice of their goals and behaviours; the interests, the possibilities offered by their social 
position and those of their rivals (power, money, contacts, communication channels), 
their own views and those of their supporters, etc., limit the nature of the changes they 
can seek to bring about. However, their course of action is not entirely predetermined: 
entrepreneurs have some latitude, which in this approach is considered to be the most 
important driver of institutional change.
In Eisenstadt’s definition, institutions comprise both the social rules for exchange, 
and the organisational configuration which effectuate these. From an analytical point 
of view it seems useful to separate these two aspects more explicitly. There are societal 
rules, and the extent to which they effectively regulate human behaviour depends among 
other things on collective organisational forms. However, these are two different things, 
which do not necessarily lie on the same line. Rigorous norms may be accompanied by a 
low level of collective organisation: e.g., the behaviour of scientists is governed by fairly 
strict professional rules, which are supported by a loose (and partly anonymous) network 
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of peers throughout the world. It would be hard to maintain the argument that this weak 
organisation implies institutions are nonexistent in such a case.
Throughout this study the concept therefore does not refer to key organisational 
forms or to the deployment of social resources,2 but exclusively to the applicable social 
rules. This fits in with a second everyday meaning of the term: “an established law, cus-
tom, or practice” (Concise Oxford Dictionary). It also aligns with the interpretation of the 
classical sociologist Durkheim, who saw institutions as manifestations of ‘social facts’, 
or collective ways of acting, thinking and feeling. According to him, this supra-individ-
ual, objectified reality is the quintessential object of study for sociology (Durkheim, 1901: 
xxiii):
On peut en effet, sans dénaturer le sens de cette expression, appeler institution, toutes les 
croyances et tous les modes de conduite institués par la collectivité; la sociologie peut alors 
être définie: la science des institutions, de leur genèse et de leur fonctionnement.
In Durkheim’s view, institutions offer a historically rooted pre-structuring of social real-
ity and are therefore a means of avoiding anomia (lack of norms, social chaos). Starting 
from a different theoretical perspective, G.H. Mead (1934: 167, 211) arrives at a similar defi-
nition of institutions:
What we mean by [an institutional form] is that the whole community acts toward the indi-
vidual in an identical way … An institution is, after all, nothing but an organization of attitudes 
which we all carry in us, the organized attitudes of the others that control and determine 
conduct.
A definition of institutions in terms of collectively rooted convictions which influence 
the behaviour of actors returns in a recent theoretical approach known as ‘new institu-
tionalism’. Hall and Taylor (1996) distinguish three variants of this: sociological, rational 
choice and historical institutionalism.
2.1.1 Sociological institutionalism
Adherents of sociological institutionalism defy the functionalist approach, in which the 
normative force of rules provides for social order. By contrast, the cognitive significance 
of institutions is emphasised. In line with social constructivism, of which the work of 
Berger & Luckman (1966) is a well-known exponent, sociological institutionalism pos-
its that institutions do not consist exclusively of rules, procedures and norms. Above all 
they offer symbol systems, cognitive interpretation frames, and moral templates which 
guide behaviour: “Institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one 
should do, but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context” 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996: 948). According to these authors, this has a number of implications. 
In the first place it blurs the distinction between bureaucratic rationality and ‘culture’. 
Following on from Weber, organisational sociologists for a long time argued that the 
central role accorded to formal, rational rules and procedures in government agencies 
and companies is an efficient adaptation to the tasks that they fulfil in modern societies. 
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In this line of reasoning, culture – in the sense of shared beliefs or values – was often 
placed outside the arena of formal organisations. A Wertrationalität (‘value rationality’) 
was only considered important to explain the behaviour of voluntary associations, ideo-
logical movements and religious sects; but the actions of modern, formal organisations 
were driven in principle by Zweckrationalität (‘ends and means rationality’). Sociological 
institutionalists counter this with the argument that all institutions have both formal 
and informal aspects (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 946-947):
Many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not 
adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with some tran-
scendent ‘rationality’. Instead [... many of these] should be seen as culturally-specific prac-
tices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into orga-
nizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the 
kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally [...] 
Even the most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms.
Secondly, in contrast to the rational choice institutionalist view (see below), in this 
approach the individual is not an autonomous homo economicus. Sociological institution-
alists have a dialectic perspective on the relationship between man and society. In the 
words of Berger & Luckman (1966: 79):
Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product [...] An anal-
ysis of the social world that leaves out any one of these three moments will be distortive.
Thus, cognitive frames of interpretation are created by people, but eventually acquire 
universal applicability. The transfer of these ‘ways of seeing’ in the socialisation process 
ensures that new generations are familiar with the rules. And when those generations 
apply the institutions, they confirm to both the social prescript itself and their member-
ship of social entities. Hall & Taylor (1996: 948) therefore designate the sociological- insti-
tutionalist perception of the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour 
as interactive and mutually constitutive.
Thirdly, according to this view the process of creating and changing institutions cannot 
be explained entirely by the efficiency with which these achieve the instrumental goals 
of actors. Rather, institutional change is often induced by the appropriateness of certain 
types of rules (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 949):
Organizations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it advances the means-
end efficiency of the organization, but because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organi-
zation or its participants. In other words, organizations embrace specific institutional forms 
or practices because the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment. In 
some cases, these practices may actually be dysfunctional with regard to achieving the orga-
nization’s formal goals [...] This picture [may be captured] by describing it as a ‘logic of social 
appropriateness’ in contrast to a ‘logic of instrumentality’.
Finally, the legitimacy of institutional arrangements is not self-evident. The fact that 
some institutions are regarded as socially appropriate while others are not has to do with 
the organisation of cultural authority. Sociological institutionalism recognises different 
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sources of authority. The state and the political process can lend public authority to cer-
tain institutional arrangements through legislation or official recognition. In addition, 
the growing number of experts (technicians, lawyers, physicians, economists, sociolo-
gists) can use their professional authority as a basis for imposing standards on their peers 
and for influencing public policy  relating to their field. Furthermore, institutions may 
be the result of an interactive decision-making process by actors in certain influential 
networks. Through peer group discussions they can reach a consensus on what are con-
sidered legitimate interpretations and solutions to social problems. Such an ‘interactive 
legitimacy’ can occur, for example, in international organisations which issue more or 
less mandatory recommendations as to which rules countries should follow in order to 
achieve a balanced government budget, economic growth, educational reform, techno-
logical innovation, etc. (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 949-950).
2.1.2 Rational choice institutionalism
The second variant, rational choice institutionalism, posits that individuals behave 
instrumentally and strategically. They determine their choices independently on the 
basis of their own preferences or tastes. These preferences are given, and individuals try 
to achieve them to the maximum through strategic behaviour based on a meticulous 
consideration of the possible costs and benefits of various alternatives. In this approach, 
institutions are rules which provide confidence in people’s current and expected behav-
iour; in doing so, they lower the risks of commercial and social exchange. Institutions 
provide information about what normal behaviour is, limit the number of choice options, 
ratify contracts and agreements, impose sanctions when people defect, etc. Rules con-
tinue to exist as long as a substantial group of people believe they would be worse off 
not conforming with the prescribed behavioural pattern than by conforming to it. If this 
social support dwindles, institutions will change if a more efficient alternative is avail-
able (see Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942-946; Brinton & Nee, 1998).
Rational choice theory has been widely used in studies on the problems associated with 
collective action, such as political decision-making. Hardin’s Tragedy of the commons (1968) 
is the exemplary portrayal of the ‘social dilemma’.3 In this article he referred to the predic-
aments that arise in farming villages with common grazing land when the latter becomes 
scarce. For each individual farmer it serves his self-interest to place as many animals as 
possible on the collective farmland; but if all farmers do this, the commons will eventu-
ally perish due to over-grazing. This is the essence of a social dilemma: behaviour that is 
rational for the individual has negative consequences for the community as a whole, and 
is therefore irrational from the point of view of the collective interest. A literary example 
of this mechanism can be found in Ian McEwan’s novel Enduring Love.4
Social dilemmas are difficult to avoid when it comes to collective goods to which every-
one has access, and from which many people derive utility. The conceivable solutions 
often bring their own disadvantages. In a hierarchical approach the desired behaviour is 
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imposed by a strong central organisation (usually the national government). However, 
this tends to be at odds with the individual freedom of action. In democratic societies, a 
hierarchical solution is therefore only viable when the undesirable behaviour has conse-
quences for other parties which are generally deemed unacceptable.
Contractual solutions seek to avoid people acting as free-riders through agreements 
between the direct stakeholders, with sanctions being imposed for infringement of the 
contractual stipulations and compliance rewarded. However, this becomes a complex mat-
ter if many actors are involved, if the consequences of the behaviour only become appar-
ent after a long period, or if the individual costs and benefits are difficult to  establish.
If a solution is sought for social dilemmas via the market, an attempt is made to change 
the costs/benefits ratio in such a way that it becomes rational for a critical mass of people 
to focus on the common interest. Market-based solutions may relate to the immediate 
costs and benefits of people’s actions (price interventions, prevention of cartel-forma-
tion), or to the transparency and accessibility of information (e.g. by prescribing that 
companies must produce an annual report, and stipulating what they have to make pub-
lic in it), and the required control mechanisms (e.g. external approval by independent 
auditors). However, the pricing of collective goods can meet with resistance, as for exam-
ple with the introduction of road tolls during peak hours, which are regarded by many 
as a selective infringement of the right to mobility. Determining the optimum incentive 
structure in such a case is also often difficult, and introducing the regulation will involve 
costs (e.g. for the technical infrastructure needed to enable tolls to be levied).
Finally, solutions sought via the community try to make the general interest prevail 
through stimulating shared standards of conduct, promoting awareness of the disagree-
able social outcomes of defection, more intensive social control, and establishing overt 
moral commitment. Examples include the promulgation of an official ‘catalogue’ of val-
ues and norms by the authorities; information campaigns targeted at the prevention of 
the collective bad; the visible naming and shaming of defectors; and making people take 
a public vow to behave as desired (no smoking, drugs or alcohol; abstaining from sexual 
intercourse before marriage; respecting the environment). The main problem here is that 
it tends to be difficult to impose shared standards, awareness, sanctioning and commit-
ment ‘from above’: ultimately, the members of the community themselves must support 
such solutions and see them as self-evident. Where communal ties are weak or on the 
wane, it is not easy for third parties (such as policy-makers) to assure compliance through 
the community.
Schuyt (see Vrooman, 1999) stresses that the rational choice approach is attractive 
because of its simple structure, which offers an explanation for much of the behaviour 
of individual and collective actors. Many variants of the theoretical principles have been 
studied in empirical research (e.g. single-person and multiple-person dilemmas, zero 
and non-zero-sum games5, situations with complete and incomplete information on the 
implications of the choice process), and the theory has therefore been validated in all 
manner of fields. The theoretical model is applied in sociology to explain relationships 
between individuals (the selection of spouses, friendship relations), between organisa-
Rules of Relief_14.indd   21 21-9-2009   15:08:34
22
2
tions (cooperation and competition of firms), between individuals and organisations 
(hiring and firing of employees), between individuals and society (collective impoverish-
ment due to individual rational behaviour, as posited by Hardin), and between collectivi-
ties (e.g. tax policy competition by states).
However, Schuyt also points to a number of methodological and theoretical objec-
tions, which make it doubtful whether rational choice theory can be regarded as the 
“quantum leap of the social sciences”. In the first place the notion of ‘rationality’ is often 
interpreted very broadly in this approach, so that for example altruistic behaviour (giv-
ing money to a beggar) becomes explainable as a rational choice (because of the moral 
satisfaction derived from it). The theory then tends towards tautology, with all behaviour 
being rational in the final instance. In Schuyt’s view, it is more common that behaviour 
is determined by a mix of rational choice and other motives, such as trust. He also ques-
tions whether the opposition between the individual and the collectivity is not over-
emphasised in rational choice theory. For example, the right to Dutch citizenship does 
have individual bearers, but would be hard to imagine without a shared collective his-
torical background; in reality, individual and society are often co-constitutive. Finally, he 
comments that in a rationalising society, rational choice theory may become something 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The greater the extent to which actions are rationally driven, 
the more types of behaviour can be explained by rational choice theory.
In the economic sciences a variant of rational choice institutionalism became in vogue 
in the 1990s, namely the ‘new institutional economics’ (nie), or the economics of trans-
action costs (cf. Williamson, 1985, 1998; Williamson & Winter, 1991). This harks back 
to the classic work by Coase (1937, 1960), from which the proponents of the nie derive 
their basic theoretical principle: when it is costly to transact, institutions matter. According to 
this approach, institutions are more or less efficient solutions for economic coordina-
tion problems, since they lower transaction costs. Unlike neo-classical economic the-
ory, there is no assumption of actors behaving in a fully rational way, but rather of their 
‘bounded rationality’, to quote Simon (1986). People do not necessarily wish to maximise 
their utility; and in everyday situations their opportunities for rational action are often 
limited. In certain conditions actors may settle for ‘satisficing’ instead of maximising 
utility: they try to achieve a level which they consider sufficient. Aiming for the satisfac-
tory theoretically prevails when choices relate to aspects that are less central to the actor. 
For instance, a person may wish to maximise his income or happiness, but in purchasing 
specific consumer goods (such as washing-powder) many different brands probably will 
be good enough.
Perhaps even more important, the bounded rationality view stresses that people 
are not always able to make rational choices. Actual behavioural choices are often based 
on a simplified view of reality. Actors tend to take only a limited number of factors into 
account, which they think are most relevant or crucial to them; and in the process, they 
are prone to make misjudgements. In some cases they may not be able to acquire all the 
information that is relevant for making a rational choice; or they may not want to seek 
this, since it requires to much time or money. In other instances, information may be 
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so abundant that people cannot process it adequately. Moreover, people are not always 
able to determine the consequences of their behaviour accurately in advance, and their 
preferences and interests may not be stable or clear. And finally, their decisions may be 
influenced by situational and personal factors (the degree of shade in the room, their 
serotonin level, their predisposition to calculate, their abilities to do so).
However, in the bounded rationality perspective actors intend to make rational 
choices, in the sense that they opt for actions which they regard as effective means to 
accomplish their ends (interests or preferences). Schmidtz (1995: 12-13) points out that 
people may act rational even if they ‘objectively’ make the wrong choices. What matters is 
that an actor is aware of his ends; that his behaviour is directed towards these goals; and 
that he has good reason to believe his particular line of action is effective enough.
2.1.3 Historical institutionalism
In the third approach institutions are fairly strongly allied to formal organisations, and 
their creation in a given socio-historical context is emphasised. As Hall & Taylor (1996: 
938) point out, institutions are then regarded as
Formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organiza-
tional structure. [...] They can range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard 
operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour 
or bank-firm relations.
Historical institutionalists generally share their view of the relationship between people 
and institutions with one of the other two schools mentioned above, sociological and 
rational choice institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 939-940). In some other respects, 
however, their approach is a unique one. It is centred in the first place around the histori-
cal restraints of social evolution, as expressed in the notion of path dependence. Historical 
institutionalists distance themselves from the traditional view that similar developments 
– e.g. technological innovations – will lead to the same results everywhere. On the con-
trary, they argue that the existing historical context operates in an intermediating way: 
whether or not a given innovation is implemented, and the extent to which it catches 
on, depends greatly on the characteristics of the society concerned. Institutions play an 
important intervening role here: if the formal and informal rules are at variance with the 
innovations, the latter will not be implemented as a matter of course.
A textbook example of technological path dependence is the survival of the qwerty 
standard for the keyboard layout in typing and word processing (David, 1985). In the 
1860s, the first typewriters had the disadvantage that the impression made by the type 
bars on the paper was not immediately visible. If one of the keys got stuck, this caused 
the same letter to be typed over and over again, something which only became apparent 
when the carriage was lifted. The inventor of qwerty, Richard Sholes, tried to minimise 
the number of collisions between the type bars by placing widely used letter combina-
tions in English a long way apart. At the time this was a technological improvement, 
which was patented in 1868 and included in Remington’s first ‘Type-Writer’ in 1872. 
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Already in the 1890s an alternative for qwerty was available: Blickensderfer’s ‘scientific 
keyboard’, which used the dhiatensor-arrangement, and enabled 70% of English words 
to be typed using the keys on the bottom row of the keyboard. According to David qwerty 
nevertheless prevailed, mainly because users had already invested in the method: during 
the period that the market for typewriters was growing rapidly, touch-typing on qwerty 
keyboards had become the standard. The costs of switching to a different system would 
have been relatively high for users; while for typewriter manufacturers it required a fairly 
small investment to incorporate qwerty keyboards into their existing models (by solder-
ing the type to different bars and changing the keys on the levers). The continued exist-
ence of this ‘institution’ can be seen as an example of path dependence: every new key-
board layout first had to demonstrate that the advantages of its introduction outweighed 
the drawbacks of abolishing the qwerty standard (breaking through existing habits, the 
time and costs of retraining users). Later superior alternatives like the Dvorak or Velotype 
keyboards supposedly6 did not succeed due to path dependence, which leads David (1985: 
336) to conclude that
Competition [...] drove the industry prematurely into standardization on the wrong system – 
where decentralized decision making subsequently has sufficed to hold it.
Of course, path dependence becomes more complicated when applied to the analysis of 
social processes. In historical institutionalism the theory has been developed mainly in 
comparative studies of government policy and collective decision-making. Countries 
may respond entirely differently to similar policy problems because the existing institu-
tions make some solutions appear more obvious than others. There may be several rea-
sons for this. The prevailing legislation and related informal rules can promote change, 
but can also hinder it. For example, whereas unprofitable farms go bankrupt in free 
market countries, they may be kept alive elsewhere via state subsidies, a practice that 
is often legitimised by referring to the national interest of an independent food supply, 
or by pointing to the need to protect farm products that are considered unique. Similar 
developments may also lead to different results if the shared views of policymakers (the 
‘policy culture’) or the configurations of interests (e.g. strong or weak trade unions) vary 
among countries. A factor of prime importance is that countries have invested in their 
current institutions. This means that changing the formal rules can entail higher costs in 
some countries than in others. Moreover, if the informal views in a country oppose such 
a change of the formal institutions, it may prove difficult to implement it.
Hall & Taylor (1996: 941-942) conclude that the notion of path dependence implies 
that institutions are not always functional:
Historical institutionalists stress the unintended consequences and inefficiencies generated 
by existing institutions, in contrast to images of institutions as more purposive and efficient.
A second characteristic of historical institutionalism is the attention for the distribution 
of power and the existence of conflicts over scarce goods between rival groups. Institutions are not 
neutral rules (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 941), but
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[…] give some groups or interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process; 
and, rather than emphasize the degree to which an outcome makes everyone better off, [his-
torical institutionalists] tend to stress how some groups lose while others win.
In the third place, this school of thought sees institutions as being not the only cause of 
social change. Although the formal and informal rules determine the direction and scope 
of changes in society, they do so in combination with other factors, such as demographic 
and socio-economic trends, scientific and technological developments, etc. As a result, 
society is “more complex than the world of tastes and institutions often postulated by 
rational choice institutionalists” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942).
2.2 North’s economic-historical approach
In his theoretical analysis Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (1990), 
Douglass North combined several of the above insights, though he integrated the eco-
nomic and historical perspectives better than the sociological aspects. North (1990: 3) 
defines institutions as
… the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction.
Institutions may be formal (laws, regulations) or informal (social norms, customs, 
behavioural codes). Infringing such rules incurs sanctions; this implies that the price of 
establishing defections and the severity of the punishment is an important part of the 
functioning of institutions.
Institutions have to be conceptually separated from organisations. North considers 
the former as “the rules of the game”, while the latter are among the players. There is a 
dialectic connection between organisations and institutions. On the one hand the exist-
ing rules help determine which organisations are formed and how they develop; organi-
sational forms are a response to the incentive structure offered by institutions. On the 
other hand, organisations also influence the development of institutions: they seek to 
change the opportunity structure in such a way that they derive more benefit from it.
2.2.1 Institutions and transaction costs
Institutions regulate human behaviour, and North assumes that actors behave on the 
basis of the bounded rationality perspective described earlier. He believes that transac-
tion costs play a key role in the regulation of behaviour. These expenses are the sum of 
the costs of:
a) defining and protecting property rights, and monitoring and enforcing agreements;
b) measuring the valued attributes of goods and services.
Economists have traditionally focused mainly not on transaction expenses, but on trans-
formation costs: the investment of land, labour and capital that is needed to change the 
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physical characteristics of a good in such a way as to create added value. North, however, 
points out that transaction costs in modern economies are considerable – for the United 
States he estimates that they account for 45% of gdp – and therefore have a substantial 
influence on the economic process as well. And because institutions provide a framework 
for economic exchange, they are important determinants of the level of transaction costs.
First and foremost, institutions regulate the way in which ownership of a good is 
acquired, how it may be used or how its use may be denied to others, and how the con-
tract can be observed. For example, the property rights to a dwelling are generally highly 
regulated in modern societies. There are formal rules dictating the content of the sales 
contract, the entry in the land register, agreements with the mortgage provider, the tax-
able status of home ownership and the tax deductibility of housing and maintenance 
costs, the inheritance laws, the possibilities to evict and prosecute squatters, etc. These 
rules are often reinforced by the self-evident mutual expectations of buyers and sellers 
on what is a reasonable margin between asking price and bid, the role of estate agents, 
etc. Institutionalisation needs not be that high, however. In a society where tracts of 
terra nullius are available, it may be that property rights are created by simply fencing off 
or inhabiting such areas and defending that land against any competitors7. But in both 
cases establishing the property right involves transaction costs: the fees for the notary, 
the mortgage provider and the tax office in the highly regulated society, and the costs of 
defending one’s home in the other variant.
In addition, every economic exchange involves measurement costs. The value of an 
exchange commodity is the sum of the characteristics which are involved in the good 
or the service for both parties. If someone buys a house, they purchase a number of 
attributes: a certain number of square metres, a particular building style, the solidity of 
the construction, the attractiveness of the neighbourhood, the distance from central 
amenities, etc. To determine whether the desired characteristics are included in the sale 
and whether the asking price is in line with the market, it is necessary to make inquir-
ies: comparing houses and neighbourhoods, carrying out architectural research, etc. 
This takes time and money, and in complex exchange it is often not feasible to obtain all 
relevant information. Moreover, information asymmetries often occur in practice: the 
vendor of the house generally knows more than the buyer, and either one may have an 
interest in hiding or revealing certain traits.
The costs of establishing property rights and measuring valued attributes may vary 
depending on how efficient the rules are. In general, total transaction costs increase as 
the type of exchange and the socio-economic setting become more complex; and as the 
ability of the actors to understand the context, and to enforce compliance with the rules, 
declines.
2.2.2 Formal and informal rules
North draws a distinction between formal and informal institutions. He suggests that the 
difference is a gradual one: it may be regarded as a continuum of institutionalisation, with 
customs, traditions and taboos at one extreme, and a written constitution at the other.
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Formal rules are created in order to make exchange (in a political or economic sense) 
possible, and are based on the initial negotiating power of decision-making parties. For-
mal rules need not necessarily be efficient: in principle they are designed more to foster 
the interests of those in power than to optimise the general interest. North identifies three 
types of formal institutions: political and judicial rules, economic rules and contracts.
1. Political and judicial rules. These reflect the hierarchy of the various policy issues, as 
well as the key points of the decision-making procedure and the method of agenda for-
mation. Political and judicial rules have a certain primacy because they shape the play-
ing field for economic rules and contracts. This primacy is incomplete, however, because 
there is also a feedback mechanism in which actors attempt to influence the political and 
judicial rules.
In the simple case there is one dominant ruler, who in exchange for tax revenues dis-
penses justice, provides safety (or at least prevents chaos) and protects property rights. As 
different factions have different opportunity costs and negotiating power, they enter into 
individual contracts with the dominant ruler.
In a slightly more complicated model there is a representative body which acts in 
behalf of the interests of a limited number of groups (such as the Spanish Cortes, origi-
nally a parliament of the three estates). This enables the ruler to generate more tax rev-
enues in exchange for the granting of privileges to the interest groups and their agents. 
This creates a hierarchical structure and an extensive bureaucracy.
In modern representative democracies there is a multitude of interest groups and a 
much more complex institutional structure designed to foster the exchanges between 
the various groups. There is also not just a single legislator, but a legislative assembly. All 
representatives (mps) have to satisfy their own constituencies, each of which has its own 
characteristics. This cannot be achieved through a simple exchange of votes; often it is 
a matter of making prior agreements on voting cooperation, or of granting each other 
influence on certain closely defined topics and on the agenda (e.g. the chairmanship of 
committees).
2. Economic rules. These mainly establish property rights. In the simplest model prop-
erty rights are a function of changes in economic costs and revenues: they arise when 
changes in relative prices and/or scarcity are such that they counterbalance the costs 
of granting or enforcing the rights. There are however also many inefficient rights, the 
monitoring of which is not economically viable. North explains this on the basis of the 
inefficiency of the political markets: rule makers do not wish to upset their influential 
supporters, or it may be that the costs of establishing and collecting levies are so high 
that a less efficient allocation of rights leads to higher revenues. An efficient distribution 
of property rights arises where the political transaction costs are low and the political 
actors have adequate subjective perceptions. In practice this is often not achieved.
3. Contracts. These contain the conditions governing specific exchange agreements. In 
traditional economic settings contracts often referred to the trading of a single good at 
a single moment. Modern contracts cover several goods and extend over a longer period. 
They are by definition incomplete and therefore stipulate which matters will be decided 
through arbitration by a third party or the courts.
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According to North informal institutions, such as codes of conduct, norms and conventions, 
are often embedded in the formal institutions. In many respects, however, they are more 
important, as formal rules contain few instructions for everyday behaviour. Their influence 
is evident from the fact that the same formal rules can lead to different results in a different 
social and historical context, and from the persistence of informal rules long after a radi-
cal amendment of the formal institutions and their related organisational forms (e.g. the 
Japanese culture after the us administration following World War ii; the Jewish and Kurdish 
culture in the Diaspora, the Orthodox Russian Church after 70 years of Communism).
North (1990: 37) broadly equates informal institutions to culture:
Informal constraints [...] are part of the heritage that we call culture, [... which] can be defined 
as the transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, 
values, and other factors that influence behavior.
A sociologist would probably be more inclined to refer to this latter aspect as socialisation 
or cultural transfer (see §2.8.3). North’s view of culture is however closely connected to 
that of sociological institutionalism, because he stresses its cognitive significance: “Cul-
ture provides a language-based conceptual framework for encoding and interpreting the 
information that the senses are presenting to the brain” (North, 1990: 37).
The transmission of culture ensures that informal solutions for exchange problems 
survive; social change may occur, but in the long run it will be accompanied by a persist-
ing undercurrent.
Informal institutions arise to coordinate repeated social interaction. Here again, North 
distinguishes three variants:
1. First there may be extensions, elaborations and amendments of formal rules. These are the 
‘unwritten laws’ or conventions that arise as a result of repeated interaction between 
actors.
2. Then there are socially sanctioned norms of behaviour. North cites the example of a gentle-
man who is challenged to a duel to the death. The evening before he draws up a long 
list of reasons for not taking part in the duel, with at the top the strong argument that 
there is a fair risk that he will lose his life. Yet he still decides to participate in the duel: 
a gentleman would suffer a serious loss of reputation if he avoids what in his circles is a 
traditional manner of settling conflicts.
3. Finally, North points to the existence of internalised standards of conduct: ideas, ideolo-
gies and convictions which cannot always be reconciled with rational choice. Although 
he does not mention him by name, Weber’s8 classical analysis in Die Protestantische Ethik 
und der Geist des Kapitalismus (1905) clearly resonates in North’s argument: “Effective tra-
ditions of hard work, honesty, and integrity simply lower the cost of transacting and 
make possible complex, productive exchange” (North, 1990: 138).
In North’s view, in modern democratic societies informal institutions are important for 
two reasons. In such a context the formal rules (political and judicial rules, economic 
rules and contracts) usually are numerous and complex, but can never cover all possi-
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ble circumstances. The rights established in the formal institutions therefore have to 
be strengthened by informal constraints: conventions, social norms and internalised 
standards of conduct that regulate the latitude of interpretation and action implied in 
the formal rules.
In addition, the costs of expressing opinions in democracies are often low, because 
freedom of speech is a constitutional right which is ratified by the prevailing views of the 
population, and because information is relatively freely available. These low costs mean 
that the subjective preferences of individuals are more important determinants of behav-
iour than is the case under an authoritarian regime, where the preferences expressed 
in public life have to toe the official line. The costs of expressing one’s opinion in such 
a regime may be considerable: some statements are unlawful, those uttering them are 
regarded as social outcasts and moral reprobates, and censorship means a great deal of 
effort is needed if individuals wish to make their views known to others.
2.2.3 Enforcement
North (1990: 32-33) points to the importance of the ability to enforce desired behaviour for 
both formal and informal institutions. This enforcement can be achieved through direct 
reprisal by the injured party, through internalised codes of conduct, through sanctions 
imposed by the community, or through the actions of a third party (often the state). In 
complex exchanges where no complete information is available, enforcement is needed 
to achieve cooperative behaviour; without it the individual interests of the various actors 
would predominate. The costs of enforcement form part of the transaction costs, and 
reflect the uncertainties of the contract. They are a risk premium, whose amount depends 
on the likelihood that the other party will fail to meet their obligations, and the costs that 
this would entail for the first party. North comments that contracts in a profit-maximising 
situation are ‘self-enforcing’ when the rewards of complying with contracts are greater 
than the costs. In his view this occurs in tribal societies and small communities, where 
people have lots of information about each other and repeatedly engage in exchanges. 
Here, the measurement costs of contracts are low, but the costs of cheating, avoiding 
responsibility and opportunism are considerable. Formal contracts are not necessary; 
norms of behaviour govern the exchange. Modern societies, however, are characterised by 
large-scale impersonal exchanges. There are many valued attributes, the exchange often 
extends over a long period and is not repeated in the same form between the same actors. 
In this situation the measurement costs are high, and without enforcement the advan-
tages of cheating would be much greater than the rewards of cooperative behaviour.
North clarifies this by calling on game theory. In the classic prisoner’s dilemma a 
sub-optimum solution is often chosen because the collective payoff is much lower if one 
person cooperates (snitches his fellow prisoner) while the other does not. In a repeated 
or iterative game, however, cooperation is a more evident choice, provided a number of 
conditions are met: the information must be complete, and the exchange must continue 
indefinitely (if people suspect that the game is finite, the anticipated final moment will 
partly determine their choices). In reality, such conditions are often not met: the dura-
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tion of the exchange is unknown, it involves several individuals who are not very well 
acquainted, and the information possessed by the various parties differs widely. In this 
situation enforcement – and, in the case of non-compliance, punishment – by a third 
party is necessary.
It is possible that voluntary organisations are the sole enforcement agent. How-
ever, North points out that in the context of impersonal exchanges in modern, mutually 
dependent economies, the transaction costs for information acquisition and sanctioning 
will quickly become too high. If the state acts as the enforcement agent, by contrast, it 
can generate huge economies of scale. This then creates a new dilemma, however. On the 
one hand a modern society cannot operate without formal ‘third-party enforcement’ by 
the state; but on the other hand those who represent the state are also agents who seek 
to maximise their utility: “Put simply, if the state has coercive force, then those who run 
the state will use that force in their own interest at the expense of the rest of society” 
(North, 1990: 59). This means that the state is not necessarily a neutral third party, which 
can assess the value of attributes at little or no expense, and which will automatically 
ensure that those who break the rules pay so much compensation to injured parties that 
defection is more costly than complying with agreements.
2.2.4 Institutional change and path dependence
North’s view of institutional change is an interesting mix of the rational choice, socio-
logical and historical institutionalism discussed earlier. He sees two driving forces: both 
mutations in relative prices and altered actor’s preferences can lead to rule amendment. 
He regards the former as the most important. This involves changes in the ratio of factor 
costs (land/labour; labour/capital; land/capital), in the costs of information, and in civil 
and military technology. According to North, relative prices may change due to exogenous 
shocks, such as the plague epidemic in Europe in the late Middle Ages, which radically 
changed the price ratio between labour and land. However, he considers relative price 
changes largely as a process driven by endogenous developments. The role fulfilled by 
entrepreneurs is crucial in this respect. Over time they gain knowledge and experience, 
and as a result their transaction costs fall, in line with the notion that a game proceeds 
differently when it is played by professionals rather than amateurs. Therefore, if the pro-
fessionals gain the upper hand relative prices will change, and this will create pressure to 
refine the rules of the game. Or to put it more precisely,
The process by which the entrepreneur acquires skills and knowledge is going to change rela-
tive prices by changing perceived costs of measurement and enforcement, and by altering per-
ceived costs and benefits of new bargains and contracts (North, 1990: 84).
If the relative prices change, this means it becomes attractive for some parties to recon-
sider existing contracts. Since these are embedded in the hierarchy of rules, this is often 
not possible without breaking higher rules or norms of behaviour. A disadvantaged party 
may then decide to attempt to change the formal rules. This subsequently distorts the 
equilibrium in the informal institutions, which are by nature embedded in the old formal 
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structure. A change in the relative prices thus may change the formal rules with the result 
that behavioural norms, customs or traditions are gradually eroded and replaced by oth-
ers, which better match the new formal institutions.
But North suggests that institutional change comes about not just because of changes in 
relative prices. Changes in the preferences or ideas of actors are a second potential source 
of change – in North’s view often less important, but relatively autonomous nonetheless. 
He illustrates this by pointing out that the abolition of slavery in the United States cannot 
be explained on the basis of changes in relative prices. At the time of the American Civil 
War, slavery was still profitable in the Southern states, so there was no economic need for 
abolition. North attributes the institutional change that took place after the end of the 
Civil War in 1865 among other things to the strong intellectual force of the anti-slavery 
movement, combined with political democracy which enabled opponents of slavery to 
express their ideas at little personal cost. By contrast, the Southern slave masters had no 
means at that time and in that structure to persuade the entire electorate to back their 
point of view (North, 1990: 85). North argues that the causes of such changes in prefer-
ences, or ‘cultural evolution’, lie in random processes, learning mechanisms, and natural 
selection. It is however also possible that preferences adapt in response to relative price 
changes. To illustrate the latter North refers to the evolvement of family relationships 
in response to changing relative prices of work and leisure time and the introduction of 
contraceptives.
North stresses that it is ultimately the actors who make and recreate the rules. The 
existing institutions define an opportunity structure for individuals, to which they will 
gear their behaviour; and if their social success is too low according to the standards they 
apply, they will try to change the formal or informal rules. North allocates a key role here 
to political and economic entrepreneurs, an idea which corresponds with the view of 
Eisenstadt cited earlier. To what extent they succeed in this depends on their cognitions 
(formal knowledge, tacit knowledge and experience), their subjective norms and expec-
tations, their interests and negotiating power, and the degree to which they succeed in 
competing with other interested parties in shaping the policy agenda and formal rules to 
their own wishes. As their rationality is by definition bounded, this can lead to socially 
sub-optimum solutions. Their bounded rationality also explains why entrepreneurs may 
react differently to economic, social or technological changes.
As he also attaches importance to informal rules and to the perceptions and accumula-
tion of knowledge of entrepreneurs, for North institutional change theoretically is not 
a linear process. Changes in preferences may lead to modification of informal institu-
tions, which in turn can prompt changes in the formal rules. There is also frequently 
interference between the two: if formal institutions are changed radically, the informal 
rules often offer resistance to excessive reforms, because they still offer a solution to 
the exchange problems of the actors. In these cases a new equilibrium may eventually 
emerge, in which the formal institutions move in the direction of the ancien régime, and 
the informal rules are modernised.
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If the two driving forces – changes in prices and preferences – are combined, this 
offers a certain explanation for institutional variation in the short term, but still leaves 
unclear why inefficient institutions are able to survive. After all, if certain countries or 
organisations record lower achievements than others, the expectation would be that 
they eventually succumb to the competition. They would necessarily have to opt for the 
more efficient rules in the end, in order to prevent the best qualified part of the popula-
tion leaving the country or the business going bankrupt. The survival of sub-optimal 
institutions can be explained by a third mechanism in North’s theory: the notion of path 
dependence, which was discussed earlier under historical institutionalism. According to 
North, path dependence arises as a result of the increasing added value of institutions – 
as a result of high initial investments, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive 
expectations – in combination with imperfect markets. It is, however, not an automatic 
or linear process (North, 1990: 98-99):
[There is no question of ] a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future. 
[...] Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision-making 
through time. [...] Once a development path is set on a particular course, the network exter-
nalities, the learning process of the organizations, and the historically derived subjective 
modeling of the issues reinforce the course.
Path dependence is also one of the reasons that formal rules, when adopted by other 
countries or organisations, do not function in the same way or may generate different 
effects. German reunification provides an interesting example of this: the labour market 
and social security institutions of the old Bundesländer were ‘exported’ to the new federal 
states in the 1990s, but led to somewhat different results there (see Mars et al., 2002).
The foregoing makes clear that formal and informal institutions theoretically determine 
the behaviour of actors, and thus influence the economic and social performance of 
countries and organisations. For sociologists, the tenet ‘institutions matter’ is more self-
evident than for neo-classical economists, whose paradigm adherents of the economic 
variant of rational choice institutionalism (nie) oppose. The intellectual challenge is 
rather to establish empirically the magnitude of the socio-economic impact of institutions 
in diverging contexts. In this study this issue will be explored for specific types of rule 
sets: those pertaining to systems of social security. Before tackling this empirical ques-
tion, however, it will be useful to elaborate the meaning of institutions more precisely, 
and to specify what such a demarcation implies for social security. The first is covered 
below, while the second is the subject of chapter 3.
2.3 The evolvement and impact of institutions: a figural model
It is not simple to integrate the three variants of ‘new institutionalism’ discussed above, 
partly because they have developed relatively autonomously. Here, building on the work 
of North, an attempt is made to synthesise them into a general figural model. This is not 
intended as a formal theoretical model, but rather as a heuristic aid, a flow chart of hypo-
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thetical relationships that may be translated into empirical statements (cf. Lindenberg, 
1983: 21-22). The model seeks to indicate what institutions are, how they come into being, 
in what way they regulate interaction, and what consequences this has for both the actors 
involved and society at large. Figure 2.1 illustrates the main outlines; the individual ele-
ments will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.
The model distinguishes between factors at the collective and actor levels. Institutions are 
the collectively defined rights and duties that aim to regulate behaviour, and their attached 
conditions and possible sanctions. Formal institutions are rules promulgated or recognised 
by the government; informal institutions are borne by groups or communities. In the hier-
archy of formal institutions, the meta-rules which establish the method of decision-making 
are situated at the top. They give direction to the rules for government production: goods and 
services provided by the government (e.g. defence, education). They also influence the third 
type of formal rules, namely enforcement by the government, as a party above the parties, 
of the rights, duties and mutual relations of private actors. This third-party recognition forms 
the framework for formal contracts between private parties, the fourth type of formal insti-
tution. The contracts entered into by the government with private parties in its role as a 
producer (tenders for public works, etc.) are a specific variant of this.
Among the informal institutions, values theoretically give direction to social norms. 
The former consist of general principles of action, the latter of specific behavioural rules 
for actual situations. Unlike values, norms also contain the possibility of sanctions. Con-
ventions differ from social norms in that they do not have an explicit value component; 
they specify correct behaviour in a neutral way. The content of such rules is arbitrary: the 
main thing is that conventions coordinate the interaction within a group or community, 
and confirm membership of it. Informal contracts are a fourth variant: contracts between 
private parties that are not enforced by the government. Informal contracts are theoreti-
cally directed by social norms and conventions.
Formal and informal institutions are interrelated and therefore correspond to a cer-
tain extent. In principle, however, they do not determine each other in full: informal 
rules do not automatically derive from formal rules, and the converse is equally untrue. 
This also applies within the formal and informal rule hierarchies: the lower-level rules 
bear a certain relationship to the higher-level rules, but do not automatically ensue from 
them. Rather, the translation process is a matter of social consensus.
Institutions try to regulate action, and at this level two types of actors are distinguished. 
In addition to individuals (natural persons) there are also corporate actors. These exist 
where the rights and duties of such organisations (companies, associations, government 
agencies) are separate from the individuals that form part of them; they are recognised as 
independent legal body in their own right. Corporate actors are the result of the organ-
ising behaviour of other actors. They arise when individual or existing corporate actors 
wish to achieve certain goals which they are unable to achieve by themselves. ‘Organis-
ing’ implies that existing actors accord a mandate and resources to a new or modified 
corporate actor in order to realise such aims.
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Notwithstanding the autonomous rights of corporate actors, their acts are realised 
by individuals. These individuals are deemed not to act as natural persons in their own 
right, but as representatives of the corporate actor. The behaviour of such ‘agents’ can 
however deviate from the intentions of their patron (or ‘principal’): they may put per-
sonal gain before the organisational interest.
In this model, the motivations of individual actors consist of subjective rule interpre-
tations, the individual perception of interests, goals and ideals, the expected costs and 
benefits of behavioural alternatives, and the perceived probability of certain outcomes. 
Emotions may also be linked to particular forms of behaviour. The motivations of corpo-
rate actors are theoretically largely the same, but emotions are lacking because these are 
tied to natural persons. Of course, emotions can play a role for the individuals acting on 
behalf of corporate legal bodies.
The motives of actors are theoretically influenced by the institutions, the histori-
cal process and the consequences of earlier acts. Specific actor characteristics (person-
ality traits, health status, available resources) and the relations with other actors can 
also prompt particular forms of behaviour. Relationships between individual actors are 
guided by their respective traits and interaction history; their positions in social net-
works; mutual trust; and authority ties. In relations between individual and corporate 
actors two particular mechanisms are at work: the ‘founding fathers’ of a new organisa-
tion to a large extent shape its goals and mode of operation; and once established, it may 
be difficult to ensure that individuals comply with the intentions and interest of the cor-
porate actor. In the corporate context, motivations become theoretically more complex, 
because the agents can interpret the aspired behaviour of the principal in different ways 
(disagreements on the board, between departments, between employee representatives 
and management, etc.).
The model distinguishes between a rule application process and a rule generation process. The 
former indicates how a given institutional structure influences certain interactions and 
what results this brings about. The latter specifies the conditions that lead actors to 
change the rules, or leave them intact.
In the rule application process the weighting of motivations result in certain behavioural 
aspirations of the actor. These aspirations are not a carbon copy of socially constructed rules. 
There are several reasons for this: the rules are often incomplete or unclear; subjective rule 
interpretations may differ from what was collectively envisaged; and other motivations 
(e.g. the costs/benefits perception, emotions) may weigh more heavily than the allocated 
rights and duties. The course of interaction may also cause actual behaviour to deviate 
from the collective goals or the actor’s aspirations. In principle, actors are not robotic 
rule-followers; though they can become so in certain circumstances, for example if the 
costs of defection are very high (e.g. because of severe physical sanctions), or where there 
are very strict behavioural expectations which the individual actors have internalised (for 
example, in a caste-based society or sect). Since the degree to which rules govern behav-
iour is an empirical question, it is important to establish to what extent the behaviour of 
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actors is in line with the formal and informal expectations (indicating compliance) or are 
in conflict with them (indicating defection). Theoretically, the likelihood of defection is 
high in certain types of interactions. This holds in particular for the one-off, impersonal 
economic exchange of a single good between market parties, and in the case of collective 
provisions where no adequate solution has been found for the free rider problem.
The behavioural aspirations influence the rule-driven interactions between actors. Rule 
acquisition is a special variant of this, which relates to the way in which new actors learn 
about the existing formal and informal rules. The ‘other interactions’ in the model refer 
to all the remaining behavioural exchanges between actors in the private sphere (as 
members of households, families, associations or other groups), their economic transac-
tions (as consumers, employees or employers), their political behaviour (as electors, can-
didates or party members), and so on. The various forms of interaction relating to social 
security, which are discussed in detail in chapter 3, also belong here.
If the rules are a given, the results they bring about depend on the historical cir-
cumstances in which they are applied. The economic climate, the demographic situa-
tion, social and technological developments and changes in aspired futures (ideolo-
gies) define a current context of rule application for individual and corporate actors. In the 
sphere of social security this is manifested for example in the likelihood that actors will 
be affected by certain events (e.g. unemployment due to dismissal). The context of rule 
application may also be reflected in their perceptions: whether the unemployed deem it 
worthwhile to seek work, the expected costs and yields of benefit fraud, the priorities set 
by the agents of social security organisations, etc.
First of all, institutions have consequences at the actor level. In social security, for exam-
ple, the rule-driven interactions of an unemployed person with a benefits agency will 
influence his income level, it may lead to the requirement to follow a training course, etc. 
But there are also collective effects of rules, shown in figure 2.1 as a feedback to the histori-
cal process. The development of a community or society is influenced by the outcome of 
rule-driven interactions; and institutions are often also devised to achieve such collec-
tive results, especially as regards economic prosperity and the continuity of the social 
structure and ideology. This can again be illustrated using social security. The existence 
of social security rules may create new social categories (poorhouse inhabitants, state 
pensioners, single mothers living on welfare), influence the position of contributors 
and benefit recipients on the various stratification ladders, and affect the power of elite 
groups if they are a key issue in parliamentary elections. Social security institutions also 
impact on the collective wealth and its distribution, and they may influence technologi-
cal development (for example via the level of investment in physical and human capital) 
and promote certain demographic changes (e.g. denatalistic and pronatalistic effects of 
child support, the influence of the relative levels of social assistance and pensions on 
migration flows) (see also §3.6).
The rule generation process shown in figure 2.1 suggests that it is not inevitable that col-
lective rules will come into being or change. Institutions arise and develop through the 
rule-creating activities of actors in response to historical developments and the existing 
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rule structure. The historical process relates to changes in the fields of technology and 
science, the economy, the social structure, the ideals that are formed, and demographic 
trends. Depending on the existing institutions, such trends confront actors with a certain 
incentive to regulate. This is a weighted sum of changes in four factors: developments in 
relative prices, power relations, conflicts of interest and support for certain ideals within 
a social system (community, society).
Alterations in these domains can lead actors to aspire different rules. This is possibly, 
but not necessarily the case; it depends on the way actors process the incentive to regu-
late. There may be alternatives to rule amendment they prefer: actors may adapt their 
behaviour within the applicable rules, accept their loss and gains under the prevailing 
institutions, or break the rules without changing them. It is also may be that the four 
factors do not point in the same direction, or are not strong enough in the perception 
of the actors concerned to necessitate rule change. Finally, rule change brings economic 
and social costs. The new rule has to be formulated, support has to be found for it, after 
its acceptance it has to be implemented, and after the rule has been changed the net col-
lective yields must be positive. The perceived economic and social costs will be reflected 
in the inclinations of actors to regulate, and that is a source of path dependence. Such a 
‘brake on rule aspirations’ may also result from the tendency of actors to perceive reality 
in terms of the existing rules (cognitive framing, moral templates).
The fact that actors consider certain rules desirable does not automatically mean that 
they will be created: that hinges on a process of rule-interaction by rule-making actors. The 
model distinguishes three variants of this interaction process. First there is the policy 
process in which the formal government rules are defined. In addition, private parties 
can enter into formal and informal contracts. Finally there is the possibility that actors 
will attempt to redefine the values, norms and conventions within their community. 
The three types of rule-interaction can result in a certain institutionalisation. Of course, 
the newly made rules need not correspond with the aspirations of all actors who were 
involved in their constitution.
Theoretically, institutional changes are set in motion primarily by new actors: individ-
ual ‘normative entrepreneurs’, new corporate actors, the members of a new generation, 
or a counter-elite challenging the position and views of the dominant elite of rule guard-
ians. For several reasons, such new actors are more sensitive to changes in the incentive 
to regulate: they have invested less in the existing institutions, derive less benefit from 
them, and are less inclined to see reality in terms of the prevailing rules. As a conse-
quence, they are more likely to see the shortcomings of the existing institutional struc-
ture and the advantages of rule changes.
Following this general overview, the figural model will be described in more detail in 
the remainder of this chapter. First we will elaborate the meaning of institutions (§2.4), 
the various types of institutions (§2.5), and how these may relate to one another (§2.6). 
Attention then turns to the actors (§2.7), the specifics of what rule-driven interaction 
entails, and the results to which it can lead (§2.8). The way in which actors acquire rules 
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– a special form of rule-driven interaction – will also be a topic here. Finally, §2.9 looks 
more closely at the rule generation process.
2.4 Institutions as socially constructed rules
Given their central position in the figural model, it is important to clarify the meaning of 
the term ‘institutions’. As stated earlier, North (1990: 3) defines them as “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”. The last two elements in this definition, in 
particular, raise questions. Do institutions necessarily imply behavioural constraints? 
And as a corollary to this: do institutions always relate to human interaction?
Applied to, e.g., social security, a positive answer to these questions would make 
the analysis more difficult. In the first place, many social security institutions tend to 
increase rather than limit people’s behavioural options. They are ‘rules of relief’, which 
give people the right to benefit, to help in finding a job, to a safe and healthy working 
environment, etc. G.H. Mead (1934: 260-262) already pointed out this potential emanci-
pating aspect of social institutions:
There is no necessary or inevitable reason why social institutions should be oppressive or rig-
idly conservative, or why they should not be, as many are, flexible and progressive, fostering 
individuality rather than discouraging it.
This is difficult to reconcile with a definition in terms of constraints dictating what actors 
must or must not do. In addition social security comprises many rules that do not impact 
directly on the behavioural interchanges between people. For example, social security 
benefit is usually only paid if applicants have certain characteristics (e.g. a certain age), 
or after a certain event has taken place (e.g. the death of a partner). Such regulations have 
virtually no influence on the interaction between the applicants and the social security 
organisation, and can sometimes not be influenced by the actors concerned. However, 
they still belong to the ‘rules of the game’, and in that sense are institutional.
To remove these objections a slightly different delineation is adopted here, in which 
institutions are understood as socially constructed rules which indicate the rights and duties of 
actors. The rules may contain conditions for the granting of rights and imposition of duties, 
and also establish the positive and negative sanctions that may be applied. The various ele-
ments of this definition deserve some explanation.
Socially constructed rules
In line with North, the definition emphasises the social nature of institutions. They are 
prescripts constructed by groups, communities or governments of what people may and 
must do, the shared standards which separate the right ways of acting from the wrong 
ones. This excludes some rules. If they describe non-social natural laws – the sun rises 
each day, a formula9 such as PD=log10 (1+(1/D)) – then rules are in principle not institutional. 
Guidelines that are purely personal – the self-devised life principles of a hermit without 
followers, the inimitable yet often very compulsive rules of someone going through a 
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psychosis – fall outside the definition as well. An absolute normative philosophy, which 
poses universal standards for ethically good behaviour, in itself is also not institutional. 
It may become so, however, if there are people who recognise and observe the life rules, 
such as a group of moral philosophers who support the specific deontology and put it 
into practice10.
By contrast, the laws enacted by a government, the rules of a monastic order (such 
as the Rule of St. Benedict), or the unwritten mores of a society or company are socially 
constructed, and are therefore examples of institutions. Although it is not unusual for 
institutions to have a certain stability, rules need not necessarily become embedded and 
unchangeable. Social rules may also consist of one-off arrangements between actors; the 
more tangible form they assume (e.g. in the form of implementation decrees), the more 
likely it is that they will have to be adjusted regularly in response to changes in the socio-
economic environment and unforeseen or undesired consequences.
In contrast to the functionalist approach discussed by Eisenstadt (see §2.1), the 
production of ‘cultural artefacts’ is not regarded as an institution here. Undoubtedly, 
developments in the field of technology, science or art, and new ideas, can impact on 
the social construction of rules. Moreover, this form of culture is also often driven by 
rules: the standards adopted by scientists, artists and philosophers on what constitutes 
acceptable scientific knowledge, permissible artistic expressions, technical procedures 
to be followed, etc. The broad cultural domain as such is however not an institution in 
itself according to the definition applied here, because it does not indicate the rights and 
duties of the actors concerned.
In a looser formulation, North regards institutions as “the rules of the game”, with indi-
vidual actors and organisations as the players. Are social rules similar to the way games are 
regulated? North is in any event not alone in his use of this metaphor. The neo-realistic 
philosopher Searle (1995: 103), for example, states:
Games are especially useful objects of study [...] because they provide a microcosm of larger 
social phenomena. Famously, Wittgenstein argued that there is no essence marked by the 
word ‘game’. But all the same, there are certain common features possessed by paradigmatic 
games such as those in competitive sports – baseball, football, tennis, etc. In each case the 
game consists of a series of attempts to overcome certain obstacles that have been created for 
the purpose of trying to overcome them. Each side in the game tries to overcome the obstacles 
and prevent the other side from overcoming them. The rules of the game specify what the 
obstacles are and what can be done to overcome them, as well as what must and what must 
not be done. Thus in baseball the rules allow the batter to swing at the ball, but they do not 
require him to swing. However, after he gets three strikes he must leave the batter’s box and 
leave someone else to bat. Most of the rules of the game have to do with rights and duties, […] 
the overall aim is winning, and many of the intervening steps are procedural.
Others cast doubt on the game metaphor, however. Giddens (1984: 17-18) points out that 
social rules differ fundamentally from rules of a game in a number of respects. Social 
rules can be challenged by the actors, whereas the rules of the game are in principle 
incontestable – if they are questioned this leads to interruption or ending of the game. 
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Moreover, social rules often form an integrated complex, whereas the rules of a game 
usually stand alone. Partly because of this, social rules are much less uniform then the 
rules of a game; the tenet ‘three strikes and you’re out’ leaves little scope for interpreta-
tion, whereas social rules are generally more vague and may compete or even conflict 
with each other, even if they are coded in formal legislation. Prevailing social rules also 
generally reflect the existing social differentiation, which they are therefore inclined to 
reproduce. The rules of a game, by contrast, are aimed at guaranteeing fair competition. 
Finally, Giddens comments that social rules are interwoven with the perceptions of the 
actors and their mutual behaviour. Often they do not so much dictate their acts directly 
– in the sense of prescribing what people must do or not do in particular cases – but are 
instead procedures for social interaction that are regarded as self-evident (or, to use the 
terminology of Garfinkel (1967), aspects of an ‘ethnomethodology’).
Giddens’ objections to the metaphor perhaps fail to do full justice to the thriving of 
game theory in recent decades, and can be partially accommodated within more sophis-
ticated games, especially in computer-based simulations. For example, network alliances 
and iterations of games can be allowed, the application of rules can be based on fuzzy 
logic, unequal power relations can be imposed as a restriction, etc. However, his asser-
tion that social rules differ in essence from the simple rules of baseball or football is 
convincing, and in that sense the metaphor is not quite appropriate.
If rights and duties are social constructs, this begs the question of whether ethical relativ-
ism is theoretically unavoidable. This is the standpoint adopted by Coleman (1990: 49-53, 
384-387) in his analysis of action rights, in which he opposes normative moral philoso-
phy that attempts to identify theoretical codes of conduct which under certain condi-
tions ought to be followed by all rational actors11. Coleman denies the existence of such 
a “right division of rights”, arguing that rights are the result of a power-weighted consen-
sus about the interests of actors, and that they cannot continue to exist without such a 
social consensus. He illustrates this by referring to the social construction of changes in 
the right to smoke in public, and to the ethical aspects of the collective suicides of 900 
sect members in Jonestown (Guyana) in 1978. He regards acts as the latter as possibly jus-
tifiable if certain conditions have been met (knowledge of the consequences, a deliberate 
weighing up of the pros and cons, voluntary nature of the decision)12. In Coleman’s view, 
rights are always determined endogenously, within a given system of action. While it is pos-
sible to adopt different moral views from an exogenous standpoint – from another com-
munity, a certain philosophical ethic, etc. – this is no more than an outsider’s opinion 
which does not constitute a higher judgement: “There is no absolute observation point, 
outside any social system, from which a moral judgment may be made” (Coleman, 1990: 
387). This statement has far-reaching consequences. Frank (1991: 167) for example points 
out that in a political dictatorship the ruler determines the consensus, which means that, 
if one follows Coleman’s reasoning, all that dictator’s whims would become legitimate; 
and it would also imply that child abuse is a right as soon as it is approved by the power-
weighted consensus of a community.
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In principle, however, Coleman is correct. From a sociological perspective a certain 
definition of rights and duties can only be described; it cannot be regarded as universally 
applicable. If there is sufficient consensus in a community about the rule that the gods 
must regularly be offered human sacrifices, or that certain groups are pariahs, then this 
is legitimate according to the prevailing standard. Three qualifying comments need to be 
made here, however. The fact that there are no universal institutions does not imply that 
actors are free to interpret or ignore the rules as they see fit – or, as in the politico-philo-
sophical assertions of Stirner (1971 [1845]) and of individualistic anarchism, that it is actu-
ally a requirement that they do so13. Even though institutions are socially constructed 
and therefore ‘relative’ in that sense, for actors they can still be coercive  – because the 
rules generate shared advantages for all parties, because there may be severe sanctions 
for non-compliance, and above all because people grow up and live within a certain his-
torical and social context. As result of this latter point, they will often be inclined to 
perceive reality in terms of the ex ante established rules, as the natural and inevitable 
convictions about what is right and wrong.
Furthermore, some acts, such as murder and theft within one’s own community, 
have such negative consequences for others (externalities) that they are regarded in most 
social systems as unacceptable. In this sense these are fairly general rules – although even 
within advanced legal systems exceptions are sometimes made, for example by regard-
ing killing someone as permissible where it is committed as an act of love or vengeance 
(crimes passionnels, blood feud), or is intended as a deterrent (imposition of the death pen-
alty for certain crimes), or is in a perceived general interest (the execution of deserters 
and traitors in times of war).
Finally, it follows logically from the principle that rights and duties are defined within 
social systems that they can acquire a universal character in global social relations. This 
can occur more or less as a natural process, due to economic, social and cultural exchange 
and competition between communities and countries, whereby the granting of certain 
rights and the imposition of particular duties is generally regarded as beneficial or inspi-
rational. It can also result from the active dissemination of general notions about rights 
and duties, to which governments and citizens are committed. This occurred after both 
the First and Second World Wars, and is crystallised for example in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention (1950), the European Social Charter (1961), and 
a number of specific un treaties14. Now these are relatively abstract rights, which some-
times represent no more than a requirement on the government to make some effort, 
with weak or unclear potential sanctions in the case of default. They are however a first 
step towards a constructed universal granting of basic rights, which is given direction 
by more or less rational principles (the protection of every individual’s key interests, the 
expected economic and social yields). Once such rights and duties become historically 
recognised, it may become difficult to abolish them, as they have become self-evident in 
the expectations of citizens, and because governments prefer not to suffer loss of reputa-
tion in the international community.
 Coleman ignores nuances such as these rather too easily. However, this does not 
alter the fact that even rules that are generally accepted by the actors concerned, which 
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seek to impose curbs on behaviour with negative externalities, or which are supported by 
the international community, are ultimately social constructs. In certain circumstances 
(famine, ethnic cleansing, civil unrest, in the power vacuum following a revolution or 
lost war) or in certain groups (sects, subcultures), it is possible that they may not be rec-
ognised; and in this sense Coleman’s relativist position is theoretically correct.
Rights and duties
Since the definition of institutions given here – in contrast to North’s approach15– accords 
a central place to the rights and duties of actors, it is important to say something more 
about their nature and origin. The conceptual framework developed by Raz offers a useful 
starting point. Provided a person is able to possess rights16, according to this legal phi-
losopher he or she has a right if “an aspect of [his] well-being (his interest) is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) under a duty” (Raz, 1986: 166). Duties can mean 
that others have to do something to safeguard the right of an entitled person, but also 
that they may not hinder the latter in exercising his right17. Although Raz deliberately 
gives a very general definition, he acknowledges that all manner of different rights can be 
distinguished. For example, there may be undivided or shared rights to a particular good 
(object rights). Rights can also relate to the provision of certain services (service rights) or to 
the performance of certain actions (action rights). The property rights that are central to 
the ‘new institutional economics’ approach may be regarded as a subset of various types 
of rights18.
Raz’s definition of rights and duties has a number of implications. In the first place, 
according to his view a right is always based on the interests of actors: the core of a right 
is that someone is permitted to do, to possess or to obtain something, and that others 
may not hinder him in the exercise of that right, because his interests are at stake. Sec-
ondly, duties are not simply correlates of rights, in the sense that there is a single duty for 
every right. In Raz’s view, rights prevail, because it is here that interests are recognised. 
Duties are legitimised as a result and derived from those rights: “rights are grounds of 
duties in others” (Raz, 1986: 167). In other words, rights justify and establish obligations; 
imposing duties on others is a means of safeguarding the rights of actors. Thus, accord-
ing to this view rights and duties are not two sides of the same coin, as in the ‘will theory 
of rights’19.
Raz points out that several duties may ensue from a single right. For example, some-
one’s right to personal freedom imposes many duties on others: they may not forbid him 
from being somewhere, may not attack him, molest him, lock him up, etc., unless there 
are good reasons for doing so – as in the case of the imposition of a street ban on a stalker 
who infringes the personal liberty of someone else through the specific way in which 
he exercises his right to freedom of movement. According to Raz, duties are also more 
dynamic than rights: if the circumstances change an existing right can give rise to new 
duties. Finally, a right may also exist if there are no – or unclear – associated duties. Chil-
dren’s right to education, for example, may be established in law, but this does not make 
clear what duties this imposes on the various actors. The responsibility for realising this 
right may lie with the parents, the local community or central government. Raz argues 
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that the precise allocation of obligations requires supplementary premises or rules, for 
example stipulating that parents must send their children to school, that the community 
must build the school, that central government must reimburse the staff and equipment 
costs and monitor the quality of the education. Conversely, duties can exist without any 
underlying rights. Raz (1986: 166) refers to notions such as ‘chastity’, ‘honour’ and ‘chiv-
alry’, which are difficult to incorporate in his theory of statutory rights.
A final conclusion that can be drawn from Raz’s definition is that rights and duties 
ultimately rest on consensus: there must be sufficient reason to recognise certain rights 
and to impose the ensuing duties on others. That consensus may be based on the weigh-
ing of the interests of several parties.
While Raz regards interests as the main source of rights and the associated duties, this 
need not mean that they are the only source. He sees interests as ‘aspects of well-being’ 
of actors, or as utilities. If actors have clear and unambiguous interests, which they ade-
quately perceive, two complications arise: actors may have rights which in practice go 
against their interests; and it is also not uncommon for some interested parties to have 
weak rights. Raz (1986: 180) acknowledges the first of these: someone may for example 
inherit an estate that consists entirely of debts. His explanation for this is that people 
are usually allocated rights because they belong to a certain type of actors (citizens of 
their country, homeowners, relatives), who generally have an interest in the right in that 
capacity but where in individual cases the outcome can be less favourable.
Raz virtually ignores the second point. He seems to assume that the interest-related 
nature of rights also means that they are granted on the basis of a balanced weighing of 
interests. While that should perhaps be the case theoretically, historically it is more the 
exception than the rule20. Coleman (1990) also regards interests as the main grounds for 
granting rights, but emphasises that they are weighted with the power of the actors con-
cerned. Rights are defined in a social context, and the interests of those with power weigh 
more heavily than those of the powerless. Raz’s starting point that rights and the derived 
duties can be based on the interests of the actors is correct; but in the case of unequal 
power relations their constitution will frequently reflect a systematic bias in favour of the 
dominant actors. The definition of rights then reproduces the social differentiation at 
that moment, with the interests of the strong counting for more than those of the weak.
Coleman’s view in turn raises the objection that the allocation of rights and obligations 
in this way appears to ensue mainly from the limited self-interest of the powerful actors 
involved in the constitution: might makes right. This, too, is not unusual historically, but in 
practice in a democratic society the collective consensus on certain ideals helps shape the 
allocation of rights and duties. Beliefs on how the society or community should function 
in the future are theoretically a third source for the allocation of rights and duties. They 
can ensure that rights do not reflect merely the interests of the actors holding power.
Interests, power and ideals are however not the only reasons for making or changing 
rules. The costs and benefits of rules and rule enforcement also play a role, an idea which is 
central to the ‘new institutional economics’ approach discussed earlier. A new or differ-
ent rule makes little sense if its collective cost is greater than its benefit in economic and 
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social terms, if it causes excessive expenditure for the actors involved, or if it is accompa-
nied by high costs for measuring rights and applying sanctions. The material and social 
costs involved in the vesting of new rules (e.g. the possible fall of a coalition government) 
are relevant as well, as these may stand in the way of change.
Raz’s definition focuses mainly on formal statutory rights and duties, which he regards 
as being of a different order from moral requirements (‘oughts’), whereby it is expected 
that a person does what he is supposed to do without reasons being given. This would 
contrast with statutory rights, which are typified by the fact that they are justified on the 
basis of the utility or well-being of the stakeholders (Raz, 1986: 180). This imparts sub-
stantiated and coercive force to the resultant duties: they are not mere favours; there are 
good grounds on which actors are obliged to respect the rights of others.
However, it is not quite evident why statutory and moral rights and duties have to be 
as strictly separated as Raz proposes. In the classic definition by John Stuart Mill (1998 
[1861]: 97), the difference is regarded as irrelevant:
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect 
him in the possession of it, either by the force of the law, or by that of education and opinion. If he has 
what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him 
by society, we say that he has a right to it.
There is a great deal to be said for this standpoint: moral rights and duties can be very 
detailed and extensively substantiated even where that motivation – as in the Rule of St. 
Benedict cited earlier – is religious, for example, not utilitarian. Conversely, codified rights 
may be only vaguely substantiated and not always based on a balanced weighing of inter-
ests, but for example on a consensus of Supreme Court judges appointed on political 
grounds.
Nevertheless, it is useful to draw a distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ rights 
and duties, because theoretically they influence the behaviour of actors in different ways. 
Formal rights and duties are defined or recognised by the government; informal rights 
and duties are based on the consensus within a given group or community. It naturally 
follows from this that the medium within which the rights and duties are contained 
makes no difference: the distinction between formal and informal does not correspond 
to whether or not rules are written down. Within a juridical system verbal agreement 
may be declared legally valid by the government, and the rights and duties contained 
within them will then have a formal character. By contrast, detailed written rules such 
as those of the Benedictine monastic order, which are based solely on the views of a par-
ticular religious community and are not enforced by any government, contain informal 
rights and obligations: a person leaving that community will not be forced by the secu-
lar authorities to continue complying with the rules. In fact enforceability is not, as Raz 
claims, a feature that separates formal from informal rights and duties. Rules that are 
officially defined or recognised by the government are not always enforceable, for exam-
ple if a large part of the population do not endorse them or are insensitive to the envis-
aged negative sanctions. Moreover, in practice the government may have only limited 
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scope for actually imposing sanctions, for instance if the sanctioning agents have little 
manpower, or because application of sanctions is considered too expensive. On the other 
hand, actors living in a very closed community, such as a sect, may have virtually no way 
to evade the socially imposed rules.
One final qualification concerns the relationship between rules and behaviour. The 
direct behavioural regulation that emanates from a given allocation of rights and duties 
lies at the heart of Raz’s approach. The sociological institutionalism discussed earlier 
focuses attention on the role of actor perceptions. Rules generally leave a degree of dis-
cretionary scope, and their influence therefore also depends on their interpretation by 
the actors: rights and duties coordinate behaviour through the way they are perceived 
and processed. This can be a more or less deliberate assessment of behavioural alterna-
tives, but it may also be that actors perceive reality entirely in terms of the existing rules. 
In that case they will regard certain modes of thought and action to be natural while 
being unable even to consider others. This subjective filter can have a major influence on 
the relationship between rights, duties and behaviour.
Conditions
A socially constructed rule may include conditions for the granting of rights and the 
imposition of duties. With regard to rights, a distinction can be made between general 
conditions (of the type: if C, A is entitled to R) and current conditions (A is entitled, if C, 
to R). The first must have applied at one time – for example, having Dutch forebears as a 
condition for obtaining Dutch nationality – whereas the latter must be met now (e.g. hav-
ing a sufficient command of Dutch as a condition for obtaining a work permit for people 
who are not eu nationals). Such conditions can of course also be formulated negatively 
(if not C…).
Conditions for a right can relate to certain events, to qualifying characteristics of the 
interested party, and to behavioural requirements. For example, following a house burglary 
an insurance company will only meet the policyholder’s right to compensation if a recog-
nised crime took place during the period of validity of the policy, if the policyholder was 
the lawful owner of the stolen items at the time of the theft, and if the policyholder has 
reported the theft to the police and did not invite theft by leaving the door unlocked.
Duties may also be conditional. They may not apply to everyone, and those who are in 
principle duty-bound may not be so all the time or under all circumstances. If countries 
operate a system of national military service, this generally applies only for able-bodied 
men of a certain age; children, women and disabled and older men are then exempt. 
In labour relations the employee is generally obliged to follow the instructions of his 
employer. However, except in cases of total slavery, his duties will be conditional: they 
apply only during working hours and in as far as the directives are work-related.
Possible sanctions
Sanctions are an important element of institutions. They enforce the behavioural expec-
tations embodied in the rule: the acts that are expected of the (potential) holders of the 
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rights, and the duties of those whose task it is to secure those rights. Sanctions systems 
are based on the simple premise that compliance with the rules (fulfilling the conditions, 
meeting one’s obligations) brings reward, while breaking the rules (defection: not meet-
ing the conditions, neglecting one’s duties) brings punishment. An institution sets out 
the possible sanctions; their actual application depends on the behaviour of actors and is 
based on the interpretation of the rules in the specific setting.
The legal anthropologist Hoebel (1954: 15) once gave an apposite summary of possible 
sanctions:
The positive sanctions step up all the way from the lollipop, the smile, the pat on the back, 
applause, to honorific positions, bonuses, medals and citations, to posthumous enshrine-
ment. The negative sanctions range from the curled lip, the raised eyebrow, the word of scorn 
and ridicule, the rap on the knuckle, and refusal to invite back to dinner; through economic 
deprivation, physical hurt, prolonged social ostracism, through imprisonment or exile to the 
ultimate [sanction …] – execution.
This summing up shows that sanctions are not only positive or negative, but may also be 
informal or formal. Informal sanctions are rooted in groups or communities; they con-
sist of all rewards and punishments regarded as appropriate within such social systems. 
Formal sanctions are imposed or supported by the government; they are often written 
down as a corollary to the definition of formal rights and obligations. Formal sanctions 
include the conferring of distinctions by the head of state and the imposition of punish-
ments by judicial bodies (fines, court orders, detention), but also the public recognition 
of sanctions imposed within private-law structures, such as declaring legitimate the dis-
missal of employees who have stolen from their employer. Sanctions can also assume the 
form of new, ‘remedial’ rights and duties (indemnity, vindictive damages, community 
service orders). Formal and informal sanctions may lie on the same continuum – a person 
who is decorated can be admired – but this is not necessary (others may regard him as 
someone who allows himself to be appeased by the ruling class).
Coleman (1990: 278-282) points out that sanctions can also be awarded as a concerted 
effort. In addition to the ‘heroic’ sanctions described above, he also distinguishes 
‘incremental’ sanctions. Heroic sanctions occur when a single actor may bring about 
the desired behaviour through the one-off imposition of a sanction (e.g. by threatening 
physical violence). The drawback is that the costs for the sanctioning actor are higher 
than if the behavioural enforcement would be imposed by several actors or take place 
over time, incrementally. To this it may be added that formal sanctions tend to be more 
expensive than informal ones, because of the higher transaction costs associated with 
establishing compliance and defection and sustaining the sanctioning organisations (the 
investigation and prosecution apparatus, the administration of the honours system). By 
contrast, gossip is a cheap informal method of applying sanctions. A continual process 
of reinforcement is at work here, which costs the generally large group of sanctioning 
actors no more than time and saliva, but which can have far-reaching consequences for 
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the object of the sanctioning (isolation, loss of reputation). However, gossip is only usa-
ble and effective in certain social circumstances. There must be a stable, morally homog-
enous group with sufficient opportunities for mutual contact; and the sanctioned party 
must be sensitive to the gossip, because he regards himself as part of the group and does 
not wish to become marginalised.
It is important to stress that it is not always necessary to incorporate exogenous sanc-
tions in the rules. Where institutions are internalised by actors, this may also apply to the 
sanction mechanisms; the actors then feel guilty or embarrassed if they break the rules, 
and experience a sense of moral superiority when complying with them. If actors have a 
well-developed conscience, external sanctions are less important. From the perspective 
of the social system, this is a cheap solution, provided the costs needed to realise the 
formation of the required sense of right and wrong are tolerable.
The fact that a rule provides for sanctions does not mean that those sanctions will be 
applied in all cases. Imposition of sanctions may in practice incur high material and 
non-material costs (economic transaction costs, social resistance) or lead to undesirable 
side-effects (stigmatisation of certain groups). In such cases preference may be given to 
benign neglect: tolerance of defection.
Sanctions are moreover dynamic. Punishments that were once usual may at a later 
time be out of line with people’s sense of justice and law (cutting off a hand for minor 
theft; locking up debtors in a debtors’ prison until they have met their obligations). Even 
where such sanctions still exist formally, it is possible that in practice they are hardly if 
ever imposed.
2.5 Types of institution
After this discussion of the definition, it is important to look at what kind of institutions 
there are, and how they relate to each other. The figural model in graph 2.1 contains four 
formal and four informal types of institution. The formal institutions consist of meta-
rules; rules for government production; rules where the government acts as a third party 
and establishes the rights and duties of private actors; and formal private contracts. With 
regard to the informal social rules, a distinction is made between values, social norms, 
conventions and informal private contracts.
Meta-rules
It was noted earlier that the distinctive feature of formal rights and duties is that they are 
defined or recognised by a government. In the meta-rules, the rights and duties associated 
with making or changing such rules are laid down. In the first place these indicate the areas 
with which the government must or may concern itself: the goals and objects of govern-
mental rule-making. Often these are laid down in legislature in very general and perpetual 
terms, such as “It shall be the concern of the authorities to secure the means of subsist-
ence of the population and to achieve the distribution of wealth” (Article 20 of the Dutch 
Constitution). Meta-rules may be given tangible form for a certain period in the form of a 
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policy agenda, for example a government coalition agreement. The priorities of the vari-
ous objectives can be indicated in such a concord, as well as the measures to be taken to 
achieve the goals, what funds are available for this and what the envisaged result will be.
The meta-rules also specify which actors are involved in the legislative process. They 
create certain formal positions (monarch or president, government ministers, parlia-
ment, mayors, municipal councils, advisory councils, committees, etc.), lay down the 
rights and duties attached to such offices, and define the mutual relationships between 
them. The meta-rules also lay down how individuals can acquire such formal positions, 
for example through heredity, election or appointment by a higher authority.
Finally, the meta-rules contain process regulations. Those provisions place demands 
on the procedure of legislation: the form in which the rules are laid down, the need to 
hear the interested parties, the method of submitting, discussing and voting in the legis-
lative assembly, the right to submit amendments, etc.
In principle, the meta-rules are formal in nature, but they may be elaborated in the 
informal rules of political actors, who may for example – explicitly or tacitly – agree that 
the largest political party may supply the chairman for the legislative assembly, that 
the next largest party may provide a chair for the most influential committee (e.g. the 
 Treasury Committee), and so on.
Rules for government production
In a modern society a large part of formal institutions are concerned with regulating gov-
ernment production. These are formal rules that indicate which services the government 
provides (funding defence, the police, the judicial apparatus, the physical infrastructure, 
income transfers, education), and which rights and obligations arise from them for other 
actors (receipt of benefits, payment of tax and social insurance contributions, military 
service). Here, the government is in an asymmetrical exchange relationship with private 
legal persons (citizens, companies), and draws up rules which serve a cross-section of the 
goals and interests, with a certain weighting. Collective social security forms part of the 
government production.
Third-party recognition
Then there are the formal laws and rules that the government draws up by way of third-
party recognition. These are rules which imply the acknowledgement by the government 
– as an authority standing above the parties involved – of the rights, obligations and the 
mutual relationships of private legal persons (citizens, companies). In this role, the gov-
ernment also acts as a ‘third party of enforcement’, for example by imposing prison sen-
tences on individual actors who commit forgery, or by granting subsidies to companies 
which undertake recommended business activities (e.g. ecologically sound ways of pro-
duction). Normally the third-party role of the government is codified in the Constitution, 
civil law, mercantile law and criminal law.
These are the types of formal institution that are central to the ‘new institutional 
economics’: rules such as these establish property rights, create the legislative frame-
work for contracts between private actors, and thus influence relative prices. However, 
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third-party recognition also embraces rules that are not strictly economic: it relates to 
all government regulation of the rights and duties of private actors. Third-party recogni-
tion is not concerned exclusively with property rights and rights to transact, but it also 
extends to the acknowledgement of the individuals’ full legal capacity, the age at which 
persons are obliged to go to school, may legally marry or enter into sexual relationships, 
the right to abortion or euthanasia, etc.
The laws on public decency and morality are a particular form of third-party recog-
nition. They are characterised by the fact that the government attempts to promote a 
specific moral order by forbidding certain behaviours by law (the use of contraception, 
carrying out abortion or euthanasia), not legitimising others (marriage between people 
of the same sex), or prescribing certain behaviours (observing the Sabbath as a day of 
rest). In this type of legislation, the interests and freedoms of direct stakeholders are 
often not recognised by the government. This marks a difference with ordinary law, where 
there are usually demonstrable injured parties the government tries to protect (victims of 
crimes of violence and theft, firms whose trading partners fail to meet their contractual 
obligations). Public decency and morality laws often reflect the informal rules of reign-
ing elites, who use the government apparatus to declare the morality they deem desirable 
to be the general standard21.
Formal contracts
Contracts between private parties are formal if they are enforced by the government. 
They play an important role especially in economic trading relationships. Commercial 
contracts are formalised if they comply with the governmental rules on third-party rec-
ognition. As noted earlier, this does not necessarily mean everything has to be laid down 
in writing. It is sufficient if contracts are in line with the general competences and obliga-
tions specified by the government in such cases. Mercantile law, for example, may stipu-
late that within a given trade sector a certain body is responsible for arbitration. There is 
no need to record this role at great length in each specific private agreement then; tacit 
acknowledgement or a simple reference to it will be sufficient.
Formal contracts are generally less central in social exchange relationships (friend-
ships, marriages, etc) than in economic ones. In social exchanges the value of the trad-
ing good is often unclear, because it is directly linked to the individuals concerned; if 
someone receives a ring as a present, its perceived worth for the recipient depends on 
whether the giver is a new lover, her own child or a distant relative. The required reciproc-
ity is also often ambiguous: both the nature of the quid pro quo and the period within 
which it must be returned is unclear. Finally, social exchanges are not always voluntary. 
Differences such as these mean that social exchange relationships are less easy to capture 
in contracts. To the extent that government regulation plays a role, it mainly covers the 
legal and economic aspects, such as the rights and obligations imposed by the govern-
ment on people who enter into a civil marriage.
A variant of formal contracting is where the government, based on its role as a pro-
ducer, acts as a principal (and less frequently, as a contractor) and enters into commit-
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ments with private actors for this purpose. This occurs when public works are put out to 
tender, for example for the construction of physical infrastructure (roads, telecommu-
nications), government buildings, the purchase of computers and software for the civil 
service, the police, schools, etc. In such cases the government itself is a second party to 
the contract, and special forms of third-party recognition generally apply: behavioural 
guidelines for civil servants and those with political responsibility, detailed tender regu-
lations, and stipulations that are laid down in administrative law.
Values
North (1990) counts conventions, social norms and internalised behavioural standards 
among informal institutions. He is not very explicit regarding the meaning of the latter 
two types of social rules, nor on the points on which they differ; for example, he counts 
all “ideas” as internalised behavioural standards. In this study, the more usual sociologi-
cal distinction between norms and values is applied. Both concepts refer to collectively 
shared notions about what actors should do. Values can be regarded as abstract collec-
tive guidelines for preferred current behaviour. They reflect what is regarded as good, 
true and beautiful. For example, people should be industrious, honest, social, devout, 
courageous, eloquent, chaste or polite. Or, in more modern variants: people should aim 
in their behaviour above all for material wealth, assertiveness and hedonism, or should 
strive for personal development, authenticity, self-awareness and independence. Values 
may differ or conflict between different groups and communities, as for example shows 
in religious conflicts and problems with the social integration of immigrants.
Values provide a general indication of rights and obligations. For example, the value 
‘solidarity’ implies that a person in distress has a right to the support of other members 
of his group or community. Some values comprise mainly generic duties, with no cor-
responding rights. Owing to their abstract nature values cannot be contravened, and as a 
result there are no sanctions associated with them.
What constitutes ‘courageous behaviour’, for example, may vary depending on social 
position and time22. For instance, a middle-class person may demonstrate  courage by catch-
ing a thief, while a convicted criminal will perhaps not implicate a ‘considerate burglar’ 
who complies with the informal rules of his trade. And what once constituted courage 
may at a different time in history be regarded as irresponsible. If thieves become increas-
ingly organised in vengeful and heavily armed gangs, the behavioural expectations will 
change: the costs of the behaviour that in the past was courageous have become too 
high. An ordinary citizen may then already have displayed courage by calling the police 
and being willing to make a non-anonymous witness statement.
Social norms
It follows from this that social norms flesh out the abstract rights and duties encapsu-
lated in values. They are specific behavioural prescripts for actual situations, which do 
carry the possibility of sanctions. It is not the done thing to read a book during a party, 
people are expected to help victims of a robbery, and it is manners to allow others to 
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finish speaking – and if persons do not comply with the norm, they run the risk of being 
punished. Their linkage with values means that social norms are not arbitrary within a 
community, but meaningful.
Norms may also conflict between different groups and communities. This can arise 
from a conflict of values, but also from a shared value, to which differing social norms are 
attached. It is possible for norms to conflict exclusively in certain situations. For exam-
ple, in the communal domain (public spaces, the labour market, education) the expected 
behaviour may be the same for everyone, whereas in the private sphere the ‘house rules’ 
diverge markedly and can give rise to clashes.
Conventions
Conventions differ from social norms in that they are not linked to specific values; they 
simply indicate what is correct, without elaborating the details of what is regarded as 
good, true or beautiful23. They coordinate the interaction within the group or commu-
nity, and confirm membership of it. They are fairly neutral behavioural expectations, 
which impinge on the interests of all members of the communality and which apply for 
everyone in the same circumstances. The rights and obligations embedded within them 
are arbitrary in nature: a different distribution or design could have been chosen; the 
most important thing is that there is a clear rule. In principle, conventions arise infor-
mally, but they may be entirely or partly codified, as in the case of traffic rules, the official 
allocation of street and place names, and statutory rules for the spelling of a language24.
Symbolic behavioural expectations, whose meaning lies in collective expressions 
of unity or distinction (following the latest fashion, the adornment of football support-
ers, presenting the national flag, wearing logos), also have a conventional character. 
Although they are arbitrary, conventions may well carry the possibility of sanctions, 
often in the form of marginalisation or exclusion of groups or community members who 
do not adhere to them. Such conventions are not mere ‘regulative rules’ as described by 
Searle (1995). While it is true that they steer group interaction (for example by making 
the supporters of a particular football club recognisable as such), at the same time they 
confirm the shared identity (a true supporter at the very least wears something which 
expresses the club colours), and they therefore also create meaning.
Informal contracts
Informal contracts are promises and agreements concerning the rights and duties of 
actors which are not enforced by the government, but are based entirely on what is cus-
tomary within the community. They may be trading agreements which operate in accord-
ance with the norms of an international business community, or the behavioural rights 
and obligations which are allotted by the community when a child makes the status 
transition into adulthood. Here again the agreements may be laid down in writing, but 
they may also be verbal promises or behavioural expectations which are tacitly assumed. 
Informal contracts are often supportive in trading transactions, but play a central role in 
social exchanges. A church marriage – provided it is not endorsed by the government – is 
an example of this. The ceremony has no significance for the legal and economic status 
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of the marital partners, but can be a meaningful rite de passage from which moral and sym-
bolic rights and duties ensue. The government will however not enforce the latter: super-
vision of compliance with the terms of this informal contract, and the imposition of any 
sanctions in the event of defection, will have to come entirely from the community.
2.6 Institutional hierarchy
Institutions have now been defined as the social rules that determine which formal and 
informal rights, obligations, conditions and sanctions apply for actors. North (1990) 
points out that there is often a specific hierarchy between such rules. For example, two 
companies cannot draw up mutual contracts which contravene the higher rules imposed 
by official mercantile law. Although North does not regard institutions as a deductive 
system – there are also feedback mechanisms, and the relationship between formal and 
informal rules is a complex one – it is useful to say something more about the relation-
ship between the various types of rules.
2.6.1 Constitutive and regulative rules?
Searle (1995) adopts a very definite standpoint. He argues that ‘institutional facts’25 can 
only exist within a system of rules which make possible certain activities. Such ‘consti-
tutive rules’, he asserts, are of a higher order than ‘regulative rules’, which merely fulfil 
a coordinating role. Thus the rules of chess make possible the moves made during the 
game (Searle, 1995: 27-28):
Some rules do not merely regulate, they also create the very possibility of certain activities. 
Thus the rules of chess do not regulate an antecedently existing activity. It is not the case that 
there were a lot of people pushing bits of wood around on boards, and in order to prevent 
them from bumping into each other all the time and creating traffic jams, we had to regulate 
the activity. Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess.
Giddens (1984) argues against such a strict division. He rightly points out that these are 
not different types of rules, but simply variant aspects of them. One facet is concerned 
with the ability of rules to assign meaning, while another is concerned with the behav-
ioural regulation which ensues from it (Giddens, 1984: 19-20):
Consider the following possible instances of what rules are:
– ‘The rule defining checkmate in chess is …’ […]
– ‘It is a rule that all workers must clock in at 8.00 a.m.’
[… These] have seemed to many to represent two types of rule, constitutive and regulative. 
To explain the rule governing checkmate in chess is to say something about what goes into the 
very making of chess as a game. The rule that workers must clock in at a certain hour, on the 
other hand, does not help define what work is: it specifies how work is to be carried on […] That 
there is something suspect in this distinction, as referring to two types of rule, is indicated by 
the etymological clumsiness of the term ‘regulative rule’. After all, the word ‘regulative’ already 
implies rules: its dictionary definition is ‘control by rules’. I would say […] that they express two 
aspects of rules rather than two variant types of rule. [The first rule] is certainly part of what chess 
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is, but for those who play chess it has sanctioning or ‘regulative’ properties: it refers to aspects 
of play that must be observed. But [the second rule] also has constitutive aspects. It does not 
perhaps enter into the definition of what ‘work’ is, but it does enter into that of a concept like 
‘industrial bureaucracy’. What [they] direct our attention to are two aspects of rules: their role in 
the constitution of meaning, and their close connection with sanctions.
2.6.2 Core rights and derivative rights
Another possible form of institutional hierarchy is the distinction that is drawn in the 
philosophy of rights between rules that accord core rights and those that accord deriva-
tive rights. Raz (1986) describes core rights as being linked directly to the interests of 
actors, and as a source of other rights. Derivative rights stem from core rights and are 
less immediately connected with actor interests. Raz regards this distinction as neces-
sary mainly in order to explain the fact that in practice rights may occur which are not 
clearly related to interests. For example, the right to move about freely on Regent Street 
on a particular Wednesday morning does not ensue directly from any specific interest 
of the persons actually walking around at that moment. Its source lies in a core right to 
personal freedom and mobility, to move at will, and the interest that actors generally 
have in this freedom.
In the theory of rights, on the basis of such notions attempts have been made to com-
pile natural hierarchies of rights and obligations. Raz adopts a less simplistic approach: 
according to him there is no universal deductive system, in which one right necessarily 
flows from another (‘logical entailment’). At most there is a certain sequence of justifica-
tion. Raz supports his argument by pointing out that the same right can be both a core 
right and a derivative right. He cites the example of someone who owns all the houses in 
a street. If he bought them one by one, there is a ‘right to the street’ as a derivative of the 
rights to the individual buildings, the core rights that are encapsulated in the individual 
purchase contracts. But if he inherits the whole street at once, there is then a core right 
to the street, from which the rights to the individual buildings ensue. Equally, it is pos-
sible to assert a ‘core right’ of freedom of expression, from which other rights, such as 
the right to make political statements that are contrary to government policy, ensue. But 
freedom of expression can also be a derivative right (Raz, 1986: 169-170):
If […] separate independent considerations justify freedom of commercial speech, and others 
still freedom of artistic expression, scientific and academic communications, etc., [and] there 
are no general considerations which apply to all of the protected areas of speech, then the 
general right to freedom of expression is a derivative right. It is the mere generalization from 
the existence of several independent core rights.
A second qualification made by Raz is that core rights can also be limited in their opera-
tion. However central they may be, they can be restricted if they impinge on other inter-
ests (Raz, 1986: 170):
A general right statement does not entail those statements of particular rights which are 
instances of it. I may have a right to free speech without having a right to libel people. In mat-
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ters of libel, the right to free expression may be completely defeated by the interests of people 
in their reputation.
Raz’s qualifications are appropriate, but also beg the question of whether the distinction 
between core rights and derivative rights is an entirely useful one. Ultimately, according 
to his argument it is the method of codification that determines what is a core right and 
which rights are derived from it. The contrast then loses much of its persuasiveness. If 
there is no logical entailment, it is doubtful whether a strict division into these two types 
of rights will increase our understanding of actual institutional hierarchies. It may then 
be more sensible to describe the relationship between different empirical social rules 
directly. In many cases, a dichotomy between core rights and derivative rights will be too 
coarse for this.
2.6.3 Hierarchies of formal rules
The figural model in graph 2.1 shows much looser hierarchical rankings. The differ-
ent types of formal and informal institutions are arranged according to their degree of 
abstraction, and their mutual relationships are not necessarily fixed for all eternity, but 
are socially and historically variable.
A first form of hierarchy can occur within formal institutions. As the name suggests, 
the meta-rules of government legislation and regulations are of a higher order than the 
rules concerning government production and the role of the government as a ‘third party 
enforcer’. This does not mean that the meta-rules directly determine the content of other 
government rules, but it does imply that the lower institutions are not to be in conflict 
with, say, the general objectives of the government coalition agreement, and that the 
prevailing rules of procedure must be taken into consideration. Laws and regulations 
relating to third party recognition (and, if the government assigns contracts, the govern-
ment production) also steer formal private contracts, without entirely determining their 
content.
Jurisprudence is a specific form of rule derivation. It consists of earlier interpreta-
tions of rules by the judiciary, which serve as a guide in the application of the rules in new 
cases. Jurisprudence creates a certain consistency of rule interpretation. This is however 
never complete: because different cases will seldom correspond entirely, the consistency 
always depends on the subjective interpretation of judges.
It is usual to find a certain hierarchy within formal institutions of one particular type. For 
example, it may be laid down in the Constitution that the government is responsible for 
an adequate defence of the nation’s territory. Laws of a lower order (for example governing 
the actions of the Navy, Air Force, Army, etc.) can be established to stipulate how the mili-
tary apparatus is built up, what competences and duties of action the various elements of 
the armed forces have, how far political responsibility for military actions extends, under 
what conditions compulsory military service can be imposed, etc. In turn, specific regula-
tions governing the government production in this field can be linked to these laws, for 
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example laying down the budgets for the purchase of aircraft, tanks, naval vessels, and so 
on. This in turn may lead to tendering procedures, which culminate in specific contracts 
with private suppliers. The entire national hierarchy can be influenced by supra-national 
rules: agreements between allies to make a certain defence contribution, to specialise in 
certain military tasks, etc. A hierarchy such as this is however also not a logical deductive 
system where lower-level rights and obligations can be derived from the general princi-
ple in only one way: it does not follow from the obligation to defend the nation that a 
government must spend a certain amount on a particular type of tank or cruise missile. 
Such derivations are not inevitable or eternal, but are consensual, and can therefore differ 
according to the socio-historical context (economic recession or boom, a pacifist or war-
mongering political coalition in power, the presence or absence of mighty enemies on the 
national borders, the influence of arms manufacturers, and so on).
A special form of hierarchically arranged formal rules are welfare and social security 
regimes; the latter are the main focus of chapters 4 to 6 of this book. The regime notion 
refers to qualitatively different, cohesive systems of national formal rules which are aimed 
at achieving certain goals concerning the welfare and social security of the population, 
which are regarded collectively as desirable. The typology adopted by Esping-Andersen 
(1990) is the best-known example of this. He contrasts the liberal welfare regimes of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries with the corporatist systems of the Western European mainland 
and the social-democratic regimes prevailing in Scandinavia (see chapter 4).
2.6.4 Hierarchies of informal rules
There are also no inevitable derivations between informal institutions. It is possible for 
the most general institutions – values – to have a particular hierarchical ranking at a 
certain time and place. Some are regarded as being of a lower order then others: ‘polite-
ness’ may then for example be seen as a less critical value than ‘justice’. Over time, how-
ever, such a value hierarchy can change. In Western societies ‘striving for salvation of the 
soul by doing good during one’s earthly life’ was once a central behavioural directive, 
but in recent decades, with secularisation and growing wealth, this has become a fairly 
peripheral value for many people. In its place, materialistic values (achieving financial 
success and a particular consumption pattern, being  famous, having a young and healthy 
appearance) and post-materialistic values (ideas and self-development are more impor-
tant than money, one’s individual behaviour must not have harmful ecological effects) 
have come more to the fore.
Social norms are based on values; this implies a certain hierarchy, though the boundary 
between social norms and values is sometimes a relative one. Take these two examples 
of a ranking of informal rules:
(1.1) There is a consensus that it is generally desirable for people to respect each other;
(1.2) Politeness is a form of respect;
(1.3) Politeness demands that someone wanting to buy something in a shop waits their turn. If 
they do not, the bystanders suffering from the impolite behaviour can call the offending 
party to account; the latter must then apologise and refrain from verbal or physical aggres-
sion.
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(2.1) There is a consensus that in trading parties generally should aim for good business prac-
tice;
(2.2) Good business practice requires that a purveyor fully respects the rights of the customer and 
the obligations entered into;
(2.3) Good business practice implies that a customer has a right to expect that goods purchased 
are received in good condition, and that a purveyor has an obligation to ensure that this is 
so. A customer may return faulty goods, and has a right to compensation for all loss suffered. 
A purveyor has a duty to eliminate defects and compensate for any loss. In cases which are 
not clear-cut, the customer is given the benefit of the doubt.
In both cases the highest rule can be regarded as a value and the lowest as a social norm. 
In the present formulation, the middle rule is a lower value; however, if it included the 
possibility of general sanctions, it could also be regarded as a higher social norm.
Both the individual rules and the derivations between higher and lower informal 
institutions are consensual: the consensus could also have taken a different form. 
Another group or community may not share the value of ‘good business practice’, or may 
interpret it differently. In the latter case, there may for example be consensus on the rule 
that a good businessman does everything in his power to maximise his profits, as long as 
he does not break the law in doing so; or, even more broadly, that he is prepared to break 
the law as long as the likelihood of being caught is negligible. The acceptable sanction 
methods may also be defined differently. For example, the rule that people should wait 
their turn in a shop may be recognised, but only the shop owner is allowed to sanction 
infringements of this duty. In that case it is conceivable that it would be regarded as an 
insult if the rule-breaker were called to account by other customers, and that the defector 
should react aggressively in order to protect his honour.
In some contexts it is clear for the actors concerned which concrete behavioural pre-
scripts ensue from the general guidelines; in other contexts this is not the case. If a group 
or society is very closed (e.g. a religious sect, a clan, a class-based society, the ‘pillarised’ 
Dutch society around the middle of the 20th century), there will be a cohesive system of 
norms and values, from which clear behavioural dictates are derived, and the possible 
sanctions will be evident to all concerned in advance. Zijderveld (2000: 122-127) uses the 
term ‘thick institutions’ for this. However, in modern, more open societies it is often 
less evident which concrete behavioural rules ensue from the core values, and whether 
certain norms weigh more heavily than others. The lower informal rules can fragment, 
or the degree to which people endorse them may become more heterogeneous. It is also 
possible that although the institutions are clear and known to most members of the com-
munity, certain behavioural rules are treated as subsidiary or are considered by certain 
members no longer to apply to them. In such ‘thin institutions’, the likelihood of con-
flicting norms is greater, for example as regards the admissibility of abortion, euthanasia 
or the use of certain drugs. Thus a modern-day doctor whose patient announces that she 
would like an abortion has to ask him or herself whether the right to life of the unborn 
child should weigh more heavily than the patient’s right to medical treatment, and how 
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this relates to the norms as laid down in government laws and in the ethical code govern-
ing the medical profession.
A moral dilemma is a special case of conflicting norms. According to McConnel 
(2002), such a dilemma exists if an actor is confronted with two (or more) behavioural 
rules, both of which he can in principle comply with, but not at the same time. Moreover, 
it must not be possible to resolve the dilemma by ranking the behavioural rules hierar-
chically in a rational or socially accepted manner; Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice offers a sad 
example of this26.
Social norms can also vary depending on the context and the actors to which they 
relate. This occurs, for example, if the rules governing public life differ markedly from 
those in the private sphere; when there is a ‘double moral standard’ in which different 
rules apply for men and women, immigrants and natives, the poor and the social elite, 
etc.; or when various social groups have highly diverging views on the work ethic, the 
need to pay taxes, or the admissibility of criminal activities (subcultures).
As stated, conventions are not theoretically derived from other institutions. Since chang-
ing conventions consequently does not in principle entail an infringement of higher 
rules, they can be very fluid. This is apparent, for example, from the rapid succession of 
clothing fashions and consumer hypes. However, a specific content or appearance of a 
convention can also have high symbolic or material value, and because of this can be very 
stable. Thus football supporters attach a great deal of importance to their club colours, 
and any attempt to change them radically will lead to loud protests and a reduction in fan 
loyalty. Something similar applies to the faith shown by consumers in certain brands, 
which can therefore have considerable market value. If conventions have been partially 
formalised via third-party recognition, there is a greater chance that changes will be 
accompanied by higher costs, and this fosters their stability. As an example, it is rare for 
a country to decide voluntarily to switch from driving on the left to driving on the right, 
or vice versa27.
Informal contracts are generally shaped by the social norms and conventions that prevail 
in the community, without their content being fully determined by those customs. The 
contracting parties have a certain freedom of action, but also know that they can expect 
negative sanctions if they infringe the accepted norms and conventions of their com-
munity.
2.6.5 Correspondence between formal and informal rules
A last possible form of ranking is the relationship between formal and informal institu-
tions. As North rightly remarks, the two types of social rules may correspond with each 
other to a certain extent. He emphasises that informal rules often elaborate the freedom 
of action offered by the formal rules. However, the converse can also be defended: formal 
rights and duties can be regarded as a codification of the consensus between the actors 
involved. Some correspondence between formal and informal institutions is likely, 
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because they are generated and evolve in the same historical circumstances. To what 
extent formal rules dominate over informal ones or vice versa is an open empirical ques-
tion. This is most evident in times of institutional change. If the formal stipulations do 
not or no longer adequately reflect the interests of certain groups, they may be regarded 
by them as illegitimate. The formal rules can then come under pressure from the basis of 
the informal rules. The converse is also possible; as North states, informal institutions 
may adapt to changes in the formal institutions, possibly leading to a new equilibrium 
after a certain time.
As mentioned before, contracts between private parties may be formal (enforced by the 
government) or informal (enforced by a group or community, e.g. a business commu-
nity)28. It is also not uncommon for contracts to contain both informal and formal ele-
ments. The informal rules then give direction to the aims of the formal contract (e.g. 
maximising profit in an acceptable way), while at the same time providing an elaboration 
of the formal contract, in which it is not possible to define all eventualities.
The right to vote in a democracy offers an example of the complex and dynamic rela-
tionships between formal and informal rights and obligations. Often this right is based 
on an informal consensus regarding the desirability of popular sovereignty and the defi-
nition of full citizenship. At a certain point these are codified in statutory elections for 
representative bodies, and in the granting of active and passive formal voting rights (i.e. the 
right both to vote and to stand for election) to private citizens – possibly to the exclusion 
of certain groups (minors, ethnic minorities, the poor, criminals, women). Formal rights 
may also carry formal obligations, as in Belgium, where there is not only a system of com-
pulsory voting but where people, if summoned, also have a statutory duty to sit on the 
electoral committees in polling stations. On the other hand, formal rights can also give 
rise to informal obligations. If there is no compulsory voting it may be that a good citizen is 
expected to go and vote – if only out of respect for the struggle by previous generations 
to win suffrage. The informal obligation can of course also operate in the other direction: 
in certain groups or communities there may be a prevailing norm that people should 
not vote because this would be tantamount to giving support to the unjust decisions of 
a closed political ruling class. Some informal enforcement might be expected in both 
cases, in the form of social approval where the rule is obeyed and disparagement if the 
norm is infringed.
2.7 Actors, their relationships and their motivations
Institutions are reflected in the behaviour of actors because they specify their rights and 
obligations. However, from the foregoing it has not yet become apparent how this hap-
pens. It will therefore be useful to give an indication of which actors can be influenced 
by rules, what mutual relations can be theoretically observed, and what motivations may 
dictate their behaviour. This section seeks to shed more light on this.




Actors are the bearers of rights and obligations, and can perform behaviour. The figural 
model distinguishes between two types of actor: natural persons and corporate actors. 
The first are individuals, the latter organisations or bodies which form an independently 
acting legal persona. Sometimes certain individual actors play a key role in the definition 
and interpretation of social rules; they can then be regarded as political, economic or 
social entrepreneurs.
Corporate actors include companies, the Armed Forces, government departments, 
social security organisations, schools, churches, voluntary associations, clubs, pressure 
groups, trade unions, etc. They arise as a result of organising: the process whereby indi-
vidual or corporate actors transfer their rights and obligations to a new corporate actor 
in order to achieve a certain goal, and supply the necessary resources for this. Corpo-
rate actors are deliberately constructed, generally have a certain hierarchical structure 
(departments, operating companies), and are usually purposeful: the acts of all stake-
holders are coordinated in such a way that the predefined objective is brought closer. If 
the exogenous circumstances change, this may require adaptations to the goals or modes 
of operation of the corporate actor – although these are often less flexible and innovative 
than is assumed by some economists.
The government is a special corporate actor, which is expected to fulfil certain core 
tasks on the basis of the prevailing societal consensus (government production) and to 
act as a neutral third party which monitors relations between private legal persons from a 
general perspective (third-party recognition). If that societal consensus changes, this can 
have consequences for the structuring of the government apparatus: the central govern-
ment tasks may be reviewed, and the budgets for government organisations reallocated. 
The government is not a homogeneous actor; there are several territorial and functional 
administrative layers, with variable relations between rule-definers, dispensers of jus-
tice, politically responsible administrators, and the civil service apparatus. Individual 
actors from these groups constitute a rich mix of agents of the government, and they to 
do not always serve the interests of their principal.
Supranational organisations, such as the un and the eu can be independent corporate 
actors, focusing on supranational government production and third-party recognition, 
not only for private legal persons but also for national governments. The latter applies 
when certain powers are transferred from the national level to the supranational organisa-
tion, which is also given resources (in the form of direct payments by the member states, 
or via supranational levies). In that case the relationship between supranational organisa-
tion and national government does not differ essentially from that between central gov-
ernment and the lower layers of administration in the participating countries: they have 
well-defined tasks, responsibilities and resources, and they represent the collective inter-
ests that have priority at the various levels. It is however also possible for the supranational 
organisation to act as a corporate agent of the national governments. Its main task then 
is to achieve a form of common coordination, within margins laid down by the member 
states. In an even lighter form the supranational organisation is neither a corporate actor 
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nor an agent, but is merely a discussion platform. In practice, hybrid forms occur. The 
mutual consultation function may form the basis; in certain areas supranational organi-
sations try to promote harmonisation (such as in the ‘open method of coordination’ in 
the eu’s social policy); and in a few carefully delineated domains they act as independent 
corporate actors (the regulation of economic competition, monetary policy).
Groups and communities are not regarded as actors here. The difference between the 
two is that a group is usually smaller than a community and is characterised by shared 
activities29. Both social contexts are important, because they are the carriers of infor-
mal rules. In the figural model, groups and communities are exogenous to the actors. 
Through rule-setting and enforcement procedures, they may influence actor perceptions, 
motivations and behaviour; groups and communities, however, cannot act themselves. 
This view logically implies that ‘collective behaviour’, in which large numbers of people 
act in the same way, is not considered here as group or communal action30.
Theoretically, a corporate actor can consist of one group, and in that case they may 
coincide (e.g. a commercial partnership of a limited number of like-minded associates). 
Once a certain size is reached, however, one or more groups or communities will quickly 
form within the corporate actor. The fact that the members of those groups or commu-
nities develop joint activities (a lunch club, tennis club, etc.) does not make them into 
actors. They may, however, be carriers of the so-called ‘corporate culture’. In the ter-
minology used here this is a collection of informal rules of the groups or communities 
occurring within a corporate actor, not of the organisation.
2.7.2 Relationships between actors
In figure 2.1 the mutual relations between individual actors are divided into four aspects. 
The interaction history, the associated knowledge that actors have about each other and 
their affective ties are relational aspects that are linked to the persona of the actors. If the 
actors change, those relationships also change and the interactions may take a different 
course.
On the other hand, much of the research into social networks stresses the impor-
tance of the relative positions of actors, separate from the persons. Reference is made for 
example to the influence that actors can acquire by entering into strategic relationships 
with others, or by deliberately using the ‘structural gaps’ which appear in their social 
network (see e.g. Burt, 1992; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Snijders, 2001).
Trust is a central concept in sociological rational choice models, as a key mediating vari-
able. A rationally behaving actor will allow his actions to be determined in part by the 
trustworthiness of the actors with whom he is dealing. His perception of the outcome 
of behavioural alternatives is weighed against the chance that others will comply with or 
default on their obligations. In such approaches the concept is also sometimes regarded 
as a characteristic of certain social networks, groups or communities: the social capital 
consists among other things in the amount of trust in such social systems (see e.g. Cole-
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man, 1990: 91-116, 300-321)31. Trust is seen here as a feature of the relationship between 
individual actors, which may be embedded in wider social bonds. This distinction is a 
useful one, among other things because even in communities with a large amount of 
social capital the trust between some actors can be low.
Authority ties describe the accepted hierarchical relations between individual actors, in 
line with the familiar definition by Weber (1988 [1922]: 28), who defines Herrschaft as “die 
Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen Gehorsam zu 
finden”32. Authority is power or influence that in the mutual relationships of actors is 
accepted as proper, because it has been legitimised in some way. It is never absolute, but 
is a relational probability: in the final instance authority rests on mutual recognition, 
as even in the most despotic regimes a subordinate may elect to deny the authority and 
accept the negative consequences of doing so. A characteristic of authority is that it con-
fers a right to demand obedience on the party holding the authority and a duty to obey 
on those of subordinate rank. In his analysis Weber (1988 [1922]: 122-176) also posits a rela-
tionship with the institutional structure, although he does not denote this as such. The 
legitimisation of power may result entirely from informal rules: the traditional authority 
that ensues from a belief in and loyalty to customs, as in the relationship between mon-
arch and subject, between landowner and serf, between paterfamilias and progeny. It can 
also be a rational authority, where formal rules grant authority to particular individuals 
(bearers of office in government and business). A distinction is often made here between 
legal and functional authority; the former is derived purely from the dignity of the office, 
while the second is based on the expertise of the incumbent and is therefore more unsta-
ble: a functional holder of authority must maintain and continually prove their qualities, 
on penalty of loss of authority. Weber’s third type of authority is less clearly linked to 
prevailing social rules. Charismatic authority is mostly based on the affective ties between 
followers and their leader, to whom they attribute exceptional personal gifts. This is the-
oretically the least stable form of authority, because its basis disappears once the follow-
ers lose their faith in the messianic qualities of their leader. Weber (1988 [1922]: 142-148) 
sees the “Veralltäglichung des Charisma” as a common threat to this type of authority: 
the need for stable patterns of behaviour, the failure to meet the high expectations that 
have been raised, and practical matters that have to be arranged all contribute to the 
erosion of the original élan. Charismatic authority can however play an important role 
in processes of social change if it manifests itself at the right time and place, by arousing 
an enthusiastic belief among the followers in the desired future, in addition to a strong 
willingness to act. Traditional, rational and charismatic authority are ideal types, which 
in practice occur in hybrid forms: a political leader whose rational authority is strength-
ened by a charismatic relationship with his followers; inherited charisma that is passed 
on through tradition to the progeny of the original prophet, etc.
Theoretically, there are two types of relationships between individuals and corporate 
actors (cf. Coleman 1990: 325-370). On the one hand, certain individuals may be regarded 
as the founding fathers of new organisations and thus give direction to their aims and 
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functioning. The constitution of new corporate actors – the formulation of objectives, 
the allocation of resources – is therefore usually distorted towards the individual percep-
tions and interests of their initiators. This also occurs if the establishment of the new 
organisation is a decision at the corporate level: e.g., the managers of merging compa-
nies cannot step outside their own cognitive frames, and generally guard their interests 
carefully in constituting the new entity.
On the other hand, individuals often act as agents of their organisation, in which 
case they are expected to strive to achieve the aims of this principal using the permitted 
methods. This relationship is governed by institutions, in particular the formal stipula-
tions of the employment contract and the informal conventions, norms and agreements 
that are shared by groups within the organisation. Despite this regulation, the agents 
may also try to exploit the organisation as a vehicle for their own ambitions, interests and 
self-enrichment: the core of the ‘principal-agent’ problem.
Obviously, there may also be relations between corporate actors and individuals who 
are no agents of the organisation (clients, auditors, supervisors, shareholders), and vari-
ous relations between corporate actors (co-operative societies, holding companies and 
their affiliates, oligopolies) are possible.
2.7.3 Motivations of individual actors
The central question in this section is what theoretically motivates actors to follow or 
break rules. The question will first be examined for individuals – without the aim to 
develop a complete theory of the self33, however – and then for corporate actors.
In the case of individual actors, a first possible assumption could be that in princi-
ple they simply follow rules and will only break them – i.e. act contrary to the intentions 
of the rule-designers – if the prescriptions are unclear. As in practice rules can generally 
not be defined in such a way that they can never be misinterpreted, non-compliance can-
not always be avoided: imperfect rule specification provides scope to act, and this will 
sometimes lead to defection. Jones & Sergot (1993) illustrate this when they state how 
difficult it is to achieve “regimentation”, even in relatively simple systems. This term refers 
to unavoidable, enforced compliance: the behavioural options are so strictly defined that 
compliance with the rule is inevitable. If there are two actors with asymmetrical rights and 
obligations, the rights of A will always be guaranteed in this case, whereas B cannot do oth-
erwise than comply with his obligations. This occurs, for example, if the lending system 
of a library is set up in such a way that a member can borrow certain books, the librarian is 
obliged to provide them, and the loan is automatically cancelled once the lending period 
has elapsed. In theory, such a system could be designed by making the books available 
exclusively in electronic read-only format, without the possibility of printing them. Even 
then, however, design faults which are not removed, and external circumstances (such as 
a power cut) can mean that the envisaged behaviour is not realised.
It is undoubtedly the case that the specification of rules theoretically influences the 
degree of compliance with them. However, this cannot explain intentional defection by 
actors who know and understand the rules; nor can it explain group-related behavioural 
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differences. The limits of the simple ‘epistemological’ view on compliance and defection 
can be illustrated by the act of suicide, which in most societies is regarded as breaking the 
collective rules. Thus the Bible, for example, in addition to the general prohibition “Thou 
shalt not kill” (Exodus 20: 13), which can be applied to suicide, also contains a number of 
passages in which the human body is equated to God’s holy temple, which may not be 
violated on penalty of retribution34. The exegesis is generally added here that the human 
body belongs to God and that it is therefore not for man to end his life himself. The prin-
ciple has often also been expressed in formal legislation in countries with a Christian tra-
dition35. If the explanation for suicide is sought solely in the clarity or ambiguity of rules, 
it should be almost non-existent in practising Protestant and Roman Catholic communi-
ties: both the informal and formal rules are generally well known in these communities, 
and are rarely seen as ambiguous. Yet suicide also occurs among practising Christians; 
and between different religious communities suicide rates may vary significantly.
The rational choice institutionalism discussed earlier explains rule-conformity and rule-
breaking from a different perspective. In this approach, rules exist because they offer col-
lective advantages. They lower the costs of economic and social transactions by making 
behaviour predictable: the number of choices is limited, contracts can be enforced in a 
simple and standardised way, and breaking the rules carries an appropriate punishment. 
However, the behaviour of individual actors is not led by the collective benefits, but by an 
attempt to maximise their personal gain from their actions. Their choices are determined 
by the relative advantages and drawbacks of compliance and defection, the risk of being 
found out and caught in the event of infringements, and the severity of the likely posi-
tive and negative sanctions; in other words, by incentives, which are partly determined 
by the rules.
The rational choice approach does not offer a satisfactory explanation for situations 
in which people obey or break rules when this appears to be clearly against their personal 
interests. It also leaves unclear why comparable individuals make different choices under 
the same set of rules, and why behavioural variation between groups and communities 
occurs if the incentive structure is similar. These problems are usually addressed by refer-
ring to the unspecified tastes or preferences of individual actors.
Once again, suicide is an interesting case here, because in principle it would appear to 
be against the individual’s personal interests. From a rational choice perspective, actors 
make an individual judgement of the pros and cons of staying alive, and will commit sui-
cide if the drawbacks clearly prevail. The decision by the besieged Jews of Masada to end 
their lives is an example of this36. The concept of ‘contemplated suicide’ also fits in with 
the theory: isolated elderly people and the terminally ill will end their lives if they no 
longer see any point in extending it, and if they find the costs of suicide acceptable (access 
to the means of a painless death, no fear that next of kin will suffer too greatly emotion-
ally, socially or materially, etc.). However, contemplated suicides account for only a small 
proportion of all suicides37. The remainder are difficult to understand from the perspec-
tive of rational choice institutionalism, as are two other points: similar individuals in the 
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same circumstances who decide to continue living, and differences in the suicide rates of 
various social groups and countries.
A bounded rationality variant can partially remove some of these objections. Accord-
ing to this view, the weighing-up process by actors will necessarily be limited, because 
they do not possess all information (or have too much), because their interests and pref-
erences may be unclear or contradictory, and because they cannot always see in advance 
the full consequences of their behaviour. They do however continue to strive for max-
imisation of their personal utility, and will therefore follow or break rules depending 
on their subjective perception of the advantage of doing so. This view is more realistic 
empirically because variations in behaviour can be linked to differences in information 
and perceptions, and are not attributed simply to the black box of individual tastes and 
preferences. From this perspective, suicide can occur not only as a result of a lengthy 
and reasoned process of consideration, in which the individual weighs up the pros and 
cons of continued existence. In certain situations people may have incorrect perceptions: 
they may end their lives because of mental illness, loss of a loved one or the influence of 
drugs, whereas in reality this does not serve their interests. However, this does not offer 
an adequate explanation for why comparable actors under the same circumstances do 
not act in this way. It also offers no explanation of why suicide is relatively more common 
among, for example, adolescents, atheists and the Japanese.
In sociological approaches compliance and defection are usually explained on the basis 
of how the rules are embedded in social systems and the historical process. In a simple 
functionalist variant, people in principle obey rules because they have internalised then 
during a process of early socialisation. Defection can then only occur if something has 
gone wrong during the training for people’s social roles – imperfect socialisation cre-
ates sociopaths. Such an “oversocialized conception of man” (cf. Wrong, 1961) is however 
too straightforward. It ignores ambiguities in the rules, contradictions between institu-
tions and between the rules in different groups, and the possibility that not every rule 
is the object of socialisation or becomes definitively imprinted in actors (see also §2.8). 
Moreover, it is difficult to understand in this theoretical scheme how social rules could 
ever change: ‘normal’ people are by definition conformist and will not be able to perceive 
rule amendments as a result of the imprinting, while sociopaths are generally not seen as 
suitable institutional entrepreneurs. Equally unclear is how actors deal with the internal-
ised rules if the social circumstances change radically.
Other sociological theories emphasise the variations that can occur between social 
systems in the content and ranking of rules, the influence of changing social conditions, 
and the passive and active rule interpretation by actors. The latter aspect means that they 
are able to question the rules, though this will be difficult for highly significant institu-
tions. The symbolic aspects of key informal rules often make it hard for actors to rec-
ognise behavioural alternatives, because they are unable to step outside the prevailing 
cognitive interpretation frames and moral templates. Such a perspective leads to other 
explanations for committing suicide. Durkheim’s Le suicide (1897) is of course the clas-
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sic study of the social conditions surrounding this phenomenon. In terms of the figural 
model in §2.3, his familiar types can be denoted as follows. ‘Anomic’ suicides are the 
result of radical exogenous events (occupation of the country, long-term economic cri-
sis), which weaken the prevailing informal institutions across the board. ‘Egoistic’ sui-
cides ensue from the weak development of rules in certain groups. This is a result of 
low group cohesion and a high degree of individualism, so that actors are not deterred 
from defective choices. In Durkheim’s approach this explains why suicide occurs more 
frequently among Protestants and people living alone than among the better integrated 
Catholics and married people. ‘Altruistic’ suicides are inspired by the ideals of a particu-
lar group, which are not dominant in society at large. They are focused on the estab-
lishment of new rules, and the individual actor sacrifices him or herself for the superior 
goal. In Durkheim’s fourth type, ‘fatalistic’ suicide, there is no such future objective, but 
highly imperative norms and conventions apply within the group, with heavy sanctions 
for defection. An example are the soldiers in the First World War who took part in the 
battles in Flanders and Northern France, losing huge numbers of men for little territo-
rial gain. They could not evade this, because of their military training, solidarity with 
their fellow warriors, and the death sentence they would face on desertion. Interestingly, 
Durkheim’s latter two types make clear that in some social circumstances suicide is not 
rule-breaking but is rather the rule.
Building on Durkheim’s typology, sociologists have pointed to other social causes 
of suicide: the isolation and exclusion of certain groups, lack of integration in certain 
phases of life (adolescents, old age) or following certain life events (loss of a partner or 
children), weakness of the social network, a decline in social status, frustration about 
future expectations, culturally defined loss of face, etc. Such sociological explanations 
can help us to understand the differences in suicide rates between various social groups. 
Ultimately, however, they permit nothing more than probabilistic statements: the social 
conditions referred to increase the likelihood that someone will take their own life, but 
not everyone living under those same conditions will commit suicide.
It should be added that the behavioural aspirations of actors also may depend on their 
individual characteristics. Even when the rules are unambiguous, the incentives are uni-
directional for rational-minded persons, and the social conditions are homogeneous, it 
is still possible that some actors will obey the rules while others break them. This indi-
vidual variety is obviously the object of psychology, where behavioural motivations are 
regarded in terms of fairly stable personality characteristics, which are the product of the 
interaction between congenital characteristics and environmental influences. Because 
cognitive development differs between individuals and between domains, not all actors 
will regard the same choice as rational in comparable circumstances. In addition, the 
tenets of this discipline point to the influence of specific personality traits. These include 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to experience 
and intelligence, but also dominance, authoritarianism, conformism, risk aversion, etc.
Besides this, people may have developed a certain behavioural pattern that does not 
serve their interests directly because of their personal experiences, traumatic or other-
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wise. Furthermore, behaviour can be driven to a great extent by emotions, and there may 
be considerable variation here between actors and situations. Frijda (1986, 2007) regards 
emotions mainly as changes in ‘action readiness’, or action tendency. He stresses the 
importance of appraisal, which implies that emotions are not related to objective situa-
tions, but rather to the way actors evaluate these38  (Frijda, 1986: 2-4, 474):
Emotion [...] appears to be a hypothesis to explain behaviour that has neither sufficient nor 
adequate purpose or reason; the explanation, then, is sought ‘within’ the subject. Emotions 
are linked to certain physiological changes (sweating, trembling, blushing, faster heartbeat), 
to subjective valuations (good/bad, beautiful/ugly, etc.) and to self-references (‘I feel...’). 
Finally, emotions are evoked by external stimuli which the actor considers significant.
Other branches of psychology accentuate the influence of developmental stages (infant 
behaviour is mostly non-reflective), physical and mental health status, the eliciting of 
behavioural reactions by external stimuli, and presumed needs (physical safety, self-ful-
filment) which people try to achieve through their actions. Without seeking to integrate 
all these psychological schools here, it must be acknowledged that individual causes can 
be important in determining whether people obey or break rules. An attempt can also 
be made to explain suicide on the basis of individual characteristics (depression, limited 
cognitive faculties, low resistance to stress, intense emotionality) and experiences, such 
as earlier suicides in their immediate environment. The intended purpose of a person 
committing suicidal acts also plays a role: some people genuinely regard life as unbeara-
ble; others above all try to make clear that they need help or want their relatives to change 
behaviour.
The reasoned action models from social and economic psychology combine a number of 
these insights. They are widely used in research that seeks to explain the behaviour of 
consumers, voters, etc. Behaviour is seen in this approach as the result of the attitudes 
and subjective norms of individuals. Attitudes are positive or negative appraisals of behav-
ioural alternatives. They depend on the belief that the behaviour will lead to certain out-
comes, and the evaluation of those results. Subjective norms are the judgments that an 
individual expects of significant others if he opts for a particular course of behaviour. They 
follow from the beliefs that specific persons think the actor should perform the behaviour, 
and the actor’s motivation to comply with his referents. Attitudes and subjective norms do 
not lead directly to behaviour, but are weighted and then result in a certain behavioural 
intention. It is this intention that forms the basis for individual actions.
Sometimes reasoned action models are expanded to include other determinants, 
such as personality traits and socio-demographic characteristics. These are then exo-
genous factors which impinge on the attitudes and subjective norms via the beliefs, eval-
uations and motivations. They also influence the relative weight of attitudes and norms 
in the behavioural intention. Attitudes to certain rules are sometimes put forward as 
explanatory background characteristics as well (see e.g. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
If the reasoned action perspective is applied to suicide, this phenomenon is theo-
retically first of all the result of a positive attitude to the ending of life. Death is evalu-
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ated more positively than survival, and the person concerned expects the attempt to be 
successful and not too painful. In contrast to the rational choice approach, the actor’s 
attitude is not necessarily the result of an elaborate weighing of the pros and cons of 
suicide; it need not be based on rational argument. Consequently, the model is in princi-
ple not limited to explaining contemplated suicides. A second difference compared with 
the rational choice perspective is that a strong subjective norm can imply that a positive 
attitude to suicide will not translate into a behavioural intention. Theoretically, this is 
driven by the actor’s belief that his group of referents will disapprove of suicide (they 
will be sad, their memory of the actor will be besmirched), combined with a sufficiently 
strong inclination to care about their views.
A strong point in reasoned action models is the focus on the intra-psychological, sub-
jective processing of social expectations, and the significance of the anticipated results 
in behavioural choices. At the same time, the treatment of rules is fairly limited and one-
sided: to the extent that behaviour is institutionally determined, this applies mainly to 
the perception of social norms. Values, conventions and formal rules are largely left out 
of consideration. In addition, attention for the social aspects is limited to the immedi-
ate significant others, with little consideration of the wider social environment and the 
historical process. Finally, actors are above all regarded as rule-processing subjects; their 
active, rule-creating role remains in the shadows.
The position of individual actors in the figural model (graph 2.1) reconciles a number 
of the theoretical approaches outlined above. At the centre are the more or less stable 
characteristics of the actor: physical and psychological traits, the individual biography 
with a particular set of experiences, and the personal resources which they have at their 
disposal (knowledge, capacity for work, capital). These are surrounded by a shell of per-
ceptions and emotions, which impinge on the assessment of behavioural alternatives in 
an actual situation. These include:
– The subjective rules. This is the personal translation of the exogenous behavioural rules, 
in which the actor makes his own interpretation and weighing of formal and informal 
institutions, focusing on the behavioural alternatives. If the rules are internalised or 
the actor has developed a certain habitus, subjective rules may be pre-reflexive;
– The expected costs and benefits of the behavioural alternatives. These relate both to 
material gains and losses and to the perceived influence of the behavioural options on 
the actor’s reputation, esteem, etc;
– The probability of outcomes. This is the subjective assessment by the actor that his 
acts will produce the desired consequences: the amount of gain from compliance and 
defection, the chance that rule-breaking will be discovered and that sanctions of a 
given severity will be imposed, etc;
– The goals which the actor strives for, partly fed by the ideals he supports;
– The perception that the actor has of his interests (self-interest or wider interests);
– The emotions the actor associates with various modes of behaviour.
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In this approach, these perceptions and emotions depend on the one hand on the stable 
characteristics of the actor, and on the other on the institutional structure and the his-
torical circumstances in which the rules are applied. The results of earlier interactions 
(learning effects) and the relations maintained with other actors (e.g. authority, trust) 
also have an influence. The combination of subjective perceptions and emotions results 
in a certain behavioural aspiration.
From this sketch of the motivations of actors, it is possible to deduce when defection will 
be attractive for actors. This is the case in the first place if the institutions encourage this, 
which occurs if:
– Defection is more profitable than complying. This particularly happens when break-
ing a rule generates great material or immaterial benefits, and is simple to achieve 
because it costs little money, effort and time;
– The rule does not specify clearly the rights, obligations, conditions and possible sanc-
tions;
– The sanction for defection is lower; if rule-breaking carries a severe material, physical 
or social penalty, rules will less often be broken, even if the cost/benefit equation is 
favourable; but if the sanction is mild, rules will be broken even if this generates little 
profit;
– Rule-breaking is less visible, so that the chance of being caught is smaller; if defective 
behaviour brings a positive result and can be kept completely secret, actors will opt to 
break rules even where sanctions are severe;
– Sanctions are not applied in practice; severe sanctions have little effect if they are not 
actually imposed.
In addition, however, the context is also important: the object of interaction, and the 
historical situation in which it takes place, influence the behavioural aspirations of 
actors. The more the interaction resembles an impersonal exchange, the more important 
rational motivations become. In that case, behavioural choices can follow fairly directly 
from the perception of costs and benefits, which correlates with the historical circum-
stances and the ‘opportunity structure’ that is defined by the formal and informal rules. 
This applies even more strongly if this impersonal exchange is non-recurring in nature, 
relates to a single costly good, and takes place between no more than two actors. Ceteris 
paribus, well-reasoned defection is therefore more likely to occur in the purchase of an 
expensive consumer article on an open market than in a long-term collaborative busi-
ness project involving several participants.
The likelihood of non-compliance is also high where the interaction relates to a 
(semi-)collective good. In that case, the benefits of defection (use of common meadow-
land, smoking in public) usually fall to the individual actors in the short term, and they 
are inclined to regard their behaviour as a personal, one-off decision. It is only with the 
passage of time that the collective losses manifest themselves (overgrazing, higher inci-
dence of lung cancer), and these cannot be traced back to the behaviour of individual 
actors at a specific moment. Interactions where the market character is less dominant  – 
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for example leisure activities, behaviour within love relationships, artistic expressions, 
religious acts, sport, voluntary work – are in principle determined to a lesser extent by 
the weighing up of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, these behavioural modes, too, can 
become ‘commodified’ if much worth is attached to market principles and consumption 
by a certain group or society.
However, even in highly commodified or social dilemmatic contexts, in which the rules 
and historical circumstances foster rational defection, not every actor will be non-
cooperative. This is because of the subjective filtering of institutions and historical circum-
stances. Relevant factors in this connection are:
– Incomplete information or erroneous understanding of the rules and historical cir-
cumstances. For example, if the information on the costs and benefits is not transpar-
ent, or is contradictory or excessive, the actor cannot easily oversee the consequences 
of his behaviour in advance. This ambiguity increases his freedom of action, but can 
also lead to unintended or undesirable consequences;
– The existence of powerful pre-reflexive subjective rules directed towards compliance. 
As stated, this occurs in the case of internalised rules and habit formation. Relation-
ships of trust and authority with other actors may also play a role;
– Certain emotions (such as feeling uncomfortable if one breaks the rules) and stable 
personality characteristics (authoritarianism, altruism, risk-aversion, limited cogni-
tive faculties, psychological and physical handicaps) which stand in the way of rule-
breaking.
This perspective on individual actors in theory offers a more complete understanding of 
the suicide example. If under certain circumstances the rule applies that life should be 
taken, suicide is rule-compliant behaviour, a variant that could be described as normative 
suicide. Examples include the mass suicides by the Jonestown sect39 and the practice of 
sati (lit.: ‘devotion’) whereby Hindu widows in India demonstrated their devotion to their 
deceased husband by voluntarily being burned alive on their husband’s funeral pyre – a 
practice which still occurs occasionally. In suicides of this type, rule-compliance is often 
enforced: one of the reasons that the British Governor-General Lord William Bentinck 
declared sati to be illegal in 1829 was that in many cases it boiled down to nothing more 
than community-sanctioned execution40.
In other instances, suicide is an example of rule-defection. This non-compliance the-
oretically rests on certain combinations of perceptions and emotions, which are driven 
by institutions, actor characteristics, historical circumstances and the actor’s relation-
ships. In contemplated suicides particular actor traits (illness, limited cognitive faculties) 
lead individuals to regard the disadvantages of remaining alive as too high, to believe 
there is a sufficient chance of the suicide attempt succeeding, and to allow their own 
perceived interests to prevail. These motivations weigh so heavily that the actor is not 
diverted from his well-reasoned choice by any subjective rules, personal goals and ideals, 
or relationships with other actors.
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Socially induced suicides differ from normative suicides because in principle they are 
defective. They mainly result from weak subjective rules, which can arise either from fee-
ble or ambiguous group norms or from clear rules that have not (yet) been properly inter-
nalised. The relational network of the actor is limited and not directed at the prevention 
of rule-defection. These suicides are not based on an extensive weighing up of personal 
costs and benefits. They occur more often among actors (young adults, lonely elderly per-
sons) and communities that are undergoing transitions.
Emotional suicides are determined mainly by personal circumstances. Intense individ-
ual emotions (such as grief ) and delusions (because of illness, drug abuse, etc.) domi-
nate; rational judgements and social circumstances play a subordinate role.
2.7.4 Motivations of corporate actors
In figure 2.1 the forces driving corporate actors are largely the same. They too have cer-
tain characteristics: the resources they have available and the collective experience that 
organisations have built up. They are embedded in certain actor networks as well, and 
react to the historical circumstances. Corporate actors also interpret the rules and social 
context, have goals and ideals (the ‘mission’), define the interests of the organisation in 
a certain way, and base their acts partly on the probable outcomes of behavioural alter-
natives. The difference, of course, is that corporate actors are not people41. This implies 
they do not have emotions, and that all perceptions ensue from their dominant agents. 
However, the behaviour of corporate actors cannot simply be reduced to the motivations 
of the individuals of which they are comprised. Three elements are of particular impor-
tance here:
– The goals and future ideals of the corporate actor. If these are aimed at profit maximi-
sation, as is the case with a commercial firm, the rational weighing up of the economic 
costs and benefits will play a decisive role in the assessment of behavioural options 
(product development, investment, mergers, business expansion, recruitment and 
dismissal of staff, etc.). If, as in a political organisation, the achievement of consen-
sus on future policy is important, then it is not only the economic costs and benefits 
that are important, but also the possible political gains and losses. In this broader 
rationality, choices that are politically meaningful or expedient are the prime aim, 
even though in economic terms they may well be sub-optimal. In organisations with 
an idealistic or social aim (recreation, animal protection, religious conversion, com-
bating diseases) this is even more the case; here, realisation of the object is the main 
concern, and the financial balance is of secondary importance (maximum fundraising, 
minimum implementation costs).
– The strength of the organisation’s formal rules, and of the informal rules of the organ-
isational community or groups within it. If these institutions are very compelling and 
are based on a high degree of socialisation or a well-developed habitus, the percep-
tions and emotions of the agents can to a large extent be forced into line. Traditional 
government bureaucracies, the army and police are textbook examples of this, but in 
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organisational sociology reference is also made to the strict formal procedures and 
informal expectations in manufacturing industries, the offices of commercial firms, 
and religious sects. In these circumstances it is less important who fulfils a function, 
because the rules largely establish required behaviour. There are however also organi-
sations where the formal and informal rules are fairly loose (e.g. in creative and scien-
tific institutions), and where individual agents have considerable latitude in steering 
the actions of the organisation.
– The corporate hierarchies. Certain actors as a result of their function, their network or 
their informal power may shape the behaviour of the organisation more strongly than 
others. This applies especially in organisations with a pyramidal structure, which is 
linked to strictly enforced hierarchical values, norms and conventions.
2.8 Rule-driven interactions
Although the meaning of the notion ‘act’ is an obvious one in everyday language use, it is 
not a simple concept to define precisely. Acts can be regarded as the events42 that an actor 
brings about, i.e. that which he does or achieves. They are a subtype of the more general 
notion actions, which can also be performed by machines or tools. However, those appli-
ances are themselves not actors: they perform actions, but not acts43. The definition of 
the term acts leaves unresolved the issue of what ‘do’ and ‘achieve’ actually entail. Here 
a fairly pragmatic approach is adopted to this topic, with no attempt at an exhaustive 
reflection on the philosophical discussion (see e.g. Mele, 1997)44. First and foremost, acts 
are taken to include the physically observable movements made by an actor (an individual 
moves his leg) or manipulations of objects (the actor kicks a ball). However, the notion 
also includes the symbolic or social meaning of such observable acts (a football player 
scores a goal). Acts need not be observable: they can also include certain mental activi-
ties. For example, an actor who thinks through his best mode of operation in a given 
situation is displaying problem-solving behaviour. Not all intra-psychological sensations 
are however acts: the emotions felt by an actor are not acts, though any physical expres-
sions of those emotions are. The fact that the footballer weighs up which corner of the 
goal to choose before shooting is an act; his personal feelings of triumph or failure after 
the attempt on goal are not. However, his public expressions that refer to those emotions 
– cheering, putting his head in his hands – are acts (even if they are over-acted).
Acts may be intentional, but also unwitting. To stay with the example of football: the 
player preparing to shoot will bend his knee more or less consciously to steer the ball in 
the right direction, but when the physiotherapist tests his knee reflexes this act is unin-
tended. In practice, this distinction is sometimes difficult to establish45.
Interaction46 consists of a series of acts that involve several actors. These actors are all 
focused on the same goal or physical objects, and can respond to each other’s acts. The 
form of these behavioural exchanges varies. Interactions may be simultaneous or sequen-
tial – the difference between a football match in which all the players try to control the 
ball at the same time, and the chess game in which moves are made in turn. They may 
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also be non-recurring or lasting – an immediate economic exchange on the basis of a 
one-off agreement, compared with repeated bartering within the context of an indefinite 
cooperation agreement. And of course, they can take place between two actors, or in an 
interaction structure with a large number of participants in a network where the physical 
distances are great. While each actor makes their contribution to the interaction, its total 
may comprise more than the sum of the individual acts47.
2.8.1 Institutions and interaction
To a certain degree all interaction is influenced by rules, because language and implicit 
expectations play an important role in it. On the other hand, in the discussion of actors 
(§2.7) it became clear that institutions generally do not determine behaviour completely: 
‘regimentation’ (unavoidable compliance with the rules) is difficult to achieve in prac-
tice. Rules leave the actors some latitude of acting because they are unclear or not specific 
enough, and they are always interpreted subjectively. In addition, actors are not always 
led by institutions; theoretically, other motivations are also important: their emotions, 
their perceptions of the costs and benefits of behavioural alternatives, the probability of 
outcomes, their goals and interests, and their ideals. And finally, it is possible for actors to 
respond differently to the same rules because of their diverse characteristics, resources, 
experiences and relationships.
Here, rule-driven interaction is understood as behavioural exchanges between actors 
that depend on specific socially acknowledged rights and duties, with the related condi-
tions and possible sanctions. This is the case, for example, for the interaction between 
a gp and their patient, in so far as this is regulated by the formal protocols and informal 
expectations that exist regarding the proper treatment of a medical problem (intake, 
diagnosis, treatment, referral, etc.). Whether or not the two actors adhere to more gen-
eral norms and conventions – the doctor who adopts a sympathetic or aloof stance, the 
patient who verbalises his problem in good or poor English – does not form part of the 
specific rules that govern this interaction, though the encounter can be influenced by 
them. Evidently, the fact that an interaction is rule-driven does not imply that the appli-
cable social rules are the sole factors determining its course: specific rules are usually 
embedded in the general institutional context, and the motivations of actors do not 
ensue directly from behavioural prescripts (see §2.7).
The economic behaviour of individuals and corporate actors provides examples of 
rule-driven interaction: the series of acts within a company; the mutual actions between 
companies; the exchanges between consumers and sellers; the permanent negotiations 
between trade unions and employers’ representatives; and also the coordinated eco-
nomic interactions between nations (e.g. the supporting purchase of certain currencies 
by National Banks in order to influence exchange rates). But interactions that are gener-
ally not included in the economic arena are also rule-driven: the relationships between 
friends or marital partners; family contacts; the exchanges within groups and associa-
tions; political behaviour (by voters, candidates, party members), and so on. The behav-
ioural exchanges between actors which are governed by social security rules also fit into 
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this category. These will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, on the basis of a number 
of theoretical interaction models for the different types of social security schemes.
The extent to which interaction is rule-driven can vary. If two strangers meet by 
chance in a setting that is unknown to both of them and where their behaviour cannot be 
observed, it may be assumed that the interaction will not be greatly influenced by social 
rules concerning specific rights and obligations. Simmel (1971a [1908]) referred in this 
connection to the ‘objectivity of the stranger’ 48. Set against this are certain rituals and 
ceremonies, in which the successive acts of the participants are strictly prescribed and 
heavily sanctioned by the community.
If interaction is rule-driven, the behaviour of the actors concerned can in principle be 
assessed in terms of compliance or defection, but it cannot be taken for granted that this 
will actually occur. In the first place, it may be difficult to establish whether rules are being 
broken or observed, because they are often fairly unspecific. This applies especially for the 
more abstract institutions (values and formal meta-rules). It was noted earlier that values 
cannot be contravened: whether or not actors infringe them can only be measured using 
the social norms and formal rules that are actually linked to these general guiding princi-
ples. Institutions at a lower level of abstraction do contain behavioural prescriptions, but 
these can often be interpreted in several different ways in actual interaction processes. 
The rights and obligations are frequently fairly general, with ill-specified conditions, and 
some uncertainty about the applicable sanctions and their imposers in the situation at 
hand. This ambiguity of the rules means that compliance and defection in rule-driven 
interactions can depend greatly on the interpretations of the actors concerned.
In the second place, establishing defection and compliance requires that the stake-
holders keep a record of this during the interaction, and impose sanctions where nec-
essary. As stated, North (1990) does not regard this monitoring and enforcement as 
something that will happen automatically. Both lead to transaction costs, which are not 
always acceptable to the actors in economic or social terms; thus, certain rules may not 
be put into effect because the price of monitoring and sanctioning is too high. Following 
the figural model in §2.3 this can be stated in slightly more general terms. Establishing 
compliance or defection and applying sanctions requires an interaction process, which 
is not self-evident and which does not automatically proceed in the correct way; it has to 
be socially organised in some way or other. In the case of informal rules there must be a 
certain relationship between the stakeholders in the community, and there must be an 
accepted method for identifying and punishing defection (e.g. gossip, verbal reprimands, 
ostracism, pillory, etc.) or rewarding compliance (status or monetary returns, admira-
tion). In the case of formal rules, government officials entrusted with monitoring and 
sanctioning generally have to follow a specified chain of acts, or procedure, with closely 
defined tasks for the police and judiciary (investigation, instigating charges, prosecu-
tion, sentencing, rehabilitation, etc.).
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2.8.2 Interaction results and the context of rule application
All rule-driven interaction is aimed at achieving certain results. In the figural model in 
graph 2.1 these outputs relate to the actors involved and to the collective the rules apply 
to. The results for the actors may concern changes in their resources and experience 
(wealth, knowledge) and alterations of their perceptions (including the subjective rule 
interpretation), their emotions, and their relationships with other actors.
The consequences at the collective level refer to the impact of rule-driven interac-
tions on the evolution of a community or society. Often these are to a certain degree 
intended: institutions are usually aimed at achieving certain collective outcomes. In 
figure 2.1 these collective outcomes are shown as a feedback from the interactions at 
the actor level to the historical process. This implies behavioural exchanges are not only 
important for the immediate stakeholders, but also influence technological develop-
ments (such as innovations in production techniques), the economy (growth of collective 
wealth, labour market development), the social structure (differentials in income, status, 
elite-formation), the prevailing ideals (the future that a community wants for itself ) and 
demographic trends (birth rates, mortality, migration). On the other hand, the histori-
cal process is also theoretically a determinant of the collective results: the outcomes of 
the rules depend in part on the circumstances under which actors implement them, the 
context of rule application.
Consumer behaviour offers a simple illustration of this two-way causal relationship. 
The existing institutions influence the purchase of certain goods: agreements between 
market players, government rules on vat, income tax and compulsory social security 
contributions, certification and inspection of production processes, levies on imported 
goods, etc. However, to what extent consumers actually buy such goods, given these 
institutions, also depends on the historical background against which these rules are 
applied, in particular the economic climate and its impact on people’s perceptions of 
their disposable income. Keynesian economic theory stresses that their actual spending 
behaviour in turn influences economic growth. In §3.6.3 this line of thought is developed 
further for the collective results that can be achieved by social security rules.
The historical process is discussed in more depth in §2.9, since it is also the engine 
driving the creation of institutions. First, however, a special form of rule-driven interac-
tion deserves some attention: the way in which actors acquire rules.
2.8.3 Rule acquisition
As institutions are social constructs, it follows that actors cannot know them instinctively. 
Logically, certain acts or interactions must take place which allow the actors to learn and 
internalise the rules. This begs a number of obvious questions. Which actors are involved 
in the process of rule acquisition, and under what conditions are they prompted to act? 
Which rules do the actors learn, when and how? What is the result of rule-acquiring acts 
and interactions? Without discussing these questions exhaustively, a number of theoreti-
cal notions will be considered here concerning individual49 rule acquisition (for a more 
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detailed discussion see e.g. White, 1977; Klaassen, 1981; Hurrelmann, 2002; Hurrelmann 
& Ulich, 2002).
In the field of sociology, these topics are key to theories on the ‘social order problem’. 
If every society or community is confronted with a permanent “barbarian invasion of 
new-born infants” (Parsons, 1951: 208), how is it possible that such social systems sur-
vive? The classic sociological answer assumes a certain method of socialisation. This is 
often interpreted as a process of one-sided transfer of existing rules to new socialisees. 
Thus, the system’s prevailing culture is passed on to the new generation and the problem 
of social order is in principle solved. White (1977: 2) illustrates this with “die-stamping” 
definitions such as the following:
The process by which society moulds its offspring into the pattern prescribed by its culture is 
termed socialisation. [...] Socialisation is the process which converts individuals to people. 
[...] We may define socialisation as the process by which someone learns the way of a given 
society or social group so that he can function within it.
Sociological theories on socialisation mostly share the assumption that people are ini-
tially malleable (see Klaassen, 1981: 206-207). For example Durkheim (1922: 50-51) states:
L’enfant, en entrant dans la vie, n’y apporte que sa nature d’individu. La société se trouve 
donc, à chaque génération nouvelle, en présence d’une table presque rase sur laquelle il lui faut 
construire à nouveaux frais.
The egoistical individual being of the newborn child, which has only organic needs, must 
be remodelled to create a social being, according to Durkheim. Parsons (1951, 1964) also 
regards newborn children as organisms which in addition to biological urges have only 
predispositions for social learning, i.e. plasticity, sensitivity and dependence. The indi-
vidual reconciles such organic characteristics with the personality that he or she devel-
ops during the socialisation process that makes them part of the social system. Struc-
tural-functionalist theories refer in this connection to the role-less status of newborn 
children. The critical, Marxist-oriented sociology also regards human beings as highly 
malleable: the ideas and convictions that are imparted to new actors bear a direct rela-
tionship to the social position of their socialisers and are, in fact, an ideology. For social 
constructivists, finally, the starting point is generally man’s ‘world-openness’ (Berger & 
Luckman, 1966). They emphasise that homo sapiens, unlike most higher animal species, 
possesses virtually no instincts. As result he may develop a varied behavioural repertoire, 
but this requires a lengthy period of socialisation.
In sociological theories, socialisation is often seen as inevitable, especially at the start 
of a human life. Functionalists emphasise that new actors have to be trained because oth-
erwise they would not be able to exist in their society, thus jeopardising the survival of 
that social order. Socialisation is therefore promoted collectively, and consists primarily 
of processes of identification, direct instruction and the providing and training of behav-
ioural models in the socialisees. Pedagogic role expectations are attributed to parents, 
teachers and other socialising actors. Failure to fulfil those roles evokes negative sanc-
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tions, leading in the most extreme cases to the possible acquittal of their educational 
tasks (removal from the parental home in cases of child neglect, dismissal of unsuitable 
teachers, closure of poorly performing schools). The method of socialisation varies from 
one society to another, and within those societies between the different social milieus. 
In general, the early socialisation takes place within the family. It proceeds largely via 
identification with the parent, so that the characteristics acquired in this way develop a 
high degree of stability, becoming imprinted in the personality. In modern societies the 
school is theoretically also an important socialiser. That is where the socialisees acquire 
the detailed knowledge needed because of the highly advanced division of labour; and 
that is where they learn generally applicable norms and values, which can offer some 
correction for the particularistic – and possibly deviating – rules learned in the home set-
ting. With this in mind an elaborate educational infrastructure is maintained, a detailed 
educational curriculum established, and the take-up of educational facilities by the 
socialisees encouraged (financial support, compulsory education, etc.). The socialisation 
process enables the socialisees to learn the rules and skills they will need in the future, 
as members of the community, and for the specific social roles they have to fulfil within 
it. After learning them, the socialisees know what is expected of them, and what the con-
sequences will be if they fail to meet those expectations. The emphasis in this approach 
lies mainly on the integrative function of socialisation.
Critical Marxist sociology essentially follows this same functionalist line of thought, 
but place greater emphasis on the allocative function of socialisation. By this they mean 
the reproduction and legitimisation of existing social inequality or, in their specific jar-
gon, the Einübung in die Klassengesellschaft (Huch, 1972). The socialisation process is differ-
entiated: the lower social classes, girls and ethnic minorities are taught different rules, 
language codes and skills from the higher social echelons, boys and indigenous citizens. 
This transfers the existing social positions and stratification principles to new actors and 
ensures that these are not called into doubt by them. Education plays a key role in this 
allocation; it imposes the social views of the dominant groups on the lower strata, and 
selects and qualifies pupils in accordance with the existing social distinctions. A variant 
within this approach does not regard reproduction as an automatic process; evidently, 
complete reproduction would make any social change impossible, which does not tally 
with the empirical evolution of most societies. From this more optimistic social-demo-
cratic perspective, emancipatory potential is often attributed to education. Extra atten-
tion and resources aimed at deprived children could offer compensation for the inequali-
ties that arise in the pre-school phase, allowing social allocation to take place on more 
meritocratic grounds. Such a compensatory policy has in fact been implemented in many 
Western countries in recent decades, though often with modest results50.
Rational choice socialisation theories generally accord a central role to the qualifying func-
tion of socialisation, which is mainly achieved via education. The training of ‘human 
capital’ is a collective interest because it benefits labour productivity, innovative capacity 
and the economic development of the community, although the return on investing in 
education is not always easy to determine. Individual socialisers and socialisees strive to 
optimise the qualification level (the number of years’ schooling, the diplomas attained, 
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skills that can be used on the labour market), because they have a personal interest in 
doing so. A rational parent who does not teach his child to behave and does not ensure 
that he receives sufficient formal training, endangers the child’s future and will later suf-
fer the consequences (loss of reputation, a child who does not care for him when he is in 
need). And a rational socialisee who does not attain the right diplomas (but also a certain 
use of language, a network, an interesting cv, etc.) has little chance of obtaining a good 
or well-paid job, high social status or an attractive partner. Thus, from this theoretical 
perspective some degree of socialisation is inevitable as well; although the specific learn-
ing route chosen by those concerned will depend on the prevailing relative costs and 
benefits51.
Social constructivists take a broader view of socialisation, which includes its symbolic 
implications as well. For them, socialisation is not exclusively about the – position-
specific or otherwise – deliberate transfer of concrete behavioural rules, the training of 
skills, and getting the right credentials. It also involves the imparting of cognitive frames, 
moral templates, desirable affects and social identities. Socialisation is ineluctable in the 
first phase of life in particular, because of the symbolic power that parents have over their 
children during that period. This was expressed aptly by Berger & Luckman (1966: 151):
Every individual is born into an objective social structure within which he encounters the sig-
nificant others who are in charge of his socialization. […] Their definitions of his situation are 
posited for him as objective reality. […] They select aspects of (this world) in accordance with 
their own location in the social structure, and also by virtue of their individual, biographi-
cally rooted idiosyncrasies. The social world is ‘filtered’ to the individual through this double 
selectivity. Thus the lower-class child not only absorbs a lower-class perspective on the social 
world, he absorbs it in the idiosyncratic coloration given it by his parents […] Consequently, 
the lower-class child will not only come to inhabit a world greatly different from that of an 
upper-class child, but may do so in a manner quite different from the lower-class child next 
door.
According to this view, the child cannot do otherwise during the ‘primary socialisation 
phase’ than identify with its socialisers (Berger & Luckman, 1966: 154-155):
The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many other possible 
worlds. He internalizes it as the world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world 
tout court [...] However much the original sense of inevitability may be weakened in subsequent 
disenchantments, the recollection of a never-to-be-repeated certainty [...] still adheres to 
the first world of childhood. Primary socialization thus accomplishes what (in hindsight, of 
course) may be seen as the most important confidence trick that society plays on the indi-
vidual – to make appear a necessity what is in fact a bundle of contingencies, and thus to make 
meaningful the accident of his birth.
Primary socialisation is chiefly a task of the parents. Building on the insights presented 
by Mead, in social constructivism this is not regarded as a one-sided transfer, but as a 
process of interaction which is partly involuntary and pre-reflexive. Initially by imitat-
ing the behaviour of its ‘significant others’, and later by identifying with them, the child 
learns to recognise the attitudes of others, to understand their purpose and to acquire 
them. Because the socially recognised denotations are set down in language, the pro-
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curement of language skills plays a central role in this process. Play is an important aid: 
it allows the child to experiment with meanings, to learn to place itself in the position of 
others and to role-play. Primary socialisation can be regarded as successfully completed 
when the socialisee generalises the attitudes and roles of its significant others. They are 
no longer the views of the child’s parents, but have become everyone’s normal ideas, the 
notions of the ‘generalised other’.
In this approach, primary socialisation is concentrated on a central but fairly limited 
domain: the acquisition of general linguistic and social roles in the first phase of life. 
However, much of the transfer takes place later, when the ability of reflection is more 
developed in the new actors and the identification is less inevitable: “Put crudely, it is 
necessary to love one’s mother, but not one’s teacher” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 161). In 
this phase there is more scope for a conscious transfer of knowledge and skills, and the 
socialisee has a more independent, more considered contribution to the learning pro-
cess. This is defined as secondary socialisation: the initiation of actors who have already 
completed the primary socialisation process into new elements of the society of which 
they will become part. The transfer of behavioural prescriptions is often an important 
subsidiary aim in this phase: the secondary socialisation process also makes clear the 
rules by which a new batch of actors (such as future police officers, civil servants, busi-
nessmen or scientists) should shape their professional lives. On the one hand there are 
the official codes of conduct for police officers and civil servants, the accounting and 
statutory conditions which must be observed by a business employer, and the written 
professional code of the scientist. On the other hand there are the core values of the pro-
fession (maintaining order, serving the public good, making profit in a legitimate fash-
ion, the verifiable pursuit of truth) and the associated norms, conventions and informal 
agreements.
Secondary socialisation is a more extensive process in societies with an elaborate 
division of labour, with the associated more differentiated distribution of knowledge 
and roles. Its universalistic nature means it is by definition somewhat at odds with the 
 idiosyncratic, though perceived as natural, outcomes of primary socialisation.
One objection to the classic sociological approach to rule acquisition is that relatively lit-
tle attention is generally paid to the development of individual competences, something 
that is denoted using terms such as ‘personalisation’ or ‘ontogenesis’. In developmental 
psychology, by contrast, this concept plays a central role. These theories do not start from 
the premise that a newborn child is a malleable barbarian, an unwritten page that can be 
filled in at will by those around it. Rather, it is assumed that there is a succession of quali-
tatively different developmental stages which have to be gone through by every human 
being. This is not a universal ground plan which fixes the fate of the individual. Only the 
sequence is general; the precise timing and the way in which the individual goes through 
the phases can vary, depending on individual characteristics, the social background of 
the children concerned, and the society in which they grow up. Moreover, the acquiring 
of new competences depends on the development achieved by the individual in earlier 
phases.
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The phase theory put forward by Piaget is an example of such an approach, focused 
mainly on cognitive development. In his approach, the ‘sensorimotor’ phase (0-2 years) 
is concerned primarily with the acquisition of mental representations of simple goal-
directed motor actions (sucking, grasping, kicking, and throwing). This is followed by 
the pre-operational stage (2-7 years) and the period of ‘concrete operations’ (7-11 years), in 
which the child acquires symbolic functions such as language and play, the ability to con-
ceptualise and the ability to enter into interpersonal relationships. Around the 11th year 
a fourth, qualitatively different phase begins, the period of formal operations (abstract 
thought, logical proof, values). In this approach, a child develops its competences as 
part of his organic growth process (especially brain development), through practice and 
experience, through social interaction and direct transfer, and by seeking new equilibria 
through self-regulation. The social setting often plays a facilitating role in this process, 
providing the stimuli on the basis of which the child forms itself (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969: 
152-159). Such a view is diametrically opposed to the classical sociological perspective, in 
which socialisers impart the social rules unilaterally to socialisees. Such direct transfer 
does have a place in developmental psychology theories, but is always dependent on the 
way in which new actors perceive and receive it (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969: 156):
Even in the case of transmissions in which the subject appears most passive, such as school 
teaching, social action is ineffective without an active assimilation by the child.
Another objection is that many sociological theories pay scant attention to the poten-
tially conflicting nature of the socialisation process, and often do not acknowledge that 
a socialisation that is regarded as successful from a collective point of view need not be 
so for the person concerned. Wrong (1961: 186-188) illustrated this point in his classical 
critique of the structural-functionalist view of socialisation:
Freud’s theory of the superego has become the source and model for the conception of the 
internalisation of social norms […] in sociological thinking. […] What has happened is that 
internalisation has imperceptibly been equated with ‘learning’ or even ‘habit-formation’ in 
the simplest sense. Thus when a norm is said to have been ‘internalised’ by an individual, 
what is frequently meant is that he habitually both affirms it and conforms to it in his conduct. 
The whole stress on inner conflict, on the tension between powerful impulses and superego 
controls the behavioral outcome of which cannot be prejudged, drops out of the picture […] 
What is overlooked here is that the person who conforms may be even more ‘bothered’, that is, 
subject to guilt and neurosis, than the person who violates what are not only society’s norms 
but his own as well. […] To Freud, it is precisely the man with the strictest superego, he who 
has most thoroughly internalised and conformed to the norms of his society, who is most 
wrecked with guilt and anxiety […] Sociologists have appropriated the superego concept, but 
have separated it from any equivalent of the Freudian id […;] the presence in man of motiva-
tional forces bucking against the hold social discipline has over him is denied.
Psychological theories which build on the Freudian body of thought are more sensitive to 
these tensions, but here the controlling force of society at large, and the need to prepare 
the individual for the social roles he has to fulfil, are often under-stressed52.
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More recent sociological theories emphasise that socialisation processes need not by defini-
tion lead to the unilateral imprinting of strict, permanent behavioural rules. The trans-
mission of standards of conduct may vary, depending on the nature of the rules (e.g. par-
ents may be more inclined to socialise their religious or  political convictions than the 
value of self-determination, which could ultimately threaten family cohesion), and on 
characteristics of the socialiser (authoritarian or lower class parents may have other rules 
and rely more on disciplining and punishment than individualistic or middle class par-
ents) and the socialisee (e.g. different standards and socialisation methods being applied 
for girls and boys). Moreover, as children grow of age socialisation in the reverse direc-
tion may also occur, with parents adopting elements of the world view of their mature 
offspring (cf. Kohn, 1983). In more general terms, life course sociology stresses that indi-
viduals continue to adapt their convictions over the years, in response to changes in their 
environment. In modern societies this is in fact inevitable: communities are complex and 
volatile, the rules are more vague and fluid than in the past, and the traditional socialis-
ing actors (family, neighbours, church, political party, trade union) have lost significance 
in recent decades. The standardised, predictable life course of the past – a succession of 
social roles – has been replaced by singular personal biographies, with many transitions 
in social relationships and on the labour market. Individuals can no longer be equipped 
in their early years with a stable body of rules which can guide them through the rest of 
their lives. Instead they are forced to make choices and to give direction to their lives 
themselves. In doing so they compile their own life course; and to the extent that social-
isation takes place it assumes the form of a self-governed éducation permanente (Beck & 
Beck-Gersheim, 1994; Kohli, 2002; Geulen, 2002: 50-54).
Yet the question can be asked as to whether life-course sociology, in its tendency to 
set its face against the classic socialisation perspective, does not overestimate the ‘com-
pulsory autonomy’ of the modern citizen. Even in modern societies, the behaviour of 
individuals is still guided by institutions. It is plausible that formal rules, made or rati-
fied by the government, have over time become more important than informal rules. The 
role of the traditional socialising actors is however by no means played out, though in 
some areas they may have become less uniform and more fragmented, less ‘thick’. Even 
if the traditional nuclear family has become less stable, this does not necessarily mean 
that modern families no longer provide an effective socialisation context. If anything, 
the primary socialisation process seems to have intensified in recent decades: in West-
ern countries many parents, especially in the growing middle classes, try more actively 
than in the past to foster the development of language, personality and morality in their 
children. Naturally, this is called for by the increased complexity of society, but other fac-
tors promote it as well: the greater prosperity, higher education level and ambitions of 
many parents, the falling number of children and the more democratic relationships in 
modern families. Socialisation through formal education also appears to become more 
rather than less important. Indications for this are the growing participation and longer 
duration of schooling, the rising final qualification levels and the broadening of educa-
tional aims in the curriculum (such as the imparting of social skills). Certain traditional 
socialising actors (e.g. churches) have perhaps become less important, but it is plausi-
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ble that their role has partly been taken over by others (peers, the media, Internet com-
munities), whose behavioural expectations need not necessarily be less compelling. The 
life-course sociology approach rightly focuses attention on the permanent and dynamic 
nature of socialisation processes in modern societies, but may misjudge the degree to 
which the behavioural choices of individual actors are in fact predetermined.
It would be desirable to formulate a more integrated socialisation theory, which among 
other things adequately covers the various aspects of social integration and personalisa-
tion, the tension between the two, and the relative influence of the different socialisers 
in various phases and socio-historical circumstances (for an initial attempt, see: Hurrel-
mann, 2002). This theoretically interesting challenge goes beyond the scope of this study, 
however. Here we merely identify a number of possible basic principles:
1) Social rules are acquired by new actors within a process of socialisation. This not only 
imparts the existing knowledge and mores to them, but also entails a degree of indi-
vidual development (skills, aspects of identity). Newborn children are not completely 
malleable; they have their own developmental potential, which comes to fruition to 
some degree during the socialisation process. In reaching this point they pass through 
a number of general phases of development: a baby does not know what its mother 
approves and disapproves of; a four year-old can generally not understand algebra; 
and few adolescents are able to appreciate the beauty of the Goldberg Variations. The 
developmental process mirrors organic changes and is cumulative: each phase builds 
on the achievements in earlier stages, so that there is a form of path dependence in the 
personal development of individual actors. There is a fundamental tension between 
the transfer of the socio-historical institutions and the ‘personalisation’ of the indi-
vidual (development of identity, competences)53.
2) Socialisation is not a one-sided act on the part of socialisers, but an interaction pro-
cess which requires the socialisees to play an active role. Socialising acts by parents, 
teachers, friends, colleagues, etc. are only effective if the new actors are receptive to 
them and actually take them on board – i.e., understand their purpose and are able to 
incorporate them in ideas, competences and aspects of identity that they have already 
developed. Beyond early infancy, socialisation is therefore to a considerable degree a 
matter of self-regulation.
3) To a certain extent socialisation is a process of rule-driven interaction. Parents often want 
to meet the demands placed on ‘good’ mothers and fathers in their community; teach-
ers generally try to comply with the statutory requirements (completion of the cur-
riculum, achievement of certain attainment targets), as well as the expectations of 
their colleagues and the standards of their profession. The socialisees are expected to 
listen to their parents, to learn what they are taught at school, etc. On the other hand, 
the rules that govern socialisation are also often fairly vague, which means they offer 
little in the way of direction. They are also socially and historically variable: views on 
the best way to bring up and educate children change in response to developments in 
society, the dominant pedagogic views, political objectives, etc.
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4) Socialisation is not always intentional. In particular, primary socialisation does not 
involve the deliberate imprinting of generally applicable social rules. To a large extent 
it is based on the affective relations of socialisers and socialisees, and arises as a result, 
almost a side-effect, of their day-to-day interaction.
5) For a variety of reasons, socialisation is not self-evident. The envisaged socialisees may 
not respond to socialising attempts if they consider them contrary to their short-term 
interests (playing, watching tv, lounging) or to the development of competences that 
they personally value highly, such as practising sport or performing music. Socialis-
ers also do not automatically meet general social expectations. Parents, teachers, 
etc. are not by definition agents of society at large, but often have their own views 
on the socialisation process (goals, priorities, methods) and on what is good for the 
socialisees. Moreover, socialisers may not be familiar with dominant rules or may con-
sciously reject them; they can also be unwilling or unable to carry out socialising acts 
because these do not match their skills, priorities or interests. For example, a parent 
may decide not to teach their child to swim because they do not know that this is 
expected of them; because they consider swimming unnecessary, unclean, improper 
or dangerous; because they themselves are not good enough swimmers; or because, 
set against the expected return, taking their child to swim will cost too much in terms 
of time, money or trouble.
 In addition, the rules of different socialisers may conflict, for example if the rules on 
‘cleanliness’ or ‘honesty’ differ greatly at home and at school. It is also possible that 
the resources are inadequate. Children who fail to complete their education because 
there is too little money to buy teaching materials or because they have to contribute 
to the household income are the classic example of this. Finally, the mutual relations 
between socialisers and socialisees may be sparse or poor (no ‘connectedness’), so 
that there is no basis for socialising interactions.
6) The socialisation process is not uniform. Socialisees differ in their developmental 
potential and their method of self-regulation; their socialisers are not the same, and 
they may go through identical socialisation pathways in different ways. As a result, the 
socialisation process in theory generates a heterogeneous outcome, even with regard to 
characteristics that have become more or less anchored in individual actors at an early 
age. For example, individuals do not all acquire the same work ethic; they will attain a 
certain orientation towards this dominant value, depending on their competences and 
the specific slant placed on it in their family life, at school and in their circle of friends. 
It is not necessarily stable, but can change along with the labour market opportunities 
people perceive over time.
7) The process by which new actors acquire rules is socially and historically variable, both 
in terms of the phasing, the socialisers involved and their relative strengths. Tenta-
tively, and allowing for variation, in modern Western societies the following general 
pattern of rule acquisition can be assumed:
– In the first socialisation period very general informal rules are acquired, mainly in 
the family. This takes place more or less en passant: through the identification with 
significant others, through play, through listening to stories, etc. This is related to 
the understanding of language, symbolic actions, etc.
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– Everyday conventions, concrete social norms and practical competences then fol-
low. As well as the family, the school plays a key role here. Instruction and sanc-
tioning become more important, but depend on the way in which the socialisee 
processes them. For example, the socialisee learns to read and write, the rules of 
politeness, basic skills such as swimming, how to behave in traffic, etc.
– The next stage involves the development of higher values, personal identity and 
more theoretical knowledge. This involves a focus on abstract questions about the 
reasons for, the essence and the legitimacy of the societal rules. The family occu-
pies a less central position, while peers, church organisations, associations, etc. 
become more important. Schools focus on preparing the socialisee for working life 
or further education. The knowledge, skills and concrete behavioural rules that are 
needed for this move to centre stage, while the general training fades more into the 
background.
– The latter phase also involves a global familiarisation with the formal rules that 
apply in the socialisee’s own community. Mainly through education, the sociali-
see receives an impression of the existing distribution of rights and obligations 
and their legitimacy, as laid down by the government: the basic principles of the 
meta-rules, third-party recognition and government production (politics, civil law, 
criminal law). This is knowledge in outline: the extent and complexity of the for-
mal institutions means it is not efficient to bring the socialisees into contact with 
all details, all the more so because the rules can change rapidly. Only the formal 
rules which are very general (the Constitution) or important for their later working 
life (e.g. the statutory regulations governing bakery work) are discussed in more 
detail54. Beyond this, given the advanced division of labour, the socialisation of 
formal institutions mainly concerns ‘rule experts’: civil servant officials who draft 
laws, judges and lawyers who apply them, supervisory authorities, etc.
8) However, a number of comments can be made to qualify this presumed general pat-
tern. In the first place, the precise phasing can vary depending on the socialisees 
concerned, the socialisers with which they come into contact, and the social circum-
stances in which both exist. Secondly, the socialisation process is not complete once 
socially recognised adulthood has been reached. Rule acquisition continues in later 
life, and the perception of rules, required behaviour and social opportunities by indi-
vidual actors may change. This requires a less static view of socialisation processes, 
mainly by analysing them in terms of the life course of actors. A final comment is that 
even highly socialised rules cannot fully determine future behaviour. Many rules are 
general in nature, and if the behaviour of actors is not blatantly in conflict with them, 
they can partly choose their mode of action. For example, in open democratic socie-
ties adult persons sharing a household can determine for themselves how they want 
to treat each other socially and economically, as long as they do not manifestly contra-
vene the limits laid down by the government and their social community55. Here, the 
actors themselves may draw up many of the rules of their own particular relationship, 
without there being any question of direct socialising interactions involving others.
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2.9 The rule generation process: creation and development of institutions
The emphasis in the foregoing section was on the way in which existing institutions 
influence actors and bring about certain results. What was not discussed was how social 
rules arise and change; that is the focus of this section. Some supporters of the ‘new 
institutional economics’ discussed earlier have an unambiguous opinion on this. In their 
view, institutions and the associated enforcement mechanisms offer coordination gains 
in economic transactions. Rules such as these establish property rights, which can be 
understood as “an actor’s rights, which are recognized and enforced by other members 
of society, to use and control valuable resources” (Alston et al., 1996: 34). In this approach 
price mechanisms play a decisive role in the genesis and development of institutions. 
However, the prime cause is often sought in exogenous changes56, which are mostly tech-
nological in nature. The development of new farming methods, industrial production 
processes, communication facilities, etc. can alter the relative prices of labour, land and 
capital, and can also influence the transaction costs (measuring the value of goods, appli-
cation of sanctions).
According to this line of reasoning, a certain distribution of property rights in society 
reflects the interests of the actors, their negotiating power and the relative prices. These issues 
are often incorporated in the nie as a sort of four-part entity. Rights and interests are 
in principle correlated, based on the idea that it is efficient to attribute rights on the 
basis of interests: interested parties will generally ensure that rules are not contravened, 
because of the personal disadvantage they would suffer. Rational rule-makers will thus 
ensure that the allocation of property rights corresponds with the distribution of inter-
ests. Property rights and power are also theoretically strongly interrelated in the nie. The 
latter concept refers to the negotiating strength of contracting parties, and this form 
of power is often directly linked to the distribution of property rights. Thus Eggertsson 
(1996: 14) argues that:
The system of property rights [...] refers to the effective control, by individuals and groups, 
of valuable assets, including human capital. In other words, the system of property rights 
describes the distribution of power in society.
The relationship between the establishment of property rights and relative prices is rather 
more complex, but is also a very close one. On the one hand the existing rules influence 
the relative prices, mainly via the transaction costs. On the other hand, changes in rela-
tive prices may lead to the creation of new rules or the amendment of existing ones. Two 
types of explanation are generally given for institutional innovation in the nie. The first 
is direct: institutional change will take place when certain sources become so valuable 
or scarce as a result of exogenous developments that the transaction costs involved in 
measuring and enforcing property rights are no longer prohibitive, in other words are 
lower than the benefits that the actors concerned can expect from them in economic 
exchange. The second explanation reinforces the first. If exogenous developments lead 
to changes in the relative prices, it may be that the existing allocation of property rights 
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no longer reflects the interests and negotiating power of the actors. Those who regard 
themselves as disadvantaged after a price change will attempt to adjust the rules in such 
a way that justice is done to their interests and negotiating power. Those who have gained 
advantage will seek to maintain their position by insisting on rights acquired earlier and 
demanding new protective measures, for example via import levies and certification 
requirements.
The institutional structure created by such a process of change is sometimes regarded in 
the nie as a new and efficient optimum equilibrium. Some, such as North, follow a rather 
more sophisticated line of reasoning in which old rules that have become inefficient can 
survive and new or revised institutions may be sub-optimal. This is a consequence of the 
mechanism of path dependence, of the historically developed perceptions and prefer-
ences of rule-making actors, and of the disproportionate influence of certain actors on 
the rule definition – for example because they control the state apparatus.
In the nie paradigm, rules arise and change via negotiations between rational 
actors. Entrepreneurs and corporate actors play a key role in this process: they are often 
regarded as the carriers of institutional change. The importance that North attaches to 
entrepreneurs has already been discussed; elsewhere he stresses the innovative role of 
organisations: “It is the interaction between institutions and organizations that shape 
the institutional evolution of an economy” (North, 1998: 249). A similar notion is found 
in Coleman’s (1990: 531-552) related sociological approach. In his view, the growth in the 
number of corporate actors has meant that they increasingly determine the development 
of society; not only through the accumulation of capital and knowledge within organisa-
tions, but also because much social interaction is linked to corporate actors. The number 
of exchanges between organisations has increased greatly, and natural persons spend 
a large part of their lives acting as agents for the companies, government institutes and 
associations of which they form part.
2.9.1 The incentive to regulate
The nie’s view on institutional change can be criticised and complemented in a number 
of respects. Firstly, its direct cause is attributed to changes in relative prices. In figure 2.1 
price mutations were also presented as an incentive that may lead to rule amendments. 
This means that actors will desire new or different institutions if price changes imply that 
the proceeds of social interaction (discounting the transaction costs of measurement and 
rule-enforcing) after the introduction or revision of the rules are expected to be higher 
than previously.
In the figural model presented in §2.3, however, price changes are not the only cause of 
institutional change. This has to do in the first place with a slightly different theoretical 
view of power. In the nie, the distribution of power and the structure of property rights 
largely coincide – a standpoint in which, interestingly, some ‘neo-capitalist’ institutional 
economists find themselves on the same side as the authors of the Manifesto of the Com-
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munist Party57. In this approach, power is reduced to the capacity for control of what are 
regarded as valuable goods or events. Coleman (1990: 133) applies a similar definition of 
power, albeit a more subtle one:
The power of an actor resides in his control of valuable events; the value of an event lies in the 
interests powerful actors have in that event58.
Many sociologists consider such a view of power to be too limited. They argue that threat-
ening to apply coercion and the ability to arouse feelings of anxiety or fear in other actors 
are central aspects of the notion of power, without which phenomena such as suppres-
sion in man-woman relationships or the geopolitical relations between states cannot 
easily be understood (see e.g. Collins, 1991). Power is more than negotiating power, more 
than control over goods or events that are regarded as valuable. For this reason the classic 
Weberian definition, in which the emphasis lies on the ability to impose one’s own will 
on others, may be more accurate (Weber, 1988 [1922]: 28):
Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eignen Willen auch 
gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht59.
This sociological notion of power attaches central importance to coercion, or the threat 
of coercion. Its binding nature distinguishes power from influence, which implies more 
in the way of argumentation or suggestion, and in the final analysis cannot be enforced; 
and also from authority, in which certain power relations are regarded as legitimate by 
actors.
If power is defined in this broader sense, the connection with relative prices is theo-
retically looser than advocates of the nie assume. The power relations between actors can 
then also change if relative prices remain constant – think of political coups where one 
corrupt political regime is replaced by another. And this in turn implies that changes in 
the relative power of actors are in theory an independent source of institutional change.
Something similar holds for interests. In the nie this notion is taken mainly to represent 
the self-interest of rational actors, understood as the maximisation of the individual 
profit of certain actions for given preferences. Such an interpretation makes the role of 
interests in the process of institutional change relatively unproblematic. If a price change 
reduces the relative profit of economic exchanges, the self-interest of some actors will 
suffer. Assuming preferences remain unchanged they will then modify their behaviour 
or, if it is more profitable, seek to change the rules. They will succeed in this if they are 
able to generate sufficient negotiating power, for example by working together with 
other interested parties.
Theoretically, however, interests are not quite as uniform as the advocates of insti-
tutional economics presume. Interests can be defined as everything that serves the 
well-being or utility of actors, and what those actors therefore wish to see assured. This 
embraces more than individual self-interest. Actors may also attach importance to inter-
ests that they share with others: the collective interests of the family, the firm, the social 
class and the nation-state. It is moreover a dialectic concept: interests become most 
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sharply defined when they come into conflict with others, and it is doubtful whether they 
can be truly general60. Such conflicts of interest can occur between persons, organisa-
tions, and corporate actors and their agents. However, a single actor may also experi-
ence conflicting interests, for example double-earners who have to try and reconcile the 
interests of their personal career, the interests of their employer and those of their fam-
ily. Finally, the temporal perspective of the actor is also important: short and long-term 
interests can differ markedly.
If interests can be so diverse, they can play a role in the process of institutional change 
that goes beyond the intermediating reflex of homo economicus to price changes. What 
weighs most heavily in the diversity of interests and potential conflicts of interest is not 
known a priori, but can vary according to the social system, the historical circumstances 
and the perceptions of the actors. Competitive markets are strongly driven by individual 
or corporate self-interests, and in those circumstances such interests can indeed play 
an important role in the definition of rules. In other social systems, such as families, 
the collective interests are likely to weigh more heavily, and the rules will be drawn up 
and amended in that light. Moreover, the conflicts of interest can change within a given 
social system. Historical developments can lead to the emergence or decline of certain 
types of actor that share specific interests. At the level of a society, for example, this may 
concern an increase in the number of workers due to industrialisation, of older people 
due to population ageing, of benefit claimants due to the growth of social security; or in 
the demise of maidservants or casual workers in agriculture. In the economic subsystem 
this can be translated into the rise and fall of corporate actors, for example due to tech-
nological developments or changed competitive relations (e.g. the emergence of Internet 
companies, the declining importance of farms in the economic process of Western coun-
tries). In the micro socio-economic systems this also plays a role: if families grow in size 
or dwindle, the conflicts of interest within them will become different.
Actor interests need also not be stable. If the share of women in the potential labour 
force does not change but they wish to work more often, this group of actors will attach 
more importance to good childcare facilities. If actors share certain interests, or if their 
priorities change, the societal conflicts of interest will also change. This can result in 
some actors desiring different rules, and this is therefore also a potential source of insti-
tutional change.
Figure 2.1 also includes a direct cause of institutional change which is absent in the 
standard nie theory: the support for certain ideals. Reference was made earlier to the 
autonomous role that North attributes in the process of rule-making to the ideas or 
preferences of actors, citing the example of the impact of the American movement to 
abolish slavery61. Here this factor is presented more specifically as support for ideals, or the 
backing that exists among actors for plans to structure social systems differently. This is 
conceptually distinct from the historical development of such ideals, and also from the 
informal institutions. The latter consist of rules that have already been accepted: values, 
norms,  conventions and informal contracts may well have an idealistic charge, but they 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   88 21-9-2009   15:08:40
89i n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y
 2
are behavioural guidelines that have already been recognised and which by definition 
cannot be a source of institutional change.
Support for ideals can in the first place be thought of as ‘the feelings of the common 
people’ in an autocracy, or as ‘public opinion’ in a democracy. However, it encompasses 
more than this: it is also about ideas for change as advocated by those in power, views 
regarding the desired structure of the social system which prevail among professional 
advisors (civil servants, philosophers, priests, scientists), and the ideas for the future pro-
pounded by influential corporate actors (companies, administrators, idealistic organisa-
tions). At issue here is the support for change ideals. These are not necessarily progressive 
or emancipatory, but may also be directed towards the restoration of institutions that 
have been lost, or towards assumed traditions of the community or nation which never 
existed in reality.
A fundamental question is whether ideals really play an independent role in institu-
tional change. From a strict rational choice perspective this is not the case. For example, 
following Coleman’s analysis of revolutions62, it may be expected that actors will desire a 
new rule or a rule change if they believe that:
– They have a key interest in this, i.e. they believe that the new rule will promote a form 
of well-being or utility to which the actor attaches importance;
– An attempt to change a rule has a sufficient chance of succeeding at acceptable cost. Put 
differently, the present power relations mean that the change is likely to be attainable, 
and the costs to the actor of the change process will probably not be excessive;
– The rule change may fail, but in that case will probably result in acceptable costs (nega-
tive sanctions).
In such an approach, an actor will never wish to see rules drawn up that do not mirror his 
interests, are not attainable or which carry too high a penalty in the event of failure. In a 
bounded rationality variant, there are a number of obvious exceptions to this scheme of 
thought. Desires for rules that go against key interests are then for example possible if the 
interests, power relations and gains of the behaviour are unclear in advance, or when actors 
are manipulated or bribed, base their preferences on the authority of others, are ill, etc.
In taking this line, however, the rational choice approach fails to acknowledge the 
role that convictions can play in the process of institutional change. People may want 
different rules simply because they feel that they are better, even though the change goes 
against their main interests. Radical rule changes are sometimes only possible if people 
ignore their current personal or collective interests63 and are prepared to accept the heavy 
negative sanctions that come with failure as the price of their convictions. In the process 
leading to the independence of India and Pakistan, the conflicts of interest between the 
British administrators and the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh elites and the other population 
groups played a central role; but the support that Gandhi managed to engender for his 
convictions helped to determine the institutional path that was ultimately taken.
This does not mean that changes in the support for ideals always provide a stimulus for 
institutional change. This factor, too, may be of subordinate significance in certain social 
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systems and historical circumstances (the rules for a trade fair, an autocratic regime that 
is in firm control). In other contexts, however, they will be decisive for the process of rule 
change. This applies above all for the drafting of formal rules in a democratic society, 
where power relations are instable and the costs for expressing dissent are low. In such 
a situation public opinion may be of decisive importance; and the success of politicians 
and policymakers then largely depends on the support they are able to generate for their 
own ideals, for example by controlling or manipulating the mass media.
Summarising, institutional change theoretically occurs when new or different rules 
are more profitable as a result of relative price mutations, are opportune because of 
changed power relations, are in line with changing conflicts of interest, or are desirable 
on account of a wider distribution of certain wishes for the future. The socially weighted 
sum of changes in these four factors possibly provides an incentive to regulate, but there 
is no fixed connection or causal arrangement, as in the nie theory discussed earlier. Some 
of the logical possibilities are:
(1) Direct incentive: Δ(A) →   Δ(i),  with B,C,D (x1)
(2) Blocked incentive: Δ(A) → ~Δ(i),  with B,C,D (x1)
(3) Indirect incentive: Δ(A) →   Δ(B,C,D) →  Δ(i)
where:
A, B, C, D:   relative prices, power relations, conflicting interests, support for ideals 
(in random order)
i :   incentive to regulate
x1 :   initial level
Δ :   change
~    :   not
→ :   induces
In the case of a direct incentive (1), a change in one of the four factors (A) offers a stimulus 
for change because the other factors (B, C and D) do not prevent this at that moment. 
This occurs, for example, when a relative price change makes another rule more efficient, 
and the existing conflicts of interest, power relations and support for ideals do not in 
principle impede a rule change. The latter is the case, by contrast, with a blocked incentive 
(2). Rule changes which would be efficient following price changes may for example be 
blocked by those in power, the vested interests or dominant ideals. With an indirect incen-
tive (3), a change in A does not in itself provide a sufficient stimulus, but it does facilitate 
changes in B, C, and/or D, leading to an incentive for rule change. It may for example be 
the case that changes in the conflict of interests between pensioners and those in work 
do not lead directly to a redefinition of the social rules, but do indirectly promote such 
institutional change because they work through into support for certain ideals among 
the electorate.
All manner of variations on these basic schemes are possible; for example, simultane-
ous unrelated changes may take place in the incentive factors, which reinforce or impede 
each other. Of course, the magnitude of such changes is also crucial for the stimulus for 
rule amendments. Whether or not a given incentive is translated into new rules depends, 
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moreover, on the perception that actors have of that incentive (their desire for new rules), 
the degree to which those perceptions work through into concrete rule-setting activities, 
and the result thereof. Before going into this in more detail, however, it is necessary to 
look briefly at the underlying causes of institutional change.
2.9.2 Underlying causes of institutionalisation: the historical process
If an incentive to regulate ensues from changes in relative prices, power relations, con-
flicts of interests and support for ideals, the obvious follow-up question is how such 
mutations are brought about. Theoretically, the underlying causes of institutionalisation 
are related to the historical process at the collective level.
According to advocates of the nie, technological and scientific developments are an impor-
tant driving force in the historical process. These may concern material production, 
with the most prominent examples being major breakthroughs such as the agricultural 
and industrial revolutions, developments in military technology (weapons, logistics), 
the growing importance of biotechnology and information technology, etc. Changes in 
immaterial knowledge, such as different methods of funding and actuarial calculations 
in commercial dealings, as well as scientific insights into the functioning of the economy 
and society, can however also be included here. Such developments increase the labour 
participation rate and change the relative prices, making them a driver of the economic 
process.
In figure 2.1, technological and scientific developments are also a potentially impor-
tant underlying cause of institutional change. However, three comments need to be made 
here. First, their influence does not operate only via relative prices: technological devel-
opments can also influence the power relations, conflicts of interests and support for 
ideals. Examples might include changing relations between those who have and do not 
have access to new military technology, alterations in the conflicts of interest between 
workers and capital-holders after the introduction of a new production method, and the 
impact on public opinion of scientifically presented ideas on environmental policy.
Second, the development of knowledge and technology also may depend on the 
existing institutions. North (1990) argues in this connection that the institutional frame-
work determines what knowledge and skills actors will acquire, and that this is decisive 
for the direction the evolution of a society will take64. Or in terms of the figural model 
used here: not only can institutional changes ensue from developments in technology 
and knowledge, which work through in the incentive to regulate; but the existing rules 
also determine the form of knowledge accumulation that is attractive for the actors. This 
steers their knowledge-driven actions, and thus influences technological and scientific 
development.
Thirdly, technological and scientific developments are theoretically not the only 
underlying cause of institutional change. In figure 2.1, several types of historical deter-
minants are distinguished. This point will be examined in more detail below.
The economic process is presented in the figural model as an independent underlying 
cause of institutionalisation. This mainly refers to changes in the collective wealth and 
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its distribution. These are the result of the economic actions of actors at micro-level: 
the way in which, given a certain rule structure, they employ production factors. The 
development of the national (or regional, or supranational) product is the core variable 
in the economic process. Theoretically, many other economic factors lie at the basis of 
this process: changes in private consumption and savings, investments by government 
and industry, imports and exports, the monetary, trade and redistributive policy pursued 
by the government, and so on. And the degree of growth of the collective wealth also 
has economic consequences: it works through into the development of wages, profits, 
benefits and the degree of capacity utilisation of the production apparatus. This in turn 
has implications for supply and demand on the labour market (and thus for the unem-
ployment rate), and for the distribution of national income. Feedback mechanisms – in 
particular via consumption, savings and investments – mean that this in turn influences 
collective production.
The precise relationship between all these aspects of the economic process is of 
less importance here (for an overview of the most important relationships see e.g. De 
Kam et al., 1989: 104; Douben, 1986: 80-95). What does need to be pointed out is that the 
development of the core variable, the national product or national income, can be influ-
enced in the long term by technological change, but is not entirely determined by it. For 
shorter economic cycles the above endogenous determinants, and factors that lie outside 
national economic systems (such as prices on the world market, international economic 
developments), may be more important in explaining changes in the level and distribu-
tion of collective wealth.
This implies that the inherent dynamic of the economic process can also bring about 
changes in the incentive to regulate, independently of technological developments. 
Changes in the collective wealth and its distribution are reflected mainly in mutations in 
relative prices, the exacerbation or easing of the conflicts of interest between economic 
actors (companies, trade unions, employers’ organisations), and changes in their rela-
tive negotiating power. This becomes evident, for example, during deep economic reces-
sions; these can cause firms and governments to want to redefine the prevailing rights 
and obligations of employees, trading partners and citizens, often under the motto of 
‘necessity knows no law’.
The concept of social structuring refers to two constituent processes. The first is social dif-
ferentiation, i.e. the development of recognisable groups of actors within a social system. 
Examples include the rise and fall of the nobility, the citizenry, the working class, rich and 
poor groups, single-parent families, etc. The second process is social stratification. This 
relates to mutations in the position of such groups of actors in the social rankings, or 
changes in the social strata65. Social stratification can imply that the position of certain 
groups on a given social ladder changes, for example if the prestige of teachers declines. It 
is however also possible for changes to occur in the ladders themselves, i.e. the principles 
of social ranking that apply within a given society. The actors’ descent (social class, caste, 
racial or ethnic origin) may be the dominant stratification criterion, but so may their eco-
nomic position or opportunities (economic classes, income groups, profession), their social 
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status (prestige, fame) or their capacities and achievements (meritocratic principles).
The two processes of social structuring are allied to the allocation of social positions 
and the distribution of scarce goods, or in other words social inequality (see e.g.  Dronkers 
& Ultee, 1995). This means that there is also a certain relationship with the economic 
process, especially in class-based societies, where economic differentials define the 
hierarchy of the various groups. However, contrary to what is assumed in the Marxist 
tradition, social structuring is not by definition an epiphenomenon of the economic 
process; at most this may be the case in specific historical circumstances.
If the groups, their position in the ranking, or the stratification criteria change, this 
can impact on the incentive to regulate. The conflicts of interest can take on another 
guise (e.g. from status groups to economic classes), the support for certain ideals that are 
linked to new criteria or strata may increase (e.g. backing of universal suffrage instead of 
voting rights based on property ownership), the relative prices may be influenced (e.g. 
because a growing group of workers are collectively able to negotiate higher wages), and 
the existing distribution of power may be contested (e.g. by new groups demanding rep-
resentatives to be appointed in strategic government functions).
According to the figural model social structuring does not however determine the 
rules of society, as is sometimes assumed in Marxist theory. The relationship between 
the social structure and institutions is dialectic. On the one hand institutions are partly 
the result of social structuring, because dominant groups will always try to shape those 
rules for their own benefit. It is not automatically the case that they will succeed, how-
ever, because the existing social rankings are not the only engine driving the process of 
institutionalisation. In the historical process the other factors mentioned above also are 
a driving force; and the actual rule outcomes also depend on how actors incorporate the 
changed incentive in their rule-creating activities. Thus, institutionalisation is certainly 
not a simple carbon copy of the existing social order.
Conversely, the formal and informal rules also theoretically influence the social 
structuring. They direct the behaviour of actors; and the collective results of these acts 
can confirm or change social differentiation and stratification. Thus, for example, social 
security rules may reproduce the relationships between social classes, if the collective 
rules guarantee more extensive rights to the higher than to the lower strata. It is however 
also possible that they will promote the emancipation of backward groups, by assuring 
everyone of a relatively high subsistence minimum.
Elite-formation is a special aspect of social stratification. Elites are more than the highest 
strata in a social system: they are groups that give direction to the institutional develop-
ment. This is reflected in a definition such as that given by Thoenes (1962: 5), who sees a 
social elite as
A constituent group, which claims the role of knowing, realising and enforcing the precepts 
which determine the structure, functions or development of the wider society or a section of it.
This implies that elites can act as rule-prophets, rule-innovators and rule-protectors. 
Thoenes sees these as different stages in the process of elite-formation, in which the 
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message is first announced, the plan it entails is then realised, and the order achieved 
after the implementation of the scheme is maintained.
The actual influence of elites on the process of institutional development depends on 
a number of factors. First, of course, is their perception and appreciation of the prevail-
ing social rules. Also important is the extent to which they are able to secure key social 
positions or, in the terms used by Pareto (1968 [1901], 1935 [1916]), the extent to which they 
belong to the ‘governing elite’: monarchs, ministers, mps, senior civil servants, policy 
advisors, military personnel, captains of industry, and spiritual leaders. This depends 
not only on their own power and insights, but also on the selection behaviour of other 
actors, within the formal and informal rules that apply (the political institutions66: the 
electoral laws, traditions on the succession of rulers, etc.). Finally, a number of structural 
features of elites are also important. To what extent is the ruling elite internally homog-
enous or heterogeneous, and to what extent does it enjoy the loyalty of the lower strata 
(voters, the middle classes, workers, farmers)? And above all: are the governing elites 
open or closed? In the former case members of the lowest strata can penetrate the rul-
ing social groups. This may provide a stimulus for gradual changes to the rules, because 
the perceptions of these newcomers often diverge; they have been raised with different 
ideals, represent other interests, do not seek to use power solely at the benefit of the 
traditionally dominant groups, and may be more sensitive to changes in relative prices. 
In the case of a closed elite, however, the leaders form a stable group with homogenous 
interests and a common social background (going to the same schools, shared networks, 
norms and values, distinctive language and behavioural conventions), who recruit suc-
cessors from their own circles and progeny. A governing elite such as this will not readily 
set in motion institutional changes, even when economic or social circumstances make 
this desirable. In such a case, the succession of generations will not provide an impulse 
to amend the social rules, since the members of this elite are largely interchangeable: 
‘the King is dead, long live the King’. Institutional renewal can then only take place as a 
result of elite circulation: the rise of counter-elites that advocate rule-innovation, com-
pete with the governing elite and are able to completely or partially replace it.
The societal role of elites is often associated with undemocratic relationships and 
social stagnation: the inevitable, seemingly natural rule of an autocratic minority over 
the majority, which reinforces the status quo. Elite-formation can however also play an 
important role in a democratic context, and in theory can lead both to institutional sta-
bility and rule change. This argument has been elaborated by Thoenes (1962: 187-228) in 
his analysis of the role of elites in modern welfare states. He contrasts a closed ‘elite of 
officials’, which puts itself forward as the protector of the existing order on the basis of 
quasi scientific knowledge, with an ‘open sociology’, which acts as an intellectual van-
guard, and among other things criticises the foundations of society and delineates the 
political problems of the future. Whether certain elites wish to preserve or change the 
prevailing rules is ultimately an empirical question, not a matter of natural or historical 
inevitability. The Enarques in France provide an example of this: created with the aim to 
select the best people for key social positions in an open process, in practice they increas-
ingly form a closed and fairly conservative elite67.
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The formation of ideals is a process that is concerned with the development of new ideas 
about the future design of a social system. In essence, ideals are subjective constructs, 
although they can be underpinned by scientific insights. They may be vague ideas for the 
future – the desirability of a strong military apparatus, public transport, the long-term 
‘mission’ of an organisation – but cohesive and elaborate sets of ideals are also possible. 
If these are constructed around one or a limited number of fundamental future goals, it is 
possible to speak of an ideology. Ideologies can be supported by elites and social groups 
with an interest in achieving the future aims they espouse; in figure 2.1, however, they 
are not equated with their supporters or the social stratification process68. Political idea 
systems (such as liberalism, socialism, fascism), religious Weltanschauungen and policy 
doctrines (e.g. imperialism) are the most pronounced examples. In these ideologies indi-
vidual freedom, equality, a powerful nation surrounding a strong leader, living in accord-
ance with religious principles, and expansion of the territorial or economic domination 
are respectively the core objectives.
To some extent the development of ideals has its own dynamic. The process is often 
based on the insights of a vanguard of intellectual and social entrepreneurs. Personal 
qualities, experiences and sensitivity to the Zeitgeist, or what moves the people, all play 
a role here. On the other hand, the formation of ideals is not an entirely autonomous 
process; it is controlled in part by other aspects of the historical process: technological 
innovations, economic developments, and changing social oppositions can lead to the 
identification of new problems that require a solution. Communication facilities and the 
existing rule structure are theoretically also important. In a restrictive setting they make 
it impossible to express certain ideals: the technology to communicate with other inter-
ested parties does not exist or is not accessible, or the rules attach severe negative sanc-
tions to the dissemination of certain ideals. In an open society there are ample opportu-
nities for communication and there is a free, independent and highly diversified media, 
fostering the formation of new and competing ideals through open public debate.
New ideals can have a direct influence on institutional development if they engender 
support among (part of ) the ruling elite, a counter-elite or the lower strata, so that their 
rule wishes change. Theoretically, however, they can also influence the rule structure via 
the other incentives, if the formation of different ideas concerning the desirable future 
design of a social system means that actors begin interpreting the conflicts of interest, 
power relations and relative prices differently.
The demographic process relates to changes in the size and composition of a social system 
due to births, mortality, household formation and internal/external migration. This can 
have consequences for the economic process (e.g. the size of the potential labour force, 
the ageing of the population) and certain forms of social stratification, such as the emer-
gence of oppositions between the existing lower class and new immigrants who compete 
with them on the housing or labour market. However, demographic developments may 
also be significant apart from their influence on the collective wealth and social hierar-
chy. If the relative size of demographic groups changes, the conflicts of interest, power 
relations, relative prices and support for certain ideals within a given social system can 
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also evolve. Ceteris paribus, this may cause the distribution of rule wishes in the popula-
tion to change, and especially in a democratic society this can impact on institutional 
development.
The figural model also contains a reference to exogenous factors that can influence the 
historical process. These are developments that take place outside the social system in 
question, such as natural disasters, developments abroad, and so on. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that the influence of the historical process on the incentive to regulate can 
be either evolutionary or take place in sudden jolts. The latter can occur, for example, 
when a governing elite is replaced at a stroke as a result of a revolution or occupation by 
a foreign power.
2.9.3 The regulatory aspirations of actors
On the assumption that the underlying historical developments do actually provide an 
incentive to regulate, under what conditions will actors desire new or different rules? 
According to the proponents of the nie, this is a fairly linear process: if relative prices 
change structurally, rational actors will want to amend the existing rules or establish 
new ones, if they believe they will profit from this and expect that they can realise the 
envisaged change. However, a number of comments can be made to qualify this idea of 
an automatic reflex.
In the first place, it is not so much the objective changes that are important, but 
above all the subjective perception of those changes by the stakeholders. North (1990: 85) 
states the following in this connection:
Changing relative prices are filtered through pre-existing mental constructs that shape our 
understanding of those price changes. Clearly ideas, and the way they take hold, play a role 
here.
This means that the perceptions of actors, as discussed in §2.7, help to determine the con-
version of the incentive to regulate into rule wishes. It is not enough that prices, power 
relations, conflicts of interest or ideals change. Actors must also become aware of this – the 
transparency of information is an intermediating factor – and regard it as worthwhile to 
create new rules. These new rules must match their personal objectives, interests and ide-
als more closely, and must appear likely to generate higher returns than if the rules were 
left unchanged. In their perception, creating new rules must also be a better solution than 
the alternatives that are possible within the existing rules. A relative price change need not 
lead to rule amendments: actors may consider it better to accept their loss, modify their 
behaviour within the prevailing prescripts, or break the existing rules.
Furthermore, actors are often not free to desire entirely new rules. The historical 
institutionalism discussed earlier refers to the intermediating role of current rules, or 
the path dependence. The existing institutional framework forms a socio-historical filter, 
through which, for example, technological innovations in different social systems can 
lead to divergent results. This is because of the investment in the existing rules, which 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   96 21-9-2009   15:08:41
97i n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y
 2
means that abolishing them would entail costs; and it is also because the subjective per-
ceptions and evaluations of actors, especially policymakers, are often an extension of the 
existing rules, so that for them certain changes are inconceivable. North (1990) is even 
more explicit; he explains the self-reinforcing operation of rules on the basis of their 
increasing returns (in the case of existing institutions the high initial investments need 
no longer be made), the favourable effect on economic and social interaction (the coor-
dination gains), learning effects, and the apprehension of reality in terms of the exist-
ing rules by actors. In a perfect market path dependence is theoretically inconceivable, 
because the most efficient solution will always be chosen. Because markets are generally 
not perfect in practice, North argues that exogenous changes often result in adaptations 
of the rules that fit in with the historical developments to that point. In fact, as stated, he 
sees path dependence not as a linear process in which the past determines the future, but 
rather as a guiding principle.
Based on this it may be assumed that existing institutions will have a stronger influ-
ence on the direction of changes in the rules as:
– The initial material and social costs of new rules are higher;
– The coordination gains of the existing rules in the economic and social arena is 
higher;
– The existing institutions are more strongly embedded in other rules (high/low, for-
mal/informal);
– The existing institutions correspond with the subjective rules of actors.
In figure 2.1 path dependence is not shown as an abstract socio-historical principle, but 
as an intersubjective brake on the rule wishes of actors at the micro/level. The reason for 
this is that path dependence occurs only when actors acknowledge the significance of 
the existing rules, and endorse them either consciously or pre-reflexively. Theoretically, 
therefore, an existing rule with objectively high coordination returns can be abolished 
if the rule-making actors do not acknowledge or no longer want its social benefits – for 
example in times of political revolution.
The nature of rule wishes
It is of course impossible in general to predict what kind of rules actors will desire. This 
depends on the characteristics of the actors concerned, the nature and strength of the 
incentive to regulate and the historical circumstances: which rules already exist, how 
strong is the resultant path dependence, and what is the nature of the community and 
government that has to support the institutions? Yet a number of theoretical observa-
tions can be made concerning the nature of the regulatory aspirations.
Clearly, in determining their wishes actors will take account of the possibilities 
offered by the community and the government to establish rules. It is attractive to seek 
regulation by the government where a community does not share any higher values and 
social norms, where communication is defective, where the members distrust each other 
or are not willing to sanction defective behaviour. Similarly, if the government is weak, 
fails to keep its promises, is corrupt or is dominated by a limited number of actors, it will 
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be better to seek to establish informal rules. Logically, there is little point in seeking reg-
ulation if neither the community nor the government provides a sufficient basis for this.
If effective institutions can in principle be created both via the community and via 
the government, informal rules have certain advantages. Once they are established they 
are cheap, and at the lower levels (mutual agreements, conventions) are fairly flexible, so 
that they can be adapted quickly to changed circumstances. Formal rules may turn out to 
be more expensive: establishing them can be a lengthy process, and because the enforce-
ment is entirely external the social and economic transaction costs can be higher because 
of the need for monitoring and sanctioning. On the other hand, they have the advantage 
of being easier to control, in contrast to values and higher social norms which are diffi-
cult for individual actors to influence and which can develop largely autonomously.
Since formal and informal institutions can generally not be seen in isolation from 
each other, wise rule-making actors do not lose sight of the prevailing informal practices 
when framing new formal rules, and vice versa. If the discrepancy between institutions 
is too great, the new rule may turn out to be ineffective and become undermined after a 
certain time – for example because breaking of the new formal rules has to be tolerated 
due to persistent informal traditions.
Finally, actors will generally try to establish rules at the lowest hierarchical level that 
can achieve the intended coordination. One does not change the Constitution in order 
to accomplish something that can be attained by amending an obscure implementation 
decree.
If wishes for new rules emerge, the envisaged rule components – rights, duties, conditions 
and possible sanctions – need to be specified. Existing higher institutions – values, higher 
social norms, meta-rules and existing government regulations – can serve as a guide here, 
without the new rules being derived directly from them. If, by contrast, the aspired regu-
lation targets existing institutions, the question is which rule components will be given 
central importance. Theoretically it is plausible that actors will first wish to modify the 
sanctions associated with an existing institution, then the conditions, subsequently the 
duties, and finally the rights. Adapting the available sanctions is the least drastic measure 
in terms of the original aim of the rule. It leaves the claims and commitments intact, and 
is focused primarily on the correct application of the existing rule. Changing the condi-
tions attached to rights and duties theoretically constitutes a greater adaptation of the 
rule, since it influences directly the number and composition of the beneficiaries and 
those held under obligation. However, the core of the rule, the rights and duties as such, 
remains intact when the conditions are amended. The next logical step is to change the 
duties, because this is less fundamental than redefining the rights. This follows on from 
the view by Raz cited earlier, namely that duties are usually derived from rights, and can 
therefore be adapted more readily to changed social circumstances. Following this line of 
reasoning, changing rights is theoretically the most radical option.
In practice, however, it cannot be taken as read that actors will always focus their rule 
wishes on changing the sanction mechanisms, and will as far as possible seek to leave 
the rights unchanged. Considerations of proportionality can play a role: if something is 
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perceived by actors as a major collective problem, this may require radical changes which 
cannot be achieved simply by changing the possible sanctions. The outcome of earlier 
change attempts may also influence actors’ rule wishes. For example, if it has already 
been tried to achieve a given result by tightening up the negative sanctions, and if this 
has failed, there will in time be a move to review the higher rule components. In addi-
tion, the expected costs of rule change will also play a role. Increasing the sanction pos-
sibilities may require more resources, and limited adaptation of the conditions, duties or 
rights may then be cheaper. Finally, pragmatic considerations – the expected ability to 
achieve the particular amendments during the rule interaction – can be decisive in shap-
ing the rule wishes that actors put forward in practice.
Innovating actors
A final point here is the question of which actors articulate the rule wishes. In other 
words, who are the carriers of institutional change? As stated, proponents of the nie 
accord a central role to entrepreneurs and corporate actors. However, both invite some 
qualification. With regard to entrepreneurs, it first has to be noted that the nie econo-
mists are inclined to define them as people who bring about fundamental changes in the 
rules, so that it is not clear why precisely these individuals carry institutional change. 
Furthermore, the term is sometimes used ambiguously, which can create the impression 
that every businessman is potentially an entrepreneur. In reality, of course, they are spe-
cific actors, often with controversial ideas about business and society. They need not be 
businessmen at all; it can just as easily be visionary scientists or politicians that play a key 
role in the process of institutional renewal. Thirdly, it is sometimes made insufficiently 
clear that entrepreneurs are also a historical product. Not only must they have innovative 
ideas, but they must also be the right person at the right place and time. Institutional 
renewal occurs when entrepreneurial qualities coincide with historical opportunities; 
in other words, when certain social developments foster the rule changes proposed by 
innovative actors, and the prevailing rules are not so strict that they exclude any pos-
sibility of change. Ultimately, proponents of the nie often see entrepreneurs too much 
as gifted loners, ignoring their social background. In reality entrepreneurs can also fulfil 
their innovative role as members of a counter-elite, with a commitment to certain ideals 
and protecting the interests of particular social groups. They are not by definition iso-
lated geniuses, but often people who are rooted in specific forms of social stratification.
There is also more that can be said about the innovative role of corporate actors. 
Ingram (1998: 259), for example, points out that economists are inclined to overestimate 
the innovation potential of organisations. They are not infinitely adaptable entities that 
continuously gather knowledge and use it to enable them to respond flexibly to changing 
circumstances. Rather, many organisations tend towards inertia, both for internal rea-
sons (investments made, the raising of precedents to normative standards) and because 
of external factors, such as statutory constraints on changing business activities, the 
desire to protect existing exchange relationships with other organisations, and the risk 
of loss of legitimacy and reputation after radical changes. Ingram’s reasoning applies a 
fortiori for government actors: these often have a long history, their goals are sometimes 
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vague and unstable, and they have to reconcile a diversity of interests from the perspec-
tive of what is collectively acceptable.
The best assumption is probably that institutional change is borne mainly by rela-
tively new actors, with the capacity to cast doubt on the adequacy of the existing rules. 
They may be individual normative entrepreneurs, who are not affiliated with the ancien 
régime; they may be members of a new generation; they may be a counter-elite on the 
rise; or they may be new organisations. Such actors have three key advantages: they have 
invested less in the existing institutions, they often benefit less from them, and they per-
ceive reality less strongly in terms of the prevailing rules. This makes them more sensitive 
to the shortcomings of the existing rules and the advantages of institutional renewal.
2.9.4 Rule-interaction and institutionalisation
The fact that central actors wish to change the rules in response to changed incentives 
does not automatically mean that this will actually happen. Much depends on the inher-
ent dynamic of the social process in which rules are constructed (negotiations, competing 
issues, short-term and long-term objectives). The creation of rules usually requires inter-
action between interested parties. Even in the most asymmetrical relationship imagina-
ble – the relationship between slaves and their masters – rules cannot be imposed entirely 
one-sidedly, but are to a certain degree negotiable69. Rule-interactions generate a certain 
amount of (re-) institutionalisation: the adaptation of existing rules, the introduction of 
new ones. In figure 2.1 three types of rule-interaction are presented: the drawing up of 
formal and informal contracts between actors (private contracting); the policy process in 
which the government rules are defined; and the evolution of informal rules.
Private contracting
To the extent that proponents of the nie analyse rule-interaction, they have in mind 
mainly private contracting. The simplest example of this is an agreement between two 
individual businessmen on a direct exchange of goods. This agreement may come about 
through extensive negotiations resulting in the drawing up of a formal contract; but it 
can also take shape as a result of traditional bartering methods, in which the bargain is 
sealed with a handshake or a symbolic statement. As already noted, such forms of rule-
interaction always take place within the framework of higher rules. In the former case 
the formal embedding of the agreement within prevailing mercantile law is important, 
while in the latter case it is the shared informal behavioural expectations of the actors 
(including the sanctions in the event of non-compliance) that are decisive. Institutional 
change is given form here via the renegotiation of existing agreements and by including 
different stipulations when entering into new commitments. As stated earlier, private 
economic contracts can incorporate much more: the economic exchange may extend 
over a longer period, may take place between corporate actors, may include several con-
tracting  partners, and may proceed via third parties. The negotiations on the rules then 
become more complex and lengthy, because intricate interests can be involved and more 
provisions have to be made for the conflicts that are more likely to occur.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   100 21-9-2009   15:08:41
101i n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y
 2
In the case of social exchanges at micro-level, such as entering into affective rela-
tionships, the interaction on the rules to be followed is often less explicit. Sometimes 
concrete promises and agreements are made which define the mutual rights and obliga-
tions of the actors. A ceremony or ritual act may be linked to this, whereby the govern-
ment formalises the union, or the community ratifies it. More frequently, however, the 
rule-interaction in social exchanges is dynamic. It is a process in which people gradually 
develop tacit expectations about the mutual rights and obligations, and adapt them as 
the circumstances change. This is governed by subjective derivations from the prevailing 
social norms and conventions, the past and recent experiences of the actors concerned, 
and their knowledge and present appraisal of their partner.
Defining government rules
The policy process that gives rise to the meta-rules, rules on government production 
and third-party recognition is the core of historical institutionalism (see §2.1). In this 
approach it is mainly the formal decision-making in representative democracies that is 
analysed. This is a long-lasting exchange of rule wishes between groups with diverging 
interests. The legislative assembly is the platform for rule-interaction, though the latter 
is also influenced by the executive and judiciary powers. The relationship between the 
various administrative layers of the government plays a role as well. The civil service can 
be an influential link: officially bound to loyalty to those with political responsibility, but 
in practice often an ‘officials’ elite’ which is inclined to impede institutional change. This 
tendency is related to their sensitivity to the collective and personal costs of rule change, 
and this is often reinforced by their knowledge of the policy dossiers and the informal 
codes of the civil service, which are directed towards continuity of the policy process.
Single actors, such as private citizens and firms, generally do not have a direct say in 
the terms of the government rules, unless they form part of the administrative elite. They 
can seek to exert an influence through lobbying, protest actions, public hearings and 
objection procedures, and through participation in interactive decision-making. Corpo-
rate actors who are organised around certain interests (trade unions, employers’ organi-
sations, quangos, idealistic single-issue organisations) are more likely to play a central 
role in the policy process. This is especially true when their following is large, when they 
maintain intensive contacts with the government or certain political parties, or when 
their cooperation is required to enable rule change to be implemented successfully.
Rule-makers cannot act entirely as they see fit. They are after all bound by the man-
date of their rank and file (their interests, the ideals they support) and by the meta-rules 
(e.g. the party manifesto, the government coalition agreement), and have to take this 
into account when formulating new or different rules. If they step outside this mandate 
they run the risk of being voted out at a subsequent election. In serious cases they may be 
forced to step down in a vote of no-confidence, a recall campaign or, in the case of major 
offences, an impeachment procedure.
The course of the policy process is not predictable, and does not always produce 
the results that the actors envisage. If the rule-wishes of policymakers are a given, the 
outcome of the rule-interaction depends in the first place on the degree to which these 
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wishes conflict. And if they diverge, on whether they can be reconciled through compro-
mise or long-term trade-off of rule wishes, in a way that fits within the formal procedural 
rules of the regulatory assembly and the informal norms and conventions of the rule-
makers (the ‘policy culture’). The feasibility of such proposals depends on the power rela-
tions in the legislative assembly, and on the influence that policymakers believe the rule 
change will have on their esteem and on the future voting behaviour of the electorate. 
Even if this leads to renewed rules, institutionalisation may still not produce the desired 
outcome, or may prove to be inefficient. Through the historical process, this can in turn 
work through into a further new incentive to modify the rules.
The evolution of informal rules
The way in which the informal rules of groups or communities arise and change is more 
difficult to understand. For some economists there is no problem here, because they 
regard informal institutions as irrelevant. In the words of Frank (1992: 149):
Economists have largely ignored the existence of [social] norms; and when they have addressed 
them specifically, it has usually been to assert that rational agents would never follow them.
Sometimes they acknowledge the existence of social norms, but place them in the 
rational choice paradigm. Informal rules then arise when individual actors derive util-
ity from them, and change or disappear when this is no longer the case. The ‘signalling 
theory’ put forward by Posner (2000) is an example of this70.
Economic institutionalists often attach more importance to the informal rules. They 
do not explain their creation on the basis of the profit of individual actors, but in terms 
of their significance for the coordination of economic exchange. According to this rea-
soning, informal institutions generally change as a consequence of mutations in rela-
tive costs and adaptations to the formal rules. Often an evolutionary selection process 
is assumed here, in which only the most efficient behavioural standards survive. North 
(1990: 84-85) finds this reasoning too simple, however. He comments that
Fundamental changes in relative prices over time will alter the behavioral pattern of people 
and their rationalization of what constitutes standards of behaviour. [...] To account for the 
complex changes in norms of behavior [...] in terms of relative price changes alone, however, 
is a vast oversimplification of a complex and still little understood aspect of human behavior.
In reaction to this North stresses the interaction between changes in the informal and 
formal rules, with a new equilibrium arising after a certain time. However, he leaves 
unanswered the question of what the precise reason is for the creation and evolution of 
informal institutions.
Sociologists often regard informal rules as highly central determinants of behaviour, but 
have a different blind spot: they often treat them as exogenous factors which require 
no further explanation. This is fairly unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view, as 
rightly remarked by Coleman (1990: 248):
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Much sociological theory takes social norms as given and proceeds to examine individual 
behavior or the behavior of social systems when norms exist. Yet to do this without raising at 
some point the question of why and how norms come into being is to forsake the more impor-
tant sociological problem in order to address the less important.
In the sociological approach, an explanation is often sought in terms of the rule hierarchy: 
social norms will be modified if the guiding values change. This of course only shifts 
the problem to a higher level, because theoretically it becomes necessary to specify why 
those values alter. Moreover, it is not likely that key values change so frequently that this 
offers an adequate explanation for the many modifications in lower-level social norms 
and conventions that can occur in practice.
A further possibility is that informal rules are the product of groups of actors who delib-
erately influence the socialisation context. To do this they must ensure that the structure and 
content of in-school education and out-of-school upbringing are tailored as far as pos-
sible to their own preferences and world view, and they must preferably be capable of 
maintaining this indoctrination for several decades. Such a scenario may be feasible in a 
stable totalitarian society – though even here those in power can never fully control the 
exogenous factors that affect people (disasters, economic adversity). However, in a demo-
cratic society, where the socialising acts of parents and teachers are fairly autonomous, 
such a ‘regimentation of rule acquisition’ is far more difficult to achieve. One possibility 
is to establish relatively closed communities, which aim to create a new, better type of 
person and society. Apart from religious sects one can also point to communities based 
on idealistic rules for life and learning, such as Israel’s kibbutzim. These, however, often 
are short-lived or lose their initial zeal71.
In Coleman’s view, social norms arise if two conditions are met: there must be a demand 
for them, and the relationships between actors must be such that there are incentives to 
fulfil this demand. A demand for norms arises in his view when a certain action brings 
positive or negative consequences for others (externalities), so that there is an interest in 
regulating behaviour. However, not every externality leads to the creation of norms; in 
some cases those put at a disadvantage simply accept their loss, or the potential benefi-
ciaries waive their gain. According to Coleman, the potential for founding social norms 
occurs only in special circumstances. The costs of imposing sanctions must be accept-
able to those who benefit from the creation of the norm, and the number of free-riders 
must remain within limits; in other words, unintended beneficiaries must not be able 
to avoid the imposition of sanctions. According to Coleman, such circumstances only 
arise in certain social settings. There must be a relationship between those who create 
the externalities and those who experience than (‘connectedness’), and the members of 
the latter group must also be in mutual contact (‘closure of the network’). If this is not 
the case, it is not possible to apply positive or negative sanctions. For this reason, social 
norms are more likely to arise in communities with high levels of connectedness and clo-
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sure, a high degree of mutual trust and substantial social capital, than in the anonymity 
of the metropolis (Coleman, 1990: 241-299).
Coleman is right to regard the genesis of norms as problematic, but his explana-
tory scheme also begs questions. In the first place, it seems plausible that the creation 
of social norms is fostered not so much by the presence of existing externalities, but 
rather by the perception that actors have of changes in such external behavioural impli-
cations. In addition, in Coleman’s analysis the externalities are treated too much as a 
static premise. The theoretical challenge is of course to indicate what can cause the exter-
nalities, or the perceptions of them, to change and lead to the creation of social norms. 
A further point is that Coleman (1990: 243-244, 265), though pointing out that informal 
rules are often embedded in structures or systems of norms, analyses those mainly at the 
level of individual actors. This creates the impression that actors who benefit from a rule 
and who live in a community with a high degree of connectedness and network closure 
are free to regulate behaviour by agreeing norms. In reality, however, they can often not 
establish or change informal rules without taking into account higher values and norms 
and the formal government rules, and path dependence may also play a role – primarily 
because the members of the community have difficulty imagining other informal guide-
lines than those which they have already internalised. Finally, Coleman depicts the crea-
tion of such informal institutions as a more or less conscious and natural act by rational 
actors whose interests are being harmed or served, without making clear precisely how 
this occurs. This ignores the complex, slow and partially unintended evolution of such 
informal rules.
In figure 2.1, a slightly different mechanism lies at the basis of the development of infor-
mal rules. Actors may wish to change values, norms and conventions if the historical 
process gives rise to new relative prices, power relations, conflicts of interests and sup-
port for ideals which provide an incentive. New rules of this kind need not be related to 
possible externalities; Coleman already noted that not every informal institution can be 
regarded as a regulation of behaviour that has undesirable consequences for others72.
Informal rules can only be created or changed in a social system if there is a sufficient 
consensus on the desirability of doing so. Informal institutions cease to exist if people 
no longer recognise and observe them, and they come into being where actors articulate 
them and begin acting in accordance with them. Such changes can arise from a different 
constitution of the community (its demographic size and composition, its social struc-
ture), but may also be related to other changes in the historical process (new ideals, an 
economic crisis, technological innovation) which lead to the social coordination achieved 
earlier being regarded by the members of the community as no longer adequate.
In contrast to the policy process, this type of institutional change is not a matter of a 
more or less rational exchange of arguments on a platform for rule interaction. People do 
not generally get together in a meeting under the motto of ‘let us agree values, norms and 
conventions’ – and even if someone believes that a new consensus can be deliberately 
cultivated or imposed, the result will often be different from what they had envisaged73. 
What is involved here is a change in the communis opinio as to what is right or proper and 
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what is not; a change that becomes entrenched in everyday conversations, contacts and 
observations, and in which people affirm each other in their dissent on the prevailing 
institutionalisation. The number of actors who openly cast doubt on existing norms and 
conventions increases, more and more cases of defection occur, and the willingness in 
the community to impose sanctions falls. At the same time, the belief may arise that dif-
ferent rules could be more effective in solving current problems, part of the community 
may begin acting in accordance with those new standards, and some will begin sanction-
ing defection and compliance from the amended attitude. This redefinition of collective 
rules is very much a social process: individual actors determine the extent to which they 
themselves confirm or undermine the rules, but the informal institutions will only be 
changed if the consensus of the community regarding the rules has altered.
The process may be illustrated by the evolution of social norms on extramarital sex-
ual relations. The changing historical context (a technological innovation, such as the 
introduction of the contraceptive pill) alters the rule-making incentive: the material and 
social costs of extramarital sex fall as the risk of unwanted pregnancy declines. This can 
work through into the perceptions of actors (the number of people who accept the norm 
that ‘sex outside marriage is not permissible’ reduces) and lead to defection that is no 
longer sanctioned (more people have sex without being married and, in contrast to the 
past, are not widely criticised or ostracised). If behavioural regulation is still desirable 
in order to prevent the negative collective consequences (such as the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases), a new informal rule may arise over time, provided a critical mass 
within the community shares a consensus on this (for example, ‘sexual contact outside 
marriage is permissible as long as people practise safe sex’).
This shows that individuals cannot achieve such a redefinition on their own, although 
it is possible for certain actors to play a leading role in this process. Exemplary in this 
respect are ‘normative entrepreneurs’ who are sensitive to the needs of the community 
and articulate those; or members of a counter-elite who present an alternative to the 
social rules of the governing elite.
The communal process of redefinition relates mainly to informal rules of which the 
actors are aware. Lower-level norms and conventions can often be modified relatively 
simply, because the actors have not internalised them and are therefore able to question 
them. In the case of conventions this is made even easier by the fact that the content of 
such rules is arbitrary. In principle, rule-making actors are often bound by the higher 
behavioural standards here, which may not be contravened too explicitly. Since the deri-
vation of the rules is often ambiguous – several different lower-level norms and conven-
tions may be derived from the same higher institution – this limitation is however often 
not very restrictive.
Values and higher norms are sometimes internalised, and this makes them relatively 
stable and less sensitive to external changes. At the level of individual actors, the elastic-
ity of such higher informal rules is low, and if changes occur they are often tied to forceful 
path dependence. This does not however mean that they are inert. Since informal insti-
tutions are social constructs at the macro-level, or features of the society in which they 
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exist, individual actors cannot strictly speaking ‘have’ norms and values. At most they 
have a certain orientation or subjective interpretation vis-à-vis the informal rules of their 
community, which may be more or less self-evident to them. This interpretation is not 
by definition constant, but can change if the personal circumstances alter markedly. For 
example, long-term incapacity for work can undermine the motivation to work of those 
affected, even if they previously had a strong work ethic. If the incentive to regulate at the 
macro-level changes strongly – i.e. relative prices, power relations, interests or the sup-
port for ideals alter considerably – it may be that the value orientations of virtually every 
individual actor changes. This can be the outcome of structural historical developments 
(e.g. if a society becomes more egalitarian, many actors may uphold the value ‘respect’, 
but will be less inclined to respect superiors and inferiors differently) or of incidents with 
lasting consequences (such as a war or revolution).
Cohort replacement may be another way to explain changes in higher behavioural 
guidelines theoretically. Assuming that core values and higher norms are internalised 
during the formative years, every new cohort may place a slightly different interpreta-
tion on these, as a result of  their specific socialisation context (greater or lesser mate-
rial wealth, changes in the education system and curriculum, historical events such as 
wars, famine, epidemics, economic crises which can scar the new actors). If the contrasts 
between the formative years of different clusters of birth cohorts are large, it is appro-
priate to refer to them as different generations (the War generation, the baby-boomers, 
etc.). Presuming cohorts thus have acquired a different orientation to the higher infor-
mal rules, it is logical to assume that the mechanism of cohort replacement at collective 
level will lead to a gradual change in core values and higher norms. When new cohorts 
or generations grow into adulthood and take over the central social positions from their 
predecessors as these age and die off, the dominant informal rules gradually may for 
example become more post-materialistic (see e.g. Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Becker, 1992). The 
‘culture shift’ accomplished through cohort replacement will generally be slow: there is 
forceful path dependence, as a result of the persisting role of the older generations and 
their influence on the socialisation of the newborn.
The theory is attractive because it offers an explanation for both the change and con-
tinuity in high-level informal institutions. However, it is questionable whether its core 
assumptions actually hold water (see also §2.8.3). For example, it is doubtful whether 
the result of the socialisation that people go through in their formative years is always 
as stable as is assumed, or that the socialisee adopts such a passive, receptive role. The 
number of unchangeable, deeply anchored rules may be limited, and even those are 
always dependent on the meaning that actors give to them at a later point in their lives. 
It is also plausible that the socialisation context of a cohort is usually less uniform then 
the theory supposes, on account of the wide differences between social backgrounds, 
genders, regions, etc. If the socialisation within cohorts is usually heterogeneous, it fol-
lows from this that its results will also be diversified. Evidently, the replacement of one 
heterogeneous cohort with another will not constitute a major driving force in the evolu-
tion of values and higher norms. This may explain the rather limited empirical evidence 
(see e.g. Dekker & Ester, 1995; Van den Broek, 1996) for the mechanism of differential 
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cohort-socialisation and their impact on values and social norms through the succession 
of generations.
2.10 Conclusions
In chapter 1 the following general conceptual and theoretical questions were formu-
lated:
– What does the notion ‘institutions’ entail?
– What kinds of institutions can be distinguished, and how do they relate to each 
other?
– How do institutions give direction to social interactions, and which actors may be 
involved in this?
– What consequences can rule-driven interactions have?
– Under what conditions do institutions come into being, and what causes them to 
change?
All these questions have been discussed at length in this chapter, with the figural model 
presented in §2.3 acting as a guide. Here it may be useful to recap some of the answers 
that have emerged from the conceptual and theoretical analysis.
The nature of institutions
Institutions are socially constructed rules that indicate the rights and duties of actors. 
They also specify the conditions attaching to the granting of those rights and the imposi-
tion of those duties, and what positive and negative sanctions are possible.
The fact that institutions are social constructs excludes the contents of natural laws 
and absolute normative philosophies from the definition. It also implies a certain degree 
of ethical relativism; there is no ‘right division of rights’, a specific attribution of rights 
and duties can be described but not be regarded as universally applicable.
The core of a right is that someone is permitted to do, to possess or to obtain some-
thing, and that others may not hinder him in exercising that right. Rights usually imply 
that someone else is held under a duty. Object rights relate to particular goods, serv-
ice rights to the provision of specific facilities, and action rights to the performance of 
behaviour. Rights theoretically reflect the interests of actors, but also their power, shared 
ideals, and the relative costs and benefits of rules (including their vesting, monitoring 
and enforcement).
Rights and duties ultimately rest on a social consensus; and both the granting of 
rights and the imposition of duties may be subjected to various conditions. In order to 
gain a right, it may be necessary for specific events to occur, that the interested parties 
have certain qualifying characteristics, or that they show specific forms of behaviour. 
Duties may not apply to all actors; and those who are in principle duty-bound may not be 
so all the time or under all circumstances.
Sanctions are rewards in case of compliance with the rules, and punishments associ-
ated with defection. Institutions specify the possible sanctions. These may be positive or 
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negative, and be enforced by authorities or at the level of groups and communities. Sanc-
tions may also be awarded in a ‘heroic’ way (a single actor imposing a one-off reward or 
punishment), or collectively and incrementally. They need not be exogenous, but in the 
case of individual actors may also be internalised, in the form of feelings of guilt, embar-
rassment and superiority associated with defection and compliance.
Types and hierarchy of institutions
There are two main kinds of institutions. Formal institutions are promulgated or 
enforced by the government; informal institutions are based entirely on the social con-
sensus within groups or communities. Formal institutions can be subdivided into meta-
rules (e.g. the Constitution, election laws), describing the rights and duties regarding the 
establishment of formal regulations; rules for the production of goods and services by 
the government (such as defence, education); third-party recognition by the government 
of the rights, obligations and relationships of citizens and companies (e.g. civil law, mer-
cantile law); and contracts between private parties that are enforced by the government 
(e.g. commercial contracts complying with mercantile law). Informal institutions can be 
subdivided into values, which are general behavioural guidelines; social norms, or spe-
cific behavioural prescripts for actual situations, which carry the possibility of sanctions 
being imposed; conventions, which are arbitrary and neutral expectations, mainly serv-
ing to coordinate behaviour efficiently; and informal contracts between private parties 
that are not endorsed by government.
There is no fixed hierarchy either between formal and informal rules or within these 
two main types. Informal rules may be a specification of formal ones, but the latter can 
also be regarded as a codification of the informal consensus. To what extent either one 
dominates the other is an open empirical question.
Within sets of formal or informal institutions, it is a common general principle that 
rules at a lower level of abstraction (e.g. laws on government production or third party 
enforcement, social norms) may not contravene the more abstract institutions (such as 
formal meta-rules, values). This hierarchical ranking is rather loose, however. Lower rules 
cannot be derived from higher ones by logical deduction: various lower-level attributions 
of rights, obligations, conditions and possible sanctions may correspond with the same 
higher principles. The relationships between different types of rules are based on social 
consensus, and can therefore diverge both historically and socially.
Actors and rule-driven interaction
A distinction can be made between natural persons and corporate actors (organisations 
which form an independently acting legal persona). Actors do not necessarily accept the 
rules as givens, but create a representation of them. Institutions therefore do not influ-
ence behaviour directly, but only after being filtered by actors. These are led not only by 
their interpretations of the rules, but also by their resources, experiences and a number 
of motivations: their goals, ideals and interests; their assessments of the costs and ben-
efits of behavioural alternatives; the probability of outcomes; and emotions. With cor-
porate actors there is theoretically an additional ‘principal-agent’ problem. How can an 
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organisation assure itself that the individuals acting on their behalf (employees, manage-
ment, etc.) do not seek to serve their own interests and preferences, but behave as loyal 
representatives of the wishes of their principal?
Several forms of rule-driven interaction are possible: economic exchange between 
persons and organisations; relations between friends; political choices at elections; and 
so on. Rule acquisition is a specific variant of this. Because institutions are social con-
structs, new actors do not know them instinctively, and must learn them. The socialisa-
tion of new actors is not a process that can be taken for granted, and is not a matter of an 
automatic and one-sided imprinting of behavioural precepts. Rather, it is a continuous 
interaction process, in which the transfer of existing rules may be at odds with the need 
for personal development. The outcome of the process is heterogeneous, depending on 
the socio-historical context in which it takes place and on the individual characteristics 
and experiences of the socialisers and socialisees.
Individual and collective impact of institutions
Rule-driven interactions produce results for the actors involved which may lead to 
changes in their resources (wealth, knowledge and experiences) and their perceptions. 
Theoretically the outcomes at the collective level are more interesting. In principle rules 
are drawn up in order to achieve certain shared objectives. Rule-driven interactions can 
therefore influence technological and scientific innovation, the economic process, the 
social structuring (including the emergence and decline of elites), the formation of ide-
als and demographic trends. However, rules not only determine this historical process; 
their operation also depends on the prevailing context of rule application, for example 
the economic climate.
The rule generation process
Institutions are actor-made. The socially weighted sum of changes in relative prices, 
power relations, conflicts of interest and the support for certain ideals may provide actors 
with an incentive to formulate new rules or change existing ones. Mutations in these fac-
tors, and thus in the incentive to regulate, arise theoretically from the interaction of 
the existing rules with technological innovations, economic and socio-cultural changes, 
demographic trends and the emergence of new ideals.
Depending on the way actors process the incentive to regulate, they may come to 
desire new or different institutions. However, such aspired regulation does not automati-
cally lead to new forms of institutionalisation. Path dependence acts as a brake on rule 
change, and also implies that an identical change incentive may lead to diverging rule 
amendments in different socio-historical circumstances. Moreover, the actual institu-
tionalisation is determined by the course of the rule-interaction. This is quite evident 
in the policy process by which the meta-rules, the rules on government production and 
third-party recognition are established. This clearly has its own dynamic, the results of 
which may not coincide with the rule aspirations of the actors concerned.
Because institutions at a lower level of abstraction (implementation decrees, infor-
mal contracts) are often more elastic than higher-level ones (the Constitution, certain 
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core values), the costs of rule change are usually lower in the former case.
New actors often play a decisive role in institutional change. These may be members 
of an up-and-coming generation, emerging counter-elites, new organisations or indi-
vidual normative entrepreneurs. New actors are more sensitive to the limitations of the 
existing rules and the benefits of new ones. They have also invested less in the old institu-
tions, they derive less benefit from them, and they perceive reality less from the basis of 
the existing rules.
In the next chapter the insights discussed here will be used for a theoretical exploration 
of the institutions of social security, the main topic of the rest of this study.
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3  Social security and the institutional approach
In this chapter the main object of this study, social security, is delineated from a theoreti-
cal perspective. A number of questions on this issue were formulated in the Introduction, 
and the topics to be discussed here derive from these. In §3.1 some traditional defini-
tions of social security as a theoretical notion are discussed and compared. Subsequently 
the main elements of the theoretical analysis of institutions in the previous chapter are 
applied to social security. §3.2 demarcates the concept from this institutional perspec-
tive. A number of specific types of social security rules are then described, as well as the 
actors to which they apply (§3.3). The way in which actors generally acquire formal and 
informal institutions was discussed extensively in the previous chapter. This is elabo-
rated in §3.4, which focuses on the rather ‘undersocialised’ character of social security 
rules. §3.5 sketches various models of rule-driven interaction that may occur in social 
security. A discussion follows of the theoretical results of such behavioural exchanges, 
with the emphasis on the collective consequences (§3.6). The process through which 
social security rules arise and change is elucidated on the basis of a historical example: 
the transition from largely informal to predominantly formal systems (§3.7). The final 
section sets out the main conclusions.
3.1 Traditional definitions of social security1
While several of the institutions to which the concept refers have a long history (espe-
cially in poor relief ), the notion of ‘social security’ itself is a fairly recent one. The earliest 
examples of use of the term date from the 19th century. In a speech to mark the independ-
ence of Venezuela, Simón Bolívar (1819) pronounced that2:
El sistema de gobierno más perfecto es aquel que produce mayor suma de felicidad posible, 
mayor suma de seguridad social y mayor suma de estabilidad política.
The concept was also used in the proclamation of the first national congress of the Ital-
ian Labour Party (1894) and in a decree issued by the Council of People’s Commission-
ers of the Soviet Socialist Republic (1918) (see Veldkamp, 1978: 1-2). However, the actual 
starting point lay in the us Social Security Act of 1935. This scheme, introduced as part of 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal, was initially called the Economic Security Act, but follow-
ing a number of amendments during the passage of the bill through Congress it was pro-
posed that the name be changed. The term ‘social security’ referred simply to all issues 
covered by the scheme, and reflected the fact that through the Act society was providing 
some degree of economic security to its citizens. The Act aimed to protect insured workers 
in industry and commerce against the major “hazards and vicissitudes of life”; and, in the 
midst of the Great Depression, to guard society against the widespread poverty and social 
unrest that could result from mass unemployment.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   111 21-9-2009   15:08:42
112
3
The Atlantic Charter (1941), in which Roosevelt and Churchill set out the usa’s and Britain’s 
shared objectives of post-World War ii policy, also used the concept. Its fifth principle 
aims
[...] to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with 
the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social 
security.
In the Beveridge Report the term is used as an overarching concept to describe the three 
collective methods of covering the economic risks of households: “social insurance for 
basic needs; national assistance for special cases; voluntary insurance for additions to the 
basic provision”. In the report, social security refers in particular to the body of income 
regulations, but it also implies care and reinsertion (Beveridge, 1942: 120):
The term ‘social security’ is used here to denote the securing of an income to take the place 
of earnings when they are interrupted by unemployment, sickness or accident, to provide for 
retirement through age, to provide against loss of support by the death of another person, and 
to meet exceptional expenditures, such as those connected with birth, death and marriage. 
Primarily social security means security of income up to a minimum, but the provision of an 
income should be associated with treatment designed to bring the interruption of earnings 
to an end as soon as possible.
In 1944 the International Labour Organisation, which had been charged with working 
out the detail of the social objectives of the Atlantic Charter, published a report entitled 
Approaches to Social Security. It contains one of the oldest substantive definitions of the con-
cept (ilo, 1944: 80):
Social security is the security that society furnishes, through appropriate organisation, 
against certain risks to which its members are exposed. These risks are essentially contin-
gencies against which the individual of small means cannot effectively provide by his own 
ability or foresight alone or even in private combination with his fellows. It is characteristic of 
these contingencies that they imperil the ability of the working man to support himself and 
his dependants in health and decency. Accordingly, as the State is an association of citizens 
which exists for the sake of their general well-being, it is a proper function of the State to pro-
mote social security. While all State policy has some bearing on social security, it is convenient 
to regard as social security services only such schemes as provide the citizen with benefits 
designed to prevent or cure disease, to support him when unable to earn and to restore him 
to gainful activity. Not all such measures, however, can be considered as affording security. 
For security is a state of mind as well as an objective fact. To enjoy security, one must have 
confidence that the benefits will be available when required, and, in order to afford security, 
the protection must be adequate in quality and quantity.
Following these publications ‘social security’ became the umbrella term used to denote 
both the post-wwii national provisions and the older social insurances and poor relief 
arrangements3. The European Union, in particular, uses the related concept of ‘social 
protection’, which has a similar meaning4.
In current scientific literature social security is delineated in various ways. The more com-
mon approach equates social security to the collective instruments which under certain 
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circumstances offer income protection in the form of benefits and provisions. There is 
also a broader approach in which social security serves other ends as well, is not limited 
to what the government provides, and is not confined to awarding income entitlements 
in cash or in kind. The main elements of both traditions will be discussed below.
3.1.1 The narrow approach
When interpreted in sensu strictu, social security is often regarded as the entire body of 
government provisions aimed at providing a cushion for private households which as a 
result of specific events or circumstances have ended up in a weak income position. The 
following elements characterise this interpretation:
- The objective of social security is to offer a certain degree of income protection;
- The instruments used to achieve this goal comprise social insurance and national pro-
visions regulated by law;
- The main intervention implied in these instruments is to provide benefits in money or 
in kind;
- Social security focuses on specific, clearly defined risks.
These four aspects of the narrow approach of social security are discussed in more detail 
in the rest of this section.
Income protection as an objective
According to Deleeck (1991: 18), modern social security has a dual income protection 
purpose: it has to guarantee a minimum income for everyone, and in addition it has to 
maintain the existing standard of living to a certain degree. Historically, the ‘universal 
minimum income’ goal supplanted the ‘income continuity’ objective. The main purpose 
of the pre-wwii system of social insurances was to maintain the standard of living of the 
working population to a certain extent. Some later authors still regard income continuity 
as the primary objective of social security, arguing that this should be assured as far as 
possible for all citizens. This is expressed for example in Laroque’s (1966: 84) definition 
of the concept:
A guarantee by the whole community to all its members of the maintenance of their standard 
of living, or at least of tolerable living conditions, by means of a redistribution of incomes 
based upon national solidarity.
In the wake of the Second World War, however, the goal of assuring a minimum level of 
income for all became predominant. In the Atlantic Charter the hope was expressed that 
after the War, “all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear 
and want”. In the Beveridge Report, the universalistic principle was given shape in the 
form of a blueprint for post-war social security, which was intended to guarantee “the 
abolition of want” for the entire British population5 (Beveridge, 1942: 7-9). The Van Rhijn 
Commission (1945/1946: part I, 13), which was charged with drawing up general guide-
lines for the Dutch system after the War had ended, defined social security as
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A body of rules whose intended purpose is (a) to compensate wholly or partly loss of income 
arising from certain specifically defined risks (such as illness, old age, etc.) or the additional 
expenses brought on by certain events (e.g. an increase in family size); and (b) to provide med-
ical and nursing care as well as the opportunity for rehabilitation.
On reading further it becomes apparent that social security is intended primarily to 
meet situations of financial uncertainty and, in line with international developments at 
the time, should focus on “providing indemnity against want”, or providing protection 
against poverty for all inhabitants.
Deleeck’s ‘dual objective’ was present in many of the collective social security systems 
that actually emerged after the Second World War. In spite of their marked structural dif-
ferences (which will be discussed in chapter 4), the modern schemes often guaranteed 
both a minimum income to the most vulnerable groups, and some kind of income conti-
nuity to the working population.
The instruments: social insurance and national provision
The social security systems which evolved in the 20th century were generally a hybrid form 
of the ‘pure’ models of social insurance and national provision (cf. table 3.1). Social insur-
ance is also referred to as the ‘Bismarckian’ model of social security, which developed 
in the later part of the 19th century in Germany. Historically, this system represented 
an important change: certain risks – initially mainly old age, illness and occupational 
accidents – that had previously been the responsibility of the individual or the local and 
church community were now covered by collectively funded arrangements. The need for 
this state interference was argued in both negative and positive terms. On the one hand 
a stronger government role was regarded as indispensable for combating certain social 
ills (poverty, social unrest), while on the other it was considered as a means of supporting 
the process of nation building. For the rising working classes and the poorer sections of 
the bourgeoisie (such as the Protestant kleine luyden in the Netherlands), state interven-
tion was moreover one of the instruments for achieving their emancipation. In Western 
Europe, the struggle to achieve statutory protection for socio-economic risks ran largely 
parallel to the controversies on universal suffrage and the right to education for all chil-
dren.
The primary objective of social insurance is to ensure continuity of income, to main-
tain the existing standard of living at a certain level. It is aimed at a limited target group, 
generally employees in a specific sector. The coverage provided by social insurance is 
limited to events that are actuarially insurable; selection of risks is unavoidable, which 
means for example that someone who is already ill can be excluded from a disability ben-
efit insurance scheme.
Social insurance entitlements (either in the form of cash benefits of benefits in kind) 
depend on two things: the contributions made by the insured parties – without payment 
of contributions there is no entitlement to benefit – and the extent of the loss suffered. 
The principle of equivalence means that there is a causal link between contribution, 
potential and actual risk, and benefit level, sometimes referred to in the literature as the 
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‘causality triptych’6. Social insurance is funded by the collection of contributions (pre-
miums) from the employers and employees concerned. The amount of the premiums is 
geared to the actuarial insurance risk, and can therefore differ from one sector of indus-
try to another, between age groups, etc. The total premium required may be apportioned 
among the individual participants of the scheme so that current contributions are used to 
pay current benefits (pay-as-you-go schemes), or reserves may be built up to cover future 
financial obligations (funded schemes). The administration of social insurance regula-
tions is placed in the hands of autonomous organisations for each branch of insurance. 
These organisations collect the premiums and distribute the benefits. This process takes 
place purely from an endogenous insurance perspective: benefits are paid in accordance 
with the policy conditions, without considering the general interest or social position of 
the insured parties.
Social insurance is regulated by law, but need not be administered directly by the 
government. This ‘insurance autonomy’ is reflected among other things in the autono-
mous fixing of the contribution level by the agency concerned, and the absence of inde-
pendent supervision. To the extent that supervision does take place, it is regulated by the 
sector itself, or possibly by a separate body with a limited mandate.
Table 3.1 
Social insurance and national provision: pure model s
Pure model of:
Social insurance National provision
Target group selective (employees in various sectors) universal (all citizens) 
Covered risks individual insurable risks risks considered to be a collective
 (individual risk selection) responsibility (no individual risk selection)
Benefi t level dependent on own contributions and dependent on neediness of applicants; 
 extent of loss suffered (equivalence) possibly means-tested
Funding source earmarked contributions from employers  general revenue or earmarked contributions
 and employees from entire taxable population
Contribution level based on actuarial risk based on ability to pay 
 (contribution differentiation) (solidarity principle)
Funding method capital fund or pay-as-you-go among  pay-as-you-go (apportionment) among
 employers and employees taxable population 
Organisational structure autonomous organisations per sector, limited number of (semi-)government
 non-governmental (with offi cial recognition); organisations; 
 one body for benefi t payments and collection  benefi t payments and collection of
 of contributions contributions may be split
Responsibility for benefi t  autonomous fi xing of premiums and benefi ts  central government sets contribution
and contributions levels by administration and benefi t levels
Administration perspective mainly endogenous (insurance principles) mainly exogenous (general interest, clients)
Relation with other policy self-contained, no connection with other  explicit ties with health care, education,  etc.
sectors policy areas
 
Supervision self-regulation, insurance autonomy independent supervision by separate 
  (semi-)government agency
Sources: Veldkamp (1984); Geleijnse, Vrooman & Muffels (1993); adapted
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National provision is an exponent of the ‘Beveridgean’ perspective, after the influential 
report drafted during the Second World War at the request of the British government. 
This too marks a turning point in thinking on social security. After the economic crisis in 
the 1930s, the misery that the War visited on the people and the threat emanating from 
rising Communism, it was considered desirable to increase government responsibility 
for the welfare of the population. State intervention to ameliorate acute social ills was 
no longer enough; what was needed now was to establish the principle of government 
responsibility to offer all citizens security of income, regardless of the contribution they 
had made to society in the form of their labour and social insurance premiums7.
The system of national provision focuses on the minimum income goal, and there-
fore seeks to guarantee a certain threshold amount, usually graded by various household 
types. The entitlements are universal in nature: all citizens who fall within the terms may 
apply for it. There is no risk selection because the minimum income guarantee applies to 
risks that cannot be borne by every individual, and therefore is a collective responsibility. 
The amount of the benefit does not depend on the contribution paid or the extent of the 
loss suffered, but on the neediness of the applicants. The right to benefit is accordingly 
sometimes made dependent on an assessment of actual need through means testing. 
The scheme may be financed either out of the general revenue (taxation) or through ear-
marked contributions from the entire taxable population. Where contributions are lev-
ied, a key difference compared with the social insurance model is that the amount of the 
contribution is not based on the insurance risk, but on the ability of the contributors to 
pay, the ‘solidarity principle’. Generally an apportionment method is used to determine 
the contribution levels: the estimated amount needed in order to pay benefits in a given 
year is divided among the entire taxable population. A contribution-based provision 
without means testing is regarded as a form of national insurance; a means-tested scheme 
that is funded from general revenue is designated as national (social) assistance.
Organisationally, national provisions are administered by a limited number of government 
or semi-government agencies. Collection of contributions and payment of benefits may 
be kept separate, for example split between the tax authorities and a benefits agency.
The exogenous perspective of the collective interest and the clients drives the admin-
istration of national provisions; it is also regarded as desirable to establish a connection 
with other policy sectors, such as health care and education. There is powerful independ-
ent supervision and close financial control (e.g. by an Audit Chamber). Government and 
Parliament play an important role in the national provision model: the level of contribu-
tions and taxes, as well as the amount of the guaranteed minimum income, are fixed at 
the national level.
In practice these models do not occur in their pure forms. Many social insurances have 
acquired provision-like features over time, for example due to a broadening of the target 
group, the introduction of need elements in determining the level of benefits, and more 
attention for the social implications of awarding benefits and collecting contributions. 
Conversely, insurance elements often crept into national provisions; the covered popula-
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tion may be limited (e.g. by restricting survivor’s benefits to older widows or widows with 
young children), benefit levels may be made dependent on the number of years resided 
in the country, etc.
Providing benefits as the main intervention
In its narrow sense social security consists mainly of transfers in the form of money or in 
kind. The income security which is the aim of the statutory systems of social insurance 
and national provision is achieved primarily by providing households with financial sup-
port and compensations when they have difficulty in meeting certain costs. This empha-
sis on the ‘benefits’ side of social security is illustrated by the definition formulated by 
Halberstadt (1976: 22-24), who characterises it as
The entire body of discretionary or automatic individual, financially appraisable entitlements 
to a certain standard of living.
This is in fact a fairly broad definition, since it refers to entitlements which can occur 
both in the form of generic transfers (old age pensions, unemployment benefit, social 
assistance) and of earmarked retributions (student grants, housing subsidies, health 
care, subsidies for utilising public transport, sports facilities, libraries, museums etc). 
However, the focus on the standard of living suggests the monetary, compensatory char-
acter of social security is its central feature; other possible interventions, such as pre-
venting someone from becoming unemployed or incapacitated for work, or promoting 
reintegration into employment, play a subordinate role. In this view, social security is 
above all a monetary issue, a system that converts financial contributions into benefits 
and compensations.
Coverage of a limited number of risks
In the narrow approach social security only offers income protection when certain events 
or emergencies occur, also referred to as ‘social risks’. Generally, the events covered are 
those referred to in Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organisation (ilo) 
(the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952). This is a limitative summary; social 
security incorporates the provisions that come into effect when households have insuf-
ficient income or have difficulty in meeting costs as a result of specific events8. These 
‘contingencies’ are:
– Survival beyond a prescribed age, to be covered by old age benefit;
– The loss of support suffered by a widow or child as the result of the death of the bread-
winner (survivor’s benefit);
– Responsibility for the maintenance of children ( family benefit);
– The treatment of any morbid condition (including pregnancy), whatever its cause 
( medical care);
– A suspension of earnings due to pregnancy and confinement and their consequences 
(maternity benefit);
– A suspension of earnings due to an inability to obtain suitable employment for pro-
tected persons who are capable of, and available for, work (unemployment benefit);
Rules of Relief_14.indd   117 21-9-2009   15:08:43
118
3
– A suspension of earnings due to an incapacity for work resulting from a morbid condi-
tion (sickness leave benefit);
– A permanent or persistent inability to engage in any gainful activity (disability benefit);
– The costs and losses involved in medical care, sickness leave, invalidity and death of 
the breadwinner due to an occupational accident or disease (employment injuries).
For each of these risks the convention lays down what part of the population at least has 
to be covered, the minimum level and duration of benefits, and the basic conditions for 
entitlement. It also stipulates this can be achieved through social insurances or national 
provisions (including social assistance; ‘indigence’ is not considered a separate risk). 
However, the limitative summary excludes a number of risks from the domain of social 
security. Events such as divorce, excessive housing costs, high transport costs, etc., are 
not covered as independent items, and neither are the costs which relate to prevention 
and restoration.
3.1.2 The broad approach
In recent decades wider views on social security have emerged in the literature. In this 
broad approach, all the features mentioned above are extended. The objective of social 
security is not only to provide income protection, but also security of work, health, and 
social participation. In addition, social security instruments are not limited to collective 
insurance and provisions regulated by law, and payment of benefits is not by definition 
predominant; interventions aimed at prevention and restoration theoretically play a key 
role. And according to this view, social security relates to more than just the traditional 
social risks.
These elements of social security in sensu largo also require some explanation.
Limiting ‘human damage’ instead of income protection
In the broad approach, the object of social security is not restricted to guaranteeing a 
minimum subsistence income or assuring a certain continuity of the acquired living 
standard. A definition used by Berghman (1990: 6) is illustrative here9; he characterises 
social security as
A state of complete (or optimum) protection against human damage.
The notion of ‘human damage’ is given central prominence in the Flemish social security 
literature (cf. Viaene et al., 1990: 61-65). Human damage means the loss of certain capaci-
ties by an individual which disrupts the relation with their social and natural environ-
ment. From this perspective, Viaene et al. (1976) define social security as
A permanent evolution towards offering the highest possible level of protection against 
human damage for the highest possible number of people.
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According to this view, social security should be focused on two theoretical forms of dam-
age: loss of income and loss of health. In order to achieve these aims social security has 
three theoretical ways of intervening, or ‘modes of operation’ (Viaene et al., 1990: 65):
This evolution is sought in the first place through the prevention of health damage; secondly, 
where damage occurs, through its rapid and complete restoration; and, in last and subordi-
nate place, through a policy of compensation of labour income losses, which underpins the 
prevention and restoration policy.
In this definition, social security is not regarded as a complex of provisions, but as a pro-
cess of societal evolution, aimed at maximising protection levels for as many people as 
possible. Combating human damage is the primary objective: the goal of social security 
is to counter an actual or potential loss of income and health (the latter is sometimes 
taken to include subjective well-being as well). The demarcation of human damage is a 
wide-ranging one, including not only the immediate ‘utilitarian’ losses, such as the direct 
income reduction suffered by an employee who is laid off, but also the long-term conse-
quences, the implications for the social and natural environment, and the repercussions 
that cannot be expressed directly in economic terms (such as a decrease of happiness). 
Health is therefore defined very broadly, as a state of optimum physical, psychological, 
social and ecological well-being. Characteristic of this approach is also the fact that the 
aims of social security are interpreted in a dynamic and forward-looking way. Human 
damage is not seen as a one-off risk that can be compensated by a single benefit payment 
(income substitution based on limited causality), but as an event which can continue to 
have an impact into the future, and will continue to demand attention (‘finality’).
Because the notion of ‘damage’ thus tends to become all-embracing, some authors advo-
cating a broad approach reduce the objectives of social security to a limited number of 
theoretical dimensions (see e.g. Muffels, 1993; Berghman & Verhalle, 2003). The purpose 
of social security is then to correct losses in terms of:
a) income,
b) employment, and
c) health and social participation.
As a consequence, social security cannot focus solely on the traditional income protec-
tion functions, but also has to seek to increase labour market participation and to achieve 
an optimum state of health and social integration. In principle these dimensions are not 
independent of each other. People who become medically unfit to work not only suffer 
a deterioration of their health but also lose their job, part of their income, their social 
contacts at work, and the social status and social integration that being in employment 
brings.
However, the various objectives may be difficult to achieve simultaneously in practice. 
Geleijnse et al. (1993: 28-38) refer in this context to ‘policy contradictions’, implying that 
seeking to achieve one objective cannot always be reconciled with realising another:
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– If the income security objective is maximised and benefit levels are high, the incentive 
for beneficiaries to look for work may be limited, and it may become too expensive 
for employers to take on low-skilled workers. In addition, some groups of recipients 
may not be regarded as meriting such high benefits; they then risk being stereotyped 
as scroungers and lazybones, and they may consequently become isolated from main-
stream society. Maximising the income security objective can thus lead to an inad-
equate fulfilment of the objectives of securing employment and social integration;
– If on the other hand policy efforts are directed towards maximising participation in 
employment, for example by keeping benefit levels very low and regarding all work as 
in principle appropriate for everyone, this can undermine the objectives of guarantee-
ing income security, health and social participation. Groups which find themselves 
unable to acquire work are then in danger of ending up in structural poverty (because 
of the low benefit levels), while people may also feel compelled to accept jobs that 
could harm their health or social life (hazardous or strenuous work, occupations that 
do not reflect their training and capacities, night shifts);
– And finally: maximising health and social participation can undermine the income 
and employment objectives. An example might be a medical examiner who too readily 
declares someone unfit for work because this is the best solution given their current 
health status. Such people thus lose their position on the labour market and may have 
considerable difficulty finding work again at a later date. The disability benefit in most 
cases will be less than the previous earnings, and in the long run the income loss may 
become even greater, due to missed career opportunities and, possibly, as a result of 
the limited indexing of benefits.
This implies that social security can at best aim for a simultaneous optimisation of the 
objectives of income security, security of employment, and security of health and social 
participation. Precisely where this optimum lies is socially and historically variable, 
bearing in mind Coleman’s view that there is no such thing as a universal “right division 
of rights” (see §2.4).
Not only social insurance and national provisions
Veldkamp (1978, 1984) has argued that social security should not be equated with the 
existing systems of social insurance and national provisions. In his view all schemes and 
arrangements – both collective and individual – aimed at securing the continuity of an 
existing standard of living form part of social security. He uses the following extensive 
definition (Veldkamp, 1978: 4):
Social security [comprises] the whole complex of institutions and provisions aimed at guar-
anteeing a certain standard of living [...] by substituting income as far as possible where the 
existing source of income disappears and by compensating directly or indirectly for costs 
which are difficult to bear [... as well as the institutions and provisions] aimed at removing as 
far as possible the causes of the inadequacy or loss of income. [It thus includes] not only the 
traditional social insurance and other social provisions, such as social assistance schemes, 
but for example also the system of housing subsidies, employment policy, student grants, and 
so on. Wherever a system of income guarantees, income substitution and income comple-
mentarity exists, this must be regarded as social security.
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In Veldkamp’s vision, social security in a broad sense consists first of all of arrangements 
to which people can turn if they lose their work or income, or when they face health-
related costs that are difficult to meet. This includes the traditional social insurances and 
national provisions, but also extends to housing benefit and student grants.
A second type of social security consists of arrangements that are intended to pre-
vent people from losing their job or income, and therefore having to make use of benefit 
schemes. Veldkamp includes among these preventative instruments sickness and acci-
dent prevention, the regulation of working conditions, measures designed to promote 
employment, the notification and assessment of proposed mass redundancies, the dis-
closure of merger negotiations between firms, and the minimum wage.
In the third place social security in a broad sense consists of more than the arrange-
ments that are enforced by the government and formalised in national law. This idea has 
been elaborated by Berghman (1986: 13-16), who refers to the ‘invisible’ forms of social 
security. In doing so he builds on the ‘social division of welfare’ proposed by Titmuss 
(1958), who identified three complimentary methods for configuring welfare arrange-
ments in a modern society:
In the first group Titmuss includes social benefits and services which constitute the visible 
heart of the welfare state and which he brings together under the term social welfare. In addi-
tion he refers to fiscal welfare: the body of tax exemptions and reductions which increase the 
disposable income in the same way that benefits do. Finally, he speaks of occupational welfare, 
as the body of employment-related fringe benefits which are funded wholly or partly by the 
employer.
Although Titmuss did not define his threefold division explicitly for the analysis of social 
security, according to Berghman it can serve this purpose well. Berghman does however 
state two additions are needed to Titmuss’s typology. The private welfare category consists 
of arrangements people make by themselves (savings, supplementary private pensions, 
annuities). Provisions emanating from the civil society (e.g. church charity, mutual soci-
eties) could constitute a further type of social security; Berghman suggests the term vol-
untary welfare for this.
In its broad interpretation, therefore, social security is not limited to the traditional sys-
tem of statutory social insurance and national provisions. It includes all government pro-
visions aimed at ensuring security of income, work, health and social participation: not 
only social insurance and provisions, but all arrangements sustaining social and fiscal 
welfare. Moreover, it is not limited to schemes in which the government plays a decisive 
role. The same objectives can in principle be achieved by occupational, private and vol-
untary arrangements.
More interventions
It is already apparent from the definition used by Viaene et al. that the objectives of social 
security can be achieved not only through the payment of benefits. There are various 
theoretical ‘modes of operation’ of social security, and these are often arranged hierar-
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chically. In this line of reasoning, top priority should then be given to measures aimed at 
prevention10; if this is not achievable, efforts must be directed towards restoration of the loss 
of income, employment and health/social participation as soon as possible. Only when 
restoration is not feasible consideration should be given to (partial) compensation for the 
damage suffered. In the narrow approach of social security, by contrast, it is precisely this 
latter function that is key: the damage suffered is ‘bought off’ and relatively little atten-
tion is given to prevention and restoration.
Viaene et al. regard it as characteristic of the forthcoming ‘third phase’ of social secu-
rity – after the emergence of the Bismarckian (social insurance) and Beveridgean (national 
provision) principles – that the main emphasis should in future be placed on prevention. 
Other authors consider this a less self-evident development. Van Langendonck (1992) 
points out three obstacles to prevention:
– It is not always economically viable. Prevention may require high absolute investments 
for a limited and often uncertain return; and companies or societies investing in pre-
vention are in a relatively unfavourable position vis-à-vis competitors economising on 
such costs;
– It is not always socially acceptable. Prevention of alcoholism or sporting injuries can 
theoretically be achieved by prohibiting alcohol or banning the more dangerous sports 
(boxing, alpinism, motor racing). However, such drastic measures probably will not 
be supported by economic stakeholders and the public at large, and may elicit unin-
tended behavioural reactions (e.g. bootlegging, illegal fighting competitions);
– The usefulness of preventive operations cannot always be readily objectified.  Preven-
tion refers to a negative fact (ensuring a risk does not manifest itself ) which is hard to 
ascertain; and the longer nothing happens, the more difficult it becomes to maintain a 
high degree of preventive measures. Apart from that, there is also often no one single 
clear cause on which preventive interventions can focus (multiple causality of loss).
To this can be added the comment that a social security policy focused on prevention is 
not always possible. Demographic risks, such as old age, are hardly subject to influence by 
preventive measures: the risk manifests itself fairly independently of the policy, which 
can at most regulate the take-up of the various arrangements (for example by raising 
the statutory retirement age). For older persons, but also for other groups such as the 
seriously ill and ‘non-employables’ (socially dysfunctional persons, the homeless), the 
compensation function of social security will remain crucial and the opportunities for 
prevention are limited. While prevention may assume a more prominent role in future 
social security, for reasons such as these it is doubtful whether it can ever be its main 
intervention.
Generalising this statement, it may be useful to widen the range of interventions 
available to social security, but it does not seem self-evident that the various modes of 
operation theoretically have to be applied in a hierarchic fashion. While acknowledging 
that social security in a broad sense is not confined to compensation, in specific circum-
stances it very well may be that it is cheaper or socially more acceptable to award benefits 
than to put much effort in prevention or restoration. This is in line with the analysis of 
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institutional hierarchy in the previous chapter, which stated that there are no inevitable 
or eternal links between higher and lower rules (cf. §2.6); such derivations always reflect 
the prevailing social consensus.
Moreover, the interventions of social security are not mutually exclusive. For exam-
ple, it may be that disabled persons return to work for their old employer at a lower wage, 
with the government topping up their income to its original level, and funding adapta-
tions to the workplace which help to carry out the current job and avert renewed or differ-
ent complaints arising. In such a case the interventions are mixed: there is a partial resto-
ration of the employment loss suffered, a compensation for the structural loss of income, 
while the adaptation of working conditions serves the prevention of future disability.
Broadening and blurring of the risk definition
In the broad approach, social security therefore has to achieve more (not only income 
protection, but combating all forms of human damage), comprises more than just social 
insurance and provisions, and is not focused exclusively on compensation. It is there-
fore not surprising that the risk covered is also interpreted more widely. Social security 
not only has to offer protection against the financial consequences of unemployment, 
illness, old age, disability, etc.; it also has to help prevent or eliminate benefit depend-
ency, prevent loss of health and promote (re)integration into employment and society. 
The envisaged social protection thus encompasses much more than simply cushioning 
the income consequences of the social risks set out in the ilo list. Irrespective of the 
cause and nature of the loss suffered, social security should seek to provide a maximum 
or optimum level of protection against human damage. The method used to achieve this 
is of secondary importance.
Consequently the broad approach of social security also implies a certain ‘blurring 
of risk’: if someone has suffered damage (in terms of income, employment, and health/
social participation), social security must try to meet that loss, no matter whether it is 
caused by long-term unemployment, an accident at work, ageing, divorce or something 
else.
The broad interpretation of the instruments of social security implies that it is not 
necessarily a government task to provide coverage for this wide and blurred set of risks; 
this may also be attained via occupational, voluntary and private provisions.
3.1.3 Criticism of the narrow and broad approaches
The differences between the narrow and broad approaches of social security are summa-
rised in table 3.2 in terms of the objectives, instruments, interventions and risks covered. 
In the narrow approach the primary objective is to provide income protection, in the 
sense of a minimum income guarantee for all and a certain degree of income continuity 
for the working population. The main instruments for achieving this objective are statu-
tory social insurance and national provision. These compensate for a lack or deteriora-
tion of income, provided that the shortage is the result of one or more of a number of 
closely defined risks.




The narrow and broad approaches of social securit y 
Narrow approach Broad approach
Objectives Income protection Protection against human damage
  1 guarantee of a minimum income to all citizens  not only income protection, but also security
        based on need of (paid) employment, health, and social partici-
  2 continuity of existing standard of living, espe-  pation
     cially among the working population
 
Instruments Statutory social insurance and national provision All provisions focused on security of income,  
   employment, health, and social participation; 
   social, fi scal, occupational, private and volun-  
   tary provisions
Interventions Compensation (through benefi ts and provisions)   If possible, prevention should precede restora- 
  has priority tion; compensation is the fi nal resort
Risks covered Limited number of risks (ILO list) Risk broadening and blurring
  - old age  all events that can lead to human damage,
  - death of the breadwinner regardless of the precise cause
  - maintenance of children
  - treatment of illness
  - maternity
  - unemployment
  - sickness leave
  - disability
  - occupational accidents and diseases 
In the broad approach, social security targets all forms of human damage, thus aiming to 
provide security of income, employment, health, and social participation. Social insur-
ance and national provision are one means of doing this, but fiscal, occupational, private 
and voluntary arrangements can equally well be used. Compensation of losses is the final 
resort; if possible, interventions aimed at prevention and restoration should take prece-
dence. The covered risks not only include the standard calamities, but all events that have 
led to human damage, regardless of their precise cause. Consequently, the risk definition 
is widened and blurred.
Both views on social security have their advantages and disadvantages. One strength of 
the narrow approach is that it makes absolutely clear that the design of the social secu-
rity system is important. Historically, political battles are often waged over the concrete 
structuring of schemes, over the specific institutionalisation of general principles. This 
is in line with the theory set out in the previous chapter; the proposition that ‘institu-
tions matter’ implies that the design of a social security system largely determines its 
outcomes. At the same time, the major weakness of this approach is that social security 
is equated to its compensatory mechanism with regard to specific ‘ossified’ risks. This is 
not very satisfactory theoretically, since it reduces social security to nothing more than a 
collection of income arrangements.
There are several reasons for preferring the broad approach. Here social security is not 
equated to specific historical instruments of income protection, but is defined in terms of 
its general objective (combating human damage) and their achievement. In this perspec-
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tive the arrangements offered are above all a means of realising the goals, with the useful 
extension that the modes of operation are interpreted more widely: they not only include 
compensation, but also instruments aimed at prevention and restoration.
However, the broad approach also has disadvantages. In the first place it is under-
standable that, in reaction to the traditional perspective, the broad approach emphasises 
that social security is not only about statutory arrangements. Yet this should not lead to 
the conclusion that the design of a social security system is not a key feature; the body of 
schemes and arrangements is important because it establishes the rights and duties of 
actors and therefore gives direction to their behaviour.
A second problem is that the objectives of social security are defined in a very com-
prehensive way. The interpretation of human damage may be so wide that there are few 
events that are not covered, thus limiting the heuristic value of a separate ‘social security’ 
concept – it more or less becomes equivalent to the notion of the welfare state.
Furthermore, the broad approach is often rather a-sociological, since it accords vir-
tually no role to people’s behaviour and their subjective perceptions of social security. 
In terms of the institutional theory discussed in the previous chapter, however, these 
constitute an important intermediary factor. Social security rules steer the perceptions 
and behaviour of actors (benefit recipients, contributors, case managers etc.); and their 
reaction to those rules largely determines the impact of the social security system.
Equally, the objectives and design of the social security rules are human products; they 
are created in a process of rule interaction by specific actors, on the basis of their percep-
tion of the communities’ need to create such institutions. Social security does not evolve by 
itself, but is the result of human interactions that are linked to a certain consensus among 
‘social security entrepreneurs’ on the best way to respond to actual changes. The broad 
approach of social security tends to neglect this, and is therefore somewhat a-historical. The 
view of Viaene et al. (1990), which interprets social security as an unconstrained evolution 
towards ever higher levels, is illustrative in this respect. The emergence of the first social 
insurance arrangements, followed by national provisions and the expansion of the risks 
covered, can undoubtedly all be seen retrospectively as an evolution. However, this does 
not mean that such a course of development is inevitable or that it can be extrapolated ad 
infinitum. In fact, recent decades have seen a retrograde movement in many modern welfare 
states, in which the collectively funded social security system has been curbed considerably 
(cf. Leibfried & Mau, 2008). This makes it clear that evolution towards ever higher levels of 
protection is not an automatic process. The way in which social security develops is not a 
theoretical given but is historically determined, as demonstrated by the variety of social 
security regimes in different countries (see chapter 4).
The collective significance of social security also tends to be rather neglected in the 
broad approach. By according central importance to the concept of human damage, 
social security is measured primarily by its influence on individuals and households. This 
ignores its more general role: an essential characteristic of social security is that it serves 
common goals or shared interests, such as the desire to limit poverty, inequality and 
avoidable benefit dependency. For example, the efficient combating of poverty theoreti-
cally reduces the likelihood that certain forms of collective damage will occur (‘public 
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bads’: theft, social unrest, illness), and also creates collective profits (‘public gains’: e.g. 
instead of having to work in order to supplement their family’s income, children are able 
to attend school, which serves the long-term development of human capital and eco-
nomic prosperity). This public impact of social security can be a sufficient reason for the 
government to be accorded a key role.
3.2 Social security in an institutional sense
In view of the shortcomings highlighted above, a different approach is preferred here, in 
which social security is regarded as the entire body of rules which offer people economic 
protection for the benefit of society. Stated in a more precise way, social security consists 
of the collectively defined rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions which aim to generate posi-
tive social outcomes by protecting individual actors against economic deficits.
A set of institutions
Three aspects characterise the definition proposed here. In the first place it implies that 
social security is a set of socially constructed rules, or institutions. Social security is a 
body of rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions devised by actors, which works 
through into their motivations and expectations, and consequently may influence their 
behaviour. The form in which the rules are cast makes no difference: they may be laid 
down in written form in laws and government decrees, but may also be based on tacit 
agreements within a community. Thus for example the right to an adequate income for 
older persons forms part of social security, regardless of whether it is guaranteed by a 
statutory state pension or by the informal expectations of the elderly vis-à-vis their chil-
dren and the local community.
In line with §2.4, the elements of social security institutions can be regarded as varia-
tions on the following logical fundamental structure11:
(1) Social consensus On the basis of prevailing relative prices, powers, interests and ideals
 there is a sufficient shared understanding that society gains if:
(2) Conditioned rights –   A is entitled to R if (E happens to A); (A=Q); (A does C)
(3) Conditioned duties –   B must fulfil O to secure R, or not interfere with A in 
exercising R, if (B=Q)
(4) Potential sanctions –   S- is possible if (A induces (E or Q)), (A ~does C), (B ~fulfils O), 
or (B interferes with A)
 –   S+ is possible if (A ~induces (E or Q)), (A does C), (B fulfils O), 
or (B ~interferes with A)
(4) where: –   A: potential beneficiaries 
B: duty-bound contributors and intermediaries 
R: rights of A 
O: obligations of B 
E: conditions: eventualities 
Q: conditions: qualifying properties 
C: conditions: conduct 
S-: negative potential sanctions 
S+: positive potential sanctions 
~: not
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The first statement expresses the consensual nature of social security institutions. They 
rest on a social agreement that it is beneficial for society to establish social security rules 
which reflect the current relative prices, power relations, dominant interests and support 
for ideals. These collective purposes are not elements of the rules as such, but constitute 
their vindication, an issue which will be elaborated below.
The second proposition relates to the rights: those who can claim them, the nature of 
the rights to be granted, and the conditions attached to them. Category A comprises the 
actors which are potential beneficiaries of social security12, the bearers of the rights R. 
The latter are the core of the ‘rules of relief’. R consists primarily of the entitlements to 
prevention, restoration and compensation (monetary or in kind) which may be offered 
by the government or community. However, procedural entitlements, such as the right to 
appeal to higher agencies if someone believes they have not received that to which they 
are entitled, also forms part of the rights structure.
The rights are usually defined in a hierarchical way; e.g. the constitutional right to 
a minimum standard of living translates into specific rights to social assistance of a cer-
tain level and duration. Such a hierarchy is consensual, in line with the position taken by 
Raz (1986) that there is no ‘logical entailment’ between core rights and derivative rights 
(cf. §2.6.2).
Social security rights are generally conditioned. Three types of conditions can be 
identified. The first, E, relate to the specific eventualities that confer the right: the ‘opera-
tional definitions’ of, for instance, old age (e.g. reaching one’s 65th birthday), indigence 
(e.g. having a net disposable income below eur 800 a month), unemployment (e.g. loss of 
at least four hours of paid labour), or disability (e.g. not being able to earn 15% of previous 
earnings due to an illness or impairment). E-type conditions theoretically refer to par-
ticular actor states, to which the government or community in principle attaches rights13. 
The eventualities in social security usually pertain to certain types of economic protec-
tion (cf. below). E-type criteria are often defined as prerequisites, or necessary conditions 
for R; yet meeting them may not be sufficient to award entitlements to the A-group, as 
additional criteria may apply.
Conditions of the Q-type are an example of these. They refer to supplementary quali-
fying characteristics of an applicant, such as a certain employment history, or an income 
or personal wealth that is not above a certain limit. C-type requirements, on the other 
hand, are ‘conduct conditions’: behavioural demands that have to be met by the potential 
beneficiaries, such as expecting them to seek work or to do something in return for their 
benefit.
The three types of conditions may be general or current in nature. General conditions 
always apply, as in the stipulation that sufficient contributions must have been paid, that 
a certain employment history has been built up, etc. A current condition would be the 
stipulation that benefit recipients must presently be willing to accept work involving a 
number of hours of travel.
Though not necessary, it is possible for all types of conditions to be attached to social 
security rights simultaneously. For instance, the right to unemployment benefit may 
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carry the conditions that the unemployed person has lost a minimum number of working 
hours, is willing and able to perform labour, and makes serious efforts to find a new job.
The consensus extends further to include the duties imposed on others in order to secure 
the rights of the potential beneficiaries (statement 3). Group B consists of the duty-bound 
contributors and intermediaries. Its members may have a direct personal relationship 
with the beneficiaries (children who support their parents financially), but there may also 
be a large pool of contributors who generally do not know the beneficiaries. Group B is 
delineated by qualifying properties, or Q-type conditions14; e.g. a person has to pay a 
contribution to the hospitality industry unemployment fund if he is gainfully employed 
in a hotel or restaurant for at least 12 hours weekly. Q-type conditions may be very generic 
(all resident adults have to contribute), but may also target specific groups (the young, the 
better-off, those working in high-risk jobs).
Intermediate actors – benefits agencies, supervisory authorities, magistrates, advi-
sors – may also be subject to duties and therefore belong to B. They often have some lee-
way to determine independently how they treat their clients, how they interpret the rules 
in actual cases, etc. This latitude should not be regarded as a right of the duty-bound. 
Rather, it is the result of an unclear specification of their duties, or in other words, it is 
the discretionary scope of B within O.
In informal social security systems, the specific obligations O of group B consist in 
extending the socially expected aid and assistance. In formal systems the obligations 
of the contributors imply the duty to pay levies in order to finance benefits and inter-
ventions aimed at prevention and restoration. The duties of intermediary organisations 
mostly relate to assessing the entitlements and actually providing these, but also to the 
collection of contributions, the auditing of the legitimacy and impact of the administra-
tive process, judging cases of appeal, etc.
Obligations in social security are often focused on securing claim rights, such as ben-
efits. However, non-interference duties may also be imposed. This occurs, for instance, 
if an employment agency is not allowed to force an unemployed person into accepting a 
low-skilled job if he or she has not yet completed a training course which would enhance 
his job prospects.
The collective consensus also relates to the potential sanctions in the event of defection 
and compliance (statement 4). The rules may provide for negative sanctions such as ban-
ishment from the community, ‘naming and shaming’, suspension of rights, demanding 
repayments, fines, and imprisonment. These may be imposed upon potential beneficiar-
ies if they attempt to induce their rights or do not behave as required. They may try to 
acquire entitlements by bringing about or giving a false account of events and qualify-
ing characteristics (e.g. resigning from one’s job, pretending to be seriously ill; changing 
one’s household situation and failing to disclose this) or they may not meet the conduct 
conditions imposed on them (e.g. not seeking employment). Social security rules may 
also provide for positive sanctions in case of compliance with the rules, for example by 
making it possible for beneficiaries to be paid a financial reward on accepting a job.
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Sanctions such as these are usually imposed externally by duty-bound actors, for 
instance a benefits agency. Sanctioning is not an autonomous right of B, but a conse-
quence of B’s obligation to secure the right of A. If the benefits agency hands out a fine 
this does not ensue from its fundamental prerogative to do so; it is a consequence of its 
duty to limit the granting of rights to actors who meet the conditions.
The duty-bound group can also be the subject of sanctions if they default in the ful-
filment of their obligations. This situation arises in cases of social insurance premium 
fraud and tax evasion by contributors, social security agencies which do not pay benefits 
properly or which achieve insufficient reintegration, etc.
Serving collective purposes
The definition also stipulates that social security reflects collective purposes. The rules 
provide some persons with rights and oblige others to perform duties, but that is not 
their final objective. Social security institutions protect some members of a community 
or nation at the expense of others not out of benevolence, but because there is a shared 
conviction that the collectivity will be served by doing so. Every social security arrange-
ment reflects a dominant view that it is socially beneficial to cover economic risks in 
a specific way. Through the institutions, rule-making actors expect to achieve results 
which are considered desirable for the community or society at large; and in the final 
analysis that is the raison d’être for any set of social security rules.
In contrast to the perspective of the human damage theory, the structure of rights 
and duties implied in social security is not regarded here as an autonomous reality which 
can and should continue to evolve ad infinitum. Social security is a historical construct; 
its course of development correlates with the evolution of the perception of what serves 
the community or nation best. The consensus on the collectively desirable outcomes can 
reflect various motives of rule-making actors. As noted in the previous chapter, institu-
tional change is generally a weighted product of changes with respect to four factors, none 
of which logically prevails. Social security rules may therefore emerge or be amended 
because this is considered to be profitable; e.g. when the social and economic disruption 
brought about by a growing discontented urban proletariat is considered more costly 
than providing them with basic protection in terms of income, health and working con-
ditions. It is also possible that new or amended forms of social security are deemed to be 
more in line with changing power relations and conflicts of interest, for instance because 
they aim to pacify the emerging working class. The motives of the actors in establishing 
or changing the social security rules may be largely ideological as well. This occurs for 
example when they regard it as an expression of the value of Christian charity or of gen-
eral principles of justice and fairness. It is possible for these changes in relative prices, 
power relations, interests and the support for ideals to occur simultaneously and to be 
mutually reinforcing, thus leading to new forms of social security. Yet theoretically this is 
not necessary; they may also occur in isolation or oppose each other (cf. §2.9.1).
The expected result of social security rules may relate to the attainment of collective 
gains, but also to combating communal disadvantages. The first category includes shared 
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views on the promotion of prosperity and the social cohesion of the community; improv-
ing the functioning of the labour market and the economy; and stimulating the emanci-
pation of certain social groups or, by contrast, reproducing the natural order of estates 
and classes. The second category embraces the consensus that social security rules may 
prevent or limit famine, poverty, widespread disease, class conflicts or labour disputes.
The particular social security institutions on which rule-making actors agree can vary 
according to time and place; and the opportunities to establish or change the rules depend 
on the routines, interests and investments encapsulated within the existing institutions. 
The consensus may also fluctuate across different sections of the community. For exam-
ple, for groups such as the elderly, the disabled and single-parent families the employ-
ment dimension is sometimes subordinated in favour of income protection. Finally, the 
consensus need not be unanimous: what is important is that there is sufficient common 
understanding. In a democratic system, formal social security rules must generally be 
approved by a qualified majority of the legislative assembly. In the case of informal social 
security institutions it is important that dominant actors within the community consider 
the rules beneficial for the whole.
Protecting individual actors against economic deficits
A third aspect of the definition stipulates that social security tries to protect individual 
actors against certain economic deficits. The deficits theoretically refer to a lack or loss of 
income, labour, health and social participation. Their economic nature has to be under-
stood in the sense that the lacks or losses can be appraised in financial terms: a low or 
diminished income, a decrease in working hours or hourly wages, the costs of medical 
care and social participation (e.g. visiting one’s next of kin). Social security rights may 
compensate for such lacks and losses, but also include the financial cost of measures aim-
ing at prevention and restoration.
A further restriction is that social security is by definition aimed at persons or house-
holds: it is the coverage of the economic deficits of individual actors that is at stake, not 
those of large corporations, voluntary associations, etc. The obvious reason for this limi-
tation is that the theoretical objectives of social security are concerned with the pre-
vention, restoration and compensation of deficits in terms of income, labour, health 
and social participation. Such shortages in principle only occur in natural persons – for 
instance, organisations can experience poor health only in a metaphorical sense15.
Restricting social security to the economic protection of individuals is in line with 
the historical roots of the concept (cf. §3.1). It also has the merit that social security, thus 
conceived, does not become a catch-all phrase for any kind of collective intervention, 
or an equivalent of the more general notion of the welfare state. While it is still fairly 
wide, a demarcation of social security in terms of the monetary equivalent of lacks and 
losses of income, labour participation, health and social participation is more restrictive 
than one in terms of ‘any form of human damage’. For instance, measures which attempt 
to mitigate the ecological damage humankind may suffer because certain species are 
threatened by extinction generally do not belong to social security as it is understood 
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here; that damage bears no direct relation to the individual economic lacks and losses 
referred to in the definition. Yet the regulation of the long-term consequences of, for 
instance, occupational diseases is part of social security – ideas of finality surely enter 
into the definition.
The notion of risk – to be understood as the eventualities which bring about lacks or 
losses – is not included in the definition. This is because theoretically social security may 
be provided without taking the causes of economic deficits into account, as the exam-
ple of the full unconditional basic income shows. Such a scheme periodically grants an 
amount of money to all citizens, irrespective of whether they are working or not, are ill, 
old, needy, etc. By awarding a basic income society seeks to shield its members from the 
undesirable situation of not having enough money to live in an acceptable way, no matter 
what the cause of the income deficit is16.
Nonetheless, in most actual social security systems there are specific attributions 
of rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions to cover the eventuality of unem-
ployment, disability, old age and the like. In practice, social security institutions usually 
include the causes of economic deficits, specified in E-type conditions, because this has 
a number of potential advantages17. If there is a consensus that the causality triptych 
of social insurance (cf. §3.1.1) is important in any way, the rules necessarily provide an 
explicit demarcation of the risk involved.
What social security is
On the basis of the definition no universally applicable list of social security institutions 
can be given. This is because the contents of the rules always reflect the prevailing con-
sensus in specific socio-historical circumstances. Suppose that in a given community 
bearded persons are not allowed to work for religious or hygienic reasons; this could lead 
to high unemployment among men who cannot afford to shave. If a legal rule stipulates 
that the local authorities, in order to counter the negative collective repercussions, must 
reimburse daily visits to the barber for a shave, this is a form of social security. It is an 
entitlement protecting a considerable part of the population against economic losses, 
to which conditions may be attached (exclusion of women and pre-adolescents, means 
testing), and which specifies the obligations that have to be fulfilled (e.g. the duty to pay 
contributions to a local ‘shaving fund’)18, and the sanctions that may be applied (e.g. 
imposing a fine on bearded persons walking in public areas).
Obviously, the definition does not allow for any deontological demarcation of the content 
of the rules, as sociologically speaking there can be no such thing as a ‘right division of 
social security rights’. However, following the definition there are some logical curtail-
ments. The premise that social security is a set of institutions implies that everything 
which does not refer to rights and duties, with their associated conditions and possible 
sanctions, does not belong to it. The concept therefore does not relate to social insur-
ance or national provision as such, as in the traditional narrow interpretation; but to the 
rights, duties, conditions and sanctions incorporated in these regulations.
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Similarly, based on the institutional criterion the organisations responsible for the 
rule elements – benefit and employment agencies, social security funds – are not part of 
social security proper either; rather, they are corporate social security actors (cf. below).
As a consequence of the stipulation on the collective purposes of social security, 
arrangements that are not considered to serve a shared objective at the macro-level are 
to be excluded from the definition as well. This usually19 applies to things such as private 
fire and theft insurance policies. Although these are embedded in the formal institutions 
of civil and contract law and target the economic position of households, coverage of 
the latter is not commonly regarded as serving a collective purpose. Even so, this does 
not mean that what has been denoted by Berghman (1986) as ‘private welfare’ should 
never be regarded as social security. Where private arrangements are deemed to benefit 
 society in some way or another, and are therefore collectively enforced, they unquestion-
ably enter into the definition. Thus, saving for one’s old age is not social security if it 
merely reflects the preferences of a few individuals to retire early; but it certainly is if the 
community expects people to provide their own pension and applies negative sanctions 
in the event of defection (for example by showing disapproval to elderly people who are 
dependent on social assistance).
Provisions that are not aimed at individual actors do not belong to social security 
as defined here either. This is the case, for example, for the rules on state aid to large 
businesses facing insolvency. Such measures may clearly influence the take-up of social 
security arrangements (by preventing job redundancies) and thus the economic position 
of potential beneficiaries and contributors; but as there are no direct individual entitle-
ments and duties involved, such arrangements are too generic to be counted as a form of 
social security.
Institutions which affect individual actors but do not have a direct bearing on their 
economic protection also fall outside the definition. The example of ‘ecological risks’ has 
already been mentioned; but the rules governing higher education, the housing market 
or the sentencing of criminal offenders generally are not part of social security either. 
However, the components of such rule systems which explicitly refer to economic risks 
of persons (such as student grants, housing benefit, or preparing convicts for return to 
employment after their release) do fall within the scope of the definition.
Apart from these logical restrictions, the contents of social security rules implied in the 
definition can only be ascertained in a descriptive way, for instance by trying to recount the 
shared consensus in a given historical context; e.g. the common denominator prevailing 
in affluent modern democracies at the beginning of the 21st century. Such a descriptive 
list could include rules aiming at:
– The classic income risks of social security, viz. the contingencies in the ilo list (old age, 
unemployment, surviving dependants, the maintenance of children, illness, disability, 
sickness leave and occupational diseases and accidents). While their coverage through 
national legislature is comparatively recent, many of these risks were already regarded 
as a ground for local poor relief in pre-industrial times. Thus the early 19th-century Reg-
ulations in the town of Den Bosch mentioned in the Introduction contain – albeit in 
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rudimentary form – most of the events mentioned in ilo Convention no. 102, with the 
exception of employment injuries20;
– New income risks, such as parental leave, divorce and income fluctuations as a result 
of freelance labour. Unavoidable one-off expenditures that cannot be borne by the 
individual or household may also fall into this category (e.g. breakdown of domestic 
appliances);
– Labour risks: minimum labour standards (e.g. working hours, working conditions); 
child care facilities for working parents; and measures which aim to prevent disabil-
ity, restore labour capacity or reintegrate individuals into the employment process 
(including subsidised employment and workfare);
– Health risks: the costs of medical treatment, including prevention, rehabilitation and 
formal or informal care;
– Social participation risks: the costs of socially required activities that the actor cannot 
afford (visiting one’s relatives, sports club membership for children, minimum trans-
port facilities).
Yet the actual shape social security takes may diverge widely over time and between com-
munities or nations. Currently new risks, such as paternity leave and divorce, are only 
considered a collective responsibility in the more extensive social security systems, espe-
cially those in Scandinavia. Similarly, guaranteeing a minimum level of social partici-
pation remains a rather insignificant element of most modern social security systems. 
And even the coverage of the classic risks of social security at a low level is not taken 
for granted in all affluent modern democracies. This is illustrated by the fact that ilo 
Convention no. 102 has not been ratified by several oecd countries, including Australia, 
Canada and the usa. There remains a considerable empirical variation between national 
social security systems, a topic which will be explored further in the next chapter. How-
ever, now that the concept has been defined, it is useful to look first in more detail at the 
institutional approach to social security.
3.3 Institutions and actors in social security
Social security institutions can appear in an informal or formal guise; i.e. the accredita-
tion of rights, conditions, duties, and sanctions may rest directly on the prevailing con-
sensus in a community or they may be defined or recognised by the government. The 
theoretical nature of formal and informal social security rules and the relationships 
between them will be outlined here, as an elaboration of what has been said in the previ-
ous chapter about various institutions in a general sense. The types of actors that may be 
involved in social security will also be defined more precisely in this section.
3.3.1 Informal social security rules
Every social security system contains informal elements. The values of solidarity and fair-
ness as perceived in a community or society shape the definition of specific rights, duties 
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and potential sanctions. Within the general hierarchy of values, the position of such 
notions is not fixed. If solidarity and fairness values are considered subordinate to ‘indi-
vidual freedom should not be interfered with’, for example, this can limit the attribution 
of social security entitlements.
Social security norms are the rights and duties that are actually recognised by mem-
bers of a group or community: Which risks are economic, and should these be a collec-
tive responsibility? Which entitlements are justified, and to what extent should the com-
munity provide for them? Who is required to make contributions in order to secure the 
general rights? Which penalties can beneficiaries, contributors and intermediary actors 
expect if they default?
Conventions relate to routines in social security interactions between beneficiaries 
and duty-bound. For instance, custom may prescribe that the contributions of the com-
munity are collected at a certain moment in time (e.g. via a weekly church collection), or 
that poor relief recipients can report at a certain time to an issue point for food, water, 
fuel or financial support.
Informal social security contracts may consist of tangible agreements between private 
actors; for example, someone who borrows money from a relative to help them out in a 
time of need and promises to pay it back within a certain period.
3.3.2 Informal social security systems
As the Den Bosch Regulations discussed in the Introduction show, it is possible for social 
security schemes or systems to be completely informal. Berghman (1986), as noted ear-
lier, speaks in that case of ‘voluntary’ social security. This term is somewhat unfortu-
nate, because informal social security schemes can be very compelling. The beneficiaries 
may have to accept burdensome duties: a show of submissiveness, shame and gratitude 
towards the group or community; a highly demanding quid pro quo, for example having 
to perform heavy labour in the workhouse; or the moral obligation to display loyalty to 
their benefactors. They often also face negative informal sanctions. Merely by making 
use of the informal arrangements it is possible that beneficiaries end up at the bottom 
of the social hierarchy; and their reputation may be so badly damaged that their chances 
– and those of their children – of climbing back up the social ladder will be severely com-
promised for many years to come. If the community thinks beneficiaries have to blame 
themselves for their dependency (because they have not done enough to avoid being in 
a situation of need, did not save when they were able to do so, have ignored the religious 
prescripts, or have led a bad life in some other way), they can be regarded as undeserving, 
and consequently may be the subject of moral rejection, taunting or exclusion.
Similarly, the contributors in informal systems may find it difficult to shirk the acts 
of benevolence they are supposed to perform. Even if the decision whether or not to 
contribute is discretionary, in reality the duty-bound often have to take account of their 
social position and the disapproval they will face if their contribution does not meet the 
expectations (e.g. losing their place on the front row at church). The single ‘voluntary’ 
element in schemes of this type is that there is no enforcement by the government: such 
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systems are based entirely on the norm that individual actors have a certain right to sup-
port from the members of their group or community if certain risks occur and they meet 
the habitual conditions.
Informal social security systems may consist of familial, communal or occupational arrange-
ments. Familial social security is based on relationships between blood relatives (nuclear 
and extended family, clan). It includes, for instance, the expectation that children will 
sustain and care for their parents when they are too old to work and no longer have suf-
ficient means of their own. Such an arrangement may incorporate a form of informal 
reciprocity, in that grown-up descendants repay what they received from their parents in 
their childhood.
Communal social security is based on local community organisations, and is gener-
ally associated with church charity and works of mercy by affluent members of society. 
Direct support through the donation of money, food, fuel, clothing and medical help 
is the best-known form of communal social security. Other examples include provid-
ing shelter for certain categories of the needy (older persons, the disabled, widows and 
orphans, foundlings, beggars) in communal care homes, mental homes, orphanages or 
workhouses; or placing such groups in private lodging with paid caretakers. ‘Patronage’ 
can also be included under communal social security. In this form of care, attempts are 
made to ensure that paupers become moral and religious citizens by arranging for the 
well-to-do to personally oversee their lifestyles, among other things through home visits 
(see for examples in the Netherlands: Van Loo, 1987: 35-46).
Informal occupational social security is built around labour relationships. The guild 
funds are an historical example of such a system: the entitlements were limited to guild 
members and their dependent relatives. Currently, employers still may offer provisions 
which are no part of the formal contractual employment relationship, but in most afflu-
ent societies this is a rather marginal phenomenon (e.g. the right of employees in a bak-
ery to take home left-over bread).
These informal social security arrangements can exist alongside each other, in a comple-
mentary or nested form. The duty to provide help then may rest in the first instance on 
the next of kin; if they are absent or default on their obligations, these may pass to the 
extended family or clan; and if that provides insufficient remedy, the responsibility could 
shift to the community organisations (such as the church) or the municipality.
Informal social security systems can only exist where there is a recognisable group 
or community which shares the informal rules (values, norms, conventions and informal 
contracts) to a sufficient degree. An informal social security system can fulfil a number 
of functions for a group or community. Of course, its primary aim is to combat the most 
serious social ills (hunger, illness, child mortality), thus improving the collective wel-
fare and future prospects of the community as a whole. Apart from that, it may serve the 
emancipation of disadvantaged groups within the community. Furthermore, by comply-
ing with the normative expectations of social security rules solidarity is expressed in a 
very tangible way, and perpetuation of the collectivity is enhanced. Informal social secu-
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rity can moreover offer a means of demarcating internal and external hierarchies. Within 
the group or community the mutual dependence relationships and social relations are 
confirmed, while at the same time social integration is fostered by excluding outsiders 
from the protection provided.
3.3.3 Formal social security
Modern social security systems are generally highly formalised; they are created or rati-
fied by the government through legislation and regulations. In the narrow approach dis-
cussed earlier, social security is even equated to such government arrangements. Three 
main types of formal social security can be distinguished:
a. Collective social security, also referred to in the literature as the ‘first pillar’. Follow-
ing the line of argument of Titmuss and Berghman, a distinction can be made here 
between social security produced by the government in the form of social insurance 
and national provisions (social welfare or ‘visible social security’), and the tax breaks 
and subsidies that the government grants to individuals or households (fiscal welfare). 
The latter can be further subdivided into provisions that are comparable to benefits or 
a partial basic income (such as tax credits) and reimbursement of the costs that people 
actually incur (tax relief for pension contributions, annuities, medical expenses).
b. Occupational social security enforced by the government, or ‘second pillar’ arrange-
ments. This occurs for example when the law stipulates that employer and employee 
representatives are responsible for implementing an unemployment benefit scheme; 
that employers are responsible for supervising the sickness absence of their employ-
ees; that collective labour agreements apply for all firms within a given sector, and so 
on. Occupational social security can also exist without government enforcement, but 
is then informal in nature (cf. above).
c. Government-enforced private social security contracts, or ‘third pillar’ provisions. 
These include private pension and health insurance plans, for example, in which the 
relationship between the insurer and the insured is steered by government rules. This 
is the case for example when the government compels people to enter into such a con-
tract with a certified insurance company. As stated earlier, any tax relief awarded by the 
government for the costs incurred do not form part of this system; that is collective 
social security in the form of fiscal welfare. Where such arrangements are not enforced 
by the government but by the community (for example, a widely shared expectation 
that people will save up for their retirement themselves), such private contracts have 
an informal character. If they are based entirely on personal preferences, they are not 
included under social security as defined here at all.
Formal social security institutions can theoretically be ranked in an infinite number of 
ways. As indicated before, it is usual for the rules to exist in a certain hierarchy, though 
without one inevitably deriving from another; there is a top-down ranking of formal 
institutions, but no logical entailment. Constitutional recognition of the right to social 
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security may force the government to formulate certain specific laws on the right to, e.g., 
social assistance benefit, unemployment benefit, collective old-age pension and so on. 
These laws will generally be elaborated in specific regulations, administrative decrees 
and jurisprudence. The entire national body of formal institutions can be influenced by 
supranational rules, such as European Union regulations, directives and decisions21, un 
and ilo conventions, etc. All these rules, and the derivations between them, stand in 
a certain hierarchical relationship to each other. This hierarchy is based on consensual 
interpretations. The awarding of social assistance benefit in specific cases at a certain 
level and for a particular period of time does not ensue inevitably from the basic right 
to social security, but is the result of an accumulation of political and administrative 
choices. Equally, the hierarchy does not imply that the higher rules are more important. 
The rules which define specific rights, duties, conditions or sanctions (such as benefit 
levels, contribution rates, work incentives, fines in case of defection) may weigh more 
heavily in the motivations and behaviour of actors – and in the social outcomes achieved 
–  than the abstract intentions at the top of the institutional hierarchy.
A second ranking option concerns the relationship between the three types of institu-
tions in formal social security: collective, occupational and government-enforced pri-
vate rules. The term pillars, which is frequently used in the literature, suggests a parallel 
hierarchy with a vertical division of responsibilities. For instance, the government may 
restrict its first pillar role to a social safety net in the form of social assistance benefit. 
Unemployment and disability benefit arrangements and old age pensions can then be 
regarded as a statutory responsibility of employers and trade unions in the second pillar. 
In such a system, households could be expected to take steps themselves to cover other 
risks (such as survivor pensions and arranging childcare facilities) in the third pillar, with 
the government possibly reimbursing some of the costs through the tax system.
Yet a horizontal distribution of responsibilities is also possible, in which the three 
types of institutions are arranged in layers. This occurs, for example, when old age benefit 
consists of a first pillar national pension with uniform amounts, which is topped up to a 
certain percentage of the previous earnings via occupational pension schemes, in addi-
tion to which people may draw on provisions that they have built up themselves in the 
past with the help of the government. This layered variant is sometimes described as the 
‘cappuccino model’. In such an arrangement, the three types of social security can operate 
as communicating vessels: if the state pension is only partially adjusted for inflation, for 
example, this puts pressure on the funding or level of occupational and private pensions.
3.3.4 Informal elements in formal social security
Even though modern social security systems are typically highly formalised, informal 
institutions can theoretically still play an important role in them. This applies in particu-
lar to the role of complementary informal arrangements, the public support for formal 
rules, and the possible existence of deviating norms in some sections of the community.
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Modern societies with extensive formal systems still can contain informal social secu-
rity arrangements which play a supplementary role. Communal social security is not 
entirely without importance, although it is often invisible in the statistics. Examples 
might include activities such as those of the Salvation Army, Food Banks, and other 
organisations which combat the more severe forms of poverty on the basis of their moral 
or social conviction. Reference can also be made to companies which provide student 
grants to certain groups; to mutual non-profit arrangements (e.g. cooperative insurance 
schemes for trade union members, which can be regarded as the successors to the funds 
maintained by the guilds to support poor, sick or old guild members); and to provisions 
outside the monetary economy, such as the entitlements and duties contained in Local 
Exchange and Trading Schemes (lets; cf. Seyfang, 2001; Williams et al., 2001).
It has already been mentioned that informal occupational social security is rather 
marginal in highly developed modern welfare states. Familial social security has undoubt-
edly lost much of its key role as well, but it has not been eradicated, as borne out by the 
following current examples:
– familial assistance where the collective provisions are absent or demand a high con-
tribution from the recipient, for example the provision of childcare services by grand-
parents or other relatives when both parents are working;
– informal care, or help provided by people to their sick or needy relatives;
– financing children’s higher education; this may take the form of the complete fund-
ing of education courses and living expenses by the parents, or the provision of extra 
resources by the extended family;
– incidental gifts and legacies;
– support in the event of acute financial problems, such as the replacement of consumer 
goods that are deemed necessary, paying off debts, acting as guarantor;
– migrants who provide financial support for relatives in their country of origin. 
This concerns, for instance, about a quarter of the Dutch households with roots in 
Morocco22.
The public support aspect relates to the question of how well the actual or proposed 
configuration of formal social security matches the views that prevail in the population. 
General notions on solidarity and fairness work through into – not always abundantly 
clear – opinions about the social risks that should be covered, the groups that ought to be 
eligible for that cover, the rights (benefit levels, duration, etc.) and duties that are consid-
ered appropriate, the desired sanction possibilities, and the strictness with which sanc-
tions should be applied. There are two possible areas of tension here. In the first place, a 
part of the community may feel that government should produce more or different social 
security, while others think it should stay equal or be minimised. These differences of 
opinion were very prominent in the political struggle surrounding the construction of 
collective social security at the end of the 19th and early 20th century in many Western 
countries (cf. §3.7). In the second place, policymakers who are responsible for the govern-
ment rules may believe that the collective interest is best served with a wider, narrower 
or different social security system, while the community may disagree. This antagonism 
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arises particularly in times of government cutbacks, such as attempts to curb collective 
(pre-)pension arrangements, which in some countries have led to mass social protests. 
However, a situation can also arise where policymakers presume that the population 
needs different forms of social security (such as flexible collective arrangements with 
more individual freedom of choice), whereas public support for this turns out in practice 
not to be very extensive or to be highly specific (see e.g. Hoff & Vrooman, 2002).
Informal social security rules should ideally complement and support the formal rules. 
For instance, the conditions on job search requirements should in principle be endorsed 
by unemployment benefit recipients and those around them. In practice, however, cer-
tain groups may apply informal rules which are at odds with the formal social security 
rules. This idea is developed particularly in the research tradition that builds on the ‘cul-
ture of poverty’ which Lewis (1959, 1968, 1969) believed he observed in poor slums in 
Mexico, Puerto Rico and the usa. In his view, people living in such neighbourhoods are 
forced by the economic constraints to develop a particular strategy or philosophy for cop-
ing with their poverty, which is perpetuated in new generations (Lewis, 1969: 188):
By the time slum children are age six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic values 
and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of 
changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime.
Wilson (1987) stressed that a deviant culture such as this does indeed occur among the 
underclass in the large American cities, but that this cannot be seen in isolation from 
their structural position, in particular their weak connection to the labour market. In 
his view, the new urban poverty is so problematic primarily because the residents of 
poor inner-city neighbourhoods are predominantly unemployed, whereas in the past the 
working poor dominated; this is giving rise to ‘jobless ghettos’ (Wilson, 1997: 3-24).
This theme has been explored in the Netherlands in several qualitative studies focus-
ing on the coping strategies of benefit recipients (cf. Kroft et al., 1989; Engbersen, 1989, 
1990; Engbersen et al., 1993; Engbersen & Staring, 2000). This line of research mainly 
revealed that in many cases the reaction to benefit dependency was a traditional one, and 
was in line with formal rules and the norms and values that are considered dominant in 
Dutch society. A number of smaller groups, however, had deviating views on the accept-
ability of breaking rules, on the government, and on the advantages and disadvantages of 
working. This was reflected in rational strategic behaviour: even when their entitlements 
were doubtful, these groups were more inclined to apply for benefits and to continue 
drawing them.
3.3.5 Social security actors
The picture that was outlined in §2.7 in principle also applies for the actors in social 
security, their mutual relationships and their motivations. The actors here can be theo-
retically divided into current and potential beneficiaries (people in need of help, benefit 
claimants, insured parties), contributors (taxpayers and social insurance contributors), 
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intermediating social security organisations (a local poor relief fund, a national social 
security administration) and other corporate actors (such as firms). Social security actors 
may have both corporate and individual agents. For instance, a board of trustees may 
be the corporate representative of a municipal poor relief fund, with local care officials 
acting as their individual agents; or a medical benefits institute may be the corporate 
agent of the national social security administration, and employ medical assessors as 
individual agents. Individual benefit recipients may have agents as well, e.g. trade unions 
and individual lawyers who represent their interests in legal procedures.
The actors do differ theoretically according to the type of system, as will become 
apparent in the description of social security interaction models in §3.5. Informal social 
security systems are generally based on fairly direct, local and personal exchanges 
between beneficiaries (those in need of help) and contributors (family, church, commu-
nity, guild). The rules often allow for a fair amount of discretionary power, in that the 
rights and duties are defined in fairly vague terms. Sanctioning is largely informal (gos-
sip, scandal) and the intermediate actors are often weakly developed.
In modern, formal social security systems, by contrast, these corporate actors and 
their agents occupy a central role, in the form of the massive social security bureauc-
racies. Firms are also important corporate actors, because their behaviour (hiring and 
firing, dealing with sickness) partly determines how many people need to fall back on 
social security. In formal social security systems the direct relationship between benefi-
ciaries (claimants and recipients) and contributors (those paying taxes and social insur-
ance premiums) is often broken; the exchange relationships are manifold, national and 
impersonal. Rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions are laid down in detail in 
formal laws, regulations and administrative decrees. Informal sanctioning is of subordi-
nate importance, although certain groups of benefit claimants may be regarded as less 
deserving than others, and for that reason be treated condescendingly.
There are several reasons why it is theoretically plausible to assume that actors in for-
mal social security systems will be more inclined to defect than those in informal sys-
tems. The potential group of people with an entitlement is large, while the benefits of 
rule-breaking are relatively high and the plethora of rules offers a generous opportunity 
structure. The looser connection with the rules of communities and groups means the 
informal monitoring and sanctioning are weak. In combination with the low visibility of 
modern benefit dependency, this may result in a low risk of being caught in the event of 
defection. Finally, the collective nature of formal systems implies that the social dilemma 
inherent in social security comes to the fore explicitly. As the exchange is impersonal, in 
the short term defection does not affect anyone in particular; while in the longer term it 
only harms the government, which ‘belongs to everyone and no one’. The way in which 
various models of rule-driven social security interaction can foster defection is discussed 
in more detail later. First, however, the question will be addressed of how actors acquire 
social security rules.
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3.4 Undersocialised social security
In the previous chapter a number of principles were formulated concerning rule acquisi-
tion (see §2.8.3). This section develops the proposition that, following these principles, it 
is plausible that social security institutions are typically transferred to new actors rather 
late and not very intensively.
Generally speaking, people do not need social security rules at an early stage of life in 
order to be able to function in their social setting. Social security rules therefore do not 
usually form part of the primary socialisation process. Typically, this hiatus is only partly 
filled in adult life, as most actors do not apply social security rules on a day-to-day basis. 
Secondary socialisation consequently also occurs to only a limited extent. The exception 
to this is the rather small group of professional rule experts: policy officials who draft laws 
and regulations, administrators, judges and lawyers specialising in social security. In for-
mal systems they usually go through an extensive and permanent process of socialisation 
in order to be able to continue practising their specialist profession properly. Further-
more, certain benefit recipients may acquire a detailed knowledge of the rules, becoming 
‘experts through experience’ with regard to the rules that matter to them.
In informal social security systems a child may become broadly acquainted with the rules 
as a result of the actual and idiosyncratic experiences he and his family or community go 
through. The application of such rules of relief can leave a deep and lasting impression 
on children, as borne out by the frequent discussion of the theme ‘growing up in pov-
erty’ in autobiographically tinted novels, from Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist (1837) to Frank 
McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes (1996). Also, in familial systems the socialisers have an interest in 
instilling some basic principles or expectations, as they are likely to become dependent 
on their children in old age. Yet this does not imply that the socialisees will understand 
the details of the rules: typically, children have only a dim notion of the specific informal 
social security rights, duties, conditions and sanctions their parents are faced with.
Formal social security rules are less likely to form part of the everyday experience of 
young socialisees. These institutions are often complex, abstract and ambiguous, so that 
it is difficult to acquire knowledge of their content, especially at an early age; this demands 
the cognitive ability to see the logic behind them, and a degree of moral awareness. Since 
parents normally have no direct interest in whether or not the socialisees are familiar 
with the formal rules – as the risks are covered at the impersonal level of the nation state 
– they have no strong inclination to undertake socialising acts in this domain. This is not 
made up for in the secondary socialisation process: in the educational curriculum formal 
social security rules often are covered only in very broad terms, if at all.
The foregoing makes it theoretically plausible that social security tends to be imprinted 
on the new generations in a very limited fashion; and that this ‘undersocialised character of 
social security’ is expressed more emphatically in formal than in informal systems.
The lack of internalisation implies that rational actors are likely to break the rules. 
There is no internal incentive which prevents contributors from keeping their payments 
to a minimum, or beneficiaries from striving to derive the greatest possible gains from 
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social security arrangements. This can only be avoided if individual actors can be incited 
to behave in a way that would not seem rational in the short term, or through the estab-
lishment of an effective external monitoring and sanctioning system.
In familial social security systems, a number of factors work against defection. As stated, 
such rules may be socialised to some degree, partly because the socialisers have an inter-
est in this. Even more important is the fact that the rules are based on long-term, highly 
affective relationships, in which reciprocity can also play a major role. As a result, it 
may indeed be ‘unthinkable’ for children not to support their elderly parents. But if the 
mutual relationships have become distorted, or if the resources of the adult children are 
too meagre, this is anything but self-evident.
In communal and occupational social security systems the affective ties between the 
stakeholders are generally less strong. Here, the obvious way to resolve the problem of 
the undersocialised nature of social security is to make the rules explicit, carefully moni-
toring compliance with them, and sanctioning infringements publicly. The risk of defec-
tive behaviour can be reduced further by keeping contributions at a reasonable level and 
restricting the rights as far as possible.
As the undersocialisation is theoretically greatest in formal social security systems, the 
risk of rule-breaking is highest here. This rapidly leads to a social dilemma: there is noth-
ing to deter actors from seeking to maximise their personal utility, and in the long run 
this can make it impossible to keep the collective provisions intact. There are several 
ways of addressing this from a theoretical perspective, but they offer no fundamental 
solution to the problem of defection.
One way of attempting to tackle it might be by embedding the formal rules in infor-
mal ones and relying upon monitoring and sanctioning processes within the community. 
For instance, policymakers may try to link specific formal social security institutions (a 
certain duration of social assistance, the taxation level) to abstract values and norms 
in an attempt to justify them (‘we have to look after the weaker members of society’; 
‘every citizen must stand on his own two feet’; ‘we need to ensure that the money goes 
to those who genuinely need it’). Yet for various reasons it is likely that the embedding of 
formal rules in informal institutions will often be difficult to achieve. The translation of 
such abstracts into actual formal social security rules is an arbitrary process and cannot 
be imposed from above. An individual actor who does not share the general informal 
notions and their specific derivation in formal rules, and who is not put under any pres-
sure to comply, can easily disregard them. Moreover, formal social security institutions 
often emerge precisely because communities are unable to sustain their informal sys-
tems based on shared values and norms, and on the affects and relationships of trust 
and authority between actors prevailing in well-defined social networks (cf. below). This 
makes it unlikely that such ‘old solutions’ can underpin specific formal attributions of 
rights and duties to any great extent23.
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Legislators may also attempt to define formal social security rights, duties, condi-
tions and sanctions in very strict terms, leaving as little room for manoeuvre as possible 
for the actors concerned; however, as stated earlier, a complete ‘regimentation’ is dif-
ficult to achieve in practice.
Alternatively, the government can increase its monitoring activities, and consistently 
mete out severe punishments for infringements. But this leads to high transaction costs; 
and as many infringements may be hard to detect, this strategy is in danger of becoming 
both ineffective and inefficient.
Finally, an attempt can be made to arrange the financial incentives in such a way that 
a rational actor will be encouraged to observe the rules which are regarded as collectively 
desirable. If the aim is to encourage benefit claimants to go to work, for example, one 
approach might be to maximise the difference between the total income transfers and 
the wages from employment. Yet there is often a practical limit to what is considered 
possible here. Increasing net wages costs employers or the government money, possibly 
with negative consequences for the economy as a whole (reduced investments, labour 
demand); cutting benefit levels in turn hits the spending power of households, poten-
tially generating more poverty and other undesirable social effects. Quite apart from this, 
theoretically the behaviour of actors is not determined solely by financial incentives.
These considerations make it unlikely that the social dilemma inherent in formal 
social security systems can be entirely resolved. Even so, much depends on the structure 
of interaction among the parties concerned, and the particular course taken in actual 
behavioural exchange.
3.5 Models of rule-driven social security interactions
If social security rules exist, how do they influence the interactions between actors? To 
answer this question, a number of theoretical interaction models are explored in more 
detail in this section, building on the analysis in §2.8.
All social security interactions start with the granting of certain rights to beneficiaries by 
individual benefactors or corporate actors (e.g., the local administration), in accordance 
with the prevailing stipulations. The rights relate to the three theoretical interventions 
introduced above: the behavioural interactions which aim at the prevention, restoration or 
compensation of a lack or loss of income, labour, health and social participation. Logically, 
the imposition and collection of the contributions needed to fund the interventions also form 
part of the rule-driven interactions of social security. If there is no direct transaction 
between beneficiaries and benefactors, this requires exchanges between the duty-bound 
collectors and a collecting intermediary authority (a revenue officer, a fund). Further 
common types of interaction relate to monitoring and sanctioning: checking whether actors 
are sticking to the rules and imposing rewards and punishments accordingly.
The way in which these eight types of interaction are applied in practice, and which 
actors are involved, is not fixed. The actual interactions in social security can differ widely 
between, e.g., systems in which family relationships are at the core, and systems that 
are built mainly around government rules. The former lack an intermediating corporate 
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actor, while in formal systems there is generally a social security organisation acting as 
the ‘spider in the web’. In familial systems the rights and duties tend to be less clearly 
specified, and certain interventions (e.g. prevention) are rare. Monitoring often is close, 
but the expected sanctions in case of defection tend to be unpredictable.
Within one and the same type of social security system the interaction pattern may 
vary with the specific risk covered. For example, in cases of unemployment and retire-
ment the behavioural interactions governed by formal social security regulations are 
often different. Unemployment benefit recipients usually are expected to look for a job, 
and old age pensioners are not. And even if the risk and social security type are the same, 
a great deal of variety in the behavioural exchanges is possible. For example, the interac-
tion pattern linked to formal unemployment benefit schemes may differ widely between 
two countries, owing to differences in national legislation and in the informal expecta-
tions of the actors concerned.
This great variation makes it difficult to pin down the interaction patterns in social secu-
rity unambiguously. Six theoretical models are developed in this section. These should be 
regarded as stylised types, which in practice may be subject to many empirical variations 
and exceptions. First, an indication is given of how the behavioural interactions between 
actors can be structured in three models of informal social security: familial, communal 
and occupational systems (§3.5.1-3.5.3). This is followed by a discussion of three interac-
tion types of formal social security (§3.5.4-3.5.6). These relate respectively to systems 
designed to cover demographic risks (old age, surviving dependants, costs of children); 
unemployment and social assistance; and sickness absence and disability. In the discus-
sion of each theoretical interaction model three central questions are at stake:
1. What is the interaction structure; or, which actors are involved in which types of inter-
action?
2. To what extent are the interactions rule-driven?
3. What is the theoretical likelihood of rule-compliance and defection?
3.5.1 Familial social security
Actors and interactions
Figure 3.1 presents a relatively simple interaction model of familial social security. Like 
all graphs in this section, this is an enlargement of a segment of the figural model pre-
sented in §2.3; it zooms in on the actors and the types of interaction24 that are driven by 
social security rules.
Each family (1 …n) is depicted as an individual subsystem of social security, which 
is embedded in a wider community. In this variant there are no support relationships 
between families. The interactions between the generations of blood relatives lie at the 
heart of the system: within one family the parents, grandparents and children provide mutual 
material support. In principle, most of the support in the three-generation family is pro-
vided by the parents. As they are in a productive phase of life they have the means to 
support family members, and it is logical that the duty of assuring the rights of younger 
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and older family members rests on them. However, this obligation is not inevitable. If the 
earning capacity of the parents disappears partly or completely (e.g. due to death, illness 
or unemployment), the rights and duties may come to lie elsewhere. The younger genera-
tion might then for example have to interrupt their education in order to earn money for 
the family, or grandparents may be expected to make a financial or material contribu-
tion, e.g. by selling their house.
Other family members may also be involved in this form of social security: brothers/
sisters, uncle/aunts, nephews/nieces and distant relatives. In the variant presented here 
their role is a subsidiary one; they may be enlisted if it proves impossible to obtain the 
support needed within the three generations. However, it is also possible for this type of 
system to be based on the wider family network, as in clan-based systems.
In familial social security systems such as that portrayed in figure 3.1, the relation-
ships between the actors are direct: there is no intermediating agent who collects and 
redistributes the means. There are also no corporate actors, but only directly involved 
individuals. These two structural features mean that this type of interaction model is in 
principle free of the principal-agent problem described in the previous chapter (see §2.3, 
§2.7). In addition, all relationships are reciprocal: each member of the family system can 
be both a beneficiary and a contributor. The interactions are also repeated and sequen-
tial. The exchange does not take place immediately, but extends over the entire life of 
the family members concerned, with earlier duties only leading to rights much later, 
and vice versa. Finally, in the familial social security model there is no clear relation-
ship between the individual contributions and returns. People are generally expected 
to offer and receive support at the moment that a need arises. For some this works out 
advantageously, for others disadvantageously (e.g. depending on whether needy grand-
parents are short or long-lived). At the system level – viewed across all families – it may 
be assumed that the costs and benefits in the long term are roughly in balance, since 
otherwise the sustainability of this social security model is jeopardised.
The central mode of interaction in the model is the provision of material support in 
money or in kind (board, lodgings, care) to family members. The entitling eventuality 
is the indigence, or material want, of any of the family members, which often manifests 
itself as a sudden situation of need (loss of a breadwinner, grandparents becoming too 
weak to continue working). The risks are relatively unspecified: the cause of the need and 
its culpability are not relevant. The family member requiring help generally has to ask for 
it. The support provided reinforces the implicit agreements within the family: the per-
son providing it strengthens his entitlement to future help if he should ever suffer acute 
material want. For those receiving the support the reverse applies: their duty to provide 
support in the future to family members needing help is heightened.
In addition, the social security interactions consist mainly of monitoring the infor-
mal rights and duties and applying sanctions in the event of defection. Gossip and the 
threat of squandering the right to future family support play an important role here. The 
sanctioning can also be reinforced by the wider community to which the family belongs. 
The other theoretical types of interaction are less important in this model. It is mainly 
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concerned with immediate provision; interventions geared to prevention and restora-
tion of those in need are almost nonexistent. There is also usually no clear collecting 
function: support is generally provided on the basis of the directly mobilisable resources 
within the family.
Familial social security institutions
Figure 3.1 shows that the interaction is mainly driven by the informal rules of the fam-
ily, which are embedded in the wider community of which the family forms part. The 
behavioural expectations regarding cases of indigence are socialised only moderately, 
but more so than in formal social security systems. They relate to general values such as 
‘it is right if family members help each other’ and derived norms such as ‘someone who 
is able to do so should support their parents when they are in need’. At the family level, 
this translates into specific norms and conventions governing the entitlements and obli-
gations between the members: a certain consensus within the family on the applicable 
rights and duties, and the willingness to monitor compliance and punish defection.
This demands a reasonably homogeneous structure of views and sufficient ‘con-
nectedness’ within the family. Even then, the informal institutions and the derivations 
between them often are vague: the norm cited above leaves unanswered the question of 
the degree to which people should support their parents, for how long, and in what way; 
and within a family, the applicable rights and obligations may remain implicit until an 
emergency arises. In this model, therefore, although the interaction is driven by infor-
mal rules, the actors concerned retain a great deal of latitude in interpreting their rights 
and duties.
There are a number of disadvantages to social security systems driven by the informal 
rules of the family. People with a limited network (widows and orphans without rela-
tives, elderly persons without children) have few duties, but also virtually no rights if 
they find themselves in need of help. Moreover, the risks within a family need not be 
independent. Where a community has closed social structure, with little social mobility 
and homogeneous strata (classes, estates, castes), risks such as unemployment, disability 
and having a large number of children often weigh disproportionately on certain families 
at the lower end of the social scale. If someone from the bottom strata loses their job 
during an economic crisis, the likelihood that their family members will suffer the same 
fate is high. Even where there is an extensive network and a great willingness to provide 
mutual support, families from the lower strata often see the support capacity become 
insufficient at the moment that the need for such aid increases.
Finally, there is usually a degree of asymmetry within the family between the provid-
ers and recipients of support: it is generally the relatively wealthy family members who 
pay and the poorer ones who receive. For the wealthier family members this may present 
a problem if the need for support by their relatives is so great that it limits their behav-
ioural alternatives. They may for example not be able to invest the money that is spent on 
the family in things that produce a greater return (such as business activities, education 
for themselves or their children). On the other hand, poorer family members who will 
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probably never be able to repay their material debt may feel obliged to provide some form 
of non-material compensation. They may try to accomplish this by adopting a subservi-
ent attitude towards their benefactors, by bestowing honour on them, or by granting 
them authority; but this of course restricts their own options of behaviour.
Compliance and defection in familial social security
The freedom of action allowed to the family members has consequences for the extent 
to which defective behaviour theoretically occurs. The vagueness of the rules means that 
infringements are difficult to establish. This can give rise to family arguments about the 
correct rule interpretation, for example on the question of who should take the widowed 
grandfather who can no longer look after himself into their home, and what the hosts 
should receive in return for this.
In the second place, the rights and duties are determined not only by the degree of 
need, but also by chance, arbitrariness and the existing affective relationships. The apple 
of the family’s eye, the one who meets all the expectations of the family, or to whom a 
high earning capacity is ascribed, can often count on more support and fewer duties than 
the black sheep, those who marry beneath their station, or those who are not expected 
ever to bring in any money. Familial social security systems can thus readily be perceived 
as unfair.
Defective behaviour is also made more likely by the fact that the rules are only mod-
erately socialised and there is no government to enforce them. Actors can therefore 
always decide not to comply with the rules. The likelihood of this increases as the bur-
dens become heavier to bear and the expected future gains more uncertain. This occurs 
in particular where there is an accumulation of risks (mass unemployment, large num-
bers of children and elderly relatives to care for); when the connectedness or homogene-
ity of views within the family declines; or when the wider community no longer enforces 
the family rules.
3.5.2 Communal social security
Actors and interactions
In the Introduction to this study, an example was given of an interaction pattern that is 
characteristic of communal social security. The ‘Regulations governing the provision of 
care to the home-dwelling poor’ (Reglement op de verzorging der Huisarmen) in the town of 
Den Bosch express in a nutshell what kind of behaviour is expected of the actors in such 
a system. In figure 3.2 an interaction structure of this type is elaborated more system-
atically. The central acts are applying for poor relief; the assessment of the applicant’s 
entitlement and the actual distribution of monetary or material support to the families; 
monitoring and sanctioning; and the collecting of the necessary funds. Where they occur 
at all, interventions focused on prevention, restoration and (re)integration are of second-
ary importance.
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The potential beneficiaries are members of the local community. To be eligible for social 
security there must be a recognised want, or case of indigence, and the potential benefi-
ciary must ask for help. The applicants must meet certain qualifying and behavioural con-
ditions (no help available from family, good moral conduct, doing something in return).
In this type of system there is an intermediating corporate actor: a local social security 
organisation, for example in the form of a communal poor relief institute. The board is 
the most powerful corporate agent in the communal social security organisation, with 
their members acting as individual agents. They define and interpret the ‘rules of relief’, 
supervise the attendants and collectors, and manage the funds. Sometimes they also 
have final responsibility for the awarding of rights and imposition of duties. In the Regu-
lations from Den Bosch, the Council of Regents fulfilled this central role. Colleges such 
as these were often more than a management board, being closely connected with the 
administration and often acting as defenders of the rules of the community. They veri-
fied the nominations put forward by the local poor relief officials by making home visits 
and thereafter establishing the entitlement of the party concerned. They also ensured 
that the written rules of relief and their implementation corresponded with the rules 
that applied within the community, at least among the dominant groups. These boards 
generally did not accurately reflect the composition of the local population, but were 
constituted through co-option from the better-off members of the community25.
The attendants are the most visible individual agents of the communal organisation. 
They are charged with the intake and with the administration of the system. In discharg-
ing this administrative task, they are first of all responsible for distributing benefits that 
have been awarded, for example to the needy poor. However, they are also responsible 
for permanent monitoring (to establish whether the need still exists, that there is no 
evidence of “continuous bad behaviour”, etc.) and for the imposition of negative sanc-
tions (e.g. temporarily withholding benefit). They normally have fairly wide-ranging dis-
cretionary authority. In the example given in the Introduction, the local officials caring 
for the poor acted as the attendants.
The collectors also play a key role, being responsible for collecting contributions, for 
example by means of home visits or a church collection, which they must then pay to the 
fund manager in the board.
The contributors in such a system generally come from the more well-to-do ranks of the 
local community. They raise the funds of the communal social security system through 
voluntary gifts (including church collections) and legacies. However, the corporate actors 
may also have access to their own resources. For example, the church poor relief boards 
in the past sometimes had significant income from the possession of land, property and 
securities. In addition, a part of the proceeds of the municipal tax levies was sometimes 
earmarked for communal social security. It was also possible that local taxes on certain 
articles (e.g. bread, beer) were used to fund the social security system, so that the benefi-
ciaries of this form of social security also helped to fund it partially (for the Netherlands 
see: Van Loo, 1987: 35).
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Communal social security institutions
Communal social security is based chiefly on the informal rules of the community con-
cerned. Sometimes those rules are laid down in writing by the board of the communal 
organisation, in the form of regulations such as those in Den Bosch, which can then 
be seen as a codification of the informal institutions. A typical feature of this form of 
social security is that the entitlements of the beneficiaries are constrained considerably. 
In order to minimise the costs for the community as well as free-rider behaviour, their 
rights are meagre and the conditions the applicants have to fulfil are strongly empha-
sised. However, those conditions are defined only vaguely, with the criteria for measur-
ing ‘virtuous conduct’, ‘industriousness displayed in meeting one’s own needs’, and so 
on, not being specified.
By contrast, the behaviour of the intermediary actors is generally less rule-driven. 
The Den Bosch example shows that the attendants had a high degree of autonomy in 
determining how the rights, conditions and duties should be interpreted, in the assess-
ment of defective behaviour, and in the imposition of sanctions. In communal social 
security the payments made by the contributors often are voluntary as well. These discre-
tionary elements in the system are only constrained through the general informal rules 
of the community. Reciprocal expectations may in fact have mandatory force if the inter-
mediary actors regard them as self-evident, given their position within the community 
and their convictions. Yet this need not necessarily be the case. Because there is no power 
residing above the parties, the beneficiaries cannot enforce their rights; ultimately, they 
are dependent on the mercy of the attendants and the favours that the well-to-do are 
willing to bestow on them. Communal systems of social security therefore often tend 
towards reproduction of the existing social hierarchy.
Compliance and defection in communal social security
Defection by the beneficiaries can theoretically occur in this system if they bring about 
their own indigence. The possibility of such inducements is implied in the graph by the 
relationship between the manifest risk and the local beneficiaries. However, there are 
several factors that make it unlikely that this type of intentional rule-breaking will occur 
very frequently in communal social security systems. The target group is usually limited 
to the ‘deserving poor’, and the support offered is fairly unappealing: it is meagre, the 
application test is severe and often humiliating, and being on poor relief often entails a 
considerable loss of social status. Moreover, strict checks are carried out to ensure that 
the beneficiaries continue to meet the conditions, and the negative sanctions of rule-
breaking are generally heavy. In addition, monitoring and sanctioning are not only car-
ried out by those who are officially charged to do so (the attendants), but are also often 
reinforced by the wider community through gossip and heaping disgrace on rule-break-
ers. The beneficiaries are generally people who have no alternative and who cannot afford 
to lose the communal support. All these factors mean that the costs of defection are gen-
erally higher than the gains, and compliance is a rational course of action for people rely-
ing on poor relief. This is not to say that defection never occurs: households that are no 
longer in need may still try to continue receiving support in order to build up a reserve, 
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and families which do not meet the moral standards (for example because of alcohol-
ism, unplanned pregnancies) may attempt to hide the facts. But the likelihood of these 
attempts succeeding is not very high, because of the regular checks carried out to assess 
the rights (as in the Den Bosch example, where support was meted out on a seasonal 
basis), and the intensive official and informal monitoring and sanctioning processes that 
occur. Still, in extreme situations groups of beneficiaries may defect, for example in the 
form of food riots and foraying in times of famine.
Theoretically, the defection problem is greater among the individual agents of the cor-
porate actor. Their wide discretionary powers can quickly lead to arbitrary and capricious 
decisions. In contrast to the previous interaction model, the principal-agent problem 
emerges clearly from figure 3.2. It is by no means a given that the individual members of 
the board will serve the interests of the community in specifying the rules and supervis-
ing the collectors and attendants, as numerous historical examples indicate26. The subor-
dinate individual agents do not automatically act as their board wishes either. Attendants 
may for example give preferential treatment to friends and family, collectors may run off 
with the cash.
There is also a real chance of defection on the part of the contributors. As their con-
tributions are generally voluntary and not highly visible, they can in principle neglect 
their duty. Compliance can be stimulated if the informal rules make the required con-
tribution explicit, and if the collectors and the community reinforce this by means of 
strict monitoring and consistent imposition of sanctions. Yet this is not always possible: 
there may be no consensus on the contribution level, the transaction costs that would be 
involved may be considered too high, and heterogeneous, ‘unconnected’ communities 
may not be capable of strict enforcement.
3.5.3 Informal occupational social security
Actors and interactions
Informal occupational social security occurs where rights and duties are founded in 
the employment relationship without being enforced by the government. They may 
for example consist of a company scheme for childcare or the reimbursement of medi-
cal expenses, company study grants for employees’ children, or an emergency fund for 
employees. Generally speaking, such provisions are aimed at maintaining or improving 
the labour productivity of the employees, as a means of supporting the usual business 
activities. Yet they need not be additional: it is also possible to establish an entire system 
of informal social security on the employment relationship, as in the social support pro-
vided by the European guilds in the pre-industrial age. Although the employment history 
plays a key role in the pure model of social insurance (cf. table 3.1) and in ‘second pillar’ 
provisions as well, it should be pointed out that the latter are not specimens of informal 
occupational social security. Social insurance and mandatory occupational schemes are 
formal arrangements: the government lays down the social security rights and duties 
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of employees and employers in national law, or publicly acknowledges the contracts 
between these private parties.
Theoretically many variants on the interaction structure of informal occupational 
social security are possible27. Figure 3.3 shows a fairly simple example which relates to 
a small firm with a single owner-director. There is no involvement by the government, 
trade unions, employers or external supervisors, and administration of the system takes 
place within the firm. There are three types of individual actor: the owner-director of 
the firm; the bookkeeper; and the employees. The owner-director is an individual principal 
and sets aside a budget from the company funds, instructs the bookkeeper and, as the 
person with the ultimate responsibility, takes the final decision on the rules in cases of 
doubt. The bookkeeper is an individual agent of the owner and is accountable to him. He 
is responsible for the practical aspects of administration: the intake, the allocation of 
rights and duties (possibly backed by the signature of the owner), the actual distribution 
and the processing of relevant mutations. Finally, he has to monitor the correctness of 
the awarded rights and duties, and must where necessary impose sanctions.
The employees may be required to register voluntarily as participants in the occu-
pational scheme, although this may also take place tacitly or be mandatory. In some 
cases they have to apply for help, and when it is granted the beneficiaries can be obliged 
to report any mutations that could affect their right to it (e.g. the composition of the 
household, number of hours worked, additional sources of income). In the model it is 
assumed that the company acts as the contributor, but it is also possible that the employ-
ees are required to make a contribution and thus to fund the system themselves to some 
extent.
Occupational social security institutions
The rights and duties, their conditions and the potential sanctions associated with such 
an occupational social security system may be laid down in a written firm statute, but 
may also be based on a firm practice that has developed over the years, with wide discre-
tionary powers for the owner-director and the bookkeeper. Such informal company rules 
to some extent reflect the values, norms and conventions of the community in which 
the firm operates, and of groups within the firm. Sometimes they may also be related 
to a certain professional ethic, especially in organisations dominated by highly trained 
professionals (such as a law firm).
Compliance and defection in occupational social security
From a theoretical point of view, the main form of defection in such an occupational 
social security system lies with the employees. They may apply while they are not enti-
tled, or, if they have been granted entitlements, they may not report relevant changes in 
their situation. Certain factors make employee defection more likely. In the first place, 
the employees’ relationship with their company may primarily be market-based, as speci-
fied in their employment contract. They sell their labour capacity to the organisation in 
return for a certain wage, and the company uses the labour input to try and achieve its 
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corporate aims (making a profit, serving the public). It was noted earlier that in such 
commodified circumstances rational defection is theoretically more likely to occur than 
in situations where affective relationships dominate: stealing from the boss is often con-
sidered less reprehensible than breaking the rules shared with family or friends. How-
ever, there can be wide differences between organisations on this point: in non-profit 
associations that pursue a certain ideal the everyday conduct of management and work-
ers may be driven less by costs and benefits than in commercial enterprises, which may 
reduce the likelihood of rule-breaking.
Defection is also fostered by the fact that company rules are generally socialised 
relatively late. People only become familiar with them during their training and when 
they work at the company concerned, and actors can ignore such recent behavioural 
guidelines more easily than the norms, values and conventions that they have known for 
years. This is particularly true when the occupational institutions differ markedly from 
the rules that apply in the wider community. However, there are also organisations with 
a powerful integrated culture, which is transferred via an intensive process of secondary 
socialisation. This may reduce the risk of defection, though it is plausible that a ‘company 
moral’ is never fully internalised.
Another factor that tends to increase the chance of defection is that monitoring and 
sanctioning are often poorly developed in occupational social security systems. For the 
bookkeeper this is a secondary task, and the number of cases of fraud uncovered and the 
amounts of money involved may not justify the high costs of monitoring and sanction-
ing. The imposition of sanctions is often limited to demanding the return of the surplus 
that was provided, possibly supplemented by a negative entry in the personnel file. Very 
serious cases (involving large amounts, repeated and sustained fraud) may lead to dis-
missal (either immediate or following a legal procedure) and criminal prosecution, but 
this is often the exception rather than the rule. Close monitoring and consistent imposi-
tion of sanctions can have a negative effect on the motivation of staff and on the external 
image of the company, and a certain degree of defection may therefore be tolerated, as a 
form of ‘slack’.
On the other hand, there are also factors which make compliance in occupational sys-
tems likely. There is frequently a complex exchange which extends over a long period. Uti-
lisation of occupational social security constitutes only one element of the employment 
relationship, and defective behaviour may have wider consequences. An employee who 
is caught breaking the rules may not only face direct sanctions (demands for repayment) 
but may also no longer be regarded as reliable or trustworthy, may be assigned different 
duties, be passed over for promotion, etc. The gains that are set against these potentially 
heavy indirect costs may sometimes be considered too small. Many of these provisions 
are supplementary in nature, and as long as the chance of being caught is not negligible 
rational actors will not be willing to risk their position in the long term for a relatively 
small short-term advantage. People are less inclined to commit fraud with a small medical 
expenses claim if there is a fair chance that they will lose their job if they are discovered.
In addition, defective behaviour is sometimes quite visible because the company holds 
a large amount of information on the employees and because of the daily contacts with 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   155 21-9-2009   15:08:48
156
3
colleagues. That applies in particular if the conditions that confer entitlement are verifi-
able, as in the case of an occupational pre-pension scheme (age, contributions paid).
It can be deduced from the foregoing under which circumstances employee rule-break-
ing becomes more likely in occupational social security systems. The chance of defection 
is greater in commercial companies with a high staff turnover (large numbers of short-
term contracts, temporary agency staff, casual labour) and where the contacts between 
employees are not very intensive. A weak corporate culture with many unsocialised new 
employees also exacerbates the defection problem. Generous provisions can make the 
potential gains of defection substantial, especially where the beneficiaries include a rela-
tively large number of low-paid workers. If this is combined with a low risk of discovery 
(because infringements are not easy to discover, or because monitoring and sanctioning 
are not practised very intensively), defection may become an attractive option.
It is also possible that the other actors in informal occupational social security sys-
tems do not comply. There is a principal-agent problem in the relationship between the 
owner-director and the bookkeeper. The latter may neglect his administrative tasks or 
fail to apply his discretionary powers consistently (nepotism, requiring something in 
return, running off with the money).
Defection by the owner-director is not altogether unlikely either. For instance, he 
may refuse to make available sufficient funds, or may specify the rules in an arbitrary 
or patronising way. The owner-director can be especially inclined to do so if he regards 
the business as his autocratic possession and the negotiating power of the employees is 
limited. On the other hand, the likelihood of defection by the principal theoretically is 
curtailed due to the high costs it may incur: a negative impact on the firm’s reputation, 
and on the motivation and social climate within the firm.
3.5.4 Formal demographic regulations
Actors and interactions
The fourth interaction model concerns the formal systems designed to cover demo-
graphic risks: collective old age and surviving dependants’ pensions, and governmental 
arrangements designed to help meet the costs of raising children (e.g. through child ben-
efit). The group of potential beneficiaries in figure 3.4 is no longer limited to members of the 
family, the local community or employees within a single company, but generally extends 
to all people covered by the law (residents, employees, certain sectors of industry). The 
contributors in this system may be employees, employers or the residents who pay direct or 
indirect taxes (vat, customs duty) or social security contributions. It is also possible that 
contributions are not earmarked, but that the government sets aside a certain budget 
from the general tax revenue.
Beneficiaries and contributors are not in a direct relationship with each other in this 
model and generally do not know each other. A fairly complex social security organisa-
tion functions as an intermediary. The board of directors is the key corporate agent of the 
organisation and is responsible for the general strategy. It also acts as a principal, as it is 
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responsible for running the various organisational units. The members of the board are 
their individual agents.
In the model there are three corporate agents who have to render account to the 
board; each of these fulfils a specific theoretical function. There is a fund, which is respon-
sible for imposing and collecting contributions and administering the monies collected. 
In an insurance system this fund may also be charged with advising on the level of premi-
ums on the basis of actuarial principles. Where the system is funded from general means 
the fixing of premiums is a political responsibility. In that case, policymakers may not act 
in an actuarially correct manner, but may also take into account the consequences for the 
income position of beneficiaries and contributors, and weigh the allocation of funds to 
the demographic social security systems against other budgetary items.
Benefits and provisions are delivered by a benefits agency in this model. The agency is 
responsible for the intake, and establishes whether the covered eventuality has occurred, 
i.e. whether applicants have reached a certain age, whether their partner or parent has 
died, or whether they are responsible for looking after children. The benefits agency also 
verifies whether potential beneficiaries meet the applicable qualifying conditions, such 
as having paid the required premiums over a certain length of time, having fulfilled the 
minimum number of years of employment, being residents, being in a particular type of 
household, etc. The third component of the social security organisation, the monitoring/
sanctioning agency, verifies that the payments collected and benefits paid are correct and 
imposes sanctions where necessary.
These three entities are borne by the officials who take care of the actual adminis-
trative process. They are individual agents of the benefits agency, the monitoring and 
sanctioning agency, and the fund. The processing of mutations is also part of their task. 
Among beneficiaries, this mainly relates to changes in the household situation and, if 
their right depends on it, the level and sources of income. On the side of the contributors, 
changes in all factors that affect the level of contributions (income, type of employment 
relationship, age, tax bracket) are important.
Compensation is the central type of intervention in formal demographic regulations. 
The interactions of the social security organisation with potential beneficiaries and con-
tributors generally relate to the provision of benefits or pensions, and the collection of 
the payments required to fund those. Typically, prevention and restoration of losses are 
not at stake in this kind of regulation: ageing, the death of an earning partner or parent, 
and the costs of child-rearing usually to a large extent are unavoidable events, and it is 
impossible or undesirable to restore the prior situation. It may be that a social support 
task is attributed to the social security organisation, for example the aim to combat lone-
liness among the elderly. Since such activities tend to be rather limited, they have been 
allocated to the benefits agency in this model, rather than to an independent unit of the 
social security organisation.
Naturally, the structure of the social security organisation may be different in practice. 
For example, the three entities may each have its own board, or they may not be as strictly 
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segregated as they are shown here. The number of actors may also be greater, for exam-
ple if each scheme is operated by a separate social security organisation (e.g. for child 
benefit, pensions in certain sectors of industry), each with its own board, fund, admin-
istrative apparatus and monitoring/sanctioning mechanisms. There may also be greater 
differentiation within each function, for example with separate departments for carry-
ing out investigations and imposing sanctions. In this (and the next) model of formal 
social security it is assumed that the government (country, region, municipality) has 
direct responsibility for the ‘output’: in other words, the social security organisation is 
a government agency. It is however also possible for the administration to be left to an 
autonomous body, to community-based organisations (such as churches, trade unions, 
employers or their representatives, patient associations, or combinations of these), the 
potential beneficiaries (mutual societies or associations) or to commercial companies. If 
the government gives their interventions a statutory basis and supervises their activities, 
this is still a formal social security system. Evidently, the growing number of actors, each 
with their own, partially differing interests, does theoretically increase the principal-
agent problem in the social security organisation.
A further two corporate principals are shown outside the social security organisation 
in the model. There is a social security court in which beneficiaries, contributors and the 
units of the social security organisation can all appear as both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Administrative decisions may be argued or ratified here, and sanctions can be imposed 
which do not normally form part of the competence of the social security organisation 
(e.g. custodial sentences). The social security court is often hierarchically differentiated, 
in that decisions by the lower judges can sometimes be overruled by higher magistrates 
(a Court of Appeal, a Supreme Court, rulings by the European Court of Justice). There may 
also be various courts for separate social security arrangements (a Pensions Court). It is 
also possible that some social security issues are placed within the general legal system 
(civil or criminal courts), e.g. benefit fraud exceeding a certain amount.
The final actor is the supervisory board, which audits and controls the social security 
organisation. It may be a separate organisation with independent members or, on the con-
trary, representatives of the various interest groups or factions within the community. It 
may also be an inspectorate within the government. Obviously, the members of the social 
security court and the supervisory boards are individual agents of their organisation.
Institutions of formal demographic social security
In figure 3.4 the behaviour of the actors is driven primarily by the content of the formal 
demographic social security systems. These often define the rights and duties of ben-
eficiaries and contributors in great detail, and also establish the specific interpretation 
of events and qualifying conditions by means of protocols, administrative decrees, etc. 
The decisions of the social security court additionally lead to the creation of detailed 
jurisprudence, which serves as a guide for the handling of future cases – a source of path 
dependence in the rule specification. The precise duties and powers of the social security 
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organisation, and the relations between the board and the individual entities, are often 
laid down in separate organisational laws.
The content of formal demographic systems and informal institutions may be expected 
to correspond to a certain extent. The rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions 
contained in the demographic regulations will reflect the wishes and ideas of dominant 
groups in the community to some degree, and the existence of such arrangements evokes 
expectations among the population.
Theoretically, however, the correlation is weaker than in the earlier informal inter-
action models. As mentioned before, it is difficult to embed formal systems in informal 
institutions. The relationships between actors are typically national, impersonal and 
indirect; their abstract nature implies they are no part of everyday life within the family, 
the local community or specific firms. Furthermore, it should be noted that in a dem-
ocratic society formal systems are the result of a complicated policy process. The con-
tinuous exchange of rule wishes between representatives of various groups has its own 
dynamic (cf. the discussion of rule-interaction in §2.9). The filter of the policy process 
means that the formal rules do not automatically reflect the informal rule wishes, even 
where the latter are fairly uniform.
On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that the gap between the formal regula-
tions and the informal rules will be extremely wide, at least on rule elements which a 
large majority of the population consider important. If this were the case, in a demo-
cratic society the responsible policymakers are in danger of being dismissed.
Compliance and defection in formal demographic regulations
There is a greater risk of defection in this interaction model than in the previous ones. A 
first reason is existence of a complex social security organisation. The board does not automat-
ically do what is in the interests of the organisation, and the individual members of the 
board may allow personal motives to weigh more heavily than their official administrative 
responsibilities. The three corporate agents – fund, benefits agency and monitoring/sanc-
tioning agency – may not act in accordance with the wishes of the board, and may fail in 
their duty of accountability. This may occur because the interests of the entity (e.g. keeping 
as many officials as possible employed) are in conflict with those of the organisation as a 
whole (paying benefits correctly and with as few staff as possible). Individual officials may 
also allow their own interests to prevail over those of their organisational entity and their 
clients, or may become embroiled in internal battles about tasks and priorities. Compa-
rable problems of defection can occur in the relationship between the supervisory board 
and the social security court on the one hand and the social security organisation on the 
other (inadequate supervision, non-impartial court rulings), and between the members of 
those external bodies and the corporate actor they are supposed to represent (a supervisor 
that defends particular interests, an alcoholic judge rendering erratic verdicts).
Finally, the influence of external stakeholders (political parties, trade unions, employ-
ers) may imply that the actual administration of the demographic social security regula-
tions neglects the original objectives laid down by the legislator. They may for example 
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advocate levies which are too low from an actuarial point of view, in order to bring about 
a reduction in the tax burden, or to compensate employers and households for the nega-
tive income consequences of other government measures. Or they may be in favour of a 
more lenient or stricter monitoring and sanctioning policy than the legislator intended, 
depending on their ideological preferences and their perception of the wishes of their 
supporters and electorate. If these political entrepreneurs have formal powers (e.g. via 
budgetary or appointment rights), or exercise a strong influence on the board via their 
network, it may be difficult for the social security organisation to ignore such wishes.
In summary, the principal-agent problem is theoretically considerable in this inter-
action model, because of the large number of parties with partially conflicting interests, 
and the possibility of intervention by external stakeholders. The likelihood that interme-
diary actors will not pursue their duties is exacerbated by the considerable financial flows 
and the complexity of administration and supervision; the benefits of defection may be 
high, the risk of discovery negligible.
Yet there are also factors which may help limit defection of this type. A first one has 
to do with the specific nature of demographic social security regulations. As the main 
focus is on the compensation of income lacks or losses, the social security organisation 
does not have to set priorities relative to other types of intervention (such as risk preven-
tion or employment placement). Since both the events that give an entitlement to provi-
sions and the contributions structure are fairly simple, the latitude allowed to the social 
security organisation is smaller than in, say, the administration of an unemployment or 
disability benefit regulation. The range of tasks to be carried out is also less complex in 
some respects. Typically, a large majority of applicants are entitled, and the selection of 
beneficiaries ‘at the gate’ is therefore less complicated in demographic systems. The fact 
that rights of this type often are rather stable reduces the likelihood of administrative 
errors in processing mutations. Retirement pension is usually paid until the death of the 
recipient; surviving dependants’ pension generally lasts until the recipient becomes eli-
gible for retirement pension or finds a new partner; and parents commonly are entitled 
to family benefit until the children reach a certain age or start working.
In addition, there are also ways of actively limiting defection in the social security 
organisation. A first way is to specify the powers of the board, the various entities and 
the officials in great detail, for example in an organisational law. If the interests and com-
petences are laid down clearly, if the actors concerned have a strong incentive to carry 
out their tasks properly (e.g. through financial and reputation incentives), and if there is 
efficient and impartial auditing and control by the supervisory board, the risk of defec-
tion can be reduced.
The culture within the social security organisation may also prove to be decisive. It 
is not a company seeking to maximise profit, but a government agency whose task is to 
serve the public interest. If the officials and their superiors regard themselves as civil 
servants in a literal sense, this can keep defection within bounds. But it is not self-evident 
this will occur; it demands intensive secondary socialisation of the formal rules and a 
certain esprit de corps, together with an appropriate remuneration policy (salary, respon-
sibilities, social esteem).
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The most visible forms of defection by beneficiaries in demographic regulations consist 
of obtaining benefits without being entitled or failure to report changes. In a notorious 
fraud case dating from 1999, for example, a Dutch claimant obtained eur 4,500 net per 
month in benefits, among other things by claiming child allowance for seven minors 
belonging to other family members residing in the uk – including a top-up amount 
because the children were ‘living away from home’28. And in the administration of pen-
sions and surviving dependants’ benefit schemes, variations on Gogol’s Dead Souls crop 
up with some regularity29.
Several factors encourage such types of defection. The amounts involved are consid-
erable, and this of course is attractive for the low income groups in particular. The interac-
tion between beneficiaries and the social security organisation is much less intensive and 
frequent than in the previous interaction models, and partly takes place through written 
correspondence. This makes defective behaviour less visible, a problem exacerbated by 
the fact that those close to the beneficiaries are not responsible for monitoring and sanc-
tioning, and do not experience any individual disadvantage if their relatives break the 
rules; the costs of defection are spread among all contributors. If defection is discovered 
the consequences are moreover often limited: the culprits generally have to pay back the 
unlawfully received benefit plus a fine, but they are not in danger of being expelled from 
their family or community or of harming their job or career, as in the informal interac-
tion models discussed earlier. Finally, defective behaviour is encouraged by the relatively 
undersocialised nature of formal social security rules (cf. the previous  section).
On the other hand, there are also factors which make defection by beneficiaries less 
likely, at least compared with the formal systems that will be discussed later in this chap-
ter. The nature of the criteria conferring entitlement is the most important of these. The 
central E-type conditions in the demographic systems – old age, death, having custody 
over children – are not easily to influence by those concerned, at least not unless they 
commit criminal acts (forgery, murder). As the eventualities can be determined rather 
objectively on the basis of official figures, it is not easy to submit a credible unauthorised 
application: the chance of being caught through administrative detection, for example 
on the basis of the population register, is fairly high (provided the registration system is 
reliable and contains the required information for the entire group of potential benefici-
aries). Consequently, the moral hazard30 is theoretically smaller in demographic schemes 
than in unemployment, social assistance and sick pay and disability benefit regulations.
The profile of the client group limits the likelihood of defection by beneficiaries even 
further. Older people, recipients of surviving dependants’ pension and parents of young 
children do not meet the theoretical profile of the ‘calculating’ benefit claimant: young, 
highly educated, without ties and amoral. Still, the more specific qualifying conditions 
– such as the rules that allocate pension entitlements to younger partners, provisions 
on the remarriage of widows, benefits that are linked to the household situation or to 
need – can create a certain ‘user latitude’ in demographic systems (cf. for the Nether-
lands: De Voogd & Van Schooneveld, 1991).
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Defection by the contributors (employers, employees, taxpayers) can take several forms, 
especially shirking: the legal avoidance or illegal evasion of their contributions31. Avoid-
ance refers to calculating behaviour which is not in conflict with the legal rules, but at 
most with the intent or tenor of them. Examples are where employers avoid social secu-
rity contributions by formally having activities carried out abroad, or where they pay a 
large proportion of staff salaries untaxed (for example in the form of expenses, payments 
to employees who are officially registered as self-employed or freelance). By contrast, 
evasion does involve rule-breaking. It arises when the duty-bound fail to disclose or to 
disclose correctly the base of their contributions: lower wages, shorter working times, or 
fewer employment relationships than they actually have; or where they do not pay social 
insurance contributions that are due and make their recovery impossible. Both forms of 
defection reduce the total financial revenue, which in time can make it necessary to raise 
the contributions or reduce the entitlements.
For the contributors defection is theoretically attractive. A rational actor will be 
inclined to minimise his contributions, because these increase the wage bill for compa-
nies and reduce the disposable income of households. Defection has a positive return in 
the short term, while the disadvantages manifest themselves only in the long run, prob-
ably with limited consequences for the rule-breakers personally. Avoidance and evasion 
of contributions in formal social security does not hit anyone in particular; it relates to 
the funding of a collective good, and any negative future consequences cannot be traced 
back to individual actors.
The main way of combating defection by contributors32 in formal social security 
schemes regulations implies an attempt at regimentation, or automatic compliance, 
in combination with strict monitoring and sanctioning by the administration. As men-
tioned before regimentation can never be complete; but the establishment of certain 
collection procedures can make rule-breaking troublesome for the contributors. The 
most general measure is of course to make contributions mandatory by national law. In 
addition to this, defection by duty-bound employees can be limited by obliging employ-
ers to withhold the contributions from gross wages and to transfer them directly to the 
social security fund or the tax inspector. If employers are obliged to contribute, they may 
be required to report new employment contracts and wage mutations to the social secu-
rity organisation, to have their administration carried out or approved by an external 
auditor, and to inform employees about the contributions paid (including the gross/net 
breakdown on pay slips).
In its monitoring role, the social security organisation can have a key instrument in 
the verification of identities, mutations and employment relationships though the use 
of national registers and personal social security numbers. The monitoring/sanctioning 
agency can also devote special attention to sectors where the risk of contribution defec-
tion is high because of the large flows of money and the low-paid, transitory workforce 
(the hospitality industry, the agricultural sector, the construction industry). Deterrence 
through a consistent and severe punishment of infringements can reduce the likeli-
hood of defection by contributors as well, but such strict sanctioning may not always be 
regarded as proportional by the community or the actors concerned.
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The latter points to a final factor of importance: the informal rules prevailing among 
the contributors of formal demographic regulations, or their ‘fiscal ethics’. They may 
incline towards defection because in formal schemes the duty to contribute is highly 
undersocialised, and the social pressure to pay the dues is less marked than in infor-
mal systems. On the other hand, theoretically the willingness to contribute is greater 
in demographic regulations than in the two other formal schemes discussed below. The 
solidarity with the ‘deserving clients’ of this type of scheme tends to be stronger than 
with, e.g. people on social assistance. Older persons, widows and orphans and children 
are vulnerable social groups, who cannot be blamed for their benefit dependency, and 
who have no viable alternative, as they are not considered capable of work. Moreover, it is 
likely that the contributors themselves, or people close to them, will at some point make 
use of the demographic schemes. Thus they have some personal interest in paying their 
dues; but this will not stop all the duty-bound contributors from free-riding.
3.5.5 Unemployment and social assistance benefit regulations
Actors and interactions
The interaction model for the formal unemployment and social assistance benefit regula-
tions (figure 3.5) resembles the previous one, but there are a number of structural differ-
ences. An additional corporate actor has appeared, namely firms. These play a key role in 
that the number of beneficiaries partly depends on the firms’ recruitment and dismissal 
policy. As demanders of labour, firms maintain relations both with the potential benefi-
ciaries and the social security organisation. In the graph the firms have been depicted 
as a corporate principal, because of the key hierarchical relationship they maintain with 
their employees; but if they deduct contributions from the wages and transfer these to 
the fund, firms may also be regarded as a corporate agent of the latter.
Some aspects of the position of the social security organisation are different as well. In con-
trast to the demographic schemes the central risks in this model, unemployment and indi-
gence, are sometimes avoidable; and if it does arise it is in principle reversible. This opens 
the way to other types of intervention. Theoretically, in the unemployment and social 
assistance schemes the social security organisation does not focus exclusively on com-
pensation, but also aims at prevention and restoration. In the model these tasks are attrib-
uted to a separate corporate agent, a prevention/reinsertion agency within the social security 
organisation33. For the short-term unemployed the emphasis in its tasks is usually on job-
placement, with the agency trying to match the pool of job-seekers to the labour demand 
of firms. This may be supplemented with training courses and work experience projects 
(retraining, job application training, apprenticeships, day/block release programmes, 
etc.). The tasks regarding the long-term unemployed and social assistance benefit recipi-
ents may also include offering sheltered employment to people who are considered insuf-
ficiently productive in the mainstream labour market. In addition this group may require 
extensive social support: in order to secure their place on the labour market and in soci-
ety, it is often necessary to provide financial and social aid (debt rescheduling, budgeting 
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assistance, securing suitable accommodation, medical help, finding day-care facilities). 
Interventions aimed at increasing the coping abilities of benefit recipients and countering 
their social exclusion are also among the tasks of the prevention/reinsertion agency.
In this model, the social security organisation is also a party to the relationship 
between (potential) beneficiaries and firms. It has to supervise the efforts of the unem-
ployed to find work, verify that firms follow the correct dismissal procedures, assess how 
the reintegration process operates in practice, etc. This makes the tasks of the monitor-
ing/sanctioning agency more comprehensive and more complex. This agency may also be 
authorised to apply positive sanctions, such as incentive bonuses for unemployed peo-
ple who find work, or temporary wage cost subsidies for employers. Employment-related 
interventions such as these play no role in the demographic systems.
A number of tasks of the benefits agency have changed too. The occurrence of an enti-
tling eventuality E is less easy to establish than in the demographic schemes because 
unemployment and indigence are vaguer concepts than, say, reaching the age of 65. This 
is often solved by incorporating a large number of Q-type conditions in the rule-set, for 
example relating to the number of hours or the income that a person must have lost 
before being regarded as unemployed, the specification of what may be regarded as ‘suit-
able employment’ for a job-seeker, or to the means that are to be included in determining 
the degree of indigence (incidental earnings, assets, the incomes of the partner, other 
household members and relatives). Of course such detailed stipulations place stricter 
demands on the benefits agency than in the previous model.
In addition, unlike the demographic schemes, benefit entitlements may be linked 
to conditions of behaviour. Examples of such C-type conditions are that applicants must 
not have induced their lacks and losses of work and income themselves (no voluntary 
unemployment, excessive spending patterns, etc.), they must make themselves available 
for work, and they must be actively seeking a job. However, in unemployment benefit and 
social assistance schemes the behavioural prerequisites tend to be not as far-reaching 
as in the informal forms of social security discussed earlier. For instance, they set no 
strict criteria with regard to ethically correct behaviour. It is also not unusual for certain 
groups – older and long-term unemployed, single mothers with young children – to be 
completely, partially or temporarily exempted from the conduct conditions.
The processing of mutations is an aspect of administration that is more intensive than 
in the previous model. The number of criteria is larger: changes in income, the employ-
ment relationship and (for social assistance benefit) household situation may influence 
the entitlements and the contribution level. In addition the population of benefit recipi-
ents is more volatile. While the demographic risks discussed earlier are relatively stable 
and predictable, the stock of unemployment and social assistance benefit recipients is 
far more likely to change. Beneficiaries may find work or begin living with someone who 
provides for them; but the job or the relationship may prove to be instable, forcing them 
to fall back on social security again, etc. Among seasonal workers, commuting between 
employment and benefit dependency is in fact the standard pattern. It is also possible 
for beneficiaries to combine their benefit with work or a different benefit, for example 
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because of partial incapacity for work. Incorporating changes in such cases of accumula-
tion can demand a great deal from the benefits agency.
The contributors to unemployment benefit schemes are generally the employers and 
employees, possibly augmented by benefit recipients34. The required contributions fluc-
tuate much more than in the demographic schemes and therefore are more difficult to 
predict in the long term. This is because the demand placed on the schemes depends on 
the economic cycle and on structural changes in labour supply and demand (develop-
ments in technology, immigration, work preferences of women and older persons), the 
extent and consequences of which are difficult to predict. This creates more insecurity 
for the fund than in the previous interaction model. The problem is less apparent in social 
assistance schemes, as these are usually funded from the general coffers, raised through 
national or local taxation.
Beneficiaries have a different relationship with the social security organisation than in 
demographic regulations. There the objective is simple and is shared by all actors: the 
benefit is generally awarded, and provided it is distributed correctly both sides will usu-
ally be satisfied. The scope for conflicts is greater with unemployment and social assist-
ance benefits. Benefit applications are more frequently rejected, and it is possible that 
one actor will stress the importance of the resumption of work while another regards the 
benefit entitlements as the key goal of the interaction. The nature of the entitling events 
further increases the likelihood of disputes: there is usually little room for discussion 
about the age of a retired person, but an unemployed person may fundamentally disagree 
with the administration officials on the assessment of his or her attempts to find work 
and the reasons that those attempts have failed. The contact is moreover generally rather 
more intensive than in the demographic systems. The interaction involves more than 
mere correspondence; normally, a number of intake, monitoring and supervisory inter-
views are mandatory. This makes it less impersonal, sporadic and indirect than in the 
previous formal model – though the contacts are not as intensive as in informal social 
security systems. Conflicts in unemployment and social assistance schemes can there-
fore emerge in the interview room, and the actors may not by definition behave reason-
ably (aggression and threats by benefit claimants, arbitrary decisions by officials, clinging 
to the letter of the law, driving applicants from pillar to post). In social assistance sys-
tems, conflicts are made even more likely by the fact that the provisions often are a last 
resort. If the allowance is not granted (or if it is cut off owing to a limit on duration or the 
imposition of a sanction) clients who fail to find work will not have an adequate regular 
income. This may have serious consequences for them (dependence on relatives or illegal 
activities, increasing debt problems, disconnection of gas and electricity, eviction) and 
is likely to evoke protests. Given these opposing interests the beneficiaries may decide to 
organise themselves, for example into client councils, but the influence of these on the 
administrative process tends to be limited35.
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Owing to the complexity of the administrative process and the ambiguity of the entitling 
criteria, it is more likely than in the previous interaction model that clients and firms will 
contest decisions taken by the social security organisation and will appeal to the social 
security court. The wide-ranging task of the social security organisation also means that 
the board of directors is in principle more important than in demographic systems. It has to 
coordinate more agencies, control a more complicated administrative process and give 
more elaborate instructions on the precise interpretation of the legal rules. Of particular 
importance is that the board must allocate priorities and resources to the various tasks 
of the social security organisation, which as stated may to some extent be in conflict with 
each other. It is not only important that the benefits are paid correctly and on time by 
the social security organisation, but also that unemployed people are offered a job or the 
prospect of work, that the counselling programme set up to achieve this is adequate and 
not too expensive, that preventive interventions are made where possible, and so on. To 
conciliate all these aims, the management has to make judgements within the frame-
work of the applicable rules. Evidently, the auditing and control tasks of the supervisory 
board are more comprehensive in this model as well.
Institutions of formal unemployment and social assistance regulations
As in the previous model, the behaviour of the actors in the unemployment and social 
assistance and benefits systems is steered largely by formal rules which lay down the 
rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions. However, since the entitling events 
are less clear-cut and there are more qualifying and conduct conditions, the latitude of 
actors is greater.
In this type of scheme the official rules will be embedded to some extent in the infor-
mal institutions; even so, and similar to the demographic regulations, this may not go 
very deep. Theoretically it is quite possible that the informal norms, values and conven-
tions of certain groups of beneficiaries are diametrically opposed to the content of the 
formal institutions. For example, they may not share the prevailing work ethic, may not 
regard it as a problem to abuse social security, may be strongly focused on their own 
direct gains, etc. The emergence of such a deviating ‘benefit culture’ among unemploy-
ment and social assistance beneficiaries is theoretically fostered by the fact that they are 
often more geographically concentrated than, say, pensioners, and because they tend 
to be more homogeneous in terms of education level and social background. If they are 
dependent on benefit for a long period, in particular, they may develop informal institu-
tions which deviate from the formal rules.
Compliance and defection in formal unemployment and social assistance regulations
On all points the likelihood of defection in unemployment and social assistance benefit 
schemes is greater than in the previous interaction model. In the social security organisation 
the principal-agent problem is magnified because there are more agents with partially 
conflicting objectives (income compensation, restoration of work, social support). In 
addition, in all departments of the organisation the administration is more complex, 
as a result of the less definite nature of the entitling eventualities, the more elaborate 
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qualifying criteria, the introduction of conduct conditions and the higher volatility of 
entitlements and contributions. This complexity increases the officials’ latitude and the 
likelihood of errors. The larger principal-agent problem and the more intricate adminis-
trative process make the management tasks of the board far more demanding.
Defection within the social security organisation may imply certain key functions 
are neglected; for instance, the main focus may be on providing income support, with 
limited attention for prevention and restoration. This can be due to the way officials and 
the board of directors perceive their interest. If their job or salary depends on the number 
of clients of the organisation, they have no incentive to prevent unemployment or social 
assistance dependency, and may not be inclined to stimulate a fast reinsertion of ben-
efit recipients into the labour market. The problem may be reinforced if representatives 
of group interests (trade unions, employers’ organisations) sit on the management or 
supervisory board of the social security organisation. This is rather common in corpo-
ratist unemployment insurance systems. It is often justified by arguing that these actors 
are experts on labour market issues, represent the contributors, and are key actors in 
implementing labour market policy at the local level. Even so, it stands to reason that 
the two sides will try to exert their influence on the social security organisation in order 
to achieve their own objectives: job security, low contributions and socially acceptable 
redundancy schemes for less productive workers. This can lead to an inefficient and, from 
a societal point of view, suboptimal method of administration.
The principal-agent problem and the complexity of the administrative process are 
difficult to overcome. Regimentation is harder to accomplish than in the previous model, 
and may in fact prove to be counterproductive. The Dutch unemployment insurance sys-
tem provides an interesting example (cf. Van der Veen, 1990). In the 1980s it was admin-
istered by industrial insurance associations under the responsibility of organisations of 
employers and trade unions. The organisations sought to constrain the policy freedom 
of the officials as far as possible via strict administrative guidelines, bureaucratic proce-
dures and direct intervention in administration decisions (via the so-called ‘small com-
mittees’, consisting of trade union and employers representatives). This led to a fixation 
on the timely distribution of the correct benefit amounts, in accordance with the rigid 
process rules. In doing so, the boards and officials neglected their tasks of labour market 
reinsertion and social support, which at that time probably led to a higher number and a 
longer duration of unemployment benefits than necessary.
The risk of defection by beneficiaries is theoretically greater than in the demographic sys-
tems as well. It may take the form of improper applications, undeclared working whilst 
receiving benefit, failure to report changes in their situation and non-compliance with 
the imposed behavioural obligations. Unemployment benefit claimants, for example, 
may (cf. Verheul, 1989: 65-67, 73-75):
– not report that their unemployment is their own fault,
– incorrectly state wage amounts and employment history, for example via forged docu-
ments,
– not report that they have resumed work,
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– fail to mention or reject without reason offers of work,
– make insufficient efforts to find work and submit incorrect reports on this,
– fail to participate in reintegration activities (job application training, following train-
ing programmes, carrying out sheltered employment), and
– frustrate the monitoring attempts by the social security organisation, for example by 
not appearing after being summoned by an official.
Such types of defection also can occur among social assistance beneficiaries, but in addi-
tion this group may:
– conceal the fact that they have assets and extra earnings (including income of a 
 partner),
– present the household situation incorrectly (failing to mention cohabitation, wrongly 
stating that they have children living at home),
– fail to cooperate with initiatives for social integration, such as debt rescheduling.
To some extent beneficiaries’ defection is fostered by the same factors as in the demo-
graphic systems. Here again the amounts involved are considerable, the interaction with 
the social security organisation is relatively large in scale and anonymous, and the formal 
rules are only weakly socialised. However, other elements also play a role. The ambiguous 
criteria, the complex rules and the high volatility mean that, other things being equal, 
the opportunities for defection are greater, monitoring is more difficult and the chance 
of being caught is smaller than in demographic regulations. The moral hazard is also 
greater in unemployment and social assistance benefit schemes: it is easier for benefici-
aries to create or preserve their entitlements themselves. An obvious example is failure 
to seek work actively, but there are also more ingenious forms of ‘inducing’ behaviour. If, 
for example, receipt of unemployment benefit carries conditions relating to employment 
history, it is not surprising that some working people will try to meet the requirement and 
then withdraw from the labour market for some time. And if the social assistance benefit 
for two single persons is higher than for a couple living together, some couples will gear 
their behaviour to this by officially living at different addresses or formally entering into 
a different type of relationship (e.g. tenant/subtenant, main resident/lodger).
This does not mean that every recipient of unemployment or social assistance benefit 
will defect wherever possible. The costs and benefits of rule-breaking may not be favour-
able enough in their perception (low returns, high sanctions, too risky), or the informal 
rules in their immediate social network may strongly frown upon defective behaviour 
(norms of family and friends, religious prescripts). The personal characteristics and expe-
riences of the recipients can also be an obstacle to rule-breaking: a cooperative attitude, 
respect for authority, having access to sufficient funds elsewhere, earlier experiences 
with work and unemployment, etc. The risk of defection need not moreover be constant. 
New benefit claimants may have different views about how to deal with formal rules, and 
a change in the economic climate can change the incentive to defect. Benefit recipients 
may be less inclined to look for a regular job intensively in periods of economic down-
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turn, if they think the probability they will succeed is very small. Instead, they may prefer 
to top up their income by working in the black or shadow economy.
Once again, the defection problem among contributors is greater in some respects than 
in the previous interaction model. People often assume that they themselves are not at 
great risk of being affected by unemployment or indigence. That is an essential difference 
compared with the much more predictable risk of old age, where every healthy individual 
contributor expects to live long enough to draw a pension. Due to the low anticipated 
personal gains actors will be more inclined to minimise their contributions: subjectively 
contributors often feel as if they finance the unemployment and social assistance ben-
efits of others. Put differently, the lower subjective utility of contributions theoretically 
increases the inclination of the contributors to engage in avoidance and evasion. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that unemployment and social assistance benefit recipients are 
often seen as less deserving than pensioners and families with children. Beneficiaries 
tend to be regarded as less weak and as capable of work, and it may be considered partly 
their own fault that they are unemployed or needy. As a result of this perception, con-
tributors may be less inclined to pay for them than for needy old persons, widows and 
children. Here again, however, a specific negative ethics can only emerge if the contribu-
tions are earmarked.
The introduction of firms in this model obviously creates new opportunities for defection as 
well. From the perspective of the collectivity, it is desirable that firms cause as few people 
as possible to move on to these benefits; and that where possible they engage unemploy-
ment and social assistance beneficiaries. However, the corporate interest often demands 
that, in their hiring and firing behaviour, firms select people who they expect to make the 
biggest contribution to the corporate goals, or productivity. As this is difficult to deter-
mine in advance, rational employers will use proxy criteria: age, past performance, the 
suitability and currency of training, health, seniority or length of unemployment, com-
mand of the native language, social skills, etc. Subjective perceptions that are not directly 
related to productivity can also weigh heavily in the recruitment and dismissal policy: a 
dislike of certain groups, the physical attractiveness of the employee, and the sharing of a 
certain background, social network or particular activities36. Both the proxy criteria and 
the subjective appraisal by employers tend to work to the disadvantage of the weakest 
groups on the labour market. As a result older persons, the low-skilled, sick employees 
and members of ethnic minorities are more readily dismissed, while unemployed persons 
from these groups are often no match for other candidates, such as school-leavers and 
mothers re-entering the labour market. Such ‘bounded rational’ selection behaviour by 
employers may have negative consequences for the community. People who are regarded 
as less productive or as a bad risk tend to be overrepresented in the stock of unemploy-
ment and social assistance beneficiaries; they may experience prolonged periods of ben-
efit dependency, which further reduces their labour market prospects.
There are several ways to combat rational defection in the hiring and firing behaviour 
of firms. It may be outlawed by drawing up legal rules which forbid non-recruitment and 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   173 21-9-2009   15:08:51
174
3
dismissal based on criteria that are considered unacceptable, such as health, age, gen-
der or ethnic origin. Firms may also be required to employ fixed quotas of people from 
specific vulnerable groups, such as the disabled and certain ethnic minorities. Attempts 
to change the cost-benefit ratio are another example. The costs of people entering the 
social security system may be charged to individual companies via a system of premium 
differentiation, fines or deductibles. Conversely, firms can be encouraged to hire benefit 
recipients by (temporarily) boosting productivity via wage cost subsidies, contribution 
discounts or the use of risk-free trial placements. Finally, attempts may be made to influ-
ence the informal rules, by making companies aware of their broader role in the commu-
nity (‘corporate social responsibility’), to eliminate the unfavourable perceptions that 
employers have of certain groups, and to play on the reputation of firms by praising good 
employers in public and chastising defectors.
Such strategies not necessarily resolve the social dilemma of ‘selective selection’ by 
employers. Discrimination of specific groups is often difficult to prove; quota regula-
tions require an intensive and costly process of monitoring and sanctioning; changing 
the cost-benefit ratio may require considerable financial means; and firms operating on 
highly competitive markets tend to be rather unsusceptible to moral appeals. Moreover, 
if such measures are effective but have a negative impact on the profitability or func-
tioning of the companies concerned, this may have undesirable collective second order 
consequences as well (substitution of labour by capital, lower investments, job redun-
dancies, etc.).
3.5.6 Sick leave and disability regulations
Actors and interactions
The interaction model for formal sick leave and disability regulations (figure 3.6) has the 
most complicated structure. Sickness absence occurs when people employed by a firm have 
medical reasons preventing them from working. It often precedes cases of disability, or 
work incapacity. Here, illness or impairments make gainful employment wholly or partially 
impossible, and the employment relationship generally has been terminated or the condi-
tions of the labour contract have become more unfavourable (less hours, lower salary). Dis-
ability, however, can also affect those who formerly were not in salaried employment (e.g. 
people incapacitated from an early age, the self-employed, students, housewives).
Characteristic of these systems is that medical experts to a large extent determine 
whether the entitling eventualities have occurred. The onset of old age, unemployment 
or indigence can be determined by officials using a set of decision criteria. Whether or 
not someone is unable to work because of illness or disability is however a matter for the 
judgement of medical experts. They make a diagnosis, indicate the degree to which the 
observed medical limitations make a person too ill to work, and give an indication of 
when and how the patient is likely to be able to resume his activities. Assessing the cen-
tral risk thus requires medical approval: without an official medical opinion entitlements 
cannot be ascertained, and the benefits agency is not able to pay or reject applications 
for sickness or disability benefit, for aids or support, etc. In cases of short term sickness 
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(e.g. as a result of influenza) the applicant may be given the benefit of the doubt, and a 
self-report to the employer or social security organisation may entitle him to sick leave; 
or a simple certificate from the gp will do. Sickness of longer duration, and especially the 
assessment of disability, usually involves an extensive medical examination procedure by 
specialists, possibly in consultation with labour experts. The latter investigate the work-
related risks and strain, the residual earnings capacity, the possibility of using aids and 
adaptation of the workplace or organisation on reintegration, etc.
The assessment to what extent sickness and disability make working impossible can be 
problematic. Doctors do not always arrive at the same diagnosis and may also evaluate 
the recovery prognosis and required socio-medical interventions differently. An une-
quivocal medical diagnosis still may imply that one person is able to work while another 
is judged as sick or disabled. This has to do with factors such as the nature of the work to 
be performed (an office worker can continue working with a leg injury, while a bus driver 
cannot), the loss of earning capacity, the degree of support available in the client’s social 
network, and the personal resilience of the patient. The subjective opinions of the medi-
cal experts can also play a decisive role in determining the degree of illness and incapac-
ity for work. In addition, the applicants sometimes disagree with the medical opinion, 
possibly leading to demands for second opinions.
As regards the other theoretical conditions for entitlements, benefit recipients may 
be required to work or seek a job to the extent of their residual capacity; and if they do not 
do so, be regarded as partly unemployed. The household situation and additional means 
generally play no role. Sick leave and disability regulations are often individualised, with 
benefits (or continuation of salary payments) set at a certain percentage of the most 
recent earnings. Some form of means testing, however, may be applied in non-employee 
schemes and in the guaranteed minimum amounts payable under employee insurances.
Because of the crucial role of the health evaluation in the model this task has been allo-
cated to a separate corporate agent within the social security organisation, a highly 
professionalised medical assessment agency. However, the review of illness and impair-
ments may also be attributed to the benefits agency or be integrated with the functions 
of prevention and reinsertion; or it may be placed outside the social security organisa-
tion, with gps, specialists or private sick leave and disability assessment institutes acting 
as the medical gatekeepers.
The other interactions are largely comparable with those in the previous model, but 
there are some differences. Because illnesses and disabilities can frequently be avoided 
or treated, theoretically there is a greater role for preventive or restorative actions by 
the social security organisation than in the previous interaction models (e.g. counselling on 
working with hazardous substances, issuing medical aids at the workplace). This of course 
makes the prioritisation of interventions more complex; apart from income protection 
and job security, the health of the client also has to be considered. A one-sided focus on 
the latter is natural from a medical/professional perspective, but is not in the interests of 
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the contributors. By contrast, if the emphasis is placed on guiding clients back into work, 
this may be at odds with their preferences: beneficiaries generally consider their health 
to be the most important thing, and do not wish to see this jeopardised by the imposition 
of activities that are a physical or mental burden to them.
Owing to the health aspects, the support tasks of the social security organisation 
are more extensive than in the previous models, as these may include targeted medi-
cal interventions. The employment placement activities and the offering of subsidised 
employment are constrained by the need to find work that takes into account the client’s 
impairments. The social support function may include measures which enable the client 
to cope with their disorders or disabilities in everyday life.
The inclusion of the medical assessment function, the difficulties involved in the 
evaluation of work incapacity, and the more elaborate support tasks make the admin-
istration of the schemes more complex. This increases the risk of contestable decisions, 
and makes appeal procedures more likely. The risk of errors is mitigated somewhat by the 
fact that sickness and disability generally are less volatile than unemployment and indi-
gence; their duration often is predictable, or, in the case of chronic disorders, indefinite. 
This means that the entitlements of the beneficiaries theoretically have to be reviewed 
less often than in unemployment and social assistance schemes, but more frequently 
than in demographic schemes.
The task of the board is evidently more wide-ranging than in the previous model, as 
the medical aspects of administration create greater complexity and a more complicated 
prioritisation process. In view of their specialised and professional background, the 
medical assessment agency may be difficult to control.
In the model the interactions between firms and potential beneficiaries (employees) are 
more complex as well. Both are obliged to observe the rules relating to working condi-
tions (prohibition of hazardous activities, compliance with safety instructions) and to 
sick absence (requirements for reporting sick, handling absenteeism). The social security 
organisation has to monitor and sanction this via the labour inspectorate – one of the 
oldest forms of formal regulation and organisation in this domain37.
In disability benefit schemes organisations representing beneficiaries often play a 
more active role than in unemployment and social assistance regulations. This is mostly 
because dependency tends to last longer in case of invalidity, which implies there is a less 
volatile supply of candidates, with a higher interest in organising. Even so their influ-
ence on the administrative process need not be very great, for reasons similar to those 
pertaining to other client councils (cf. above). This will especially occur when the client 
organisations are fragmented, for example with several groups representing people with 
different disorders.
Institutions of formal sick leave and disability regulations
In the model, the behaviour of the actors is driven not only by the provisions of the sick 
leave and disability regulations and the informal rules of communities; the rules that 
generally prevail among medical professionals also play a role, and the three types of 
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institution are not necessarily extensions of each other. Formal benefit rules and profes-
sional rules may diverge in two respects. First, there may be differences in the profes-
sional and formal demarcation of illnesses and impairments. Typically, the sickness and 
invalidity concept may be broader in the medical profession than the conditions that 
qualify for the benefit. This discrepancy is exacerbated by technological developments 
(medical research, better diagnostic techniques, more extensive range of treatments) and 
the growth in medical specialisms, which to some extent create their own demand. In 
addition, medical assessors within the social security organisation may be confronted 
with conflicting rules: the expectations of their masters do not always correspond with 
the informal values, norms, and conventions that they have internalised as professionals 
during their medical training.
Informal rules relating to illness and work incapacity may deviate from the statutory 
definition and the professional criteria as well. People sometimes experience impair-
ments that are not recognised by physicians as ailments (e.g. subjective complaints with 
no scientifically demonstrable cause) or for which the benefits agency does not confer an 
entitlement (e.g. injuries caused by dangerous leisure activities, partial incapacity below 
a certain threshold, insufficient loss of income). This gulf can be wider in some parts of 
society than in others, owing to deviant views about illness and its treatment. Examples 
are a culture of absenteeism in certain companies and trade sectors, where employees 
consider taking sick leave as the normal thing to do when the weather is bad or when 
a child is in need of care; or the benefit culture which long-term disabled persons may 
develop if they live in geographical concentrations (for instance, in areas which have tra-
ditionally had a large share of high-risk employment, such as heavy industry or mining).
Compliance and defection in formal sick leave and disability regulations
In many respects the incentives to comply and defect are comparable with those in the 
previous interaction model. However, there are some points that are specific to the col-
lective arrangements for sick leave and incapacity for work.
In the social security organisation the principal-agent problem is theoretically greater, 
partly for the obvious reasons relating to the complexity of the organisational structure, 
the prioritisation of the various interventions, and the nature of the entitlements and 
conditions laid down in the formal rules. However, there is also a specific defection issue 
here, which can be described as ‘the doctor’s dilemma’. This is not, as in G.B. Shaw’s play, 
a reference to the conflicts of interests and of conscience in individual physicians, but 
to a special manifestation of the principal-agent problem. On the one hand the social 
security organisation needs a medical assessment agency in order to establish the enti-
tling events, and from this perspective the social security organisation has an interest 
in acquiring sufficient medical expertise. On the other hand, in doing so it is bringing in 
an assertive professional group, which has gone through a lengthy process of secondary 
socialisation; and as a result, they may feel more committed to the rules of the medical 
profession than to the formal institutions the social security organisation has to comply 
with. This increases the likelihood that the medical assessors who act on behalf of the 
social security organisation will go their own way; they may ignore the instructions and 
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objectives of the board, and may allow the health interests of the beneficiaries and their 
own professional code (not doing anything that may harm the patient)38 to weigh more 
heavily than the letter of the law and the organisational interests. The existence of a third 
set of rules guiding the behaviour of the medical assessors makes the principal-agent 
problem between the board of directors and the medical assessment agency, in compari-
son with the other structural relationships within the organisation, qualitatively differ-
ent and more urgent. Of course, theoretically the problem becomes even greater if the 
medical assessors are independent advisors who are not on the administration’s payroll.
This type of defection can be tackled in several ways. Regimentation may be pur-
sued by drawing up detailed medical examination protocols linked to strict supervision 
of the doctors. Alternatively, the medical assessment can be made less dependent on the 
opinion of a single doctor, for example by including a second opinion in the examination 
procedure as standard; or by establishing the entitlements in an intensive collaborative 
process with labour experts, benefit officials and reinsertion consultants. It is also pos-
sible to try and link the medical professionals more to the organisational interest, for 
example by basing their pay to the number of rejected applications and the number of 
recovery declarations. A contractual solution could consist of specific agreements made 
with the national medical association, setting out the rules of conduct for professionals 
working in social security. Finally, the doctor’s dilemma can be addressed by creating 
a separate profession specifically for the purpose of carrying out medical assessments. 
Apart from the required medical skills and knowledge, such ‘social security physicians’ 
must be imbued with explicit professional norms, which take into account the interests 
of the social security organisation and the wider community.
However, there are disadvantages to all the above strategies. It may be hard to attain 
a high degree of regimentation, because the required expertise is very specific, and the 
professionals therefore have an edge in knowledge and information. Financial incentives 
may be at odds with the professional rules, possibly causing doctors working in social 
security to acquire a bad reputation among their colleagues and making it difficult to 
recruit qualified professionals. Co-assessment with other disciplines may increase the 
transaction costs of the administration process, and contractual solutions may not be 
viable, because the national medical association has no strong interest in stretching 
its own rules to suit the social security organisation. The normative force of detailed 
rules imparted in the training of a specific group of social security physicians should not 
be overestimated. This often will involve a relatively late, not overly penetrative form 
of socialisation, as a corollary to the standard medical curriculum. In practice, all these 
solutions may turn out to be rather ineffective or inappropriate. The doctor’s dilemma 
is therefore theoretically one of the major defection problems in administering sickness 
and disability benefit schemes.
For the beneficiaries the sickness or disability schemes are often more attractive than 
unemployment or social assistance regulations. Benefits are high and exempted from 
means testing, and in most cases last until recovery has occurred. The rights to support 
are generally more extensive as well. The duty to accept work is less pressing; the fully 
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incapacitated need not search for a job, while for the remainder the condition generally 
applies that accepting work must not harm their health any further. In cases of sickness 
and disability the social ‘legitimacy of idleness’ is also often greater. The beneficiary can 
in principle not help the fact that he has been struck by illness; it could happen to any-
one, and he has demonstrable, medically certified impairments. In the view of many this 
may justify the rights he has been granted.
In theory, the attractiveness of this type of benefit fosters rule-breaking on the part 
of the recipients. The possible types of beneficiaries’ defection are to some extent the 
same as those for unemployment and social assistance benefits: incorrectly claimed ben-
efit amounts, inaccurate presentation of employment relationships, failure to report 
mutations in their income or household situation, etc. Others relate to the specific E-, Q- 
and C-type conditions of sickness and disability benefit schemes. For instance, potential 
beneficiaries may (see also Verheul, 1989: 67-70):
– deliberately cause the illness themselves, or simulate the symptoms and manipulate 
the doctor’s opinion in the consultation room (inducement),
– prolong their illness by refusing medical examination and help (obstruction),
– present the illness as worse than it is (aggravation),
– submit false declarations of unfitness for work, e.g. via doctors’ certificates purchased 
abroad,
– report sick for a single day if they have insufficient days of leave or a lack of motivation 
(‘pulling a sickie’),
– report sick for a long period as a result of labour conflicts or in connection with reor-
ganisations, and
– fail to report, or report on time, the fact that they have recovered and are able to 
resume work.
The likelihood that such defective behaviour will occur depends on many factors, many of 
them the same as with unemployment and social assistance benefits (the amounts involved, 
complex and ambiguous formal rules which are weakly socialised, impersonal contacts 
with the social security organisation, conflicting interests). The formal definition of ill-
ness and incapacity for work, however, is a specific factor. A short and exhaustive account 
of entitling occupational illnesses offers less scope for defection than a broadly defined 
eventuality condition such as ‘being able to earn less, due to illness or impairments, than 
a similar but healthy person’. But the likelihood of rule-breaking by the beneficiaries also 
depends on the assessment procedure, the embedding of the medical assessment agency 
in the social security organisation, and the informal rules of relatives, neighbourhood 
and firm. The state of the economy can play a role as well; for instance, during a recession 
employees tend to be less inclined to report sick on questionable grounds, because they 
are afraid of becoming unemployed if they were to be caught.
The willingness of the contributors to comply with their funding duties cannot be taken 
for granted either. Ceteris paribus it may be assumed that the likelihood of contributor’s 
defection is higher than in pension schemes, but lower than in unemployment or social 
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assistance arrangements. While everyone expects to retire, and many people consider 
themselves as immune to the risks of unemployment and indigence, the perceived prob-
ability of falling ill or becoming disabled generally lies somewhere in between: everyone 
can be struck by illness or incapacity for work at some point of their career. A moderate 
subjective utility of contributing can therefore be expected. The duty-bound may also be 
rather inclined to contribute because the perceived deservingness of the recipients, or 
the legitimacy of idleness (cf. above), tends to be greater than in cases of unemployment 
or indigence (though smaller than where elderly, survivors or children are concerned).
A common type of defection by firms occurs when they base their selection and dismissal 
policy on the perceived likelihood of sickness and disablement. When dismissing incum-
bent personnel they possess information about their sickness history; and the bad risks 
may be placed at the top of the list of potential dismissals. Firms do not possess this 
information when taking on new staff. In that case they may seek to select against bad 
risks by requiring candidates to undergo medical examinations; but these do not cover 
all illnesses and their predictive value is limited. Moreover, they are sometimes illegal or 
only permitted if impairments make it difficult to do a particular job (e.g. poor eyesight 
in people who want to become train drivers). In practice, this quickly leads to selection by 
proxy: job opportunities are then poor for groups which firms perceive as being at high 
risk of illness or incapacity, such as older persons, women or people who have previously 
claimed disability benefit.
A special form of firm defection is the presentation of unemployment as disability. 
Employers and employees may have a common interest in regarding people who are to be 
dismissed (e.g. because of reorganisation) as unfit for work. The employers are able to rid 
themselves in a social manner of employees they regard as less productive, whilst trans-
ferring a large share of the costs of dismissal (redundancy schemes, social plans) to the 
collectivity. The employees, for their part, end up in a relatively more favourable benefit 
system than if they would have been forced to rely on unemployment or social assist-
ance benefit. Hiding unemployment in this way requires some degree of collaboration 
between employers and employees; in other words, the defection is tacitly or explicitly 
a joint undertaking. A shared intention on the part of these actors may not be enough, 
however. The likelihood that attempts to disguise unemployment as disability will suc-
ceed also depends on the possibilities offered by the formal institutions, the willingness 
of the benefits agency to interpret those rules in a lenient fashion, the priority given 
to this type of defection by the monitoring/sanctioning agency, and whether or not the 
supervisory board and the social security court regard this as acceptable. In the Dutch 
disability benefit system ‘discounting unemployment’ was an officially approved practice 
in medical assessments between 1973 and 1987 (see for instance scp, 1998: 432).
3.6 The results of social security rules
Social security institutions are designed to achieve results that are regarded as collec-
tively desirable. They are focused on the realisation of communal gains, within the pre-
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vailing relative prices, power relations, dominant interests and support for ideals. If the 
institutions are constant, then according to the figural model outlined in graph 2.1 the 
results to be achieved depend among other things on the circumstances within which 
actors apply the rules. Before discussing the theoretical results of social security rules in 
more detail, it will be useful to explore the influence of this historical context.
3.6.1 The historical background to rule application
Changes in the context of rule application, as discussed in §2.8, theoretically influence 
the results of social security rules in two ways. The first is direct: it may impact on the 
number of entitling events, and this works through into the interactions considered in 
the previous section. Historical developments can lead to an increase or decrease in the 
manifest risks – in all models discussed in the previous section the main condition for 
entitlements, and a driving factor for social security interactions. The second relates to 
changes in the perceptions of individual actors or agents, which can alter their aspira-
tions and may lead to more or less defection.
Demographic trends are one historical factor that can have a strong influence on the number 
of entitling events. Of course this is most pronounced in the formal demographic schemes 
discussed earlier: the number of older persons, surviving dependants and families with 
children who are theoretically eligible for collective support correlates with the birth 
and mortality rates, the average age of marriage, fertility rates, migration processes, etc. 
State pensions, where every resident has a right to retirement benefit on reaching a cer-
tain age, are an extreme example. Presuming no entitled persons refuse their pension, 
every change in the balance between the influx of newly eligible elderly and the outflow 
of deceased persons will translate fully into the number of benefit recipients.
Obviously, in formal social security schemes an increase in the entitling events will 
affect the complicated interaction structure and the interdependent network of actors 
involved in it. The number of claims rises, and the social security organisation therefore 
has to establish rights and duties more frequently and deliver the entitlements accord-
ingly: distribution of more benefits and provisions, and possibly more actions geared to 
prevention, reintegration and medical assessment. All things being equal, the swelling 
of the client base also leads to a rise in the number of mutations that have to be processed 
and an increase in the required monitoring and sanctioning activities. Of course there 
is also a greater need for funding. If the reserves are inadequate to cover the growth in 
entitlements, this implies that the contributions by employers, employees or taxpayers 
will have to rise; at least, as long as the institutional framework remains intact. Given the 
limited resources and the rising workload of the organisation, the board has a more diffi-
cult task in determining where the administration priorities should lie: on correct distri-
bution of benefits, placement in paid work (if applicable, as in the case of young widows), 
promoting the well-being and social participation of benefit recipients, tackling fraud, 
and so on. The strain on the supervisory board and the social security court increases as 
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well: as the number of entitlements rises, shortcomings in the administration will also 
be more frequent and more contestable decisions will be made.
However, informal familial, communal and occupational systems may also come under 
pressure if the number of needy older persons, surviving dependants and families with 
children grows substantially. For instance, if the prevalence of indigence among such 
groups rises in a familial social security system and the rules remain unchanged, the 
demands placed on the network of relatives will be intensified.
And even formal schemes which are not generally regarded as ‘demographic’ can be 
sensitive to certain population developments. For example, the take-up of sickness and 
disability benefit may increase if the share of elderly persons in the labour force grows, 
as a result of the rising average probability of becoming ill or incapacitated. The number 
of people in receipt of social assistance benefit correlates partly with migratory move-
ments: if the number of needy immigrants exceeds the number of poor emigrants, the 
benefit volume will rise. Similarly, changes in the age at which people marry and have 
children can impact on the number of entitlements; the sooner they do so, the more child 
benefit has to be paid out at the national level, as the average number of children tends 
to increase. The prevalence of divorce is another example: the more frequent it becomes, 
the more social assistance benefit will have to be paid to single-parent families.
Demographic developments are often gradual, influencing the number of events over a 
protracted period of time. Yet demographic shocks can also occur, and these may knock 
the social security system off balance. The number of people dependent on benefit can 
increase sharply in times of famine, natural disasters, high refugee flows, or an expan-
sion of the national territory and population (e.g. as a result of acts of war, colonisation 
or federalisation). Even if the latter process takes place peacefully, the consequences for 
social security can be significant. An example is the influence that German reunification 
had on benefit volumes and the distribution of entitled persons across various schemes 
(see chapter 5). The effects of such radical demographic changes moreover sometimes 
continue to be felt for a long time. If the birth rate or mortality rate in certain cohorts 
was high, this can still have an impact on the take-up of social security many years later. 
Examples include the easing of the pressure on German, French and British pension 
schemes in the 1950s which emanated from influx of the small 1886-1895 birth cohorts 
(mass deaths of young men in the trenches of the First World War) and again in the first 
half of the 1980s from the people born between 1915 and 1919 (low birth rates as the 
military were engaged in warfare). The anticipated growth in the number of retirement 
benefits as the post-Second World War baby-boomers will retire is another example39. 
Because comparatively small or large cohorts generally spawn proportionate numbers of 
offspring, demographic shocks such as these continue to influence the take-up of ben-
efits in the even longer term, with a further delay of 25-30 years.
Although the demographic process exerts its influence primarily via the events, it 
can also affect the perceptions of actors. This applies, for instance, to the possible future 
decline of the solidarity between generations with regard to pension schemes that are 
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funded by the apportionment (pay-as-you-go) method. One assumption is that the ris-
ing financial burden of contributing (growing numbers of pensions, fewer contributors) 
expected in the years to come will in the long run inevitably erode the willingness to 
fund the pensions, as the required contributions would swallow up too large a share of 
income, and would no longer be in fair proportion to the entitlements the current con-
tributors may expect when they themselves retire. Whether this form of solidarity will 
actually decrease in the near future is doubtful, however. Empirical research suggests 
that in many countries currently the vast majority of the population believe that the gov-
ernment must ensure a decent standard of living for the elderly (see chapter 4).
The economic process is a second important context for the application of social security 
rules. It relates both to the course of the economic cycle and the more structural trends 
such as the long-term development in labour productivity, the substitution of labour by 
capital, or the declining importance of agriculture and industry in favour of the services 
sector.
If many people fall out of work during a period of recession, and the institutions 
remain stable, this will lead to an increase in the number of beneficiaries and to longer 
periods of dependency. In informal social security systems, more unemployed persons 
fall back on support provided by the rules of relief prevailing in their family, community 
or occupation. In formal systems the number of people taking up unemployment and 
social assistance benefits rises, though the number of entitled persons in schemes with 
a ‘hidden’ unemployment component – early retirement pension, disability  benefit – can 
also increase. The volume growth in such circumstances has both an inflow and an out-
flow component. On the one hand the economic downturn leads to more people being 
laid off and declared unfit for work; on the other hand, the likelihood that benefit claim-
ants will find work declines because of the smaller number of jobs available and the 
increased competition with other groups (such as school-leavers, who are cheaper and 
have more up-to-date training). The growth in the total benefit volume can be dampened 
somewhat because the number of ‘work-related’ benefits declines during a recession: if 
there are fewer people in work, the number of people entitled to sick pay, childcare facili-
ties, etc., also tends to fall.
The social security organisation must accommodate fluctuations in the benefit vol-
ume resulting from the economic cycle. In principle the fund reserves ought to be ade-
quate to cope with a temporary increase or decrease, and the other agencies should also be 
able to respond in a flexible way to cyclical changes in their workload (more or less intake, 
prevention, reinsertion, monitoring, sanctioning, support tasks, etc.). Yet in practice the 
resources of these corporate agents may not always be sufficient to enable it to absorb 
economic fluctuations. For instance, during an economic recession a government is likely 
to set limits to the organisation’s budget in order to avoid sharp rises in spending. Under 
these circumstances acute deficits may arise, also because the average costs of many inter-
ventions mount up: it becomes more difficult for benefit claimants to find work, and as 
long-term unemployment rises so does the need for social support, etc.
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Where an increase in unemployment has structural causes (and the rules do not 
change), this logically implies that the number of events increases permanently. This 
raises the theoretical minimum of the benefit volume, the required funding and the work-
load of the social security organisation. It is also possible that unemployment neither 
rises nor falls as a result of structural economic changes, but becomes concentrated in 
different groups40. As a corollary to this, the composition of the unemployed population 
will change as well, which may require adaptations in the administrative procedures.
The economic process theoretically also influences the perceptions of actors. People 
who are unemployed or unfit for work may regard their chances of finding work as poorer 
during a recession, making them less inclined to seek work intensively. The social secu-
rity organisation may tolerate this to a certain extent. The administering officials, in view 
of their rising workload, may regard it as efficient and justified that benefit claimants 
who are difficult to place are not forced to look for jobs which they have little chance of 
getting anyway. The perceptions of firms also depend on the economic context; if they 
believe the economy is about to improve, they will be less inclined to dismiss people than 
when they anticipate a lengthy recession. Evidently, high unemployment rates are likely 
to impact on the recruitment and pay policy of companies as well. Since they have more 
choice when there is plenty of labour available, employers can impose strict selection cri-
teria and lower the wages and fringe benefits they offer. On the supply side, some groups 
may decide under these circumstances to withdraw from the labour market altogether. 
Women who choose not to work and concentrate on their family care tasks instead, and 
young people who prolong their educational careers, are examples of such ‘discouraged 
workers’.
One point for conjecture is whether formal social security systems can become per-
manently out of balance as a result of economic shocks. Van Praag et al. (1982) make this 
assumption when they refer to the ‘flywheel effect’ in social security. According to this 
theory, the shock of a sudden rise in unemployment such as occurred at the start of the 
1980s can create a vicious circle of rising benefit dependency and rising contributions. 
This will ultimately lead to the demise of the social security schemes as the required con-
tributions become unaffordable41. Others cast doubt on this assertion: the effect of such 
economic shocks has proved difficult to demonstrate in quantitative empirical research. 
The sharp rise in the number of benefit claimants in the Netherlands in the 1980s did for 
example lead to an increase in wage costs, but was not translated into a further rise in 
unemployment. The reason is probably that employees and trade unions were afraid to 
make high pay demands under those conditions: “in recent decades the effect of high 
unemployment on wage restraint was much greater than that of higher average costs in 
driving up pay” (De Beer, 2001: 108). According to this latter analysis, the rise in Dutch 
unemployment benefit volumes in the 1980s must be ascribed to the after-effects of the 
expansion of the social security system and to rather autonomous social and cultural 
trends (such as individualisation).
This illustrates the relevance of other historical developments to the application of 
social security rules. The number of entitling events can also be influenced by changes 
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in the social stratification. If, for example, the percentage of people voluntarily living alone 
increases, this theoretically leads to a higher take-up of social assistance. Not only does 
the number of potentially entitled households grow, but the likelihood of their being in 
need of support also rises because there are fewer households with a partner’s income 
to fall back on. Changes in the relative size of various socio-economic groups can also 
impact on the entitlements. As the share of self-employed people rises, the percentage of 
the labour force in receipt of unemployment insurance benefit tends to fall. Similarly, if 
the proportion of full-time breadwinners among couples declines and the proportion of 
double-earner households increases, this is likely to boost the number of entitling events 
in employee insurance schemes (because more people are insured), while the take-up of 
means-tested assistance may decline (because the partner’s incomes imply that house-
holds are not poor enough to qualify if one member loses their job).
A changing social stratification can also alter the perceptions of actors; for instance, 
if the long-term unemployed become highly concentrated in specific neighbourhoods, 
the social security organisation may decide to regard them as a new target group for its 
social interventions.
Technological and scientific developments influence the number of entitling events primarily 
through changes in the production process. Innovative technologies may invoke new 
forms of economic activity and can boost total labour demand; but it is also possible that 
changed production methods raise efficiency and therefore depress employment. Both 
trends affect the take-up of benefits which are driven by the unemployment risk. It is also 
possible that they impact mainly on the composition of employment (greater demand for 
it specialists, smaller demand for typists), thereby altering the risk of unemployment for 
specific groups on the labour market.
Technological and scientific innovations can also impinge on the risks covered by 
sick leave and disability benefit schemes. If the proportion of post-industrial employment 
increases, it is obvious to expect the number of occupational accidents to decline (due 
to the reduction in hazardous and physically strenuous industrial labour), whereas work 
incapacity as a result of psychological disorders may become more frequent. Advances 
in medical technology and knowledge (more specialisms, improved diagnostic methods 
and techniques) imply that somatic and mental diseases are recognised more frequently 
and sooner. This tends to increase the risk that people will be declared unfit for work, 
although the success of improved medical treatments may partly offset this.
It was argued earlier that the ideals that are dominant in a community can shape the rule 
generation process, in particular where formal rules are being drafted in a democratic 
society with unstable power relations, divided interests and low costs of expressing devi-
ant opinions. However, in principle, ideals have little influence on the occurrence of risks 
during the rule application process. If the dominant view of the future changes – and 
the rules do not – the number of people who become old, unemployed, unfit for work, 
etc. does not increase or decrease. Even so, if new ideas about the desired future become 
accepted, this may lead to alterations in the subjective perceptions of actors and the way 
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in which they apply the rules. The possible impact of changing policy doctrines illustrates 
this. In the Dutch social security policy up to the 1990s the ‘entitlements doctrine’ domi-
nated, based on the principle that the first priority in the administrative process should 
lie in guaranteeing the income rights of those affected by social risks. In 1976, for exam-
ple, the explanatory memorandum to the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs stated 
that closures and reorganisations of firms often led to psychological incapacity to work 
among the employees, and that “it is good that these people can be accommodated in the 
disability benefits scheme” (tk, 1976/1977: 14). Looking back, policy makers were inclined 
to conclude that this was tantamount to approval of hiding unemployment in the disabil-
ity benefits in order to limit the social consequences of mass redundancies. Over the next 
fifteen years the official policy line underwent a sea change, with the emphasis shifting 
to an ‘activation doctrine’. In 1991 the same Ministry (tk, 1991/1992a: 21; tk, 1991/1992b: 1) 
announced its vision of the future by stating that
it should [...] be a characteristic of a good social security system that not too many people 
need to make use of it, and that unavoidable use should not last any longer than necessary. [...] 
Increasing participation in gainful employment is the goal to which (the Ministry) will devote 
the highest priority. […] This means that not only the employment policy, but also the income 
policy, the social security policy and the policy to improve the quality of work will as far as 
possible be geared to promoting labour participation.
If such contrasting policy visions are endorsed by the board and the officials – something 
which is by no means certain –  the discretionary scope available to the social security 
organisation in applying the rules is likely to be used differently. Under the first doctrine, 
the most important thing will be to provide income and social support to the benefici-
aries, whereas the second set of policy ideals will lead to the promotion of active job-
seeking behaviour where possible, including strict monitoring and sanctioning.
3.6.2 Consequences for actors
The model in figure 2.1 indicates that rule-driven interactions have an impact on the 
actors. Since social security rules are in the first place designed to secure the rights of 
the beneficiaries, the results for these actors are in theory the most important. For them, 
the consequences may be partly intentional and positive. The application of the social 
security rules can – in comparison to the case where no such rights are granted – improve 
their income position, their labour potential, and their health and social participation. 
Thus they may be better off in terms of key resources, existential actor traits and the 
social relations they maintain within the community. Through preventive, restorative 
and compensatory interventions, social security allows the beneficiaries to make ends 
meet more easily or to preserve their standard of living to some extent; it helps them to 
find a job or to enhance their labour market prospects; and it creates the conditions for 
social integration and physical and mental health.
In addition there are a number of unintended positive consequences of the interac-
tion process for the beneficiaries. They have more leisure time, and they are not exposed 
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to the burdens and inconveniences of work: the physical and psychological effort 
required, the risk of becoming ill through working, hierarchical relationships and labour 
conflicts, travel time, etc.
Yet social security may also have negative effects for the beneficiaries. First of all, although 
they may be in a better position than they would be without social security, they still tend 
to be worse off than they were in the past. The rules offer relief, but generally do not pro-
vide complete prevention, restoration or compensation of the loss or lacks experienced by 
the recipients. From a collective point of view this is understandable; the costs of social 
security should be kept at an acceptable level, and the incentive to perform productive 
labour must not become too weak.
Even more important is that while social security rights are granted with positive 
intentions, having to depend on them may still have a negative impact on the recipients. 
This is a topic which goes back to studies on the attitudinal and behavioural repercus-
sions of unemployment in the 1930s (Lazarsfeld-Jahoda & Zeisl, 1933; Eisenberg & Lazars-
feld, 1938; Jahoda, 1982). As a result of losing their job and becoming dependent on social 
security, people may experience a deterioration in their health and psychological well-
being (more anxiety, depression, feelings of uncertainty and worthlessness; cf. McKee-
Ryan et al., 2005). Unemployment can also lead to less – and less meaningful – time struc-
turing, a pessimistic view of the future and a reduction in social contacts. A person’s 
social position can be affected as well: their social prestige may decline, they may be 
stigmatised for being in receipt of benefit, and they may feel marginalised.
Taking the argument a step further, social security institutions and the interaction 
process in which the rights are granted may also directly evoke negative personal con-
sequences for recipients. At the heart of the neo-conservative criticism of the welfare 
state is the allegation that social security does not help to emancipate people, but makes 
them dependent and inactive instead. The incentive for people to shape their own lives 
is taken away; the social security organisation tells beneficiaries what to do, and has an 
interest in sustaining the passive attitude of its clients (see e.g. Murray, 1984). A similar 
conclusion, albeit from an entirely different theoretical starting point, is drawn in criti-
cal sociology. Here the central focus is on the role of social security in imposing duties 
and discipline. In exchange for the rights they have been granted, beneficiaries must act 
in a loyal and morally correct manner, seek work intensively, participate in reintegration 
programmes, etc. The anonymous social security bureaucracy carries out strict monitor-
ing of these duties and clamps down hard on rule-breakers. This can lead to feelings of 
being trapped, of powerlessness and of dependency vis-à-vis the social security organisa-
tion or the wider community. Or, in the frequently used terminology of Habermas (1981), 
the obligations imposed on the beneficiaries by social security schemes generally result 
in a Kolonialisierung ihrer Lebenswelt42.
The extent to which such positive and negative consequences actually emerge 
depends on the scope of the rules. For instance, if the rights in a formal system are gen-
erous and the duties light, if the social security organisation interprets the rules leni-
ently and the informal rules emphasise solidarity, many of the negative repercussions 
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referred to above may in fact be limited. The consequences experienced at the micro-
level also tend to be linked to the duration of benefit dependency (the longer it lasts, the 
more negative the impact) and to the behavioural alternatives: the likelihood of find-
ing employment, and the working conditions if people do so. Ultimately, therefore, the 
outcomes of social security interactions for the entitled persons have to be established 
empirically. In the fairly extensive Dutch social security system around 1995, the extent 
to which being out of work was voluntary proved to be an important intervening factor. 
Unemployed and disabled people reported lower well-being, poorer health, more stress, 
greater social isolation and less active use of their leisure time. People who had retired 
early and had therefore chosen voluntarily to be out of work were much less troubled by 
these phenomena. Their subjective feeling of well-being (satisfaction, happiness) was in 
fact even greater than that of those in work (De Beer, 2001: 115-201).
The micro-consequences of the interactions for the other actors are theoretically of sec-
ondary importance, and mostly are fairly obvious ones. For instance, individual contrib-
utors see their spending power constrained as a result of the duties imposed, and firms 
may be affected in terms of labour costs, and in the size, composition and quality of their 
workforce. Within the social security organisation, the various agents will realise the 
aims of their principals to a certain extent. For this they may be rewarded or punished in 
terms of salaries, budget and staff allocations, and the granting and withdrawal of privi-
leges. Similarly, the social security organisation as a whole, the social security court, the 
supervisory board, etc. will be judged by their stakeholders in terms of the attainment of 
external goals, which may have repercussions on their budget, reputation or power.
3.6.3 Collective results
Following the figural model in §2.3, the collective results of rule-driven social security 
interactions feed back into the historical process. The institutions are especially likely to 
affect the degree of social structuring and the economic process, as social security rules 
typically intend to intervene in those areas. Before discussing the significance of this in 
more detail it is important to point out once more that the collective outcomes of social 
security need not be stable; for instance, the degree of benefit dependency, poverty and 
inequality generated by the same set of rules can vary within and between countries, 
depending on historical circumstances and the course taken in the interaction process. The 
instability theoretically is reinforced by the fact that the feedback creates the possibility of 
its own dynamic. As the results of rule-driven social security interactions work through into 
the historical process, the rule incentives may change and new rule wishes possibly emerge 
among the actors. Through the rule interaction on government production, typically in 
the legislative assembly (cf. §2.9.4), this can translate into institutional change. The latter 
implies that social security interactions are no longer driven by the same allocation of 
rights and duties, which can lead to changes in the collective results, and so on.
It may not be simple to assess to what extent certain collective outcomes imply the 
realisation of the communal goals social security sets out to achieve, because those aims 
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tend to be fluid as well. As stated before, all institutional arrangements of this type reflect 
a prevailing conviction that it is socially beneficial to cover economic risks in a specific 
way. This of course means that the macro-objectives of social security are not theoreti-
cally fixed, but vary with the perceptions of dominant actors. It is therefore not always 
clear whether specific collective results are intended or unintended. To assess this, one 
has to recall the intentions that the rule-makers had when constituting the rules, and 
to describe the re-interpretation of those intentions at later moments. For instance, the 
founders of a disability regulation originally may have aimed at an extensive protection 
against the loss of income, while their successors may stress that disabled persons should 
utilise their remaining capacity for gainful employment as much as possible. Evidently, 
this will influence the way the collective outcomes of the disability scheme will be appre-
ciated in terms of goal attainment.
Impact on social structuring
The first collective outcome in terms of social structuring is a rather obvious one. Social 
security rules lead directly to forms of social differentiation which would not arise with-
out these institutions. The introduction of social security arrangements tends to create 
recognisable social categories: the children from the poorhouse, people on the dole, the 
long-term unemployed (or ‘ub-40s’), single welfare mothers, oaps, and so on. They may 
be aware of their shared social position, and may organise themselves on those grounds, 
for example in client organisations. Social differentiation and organisation can also occur 
among the contributors and agents of the social security organisation: discontented tax 
payers may unite and form a single issue political party, the doctors of the medical assess-
ment agency may join in a professional association, and so on.
Social security also influences the process of social stratification, which, as men-
tioned in chapter 2, refers to changes in both the position of social groups on various 
social ladders (criteria for social distinction, such as income, descent, prestige, achieve-
ments), and the dominant ranking principles (the relative importance of the social lad-
ders). Theoretically, social security mainly aims at influencing the rankings. Through 
awarding rights, and diverting the funds gathered from the contributors to the benefi-
ciaries, the rules try to uphold the income, labour market position, health and social 
integration of the vulnerable strata of the population to some degree. This may prevent 
the beneficiaries from displaying behaviour that the community regards as undesirable 
(criminality, prostitution, vagrancy, emigration). This is not to say that the rules by defi-
nition reduce the oppositions between different groups considerably; the influence of 
social security on distribution ladders is an empirical question. Social security is usu-
ally accompanied by redistribution: the taxes and premiums paid by the contributors are 
used to secure the income, employment, health and social participation of the recipi-
ents. Depending on the way of institutionalisation, this can both reinforce and reduce 
the differences between social groups. If systems are set up along Bismarckian lines, the 
emphasis is on reproduction of the existing social hierarchy, mainly in terms of the dif-
ferentials between status groups. Evidently, if every social or occupational group has 
its own social security schemes, the solidarity principle only applies within the exist-
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ing social strata, and the differences between them remain intact. Universalist forms of 
social security, by contrast, may reduce social polarisation because here there is more 
solidarity between higher and lower strata.
The impact of social security interactions on the dominant ranking principles is 
theoretically less marked. Generally, social security rules tend to reflect the prevailing 
stratification criteria rather than determine their relative weight. Yet the latter is not 
entirely impossible. If a closed, class-based society suddenly has solidary social security 
rules imposed upon it – for example following a revolution or after losing a war – this can 
lead to a decay of the traditional stratification ladders. Since the resources are no longer 
allocated in accordance with the old class distinctions, the different social strata become 
less recognisable and the status-specific standards of conduct (such as showing respect 
to benefactors) may no longer be respected in interactions. Other hierarchical principles 
may then eventually come to dominate, for example the oppositions between occupa-
tional classes or educational groups.
Elite-formation, the fourth aspect of social structuring identified earlier, can also 
theoretically correlate with the prevailing social security rules. This applies particularly 
in democratic societies. Here the selection of the political elite may be determined by the 
importance that voters attach to current social security issues (indexation of benefits, 
maintaining the level of pensions) and by the number and composition of the beneficiary 
population (the ‘beneficiaries' vote’). The ‘median voter hypothesis’ (Black, 1948, 1987; 
Downs, 1957) goes a step further. Its basic assumption is that rule-makers necessarily 
optimise the utility of persons holding the middle ground in the electorate, as this is 
the surest way to gain a democratic majority. This implies, among other things, that it 
does not really matter which elite is in charge: all public services, including the system 
of social security transfers and contributions, will always have to reflect the preferences 
of the electorate around the median income, age, education, expectations, etc., because 
their vote is decisive. If those median values change, the institutions will have to fol-
low; e.g. an ageing population will imply that median voters favour higher, wage-indexed 
pensions, and any political candidate must accommodate those preferences in order to 
be supported by a majority of the electorate43.
The establishment and survival of government coalitions can also depend on politi-
cal compromises on social security issues. If the power of the political elites hinges on 
this, it is likely that the rule generation process will be affected as well. This can imply 
that only expedient amendments to the formal social security rules will be made, while 
changes that violate the coalition agreement or endanger the public favour are likely to 
be suspended or reversed.
Impact on the economic process
The central question with regard to the economic consequences of social security is 
whether the prevailing rules increase or reduce the prosperity of a community. By way of 
introduction, a few qualifying comments can be made here. In the first place, the influ-
ence of social security institutions should not be overstated. Collective wealth depends 
primarily on the natural resources, infrastructure, technology, knowledge and human 
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capital which a community possesses. Some of these factors may be influenced by social 
security rules, but in principle they are by no means determined by them. Moreover, col-
lective prosperity may depend to a large extent on developments outside the community, 
regardless of the local or national institutions. For example, the output of the relatively 
open Dutch economy is determined to a considerable extent by developments in world 
trade and its main trading partners, movements in interest rates on the international 
capital markets, the exchange rate of the euro, the monetary policy of the European Cen-
tral Bank, and so on. Besides this, the economic effects of social security are theoretically 
complex. This can be seen very clearly in economic models which depict the many inter-
actions between social security institutions, labour market characteristics and economic 
growth44.
Different economic schools paint a different picture of the influence of social security 
on communal prosperity45. First and foremost, the influence depends on the definition 
of wealth. If it is perceived in subjective terms, the prosperity of a community can be 
defined as the sum of the utility, satisfaction, or happiness that actors derive from the 
individual and collective goods they possess (cf. Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; 
Layard, 2005). With such a definition social security rules increase communal wealth to 
the extent that actors derive direct advantage from it (the personal rights they acquire), 
save on transaction costs (because they do not need to weigh up which individual insur-
ance will suit them best), and value the certainty that the community offers them (as they 
may have to fall back on social security themselves). It is also possible that people are 
sensitive to the prosperity of others, or to the inequality of the distribution, and for that 
reason experience a higher subjective utility as a result of social security transfers. The 
fact that others are no longer poor or deprived can be appreciated as a token of civilisa-
tion or connectedness of the community to which one belongs.
For the beneficiaries, the subjective contribution to prosperity by social security 
will generally be positive on balance; otherwise they would probably make no use of 
the scheme46. In order to assess the total, this has to be balanced against the way other 
actors assess the costs and benefits of the institutions. The contributors, for instance, 
will tend to experience a negative subjective utility as a result of the fall in their net 
income (although this may be mitigated by their possible future entitlements and a posi-
tive appraisal of lower poverty and inequality rates).
Generally, however, economists prefer a more objectified approach to prosperity, defin-
ing it as the degree to which scarcity has been eliminated, or the extent to which needs are 
met through the use of scarce resources. As this is difficult to determine at the collective 
level, the total income of a community or its total output is often used as a proxy. Here 
again, the definition is debatable. For example, should the monetary value of domestic 
work and the shadow economy (crime, undeclared employment) be included in calculat-
ing the wealth of the community? And should the social costs of the production process, 
such as environmental damage, also be taken into account?
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By convention, the yardstick used to measure national wealth is per capita gross 
domestic product (gdp), or the added value of the output of industry and the government 
which is realised per head of the population47. Theoretically this is determined by many 
different economic variables (cf. §2.9.2). In order to assess the effects of social security on 
collective prosperity, it is necessary to investigate how the rules affect such factors, and 
how this translates into actual output48.
One potential positive economic effect of social security institutions is that they may 
enhance or maintain productivity. As noted earlier, the promotion of public gains and 
the prevention of public bad were very important motives in the creation of the first for-
mal social security schemes. The collective provisions can directly increase the produc-
tive capacity of the community; by making people generally healthier, happier, better 
integrated etc. they enable more or better goods and services to be produced. It is also 
possible that social security systems contribute to the prevention of serious social prob-
lems such as crime, labour conflicts and epidemics, or help to maintain the productive 
capacity when a community is hit by mass unemployment or disasters.
A variant of this line of reasoning stresses the positive effects achieved through the 
education of the population. In an imperfect capital market and with declining returns 
on education, people with a low income will not invest to the maximum in education 
for themselves or their children (cf. Aghion et al., 1999: 1630). An adequate basic level 
of social security, linked to compulsory schooling and a generally accessible education 
system can correct for this. The community then acquires a better educated labour force 
than would be the case without the institutions; and such an increase in ‘human capital’ 
theoretically leads to higher economic growth49.
Social security can also have a positive influence on prosperity by boosting consump-
tion. Income transfers influence consumption expenditure because poor beneficiaries 
spend a greater proportion of their income than the better off; they also more frequently 
purchase local goods and services, thus reducing imports. In an unfavourable economic 
climate, social security can help to counter a collapse in demand and a downturn in pro-
duction. When the economy is booming the expenditures of benefit recipients may give 
gdp growth an additional boost, and a larger amount can be redistributed without the 
disposable incomes of the contributors falling in real terms50.
Fourthly, the cushion of certainty provided by social security implies that actors can 
afford to take more financial risks. This may lead to changes in behaviour which increase 
the communal wealth. For example, if the risks of occupational disease and impairment 
are covered, this may make more people inclined to look for work, leading to a higher 
labour supply and more, or cheaper, production. Social security institutions can also 
make it easier for people to change jobs; and greater job mobility may imply that the 
available productive capacity is utilised more effectively. Social security can increase the 
propensity to invest as well; it is less risky to set up or expand a business when there is a 
social safety net to fall back on.
A final potential positive contribution to collective output consists of the employment 
created in the administration of social security. In modern welfare states a substantial 
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number of people are employed in the various parts of the social security organisation. 
Between 1980 and 2000, for example, this sector accounted for approximately 80,000 
employment years on average in the Netherlands, roughly 1.5% of the total employment 
volume51.
The assumed direct positive effects on productivity underlie the creation of the first mod-
ern social security schemes, which in most Western countries occurred between 1875 and 
1930. The influence exerted through consumer spending was a key element in Keynesian 
economic theory, which drove the development of the social security systems after the 
economic crisis in the 1930s and the Second World War. The policy pursued at that time 
was based among other things on the belief that economic growth and the creation of 
more extensive formal social security arrangements go hand in hand.
In the wake of the recession in the 1980s, policy in many Western countries fell 
under the influence of the neoclassical theory. This economic school mainly stressed the 
negative side-effects of social security. The chief proposition is that public provisions do 
not offer compensation for imperfections in the capital and labour markets, but on the 
contrary that the involved redistribution distorts the market mechanism. According to 
this view, social security regulations give economic actors (firms, employees, benefici-
aries) fewer or the wrong incentives, and this ultimately has a negative effect on collec-
tive wealth. It is therefore argued that state intervention should be kept to a minimum, 
that the number of rules should be reduced and that existing social security arrange-
ments should be largely privatised. This standpoint follows inexorably from the theo-
retical framework adopted by many neoclassical economists: rational actors operating 
in perfectly competitive, self-regulating, and continuously clearing52 markets. From this 
premise most aspects of formal social security tend to imply a loss of economic efficiency. 
The positive functions of this kind of rules – the expected collective gains for which they 
were created in the first place – are absent; the potential contribution of social security to 
the wealth of the community is ignored. Put differently (Atkinson, 1999: 8),
The theoretical framework incorporates none of the contingencies for which the welfare state 
exists. There is no uninsured uncertainty in the model, nor involuntary unemployment, nor is 
the future introduced in any meaningful way. The whole purpose of welfare state provision is 
missing from the theoretical model.
Despite this qualifying comment, it is of course possible that the economic disadvan-
tages of social security schemes actually outweigh the gains. The neoclassical criticism 
of social security focuses on four points.
First it is emphasised that formal social security systems reduce the need to save, 
since private households need to set aside less to cover the eventualities of becoming old, 
unemployed, unfit for work, sick, etc. This implies that less money is available to invest 
in the means of production and that the interest rate will go up. Ultimately, the capital 
stock will fall, and in a closed economy the level of national wealth then by definition 
drops as well. Theoretically, this wealth-reducing aspect especially applies to pay-as-you-
go schemes53. Mason (2005: 557) notes that the empirical evidence on the issue is rather 
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mixed: a few studies report a large impact on saving rates, while others find weak effects 
or conclude that the size of social security transfers does not depress saving at all.
A second criticism from the neoclassical perspective concerns the effect of social security 
contributions on labour costs. An extension of social security dependency may lead to 
increasing employer contributions, or push up labour costs indirectly if rising employee 
contributions translate into higher wage demands. Because this would lead to a decrease 
in the expected profit, firms may decide to increase their prices, to invest less, to substi-
tute labour by capital54, or to relocate their activities (‘outsourcing’) to a cheaper town, 
region, or country. All of these reactions theoretically have a negative impact on col-
lective prosperity: less demand for goods and services, a decrease in production, more 
unemployment, etc. In addition, higher contributions may affect labour supply, although 
the net impact of this on collective prosperity theoretically is unclear55.
The third element of the neoclassical critique concerns the influence of social security on 
the unemployment rate through the labour market behaviour of benefit recipients and 
employers. Unemployment and social assistance benefits (and other schemes with a ‘hid-
den’ unemployment component) may reduce the need for recipients to go to work and 
can make employers more inclined to lay off surplus personnel. Since higher unemploy-
ment means that the production capacity is not being used to the optimum, this reduces 
the collective wealth. Benefit levels are a first factor here; in theory, unemployment rises 
more the closer average benefit levels are to average wage levels, i.e. as the replacement 
rate rises. The duration of benefit also plays a role; the longer the maximum level of ben-
efit is paid, the higher unemployment will be in theory. Finally, the so-called poverty 
trap implied in additional income-related benefits (such as housing benefit) may make it 
unattractive for benefit recipients to start working.
According to the influential study by Layard et al. (1991), an increase in the replace-
ment rate of 10 percentage points means that unemployment will rise over time by 1.7 
percentage points, while increasing the duration of the benefits by one year pushes up 
unemployment by 0.9 percentage points. These findings contradicted the results of ear-
lier research (cf. e.g. oecd, 1994), in which the generosity of benefits was found to have a 
non-significant or very limited effect on the labour supply; and the conclusion is in fact 
still not entirely without controversy (for a critical discussion see Atkinson, 1999: 43-48). 
A later study moreover pointed out that the negative effect on unemployment is partially 
offset by the fact that more generous social security benefits increase the willingness to 
go to work (Nickell, 1997: 67-68):
While high benefits lead to high unemployment, they also lead to high participation because 
they make participation in the labor market more attractive … the higher unemployment 
effect and the higher labor market participation effect tend to cancel out.
There are several reasons why it is plausible that the effects of social security benefits 
on unemployment are less uniform than the neoclassical theory assumes, especially the 
effect on job-seeking behaviour. Looking for and finding a job does not always depend 
on the short-term relative financial attractiveness of working and being dependent on 
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 benefit. The main reason Dutch benefit recipients give for not working are their health 
condition and their bad labour market prospects, not the limited material gains of 
employment. Almost all benefit recipients want to work if they are able to, and they often 
accept jobs that are no more lucrative than their initial benefit. The nature of the job 
is a decisive factor: attractive jobs are accepted by a wide majority of the job-seekers, 
regardless of the pay; while unattractive work is often refused, even when the rewards are 
higher (Hoff & Jehoel-Gijsbers, 2003; Van Echtelt & Hoff, 2008).
The neoclassical approach also ignores the many labour incentives that are typically 
included in social security regulations. For example, most benefit entitlements apply for 
only a limited period, and there are often all kinds of administrative constraints which 
seek to reduce the period of benefit dependency (duty to apply for work, intensive job 
counselling, monitoring and control, positive and negative sanctions)56. Informal social 
security rules may also run counter to the neoclassical assumptions; e.g., even those not 
in work often believe that people should earn their own keep where possible. In a Dutch 
survey jobless men and women actually scored higher on a work ethic scale than their 
working peers57 (De Beer, 2001: 168-170).
A fourth mechanism by which social security in the neoclassical perspective may limit 
economic growth regards the competition of transfer incomes with government invest-
ments which would produce a higher return. If social security costs rise there is less 
money available for, e.g. the transport infrastructure, education, and funding scien-
tific research. This, too, in the long run may reduce the collective wealth, as there is less 
mobility, human capital and technological innovation than would be the case without 
social security.
As this overview shows, the effects of social security on the prosperity of the community 
are complex, and it is not possible to make a final statement on theoretical grounds as to 
their direction or extent. Whether the positive or negative economic effects of social secu-
rity dominate has to be determined empirically, for real benefit systems and the actual 
circumstances prevailing in a specific context of rule application. However, the available 
empirical research on this topic also fails to produce any uniform conclusions. The effect 
of specific social security rules often proves to be slight. In their classical meta-analysis, 
Danziger et al. (1981: 1019) concluded that income transfer programmes had only a lim-
ited impact in reducing the labour supply and private savings. Set against this was a sharp 
reduction in poverty and income inequality (see also e.g. Moffitt, 1992). The picture does 
not become any clearer if the combined effect of many social security institutions is exam-
ined. Atkinson (1999) discusses ten studies in which the influence of the total raft of social 
transfers is incorporated in models which seek to explain economic growth. Most of the 
studies relate to oecd countries and cover periods ranging from 12 to 25 years. In two of 
these studies the result was not significant. Four mentioned a positive effect of social secu-
rity transfers: an increase of five percentage points in welfare spending led to an increase in 
the annual gdp growth of between 0.3 and 0.9 percentage points. In the other four studies 
the situation was reversed: the same increase in spending caused gdp to fall on an annual 
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basis by 0.3-1 percentage points. One study concluded that “social security expenditures … 
show positive and significant relationships with economic growth”, another that “social 
security transfers reduce growth rates rather strongly” (see Atkinson, 1999: 34-35). In a 
more recent empirical study which focused on old age pensions in 64 countries, Zhang & 
Zhang (2004) found a positive impact of social security on economic growth. According to 
these authors, an increase in pension expenditure does not affect relative savings; it does 
however lead people to have fewer children, while they simultaneously invest more in the 
education of their offspring. The latter ‘human capital’ effect of social security would be 
the dominating one (Zhang & Zhang, 2004: 473, 494, 496):
The empirical evidence suggests that social security tends to stimulate per capita growth by 
reducing fertility and increasing human capital investment without affecting the savings rate. 
[…] Social security may be conducive to growth through tipping the trade-off between the 
number and quality of children toward the latter. [… This] differs from the popular view in the 
literature that regards social security as harmful to economic growth [… and from the out-
comes of ] recent related work, and further investigation of this issue is still highly needed.
All in all, the empirical material offers no help in pronouncing a final verdict on the 
impact of transfers on collective prosperity. As mentioned earlier, this is to be expected: 
theoretically the economic effects of social security institutions depend on the precise 
nature of these rules, the historical context in which they are applied, and the percep-
tions and rule-driven behaviour of the actors involved.
Social security not only influences the level and growth of collective prosperity, but also 
its distribution. This type of institution by definition involves a redistribution of money 
or goods from contributors to beneficiaries; thus, it impacts on the personal58 distribu-
tion of income after taxes and transfers. In this way it reduces the economic differentials 
between individual actors; the latter are often correlated to the prevailing social rank-
ings (status groups, caste, social classes, ethnic origin), but the correspondence need not 
be perfect.
In principle the redistributive part of the economic process can take three forms. 
Incomes may be transferred from higher to lower income groups (vertical redistribution, 
from rich to poor), between different types of households within the same income group 
(horizontal redistribution, for example from single persons to married couples), and 
between generations (intergenerational redistribution, typically from younger to older 
generations).
To some extent, the degree of redistribution and the economic differentials depend 
directly on the social security institutions. These rules establish the duties of the con-
tributors, the means by which the contributions are raised (taxing the incomes of all resi-
dents, employee and employer contributions, consumption taxes), and the contributions 
structure (the level and degree of progressiveness of the contribution rates, contribu-
tion-free allowances, tax relief ). The rules also determine the rights of the beneficiaries: 
the level of benefits and provisions, the duration of the entitlements, the restrictions on 
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access. Theoretically, the more generous the rights, the further the duties extend, and 
the more redistribution will occur. Yet the actual degree of redistribution and income 
inequality is also affected by the context in which the rules are applied and by the behav-
iour of actors. Economic, demographic and social trends can all have a marked effect on 
benefit volumes, and the number of recipients codetermines the amount of redistribu-
tion. The way in which actors apply the rules is also relevant: the extent to which benefi-
ciaries abuse social security and contributors avoid or evade their duties, the intensity of 
monitoring and sanctioning by the social security organisation.
The empirical research on this topic concentrates on the national distribution of 
annual incomes from employment. In Western welfare states the extent of redistribu-
tion brought about by social security and the degree of income inequality following 
the collective transfers are found to diverge, both between countries and over time (see 
e.g. Ervik, 1998; Gottschalk & Smeeding, 2000; Ferrarini & Nelson, 2002; Förster &  Mira 
d’Ercole, 2005; oecd, 2008)59.
It may be important to reiterate the difference between social structuring and income 
inequality briefly here. As stated, the former refers to the differentiation of social groups, 
their positions on social stratification ladders, the dominant stratification criteria and 
the process of elite-formation. Income inequality is one of the outcomes of the economic 
process; it tends to reflect the prevailing social structure, but need not coincide with it. 
The same degree of income inequality (e.g. equal Gini coefficients) can apply to diver-
gent social distinctions. For instance, in similar distributions the composition of low-
income groups may vary: in a predominantly agricultural society the lowest deciles will 
contain large numbers of unskilled casual farm workers, whereas in a modern welfare 
state benefit recipients and students will dominate. And although groups with a high 
status or prestige tend to have high incomes as well (because they have better access to 
education and well-paid jobs, and more opportunities to influence the rules in such a way 
that they legitimately acquire a high income), the correlation is not complete. An elected 
government leader does not always receive a top income; the voluntary poor (monks who 
have taken a vow of poverty, ascetics) may carry high esteem; the nouveaux riches are often 
regarded with disdain.
Other collective results
Social security arrangements are often set up in order to achieve certain social and eco-
nomic results. This does not mean that they cannot influence the other elements of the 
historical process depicted in figure 2.1. The potential influence on technological devel-
opments (promoting innovation through the certainty offered by social security, fewer 
investments) has already been discussed above. Social security rules generally do not lead 
directly to the formation of new ideals. At most they do so via the social and economic 
results which are (or are not) regarded as fair or efficient. As stated, in that case the desire 
for different rules, or for the maintenance of the existing social security system, can play 
a key role in the rule generation process.
The effects of the institutions on the demographic process are theoretically greater. 
In the first place, they can have a direct influence on birth and death rates. If a social 
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security system fails to prevent poverty to a sufficient degree and people cannot afford 
adequate medical provisions, this can in the long run work through into the population 
statistics. Thus, social assistance and specific arrangements for child benefit, old-age 
pension and exceptional medical expenses can have a direct influence on child mortality 
and life expectancy. Mortality rates may increase where the state pension system pays 
very low benefits or where health provisions are too expensive or not universally avail-
able. The presence or absence of social regulations may also affect the need to reproduce, 
something that is an issue of debate especially in countries where the fertility rate is con-
sidered too low (typically, less than the average of 1.7-1.9 births per woman required for a 
stable population size). Introducing an extensive system of old-age pensions may have a 
denatalist effect: people no longer need children to look after them in their old age and 
will therefore be less inclined to reproduce, especially if birth control is both available 
and culturally accepted. The negative impact of old age pension expenditure on fertility 
has been corroborated by, e.g., Zhang & Zhang (2004, cf. above). Yet it may be partly offset 
by the pronatalist impact of generous family provisions (McDonald, 2002): child benefits, 
lump-sum payments (e.g. ‘baby bonuses’ at birth), general or earmarked tax rebates or 
credits (e.g. for additional costs of childcare, housing), and subsidised goods and services 
for children (e.g. medical and dental care). The effects of such schemes tend to be rather 
limited, however: based on an econometric model covering 22 industrialised countries, 
Gauthier & Hatzius (1997) estimated that a 25 percent increase in family allowances in the 
long run raises the average fertility rate by 0.07 children per woman.
Social security institutions may also influence household formation. If, say, widows 
lose their right to surviving dependants’ benefit if they remarry, this can dissuade them 
from embarking on a new relationship. Conversely, people’s prime motive for changing 
their household position may be to acquire certain rights; single-parent families may 
be established partly as a result of the opportunity structure offered by social assistance 
schemes, child benefit, specific tax advantages, etc.
A final demographic process which may theoretically be affected by social security 
rules concerns migratory movements. Attractive social security schemes may pull in for-
eigners (immigration), whereas a low level of provisions may push people into emigra-
tion. Such ‘social security tourism’ is theoretically fostered if the discrepancies between 
countries in the formal systems are considerable, the differences in language and infor-
mal rules are surmountable, and migration cannot be regulated effectively, e.g. by impos-
ing legal settlement requirements or a system of work permits.
3.7 Institutional change: from informal to formal systems
This section looks briefly at the rule generation process in social security. The perspec-
tive on institutional change that was outlined in the previous chapter (see figure 2.1 and 
§2.9) theoretically also applies to the genesis of social security rules. This will be demon-
strated here on the basis of one of the greatest changes in social security: the transition 
from largely informal arrangements to predominantly state systems, which took place in 
Western Europe mainly between 1875 and 1930 (see also the analysis by De Swaan (1988), 
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as discussed in chapter 1). Naturally, this transition did not occur in precisely the same 
way in each different country: both the content and the phasing of the transition varied. 
However, the broad outlines of the transition can be described adequately in terms of the 
theoretical rule generation process in figure 2.1: changes in the historical process lead to 
a different incentive to regulate, which brings about changes in the perceptions of actors; 
this in turn, primarily via the policy process, results in new forms of institutionalisation.
In the historical process a number of elements coincided. First demographic, technologi-
cal and economic developments changed the nature and scale of the risks. The popula-
tion was growing rapidly, among other things due to better medical care which led to 
falling infant mortality and longer average life expectancy. This increased the labour sup-
ply as well as the number of dependants. In the Netherlands, for example, the number of 
people aged 60 and above rose by 86% in the second half of the 19th century, while the 
number of 0-19 year-olds climbed by 69%. There was large-scale mechanisation of the 
production process in this period, coupled with a growing supply of low-skilled labour. 
The latter were in a dependent position with respect to the owners of the capital goods. 
Under these historical circumstances the number of needy elderly persons increased, the 
number of accidents at work rose, wages were barely above the subsistence minimum, 
labourers had to work very long hours, and economic recessions prompted mass unem-
ployment. Low family incomes fostered socially undesirable behaviour such as child 
labour, prostitution and crime.
On the other hand, in principle the economic growth was sufficient to finance col-
lective provisions via redistribution or insurance. The necessary accounting techniques 
(probability calculus, actuarial mathematics) and data (e.g. mortality tables) were avail-
able, and the legal system was sufficiently developed to enable the rights and duties of 
the citizens to be defined. As a result of the transition from local to national economies 
and labour markets, the vesting of formal institutions enabled economies of scale to be 
realised in the administration process.
In terms of social structuring, the oppositions between the classes became more 
important. The traditional, often more or less aristocratic elite found itself competing with 
representatives of the well-to-do liberal bourgeoisie, or was even replaced by it60. This new 
ruling group was in turn challenged by competing counter-elites: socialists, communists, 
feminists, anarchists and representatives of various religious minority groups, some of 
them linked to the petty bourgeoisie. These opposing forces to some extent promoted 
equality and emancipation ideals which took their inspiration from the Enlightenment, 
but became much more radical in the 19th-century ideologies. The counter-elites also 
harked back to the Christian traditions of charity, mutual care and striving for eternal 
salvation, ideals which were not easy to reconcile with the growing social ills of the time.
Thus, the historical process impacted on all factors which theoretically drive institution-
alisation: the relative prices were altered (mainly because of the low wages and high risk 
of factory workers becoming needy); the conflicts of interest shifted (mainly because of 
the more pronounced class differences); the power relations changed (due to the rise of 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   201 21-9-2009   15:08:54
202
3
the bourgeoisie as a dominant or competing elite, and the formation of various counter-
elites in reaction to this); and the ideals propagated by the counter-elites gained ground 
in society.
The consensus on the formalisation of social security did not come about without a 
struggle. In many countries there was a heated debate on ‘the social question’ and the 
need for government intervention. The fact that a form of consensus was ultimately 
achieved in most Western countries had to do with three changing perceptions, which 
increasingly led the actors concerned to aspire formal regulation. In the first place a dif-
ferent view of causality began to gain influence. The occurrence of mass unemployment, 
poverty, poor working conditions, etc., was no longer ascribed purely to the moral short-
comings of individuals or the lower echelons of society, nor to any form of divine pre-
destination, but increasingly came to be regarded as a consequence of the way in which 
industrial production was organised and embedded in society. This turned these phe-
nomena into social risks in need of a collective solution.
In the second place there was a growing awareness that the existing informal social 
security arrangements were unable to provide an adequate answer to the scale and nature 
of these risks. The scope for family support was limited, because relatives of needy indi-
viduals tended to be unemployed or indigent as well. The benefits provided by charita-
ble institutions became more meagre due to dilution effects: the growth in the available 
resources failed to keep pace with the rising demand (for the Netherlands see e.g. Van Loo, 
1992: 67). On top of this, demographic changes – especially mass migration from the coun-
tryside to the rapidly growing urban areas – meant that local communities had become 
unstable. As a result the systems of social norms on which these forms of familial and 
communal social security were based became less effective. The informal occupational 
social security arrangements common to traditional crafts and trades proved inadequate 
in the context of modern industrial production. And the large pool of labour supply meant 
that modern firm owners generally regarded occupational social security as needless cost 
increases (with the exception of a small minority of socially aware entrepreneurs).
Thirdly, many people felt there was no alternative to government regulation, and 
this increasingly came to be seen as advantageous. Formalisation of social security could 
meet the dual objective of promoting public gains and preventing public losses. The 
bourgeois elite frequently saw this as a means of ameliorating the greatest ills of the 
industrial production process: externalities such as strikes, health risks that might be 
transferred to them, etc. The desire among this group to vest a strong nation-state, which 
could compete economically and militarily with other countries, also played a role. That 
goal was more achievable with a healthy, fairly educated and loyal population, something 
which could be promoted via adequate social security arrangements. As this was a com-
mon interest of the ruling bourgeois elite, it was a natural presumption that these risks 
should be covered collectively and compulsory.
For the counter-elites, formalisation of social security was a means of promoting a 
decent standard of living and emancipation for their rank and file; here the redistribution 
motive was dominant. Government regulation would enable the oppressive strictures of 
the old charity system – based on favours and strongly focused on reproducing the exist-
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ing social status quo – to be broken. Market-based solutions were regarded as less expe-
dient, partly because of idealistic factors (the rejection of ‘capitalist’ solutions for social 
problems), and partly because the lower classes could expect risk selection. As ‘bad risks’, 
they would not be accepted by private insurers, or only at premiums that they could not 
afford; and although for some eventualities (such as funeral expenses) mutual nonprofit 
insurance companies could offer a solution, the counter-elites typically regarded state 
intervention as the only viable solution for the major industrial risks (unemployment, 
illness and incapacity for work, old age, medical expenses).
Such rule wishes ultimately resulted in formalised social security rules because the nature 
of the policy process also changed in the same period. The transition from suffrage based 
on property ownership or tax payments to a universal suffrage was important, since it 
altered the power relations in the legislative assembly. As a result, more account had to 
be taken of the interests and rule wishes of people who were not allied to the ruling elite. 
This was accompanied by the formation of political parties, which made the ties between 
electors and elected less personal. Parliaments also made frequent use of their non-leg-
islative powers, for example by exercising the right to conduct inquiries in order to chart 
the situation with regard to social ills and thus to justify government intervention.
The institutionalisation that occurred in the policy process reflected the diverse rule 
wishes of the dominant bourgeoisie and of the counter-elites, who entered into an alli-
ance. The content and form of the formal social security system was also determined in 
part by the decisions on competing issues in the political arena, such as the funding and 
demarcation of state and private education. The eventual compromise typically broke 
through the existing status quo less decisively than the counter-elite had aimed for. 
The regulations were often limited to a basic coverage for the most pressing risks (child 
labour, accidents at work, illness and old age), and the emphasis was generally placed on 
maintaining the existing social hierarchy, in line with the social insurance model.
3.8 Conclusions
In this part of the study, a number of conceptual and theoretical issues already discussed 
in chapter 2 have been explored for social security. What does this notion entail? What 
are social security institutions, what types can be discerned, and how do they relate to 
each other? How do people acquire such rules? In what way do social security institu-
tions govern interactions, and which actors are involved in the process? What are the 
consequences of such interactions? How are social security institutions created, and 
what causes them to change? The answers given to these questions can be summarised 
as follows.
Social security
Current scientific literature yields both narrow and broad approaches to social security. 
The narrow approach focuses mainly on guaranteeing a minimum income for all inhabit-
ants and maintaining the acquired standard of living for the working population if peo-
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ple are affected by a limited number of specific risks. This is accomplished through statu-
tory social insurances and national provisions. In the broad approach, social security is 
not confined to income protection. It seeks to compensate all ‘human damage’ (security 
of income, employment, health, and social participation), and is not limited to legal 
arrangements provided by the government. Compensation of losses through awarding 
benefits should in principle only occur if interventions aimed at prevention and restora-
tion are not possible. The cover provided is not limited to traditional risks such as old 
age, unemployment or disability, but includes all eventualities leading to human dam-
age, regardless of the cause.
Both approaches have some disadvantages. The first equates social security to a col-
lection of formal income regulations for specific and conventional risks. The second 
appears to equate it to the entire welfare state and takes little account of the impact of 
specific rule arrangements. The broad approach is also a-historical in its presumption of 
a natural evolution towards ever higher levels of social security; and a-sociological in its 
scant attention for the importance of actors as rule-creators and rule-subjects, and in its 
focus on the individual impact of interventions, thereby neglecting the collective conse-
quences of social security.
For these reasons, preference is given in this study to an institutional demarcation of 
the concept. In this view, social security comprises the collectively defined rights, duties, 
conditions and potential sanctions which aim to generate positive social outcomes by 
protecting individual actors against economic deficits. Thus conceived, social security 
is essentially a set of rules; these may be contained in traditional Bismarckian social 
insurances or Beveridgean national provisions, but other forms of institutionalisation 
are possible as well. Building on the institutional analysis in chapter 2, all social security 
rules can be presented in terms of a logical fundamental structure (see §3.2).
Institutions of social security
According to the definition, social security logically does not include arrangements with-
out a collective purpose (such as theft insurance), or which are not aimed at individuals 
(e.g. state aid to large enterprises) or have no direct bearing on the economic deficits of 
persons or households (for instance, long-term ecological risks). Neither is it possible to 
make a positive identification of social security on deontological grounds; there is no 
such thing as a right division of social security rights which has to be applied universally. 
The content of social security institutions as defined here is always consensual and his-
torical. The common denominator for affluent modern societies includes rules aiming at 
the classic contingencies of social security (old age, unemployment, surviving depend-
ants, the maintenance of children, illness, disability, sickness leave, and occupational 
diseases and accidents); at new income risks (e.g. parental leave, divorce); at labour risks 
(minimum standards on working hours or conditions, child care facilities, subsidised 
employment, workfare); at health risks (medical costs, including prevention, informal 
care, etc.); and at the costs of socially required activities (e.g. sports club membership for 
children).
Rules of Relief_14.indd   204 21-9-2009   15:08:55
205s o c i a l s e c u r i t y a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l a p p r o a c h
 3 
Social security systems always contain informal elements: values relating to solidarity and 
fairness, norms concerning the allocation of rights and duties that are recognised within 
a group or community, and conventions in relation to the operation of the schemes (such 
as application procedures). Social security may also be structured entirely informally, for 
example as a mutual care system.
Although informal regulations have not disappeared entirely, in modern societies 
formal social security arrangements at the national level prevail. In these formal systems 
a theoretical distinction can be made between collective social security, occupational 
social security that is enforced by the government, and private contracts that are regu-
lated by the government (the first, second, and third pillars).
Regulations must always to some extent be supported by the consensus within the 
community; however, there is no compulsory or logical hierarchical ranking of informal 
and formal social security rules.
Acquiring social security rules
Social security institutions are theoretically weakly socialised. In childhood, people do 
not need these rules in order to be able to function; and in adulthood, most people do 
not apply them on a day-to-day basis either. Moreover, the rules are often complicated, 
abstract and ambiguous, making them difficult to internalise in both primary and sec-
ondary socialisation. Apart from a limited group of professional ‘rule specialists’, there 
is little explicit transfer of the social security institutions. The undersocialised nature of 
social security is theoretically greatest in formal systems; in informal systems, socialisers 
have an interest in instilling some basic principles of rights and duties, because they are 
likely to become dependent on the good will of their offspring in the future. As a conse-
quence, the risk of rule-breaking is theoretically greatest in formal systems.
Actors and interactions
The main actors in social security include the beneficiaries, the contributors, social secu-
rity organisations and other corporate actors, in particular firms and government agen-
cies. Basic interactions are the granting of rights; interventions aiming at the prevention, 
restoration or compensation of lacks and losses; the imposition and collection of con-
tributions; and monitoring and sanctioning. However, the actors, their mutual relations 
and interactions vary depending on the type of scheme. This was elaborated in six theo-
retical models of rule-driven interaction representing differing social security systems.
In informal interaction models a distinction can be made between familial, commu-
nal and occupational types. Familial schemes typically cover the risk of indigence through 
a direct and sequential exchange of material support among relatives. The interaction is 
driven by the informal rules of the family, which are embedded in the wider community. 
Even so, actors have considerable latitude in interpreting their rights and duties, as the 
rules are vague and only moderately socialised. This makes defection likely, especially 
where there is an accumulation of risks (e.g. mass unemployment), the connectedness 
within the family is low, or the family rules are not endorsed by the wider community.
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Communal systems are governed by local informal rules and are aimed mainly at 
combating material want among residents. In the interaction structure, a local social 
security organisation mediates between contributors and beneficiaries. The rights of the 
latter are meagre and subject to strict qualifying and conduct conditions, and are moni-
tored closely. However, the board, collectors and attendants of the communal organisa-
tion have great freedom of action. This introduces a ‘principal-agent problem’ which is 
absent in familial schemes.
Informal occupational schemes exist if rights and duties are tied to the employment 
relationship, but not enforced by government; for instance, the social security provided 
in the European guild system, a modern company scheme for the reimbursement of med-
ical expenses, or an emergency fund for employees. The rules may be written down in a 
firm statute, but can also be traditional tacit agreements within the firm; they may cover 
a variety of risks. Defection on the part of the employees is especially likely in commer-
cial companies with a high staff turnover, limited social control, monitoring and sanc-
tioning, a weak corporate culture and generous entitlements.
In formal systems the interaction structure is theoretically different for demographic 
schemes, unemployment and social assistance benefits, and sick leave and disability ben-
efit regulations. These not only cover diverging risks, but also relate to different actors 
and interactions. Demographic schemes (old age and survivor’s pensions, child benefit) 
have a large social security organisation governed by a board and with different branches 
for the functions of collection (the fund), distribution (the benefits agency) and monitor-
ing/sanctioning, enacted by the officials of the administration. In addition, a supervisory 
board oversees the administrative process, and a social security court passes judgments 
on appeals. The rules governing entitlements, duties, conditions and potential sanctions 
are codified in formal law or enforced by the government; they are generally supported 
by informal community rules. Rule-breaking within the social security organisation is 
encouraged by the extensive principal-agent problem; but defection by the beneficiar-
ies may be limited as a result of the rather simple entitling conditions (age, death of 
breadwinner, having child custody) and the profile of the client group (elderly, surviving 
dependants and parents tend to be less ‘calculating’).
Unemployment and social assistance schemes have an additional type of actor (the 
firms who hire and fire personnel), and the social security organisation has extra tasks, 
mainly in the sphere of prevention, reintegration and social support. The entitling cri-
teria are both more numerous and more complex, and some of the conditions are more 
susceptible to fraud. The ‘moral hazard’ is also greater: it is easier for clients to create or 
sustain the risk themselves. As a result, defection by the client and by the agents of the 
social security organisation is more likely to occur than in demographic schemes. The 
same applies to contributors, who may be less inclined to pay their dues. They do not 
expect to have to use these schemes themselves, and opinions on the unemployed and 
social assistance beneficiaries tend to be less positive than the views on recipients of 
pensions and child benefit.
Formal sick leave and disability regulations have the most complicated interaction 
structure. The social security organisation has an extra function to perform – assessing 
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the medical incapacity to work – which is often attributed to an additional corporate 
agent. This also introduces a set of medical professional rules, which may be at odds with 
the formal institutions of these schemes. The ‘doctor’s dilemma’ increases the principal-
agent problem in the social security organisation.
The theoretical impact of social security institutions
In theory, social security rules have consequences both for the actors involved and for 
the collective context within which they apply. At the individual level, the effects for the 
beneficiaries are the most important, because the main purpose of social security is to 
safeguard their income, employment, health and social participation. However, theo-
retically the awarding of rights can also have negative consequences: reduced feelings 
of well-being, fewer social contacts, marginalisation within the community, feelings of 
purposelessness, or pessimism regarding the future. The neo-conservative critique of 
social security states that the rules needlessly create dependency and passiveness among 
benefit recipients; and critical sociology stresses the anti-emancipatory and disciplinar-
ian elements of social security rules, which can have a major and intrusive impact on the 
lives of beneficiaries.
The collective results of social security rules manifest themselves first and foremost 
in the process of social structuring within the community. This refers both to the crea-
tion of new social categories (such as pensioners and welfare mothers), and to the influ-
ence of the rules on the position of social groups on the ‘distribution ladders’. All social 
security systems involve some redistribution: the funds collected from the contributors 
are diverted to secure the income, employment, health and social participation of the 
beneficiaries. Whether and to what extent this redistribution heightens, reinforces or 
reduces the prevailing social hierarchy is ultimately an empirical question. The impor-
tance attached by electors to certain social security issues, and the influence of the ‘ben-
eficiaries' vote’ mean that social security can also impact on the selection of the political 
elite: another social structuring effect.
In addition, social security also influences economic development by affecting the 
level and growth of collective prosperity. Theoretically the economic effects can be 
both positive and negative. Arguments for a positive influence can be based among 
other things on the contribution to economic efficiency and helping to stave off loss of 
demand. Examples that may be cited of the negative effects include the reduced incli-
nation of households to save, the increase in labour costs and the disincentives among 
the labour supply that social security can bring about. Whether the positive or negative 
effects on prosperity dominate cannot be determined theoretically in advance; once 
more, this is an empirical question, the answer to which is related to the actual social 
security arrangements and social conditions that prevail in a given historical period.
Social security institutions not only affect wealth, but also its distribution, especially 
in the sphere of income inequality. Diverging sets of institutions can achieve different 
results in this respect.
Among the other collective effects of social security, the demographic impact is the-
oretically the most important. For instance, the way these rules are shaped may influence 
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fertility and mortality rates, household-formation and migratory movements.
However, the consequences of social security rules always depend on the historical 
context in which they are applied. The latter concerns both the extent to which entitling 
events occur and work through into interactions, and the perceptions of the actors. For 
example, population ageing and economic recession have an impact on benefit volumes 
and the funding of pensions and unemployment benefits: the number of entitled per-
sons increases, while the number of contributors falls. Such developments can influence 
views on the desirability of solidarity between generations, the opportunities that peo-
ple believe they have on the labour market, etc.
The institutionalisation process
Social security institutions arise and undergo change in accordance with the rule gen-
eration process that was outlined in chapter 2 (see figure 2.1 and §2.9). Changes in the 
historical circumstances lead to different incentives to regulate, which cause the per-
ceptions of key actors to change, and this leads to new forms of regulation; for formal 
systems, the policy process plays a key role. The applicability of the theoretical view on 
institutionalisation can be demonstrated by the sea-change from informal social secu-
rity arrangements to predominantly state systems which occurred in many Western Euro-
pean countries between 1875 and 1930.
It has been stressed several times in this chapter that the effects of social security insti-
tutions are not fixed in stone for ever, but depend on the content of the rules and the 
specific circumstances in which they are applied. The theoretical analysis performed 
here is therefore no more than a launch pad. A key purpose of this study is to investigate 
the actual impact of different national systems of formal social security rules on some 
key variables at the macro-level. These empirical issues will be explored in the following 
chapters.
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4  Regimes of social security
This chapter analyses the differences between the social security institutions of several 
countries1. The key question is whether the empirical variation in formal rules makes 
it possible to identify certain ‘regimes’ of social security. The regime concept offers 
an interesting starting point for analysing the social impact of formal institutions. Of 
course, an obvious way to study the issue would be to compare specific formal regula-
tions in different countries. For the European Union member states, the ec’s databases 
on social security schemes provide a wealth of material2. And for certain benefit schemes 
extensive comparisons of rule elements have been made in the past – see for instance 
Einerhand et al. (1995) on disability arrangements, Eardley et al. (1996) and oecd (1998a, 
1998b, 1999) on social assistance schemes, and Bradshaw & Finch (2002) on child pro-
visions. Such an approach also has several disadvantages, however. Single formal rules 
or regulations often contain arbitrary elements, reflecting policy compromises agreed 
upon at a specific moment. They may also be quite volatile, with certain rule elements 
changing in line with the perceived priorities on the political agenda.
Moreover, an isolated approach in terms of specific elements of national law may 
hamper the assessment of their social effects. The latter often requires examining the 
embeddedness of schemes in other relevant formal institutions. For instance, a meagre 
national welfare law may be at the root of widespread poverty, but that is not an inevi-
table causal nexus. Even if social assistance does not amount to anything much, poverty 
may be limited due to elaborate social insurances or an efficient ‘welfare to work’ pro-
gramme.
And of course, the more countries one wants to compare, the more details of specific 
schemes one has to consider. These very details can make it hard to see the wood for the 
trees: it may become difficult to focus on the main points of variation between the for-
mal rules prevailing in different countries.
Such drawbacks can be largely mitigated by studying social security regimes. The con-
cept refers to different types of coherent formal institutions at the national level, which 
are designed to achieve distinct collective goals. In terms of the figural model outlined in 
§2.3 they constitute the core of the formal rules on ‘government production’ in the field 
of social security. Because regimes are historical constructs reflecting a long develop-
mental process, path dependence (cf. chapter 2) makes it likely their essence is relatively 
stable. It is for this reason that the subsequent chapters of this study will be devoted 
to the collective effects of regimes, rather than the influence of specific regulations. Of 
course, the preliminary question then is to what extent different regime types actually 
exist. Are regimes theoretical ideal-types, or empirical phenomena? This is the central 
issue here.
As a first step, §4.1 delineates regimes and their theoretical traits, mainly by means of 
a systematic reconstruction of the characteristics that are central to Esping-Andersen’s 
influential typology.
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Subsequently, a multivariate scaling procedure is applied to empirical indicators for 
such traits (§4.2). This seeks to answer the main question of this chapter: can countries 
actually be placed in clusters which correspond to the theoretical regime typology? As a 
corollary to this, §4.3 examines how universal regimes are. Their stability over time will 
briefly be discussed, and their applicability to other domains of welfare, such as health, 
housing and education. Specific attention will be paid to the relationship with informal 
institutions: to what extent do formal regimes correspond to the notions on social secu-
rity rights and obligations among the general public? The conclusions are summarised 
in §4.4.
4.1 Theoretical traits of social security regimes
Most western countries saw strong growth in their social security system during the post-
ww ii period. However, there still is considerable variation in the way nations structure 
their arrangements. Such differences theoretically reflect the interplay of several factors. 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 105-138) points to historical context variables such as:
– economic and demographic developments (growth, wealth distribution, unemploy-
ment, number of older people);
– the power of political actors (the labour classes, employers’ organisations, farmers, 
religious groups, the new middle classes, pensioners);
– political alliances which have been possible or impossible at certain crucial moments, 
for example the Catholic-Socialist coalitions which created the national insurance sys-
tem in the Netherlands in the 1950s;
– the extension of welfare arrangements according to the previously existing institu-
tional structure (path dependence).
Several authors have tried to summarise the main differences between countries in the 
form of a typology of welfare states, or regimes. The scheme employed by Titmuss (1974) 
became a classic. He distinguishes three ideal-types: the residual welfare model, the 
industrial achievement-performance model and the institutional redistributive model. 
In the residual welfare model, the individual or the social network to which he belongs 
(household, family, community) bears primary responsibility for the financial conse-
quences of social risks. Only when this private coverage proves inadequate does the gov-
ernment step in. Benefits function as a social safety net, and are therefore minimal, tem-
porary and accompanied by a means test to ascertain the inadequacy of the individual’s 
own income and assets.
In Titmuss’s industrial achievement-performance model, greater weight is accorded to 
government responsibility for income protection. Risks are covered in proportion to the 
individual’s contribution to the collective labour productivity. Social policy ensues from 
economic policy, in which the operation of the free market dominates. State social secu-
rity arrangements are supplementary to the social protection that is arranged through 
collective bargaining between employers and trade unions. Rights often depend on 
labour performance, employment history and occupational status.
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In the institutional redistributive model, social security is a means of expressing the 
collective responsibility for individual welfare. In a modern society the family and the 
market are no longer able to provide adequate and fair coverage of social risks. The gov-
ernment therefore has to adopt a redistributive approach. It provides benefits and provi-
sions, with the needs of households as the key criterion for the attribution of rights and 
duties.
Esping-Andersen (1989, 1990, 1996, 1999) adopts a similar threefold division. His central 
tenet is that three divergent welfare regimes can be identified, which differ in terms of:
a) de-commodification; i.e. the degree to which individuals or families are able to achieve a 
socially acceptable living standard, independently of their participation in the market. 
The level, duration and accessibility of social provisions are important variables here;
b) stratification; in Esping-Andersen’s theory this describes the way in which countries 
shape citizenship through the structuring of rights. Welfare states of the same size can 
aim at very different stratification effects. One system may try to sustain the existing 
hierarchy and status divisions; another may increase social differences, for instance 
through a polarisation of educational and labour market opportunities; while a third 
may aim to realise high minimum standards for every citizen, no matter what their 
background;
c) the organisation of the labour market; welfare regime types are interwoven with specific ways 
of regulating employment. They affect the supply of labour through the various work 
(dis)incentives they provide for women and elderly people (e.g. family programmes, 
child care, early exit schemes). The regime types also diverge in the labour demand 
they generate, for instance in the required number of social security officials, nurses 
and teachers; and more generally, in the size and nature of ‘post-industrial’ employ-
ment: social and personal services (government jobs, the ‘fun industry’ in catering 
and tourism, cleaning work, etc.), and other forms of employment not directly related 
to the production of actual goods (management, marketing, lawyers, information and 
computer experts).
Table 4.1 provides a summary of specific features of the three types identified by Esping-
Andersen: the liberal3, the corporatist and the social-democratic welfare regime. The 
welfare regime concept is considered wider than the ‘welfare state’: “The basis for typol-
ogy construction are welfare regimes, not welfare states nor individual social policies”. It 
implies more than a certain mix of social insurances and national provisions (cf. chap-
ter 3). Regimes are mainly defined in reference to “the ways in which welfare production 
is allocated between state, market, and households” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 73).
The Anglo-Saxon countries are considered to be the main representatives of the liberal 
welfare regime. This regime type has limited collective provisions, comparable with 
 Titmuss’s residual model. Historically, these countries did not expand their social secu-
rity schemes to any great extent because worker mobilisation was limited (weak trade 
unions and leftist parties), because social democrats did not enter into long-term politi-
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cal alliances (e.g. no ‘red-green’ coalitions with the rural classes), and because the new 
middle class of white-collar workers resisted income transfers and were not “wooed from 
the market to the state”, as in Scandinavia (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 29-33).
In the liberal model the target group is limited to those in need, who are unable 
to meet their basic requirements in any other way. In order to keep this group small, 
strict access conditions are applied: benefit recipients must not be capable of work, and 
stringent means-testing is used to determine the level of need. The duration of benefits 
is limited to the period that the recipient is unable to work. The level of the benefit is 
meagre, tending to be more of a ‘survival benefit’ than an amount which would enable 
the recipient to play a full part in society. Apart from civil servant schemes, there are no 
separate collective provisions for specific occupational groups. Levies are low and the 
collective provision is funded from general resources (taxation). In contrast to this sys-
tem, private provisions in the liberal welfare regime are relatively extensive – at least 
for those who have access to them. The middle and higher social classes have taken out 
separate insurance or enjoy employee benefits from their companies. The tax system 
generally encourages people to make private provision, through tax exemptions and tax 
allowances. Where a minimum wage exists at all it is low: so as not to interfere with the 
presumed operation of the pricing mechanism on the labour market, there is no inter-
ference in wage formation at the minimum level. The labour market participation rate 
of women, older people and disabled people is fairly high, because the low level of ben-
efits and the absence of collective (early) retirement schemes do not create a disincentive 
– if anything, the reverse. There is little collectively guaranteed employment, even for 
groups with poor labour market prospects. Post-industrial employment is extensive and 
lies largely outside the government sphere. A dual structure prevails: good post-indus-
trial jobs for a large group of business professionals (lawyers, consultants, personnel 
managers) and poor-quality ‘junk jobs’ which fall to the low-skilled (poorly paid jobs in 
catering, entertainment, cleaning, et cetera). In terms of stratification the liberal welfare 
regime leads, according to Esping-Andersen (1990: 65) to “a curious mix of individual 
self-responsibility and dualism”: a group at the bottom which is primarily dependent on 
stigmatising, means-tested public assistance; a middle class which mainly depends on 
social insurance; and a privileged group which buys the main provisions on the market. 
There is the prospect of a future proletarianisation effect if the number of ‘junk jobs’ 
were to lead to a substantial group of working poor: “At the low end of the American ser-
vice economy, wages are close to poverty level, and fringe benefits almost non-existent” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 228). This proletarianisation could be concentrated in certain 
groups (ethnic minorities, single-parent families), but also might cross the traditional 
dividing lines, making the oppositions within these groups even more starkly apparent. 
In the American case: “As some women become yuppies and some Blacks become bour-
geois, the women and Blacks left behind will experience more keenly the phenomenon 
of relative deprivation” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 229). But it is also possible that proleta-
rianisation will not occur. ‘Junk jobs’ could also mainly be filled by a floating population, 
and might serve as a springboard to better positions for most people.
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The level of ‘de-commodification’ is low in the liberal welfare state: it is difficult for 
people to achieve an acceptable standard of living if they do not have qualities with suf-
ficient market value (or – in the case of pensioners – have not utilised those qualities in 
the past). The precise degree of de-commodification varies with the stringency of the 
means-testing and the level of benefits, however.
The countries of continental Europe and Japan are characterised by Esping-Andersen as 
corporatist welfare regimes. These often have an autocratic tradition: in the past, social 
insurance schemes were established in order to generate direct loyalty on the part of the 
individual to the central state or monarchy. Under the auspices of the state, the system 
was designed to replicate the existing status and class differences, with an elevated posi-
tion for civil servants personifying the state. Since the Catholic church was often jointly 
responsible for the development of the system, this type of welfare regime is often biased 
in favour of the traditional family structure, in line with the principles outlined in papal 
encyclicals4.
The coverage provided by collective provisions in these welfare regimes is selective 
and hierarchical. Separate collective insurance schemes attribute rights and obligations, 
in accordance with the individual’s social position. The access conditions are fairly strict 
and are based on actuarial principles: there is an arithmetic relationship between the 
contributions paid (or the employment history) and the provisions to which the indi-
vidual is entitled. Benefits may be paid for a long period, provided sufficient entitlement 
has been built up. The level of benefits is high and is generally a percentage of the pre-
viously earned income. The number of collective schemes is large, with civil servants 
enjoying a privileged position. The levies are fairly high, and schemes are usually funded 
through the payment of contributions. The ‘familialism’ of corporatist welfare regimes 
is reflected in the exclusion of non-working women from social insurance schemes, good 
family provisions which encourage full-time motherhood, and underdeveloped childcare 
facilities, which makes it hard to combine work and care tasks.
The predominance of collective social insurance schemes means the coverage 
offered by private provisions is limited. A high minimum wage operates on the labour 
market, which is fixed by law or laid down in government-sanctioned collective labour 
agreements. The prevailing incentive structure results in a low labour market participa-
tion of women. The participation rate of older and disabled people is also limited: early 
exits from the labour market are stimulated through collective early retirement schemes, 
sometimes in the guise of generous unemployment and disability regulations. There 
is little collectively guaranteed employment, with just a limited number of sheltered 
employment schemes, mainly reserved for (early) disabled people. For a number of rea-
sons, post-industrial employment is fairly underdeveloped. Corporatist regimes try to 
reduce the labour supply of women; the government sector – which potentially offers 
much work of this type – remains relatively small; and the high levies make the creation 
of low-paid work in the areas of social and personal services difficult.






 - the poor without means
very strict
 - incapable of work
 - means-testing
strict
 - benefi t paid only as long
  as recipient cannot work
meagre
 - subsistence minimum
few 
 - civil servants
low
general taxation
high (for middle classes)  
 - stimulated through tax 
  benefi ts/credits
absent or very low
no disincentives 
 - low level of benefi ts
  fairly high labour
     participation
no disincentives
 - no collective retirement 
  schemes
 high labour participation
virtually absent
extensive dual structure
 - good jobs in professional 
  business services
 - low-skilled ‘junk jobs’
Corporatist
selective and hierarchical
 - professional groups
fairly strict (actuarial)
 - employment history
 - contributions paid
(quasi-)actuarial
 - long benefi t duration if
  suffi cient rights accrued
high
 - wage related
many
 - status groups






 - breadwinner benefi ts
 - generous motherhood
   and child allowances
 - few childcare facilities
 low labour participation
many disincentives 
 - collectively funded
   schemes for early 
   retirement, disability and   
   unemployment
 low labour participation
limited 
 - sheltered employment 
   for handicapped persons
few
 - mainly industrial
   employment
Social-democratic
universal
 - all residents
only strict if work-related
 - residency for a certain 
  number of years 
 - job search behaviour 
 - participation in training or
  workfare programmes  
not too strict
 - benefi t continues as long 
   as risk is manifest 
high
 - adequate social minimum 







 - individual benefi t entitlement
 - elaborate leave arrangements
  for care tasks 
 - extensive childcare facilities 
 - high contributions force both 
   partners to work
 high labour participation
few disincentives 
 - use of collective retirement 
  schemes is discouraged 
 - active reintegration of 
   disabled
  high labour participation
extensive
extensive government sector 
 - welfare, care, social security,
 education  
 - large share of middle-ranking
 posts occupied by women
Characteristics
  Collective benefi ts
 - coverage
  (main target group)
 - entry conditions
 - limitation of duration
 - level of benefi t
 - collective schemes for 
  specifi c occupational  
  groups
 - level of contributions
 - method of funding
   Private benefi ts
 - coverage
   Employment
 - minimum wage
 - (dis)incentives to
  employment of women
 - (dis)incentives to 
  employment of older 
  people and disabled
 - collectively guaranteed 
  employment
 - post-industrial 
  employment
Table 4.1  











- stringency of means-
  testing
- minimum benefi t level
Corporatist





- contrast between 
  working/non-working 
medium, depending on:
- replacement rates
- stringency of actuarial
  principles





- contrast between females 
  working in collective sector 
  and males employed in  
  private fi rms 
high, depending on:
- benefi t levels
Characteristics
   Stratifi cation
- differences between 
  groups of citizens      
  which are promoted by 
  regime 
- expected future 
  development
  De-commodifi cation
- extent to which a 
  regime promotes an 
  acceptable living stan-
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In terms of stratification, corporatist welfare regimes often tend to reinforce traditional 
differences based on occupational status, household composition and gender. As a pos-
sible future scenario, Esping-Andersen presents a division between insiders and outsid-
ers, with working people on the one hand and non-working women, young people, the 
elderly and the disabled on the other. The collective negotiations between employees 
and employers are focused in this scenario entirely on the interests of those in work; pay 
demands are set high at the expense of job opportunities for less productive workers and 
non-workers. Combined with the lack of employment incentives for women, this results 
in “a diminishing yet highly productive workforce supporting a growing but unproduc-
tive outsider population” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 227).
The degree of de-commodification is generally higher than in liberal welfare states, 
but is largely concentrated among professionals with an adequate employment history. 
The precise extent of ‘market-independence’ depends on the replacement rate (the ben-
efit level as a percentage of previous earnings) and the flexibility with which the actuarial 
principles – the equivalence between contributions paid or employment history, and 
entitlements – are applied.
According to Esping-Andersen, the Scandinavian countries represent variants of the 
social-democratic welfare regime. In his analysis these systems emerged as a result of high 
worker mobilisation (strong trade unions), a broad alliance of social democrats and well-
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high (for middle classes)  
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price subsidies), and a successful incorporation of the new middle classes in formal regu-
lations (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 29-33).
The social-democratic regime aims to realise a high level of social protection for all 
inhabitants. Benefits and provisions are accredited at a level which corresponds to the 
wishes of the most critical among the new middle classes, and no distinction is drawn 
between the rights of the working class and those of the better-off. This is achieved 
through compulsory collective insurance schemes with earnings-related benefits. The 
most characteristic feature is the nexus between income protection and work: employ-
ment plays a crucial role in this regime. It is an expensive system, which can only be sus-
tained if there is a consistent commitment to full employment for both men and women. 
In order to be able to pay for the generous provisions, the number of benefit claimants 
must be limited and the number of taxpayers maximised. This is quite different from the 
two other regime types, where economic inactivity by certain groups is accepted (house-
wives and early retirees in the corporatist welfare state; people who are unable to find a 
place in the market in the liberal variant).
The social-democratic variant is universalistic: all inhabitants have access to collec-
tive provisions for a large number of social risks. In line with this, the entry conditions 
for benefits that bear no relation with the labour market (especially old age pensions) 
are not very rigorous: having lived in the country for a limited number of years may be 
sufficient to gain entitlements. On the other hand, applicants of working age may be sub-
jected to rather strict tests on their job search behaviour, and can be forced to participate 
in intensive training programmes and ‘workfare’ schemes, especially for unemployment 
and social assistance benefits.
There are no strict limitations on the duration of rights. Benefits and provisions may 
be granted for as long as the social risk continues to manifest itself. The level of collective 
benefits is high, often being linked to the most recently earned wage. Where this is not 
the case, a high statutory minimum income is available, which is adequate to permit full 
participation in society. The universalistic nature of the social-democratic type is reflected 
in the absence of separate collective provisions for specific occupational groups: everyone 
falls within the same schemes. Of course, financing this comprehensive welfare regime 
requires high contributions, which are usually collected through general taxation.
In the social-democratic regime the coverage offered by private provisions is low; 
the extensive collective arrangements make these unnecessary. In line with the elaborate 
social security schemes, the minimum wage is high as well. There is however a commit-
ment to wage moderation at the higher wage levels, because otherwise employment in 
the extensive government sector would become too expensive. The labour market par-
ticipation of women is promoted through specific provisions (individual benefit enti-
tlements, leave arrangements for performing care tasks, extensive childcare facilities). 
The high contributions are also a work incentive: only when both partners are gainfully 
employed can an adequate household income be generated. Older people and disabled 
workers are discouraged from leaving the labour market, through activating labour mar-
ket programmes and the restriction of early exit routes. This leads to rather high partici-
pation rates in these groups.
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A large part of the labour market is collectivised, through a sizeable government sec-
tor and sheltered employment programmes. The lion’s share of the post-industrial jobs is 
to be found in welfare, social security, care and childcare organisations. Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 222) refers to this as “a social-welfare led post-industrial employment structure”. 
The majority of the large number of women in the labour market are absorbed by this 
extensive collective sector, where they occupy mainly middle-ranking positions. There 
are few post-industrial jobs outside the government sector: the high wages rule out the 
creation of ‘junk jobs’ (outside the informal circuit).
Given its universalistic approach, the social-democratic welfare regime is designed 
to eliminate differences between groups of citizens. In practice, however, stratification 
effects may arise, because the level of benefits and provisions is constrained by cost con-
siderations. New forms of stratification are conceivable as well. If wage moderation can-
not be sustained, government jobs and collective employment may become endangered, 
and conflicts of interest could arise between the mainly female employees in the col-
lective sector and the predominantly male workforce of private enterprises. In such a 
case “social democracy can only hope that the bonds of marriage are strong enough to 
weather the storm of economic warfare” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 227).
The same line of reasoning applies to de-commodification. In theory, the universal-
istic and generous design means the degree of market-independence under this system 
should be higher than in the corporate or liberal regimes. In practice, however, even 
within social-democratic regimes full de-commodification (e.g. through a high basic 
income for all inhabitants) is hard to achieve, because there are limits to the social secu-
rity entitlements a nation can afford.
Esping-Andersen’s regimes are ideal-types. He argues that none of them will occur in a 
pure form in the real ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’. Corporatist countries, for example, 
usually have a safety net in the form of means-tested social assistance, covering those 
who are not, or no longer entitled to social insurance. Schemes that are mainly univer-
salistic in a social-democratic fashion sometimes contain corporatist elements, with 
rights depending upon past labour experience or contributions; and countries adopting 
a ‘residualist’ approach may have collective pension schemes which exceed the subsist-
ence level by quite a wide margin. This makes it important to analyse the empirical power 
of the typology, in terms of both the structure of formal social security institutions in 
different countries, and the collective results these generate. The actual existence of the 
typology will be dealt with in the next section, while the social outcomes of different 
regime types will be highlighted in the two chapters that follow.
Before turning to this, however, some reflection on the regime typology is appropri-
ate. First of all, Esping-Andersen’s demarcation of ‘regimes’ seems ambiguous in some 
respects. At the most abstract level he treats them as general principles of rule generation: 
the aspired kind and degree of stratification and de-commodification that guide the con-
stitution of social security schemes. In other cases, Esping-Andersen stresses the actual 
differences in formal social security. Sometimes this is very general, as when he points to the 
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responsibilities of the state, the market and households to secure certain risks (cf. the 
definition quoted earlier). In other instances, Esping-Andersen considers specific formal 
rules to be the core of his regime notion, as table 4.1 clearly shows. Finally, at times he 
seems inclined to let certain social outcomes enter into the definition. Although Esping-
Andersen is right in stating that social security and labour market institutions are often 
very much interwoven, there is a hint of tautology in his presentation of the share of 
post-industrial employment as an indicator for the existence of different regime types. 
The same applies when he produces trends in labour-market exits and female labour force 
participation as circumstantial evidence for his typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 144-
161 ), rather than concentrating on the actual institutions that brought about such out-
comes.
In terms of the theoretical notions outlined in the previous chapters, regimes may 
be more adequately defined as diverging systems of coherent formal institutions at a 
national level, which aim to realise distinct collective goals5. Regime types represent 
qualitatively different collective agreements on the way rights, duties, conditions and 
potential sanctions are attributed by government, either through direct legislation or 
third-party enforcement. The concept of social security regime is suitable for describing the 
diverging institutional frameworks Esping-Andersen had in mind, and which are also the 
crux of this chapter. Welfare regimes, on the other hand, consist of qualitatively different, 
coherent systems of formal institutions which also include justice, housing, education, 
etc., in line with the ‘wider’ connotation of the welfare state concept discussed previ-
ously.
There are two reasons why regimes should not be equated with social outcomes. The 
institutional ‘traits’ form the quintessence of the typology; and while regime types may 
aim to achieve certain results, it is not a necessary condition for the identification of 
regimes that such outcomes are actually realised. Moreover, following the figural model 
of chapter 2, there is no direct link between formal institutions and collective results. It 
is of course quite possible distinct regime types enhance different social outcomes, but 
the latter also depend on other factors: the historical context of rule application (eco-
nomic, demographic, social, technological and ideal developments), the degree of corre-
spondence between formal and informal institutions, the perceptions of actors, and the 
actual course rule-driven interaction takes. This makes the relationship between regime 
types and collective results a specific topic of research, which requires close empirical 
inspection. The next two chapters will explore this issue for two types of social outcomes: 
benefit dependency and poverty.
Ever since its publication, Esping-Andersen’s The three worlds of welfare capitalism has pro-
voked heated debate on the number and character of welfare regimes. In their review of 
this literature, Arts & Gelissen (2002) point out that a number of authors believe there 
is a fourth regime type, which could be described as the ‘Mediterranean’ group or the 
‘Latin periphery’. A salient feature of this type would be the rudimentary nature of for-
mal social security; for instance, there is no general safety net through national social 
assistance. Collective old age pensions, however, may be rather generous. The attribution 
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of rights and duties in the Latin regime type would be concentrated on the family. The 
administration of social security is fragmented over a great number of non-state organisa-
tions, which encourages patronage (the protection or favouring of certain social groups 
by elites, in return for loyalty). It is contestable whether these features justify considering 
such configurations as a regime type in itself. Some maintain the systems prevailing in the 
Mediterranean countries are merely rudimentary and more informal versions of the cor-
poratist type, with which it shares many basic principles (e.g. the key role of the family).
Japan is often presented as the textbook example of another kind of regime: the 
‘Eastern Asiatic’ variant, also known as welfare orientalism. In this type, social protection is 
provided primarily through familial, communal and company-based occupational social 
security, with public social insurance schemes acquiring a supplementary and fairly 
residual character. Culturally, the system is often supposed to be rooted in Confucian tra-
ditions. Goodman (1998) points to several specific regime traits, especially in Japan’s min-
seiiin system of community care. However, he doubts whether the Japanese welfare type 
really is firmly rooted in the country’s history6. White & Goodman (1998) note a number 
of characteristics that the social security systems of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan share 
with the corporatist regimes of Europe: an important role for non-state agencies, a strong 
emphasis on funded social insurance, and “a fragmented array of particular schemes for 
core social groups […] which both reflects and reinforces differentials in power and status 
in society” (White & Goodman, 1998: 14). In line with this observation, Esping-Andersen 
(1990, 1999) is inclined to consider the Eastern Asiatic configuration as a variant of the 
corporatist regime type, just like the Latin periphery systems.
Siaroff (1994) suggests yet another type. He states that differences in gender inequality 
in different countries are neglected in Esping-Andersen’s typology; the diverging labour 
market and social security positions of men and women would not weigh heavily enough. 
Siaroff proposes four regime types: the ‘Protestant social-democratic’ countries of Scan-
dinavia, the ‘Protestant-liberal’ countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the ‘developed 
Christian democratic’ countries of continental Europe, and countries with a ‘late mobili-
sation of women’ – a residual group comprising the Mediterranean countries of Europe, 
Japan, Ireland and Switzerland. Esping-Andersen (1999: 88) retorts that he has in no way 
neglected the gender dimension: it is a key point in his distinction between social-dem-
ocratic and corporatist regimes. Moreover, Arts & Gelissen (2002) observe that Siaroff’s 
classification, despite the differences in nomenclature, largely corresponds to Esping-
Andersen’s typology. Only the ‘late mobilisation of women’-regime may be regarded as 
a new separate type, but this is rather a mixed bag, relating to countries which were not 
central to the original typology. To this may be added that it is not clear why gender-
related aspects of regimes should outweigh other formal institutions, if the key question 
relates to the development of a general typology.
A further extra regime type could be the Antipodes. Some claim that Australia and 
New Zealand do not fit into the liberal category in which Esping-Andersen places them 
(cf. Castles, 1996, 1998). These countries operate a minimum income guarantee for all 
households, including those which could generate an income in the marketplace. While 
most benefit schemes have some kind of means test, this is only effective above a fairly 
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high income threshold, leading to a substantial take-up. For instance, Eardley et al. (1996: 
4-40) point out that roughly 80% of elderly Australians receive a means-tested collective 
old age pension. Such extensive protection by the state, it is argued, distinguishes the 
Antipodes from countries with a pure liberal regime. However, Esping-Andersen (1999: 
74-77) is not convinced by the argument. He regards Australia and New Zealand as variants 
of the liberal type, with which they share much in common: the limited scope of formal 
social security, the predominance of means-tested schemes, and the individual responsi-
bility to take out risk insurance.
Two final comments relating to Esping-Andersen’s theory are its neglect of the inter-
national context of social security regulations, and the rather limited attention paid 
to in stitutional change. His regime types are stable, relatively closed and autonomous 
national systems, largely modelled at the status quo of the 1980s. This disregards devel-
opments such as the process of economic globalisation, the enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union, and the social security amendments that have taken place in most Western 
countries over the past decades. In his later work Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999) acknowl-
edges that welfare states may be “in transition”, but he sticks to the structural differences 
between his three regime types.
4.2 An empirical typology
This section empirically examines the differences between the social security regimes of 
eleven countries. The nations considered here have been selected because of their pre-
sumed institutional variety: they correspond to the different ‘worlds’ of Esping-Andersen’s 
original typology. He places three of these countries in the corporatist group (Belgium, 
France, Germany), four in the liberal cluster (Australia, Canada, the United States and the 
United Kingdom), and three in the social-democratic group (Sweden, Norway and Den-
mark). The Netherlands theoretically holds a position somewhere between the corporat-
ist and social-democratic countries7.
The empirical validity of Esping-Andersen’s typology has been tested before, for 
instance by Kangas (1994), Ragin (1994), Shalev (1996, 2007), Bonoli (1997), Korpi & Palme 
(1998), Obinger & Wagschal (1998), Pitruzzello (1999), Gough (2001), Hicks & Kenworthy 
(2003), and Saint-Arnaud & Bernard (2003). These studies mainly rely on cluster or fac-
tor analysis, techniques which are far better suited to identify the similarities and differ-
ences between countries than the combination of tabulation and regression methods 
originally used by Esping-Andersen. In their meta-analysis Arts & Gelissen (2002: 153) 
summarise the results and conclude:
Esping-Andersen’s original three-worlds typology neither passes the empirical tests with fly-
ing colors, nor dismally fails them. The conclusion is, first, that his typology has at least some 
heuristic and descriptive value, but also that a case can be made for extending the number of 
welfare regimes to four, or even five. Second, these analyses show that a significant number of 
welfare states must be considered hybrid cases: no particular case can ever perfectly embody 
any particular ideal-type.
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However, there are several reasons for doubting whether the previous empirical work 
provides an adequate test of Esping-Andersen’s typology. First of all, the institutions that 
were included in the studies often did not cover all aspects of social security regimes. For 
instance, Ragin (1994) and Shalev (1996) analysed pension benefits, Gough (2001) social 
assistance schemes, and Kangas (1994) focused on health insurance regulations, which 
hardly play a role in the original typology. Such partial analyses may be quite interest-
ing in their own right, but of course cannot fully corroborate or rebut Esping-Andersen’s 
typology.
A second problem concerns the limited number of indicators in these empirical stud-
ies. Bonoli’s classification (1997) is an extreme example: he tested the validity of Esping-
Andersen’s typology by merely plotting two variables, gross social expenditure as a pro-
portion of gdp, and the share of contributions in social security funding. But in other 
cases too, often only six to ten variables were analysed, which hardly does justice to the 
wealth of attributes Esping-Andersen associates with his regime types. This is not only 
a matter of data restrictions, but there is also a methodological issue at stake. Country 
comparisons tend to suffer from the ‘small-N’-problem. Goldthorpe (2000: 49) sketches 
it quite succinctly:
Where individuals are the units, populations can be sampled so as to give Ns of several hundreds 
or thousands; but where nations are the units, N cannot rise much above one hundred even if 
all cases are taken, and is often far less. In applying techniques of multivariate analysis, serious 
difficulties therefore tend to be encountered in that N is not much greater than the total number 
of variables involved. Statistically, this means that there are too few degrees of freedom, that 
models become ‘overdetermined’, that intercorrelations among independent variables cannot 
be adequately dealt with, and that results may not be robust. Substantively, it means that com-
peting explanations of the dependent variable may not be open to any decisive evaluation.
In a causal approach it may be possible to bypass the ‘small-N’-problem through multi-
level analysis, with individuals, regions or sectors as basic units, and a given classifica-
tion of regime-types as explaining factors at the country level. However, if one tries to 
assess the internal coherence of regime types using traditional cluster or factor analysis, 
not too many variables can be included.
Shalev (2007) raises yet a third objection. Most empirical tests of the typology treat 
variables as if they were continuous phenomena: the size of the welfare state, the score 
on a de-commodification index (cf. Scruggs & Allan, 2006), etc. Theoretically, however, 
it is important to search for meaningful distinctions in the formal institutions of coun-
tries, and whether it is possible to identify underlying general principles. From a method-
ological point of view, Shalev (2007: 289-290) considers the empirical analyses in The three 
worlds of welfare capitalism rather unsatisfactory8:
Esping-Andersen’s first technique (tabular analysis) was unnecessarily ‘soft’, while the second 
(regression) is fundamentally in conflict with his analytical premises …  No systematic test 
was carried out of whether his ensemble of indicators of welfare state regimes actually do 
‘hang together’; and if they do, whether countries indeed cluster in three distinct subgroups 
on underlying policy dimensions … These empirical results are of questionable value, being 
based on regressions with 5 or 6 explanatory variables and only 18 cases. The key difficulty, 
however, is that asking whether political effects ‘matter’ after ‘controlling for’ other causes 
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is a different and more banal question than what actually interested Esping-Andersen. [… The 
regression approach] treats both policy and politics as continuous variables scattered across 
the whole spectrum of potential variation – not as a limited number of qualitatively different 
configurations with distinctive historical roots. [… Esping-Andersen] applied multiple regres-
sion as a blunt instrument for tapping gross differences between groups of countries, differ-
ences that arguably could have been more effectively conveyed by the use of tables and charts 
without the implication of constant linear effects across different contexts.
Shalev (2007: 290) also questions the appropriateness of Qualitative Comparative Ana-
lysis (qca), which applies formal criteria (based on Boolean algebra) in order to ascer-
tain whether attributes are associated with particular outcomes. Kangas (1994) and Ragin 
(1994) used this technique in order to identify welfare regimes, but the results were not 
very convincing:
[… Kangas’s and Ragin’s] creative efforts ran into serious difficulties. Kangas had trouble find-
ing the Liberal countries and Ragin was placed in the awkward position of having to assign 
one third of his countries to a ‘spare’ category, which automatically excluded them from his 
analysis. In performing cluster analysis of countries both authors were forcing them to fit into 
a single regime, thereby predetermining an issue in need of empirical exploration.
And Goldthorpe (2000: 51-52) criticises qca in a more fundamental way:
The fact that qca remains a logical technique means that its results are far more exposed to 
major distortion, both by difficulties in the selection of independent variables and by the 
occurrence of error in data than are results derived from statistical techniques.
Shalev therefore advocates a combination of multidimensional scaling and factor analy-
sis as the appropriate way to analyse welfare regimes. Other experimental techniques 
that have been suggested include fuzzy set theory (Kvist, 1999; Ragin, 2000: 286-308; Vis, 
2007) and neural networks (Hagfors & Kangas, 2004).
A more fitting trial of the Esping-Andersen’s regime typology would be to try and mea-
sure the empirical interdependence of key variables as indicated in table 4.1 as accurately 
as possible; and this is the aim of this section. In order to map out the actual correspond-
ences and differences in the formal social security institutions of these countries, a cate-
gorical principal component analysis (CatPCA) was performed on 54 characteristics. In 
line with Shalev’s recommendation, the technique applied here combines optimal scal-
ing with principal components analysis9. As in classic pca, variables are reduced to a lim-
ited number of uncorrelated dimensions. However, CatPCA deviates from this standard 
technique because it does not assume that variables are continuous; it can also handle 
indicators of rank or class (ordinal and nominal variables). In an alternating procedure, 
first for each variable category quantifications (and component loadings) are calculated 
from the initial scores of cases (‘objects’). Subsequently new object scores are computed 
from the scaled categories, then again category quantifications from scaled cases, and so 
on, until a convergence criterion is reached. The scaling of cases and the variable cate-
gories occurs in line with the specified measurement level. The latter serves as a restric-
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tion: the average correlation of the variables with the dimensions is maximised, given 
the chosen level of measurement. Since CatPCA treats the rows and columns of the data 
matrix as equivalent alternatives, the technique is less sensitive to the ‘small-N’-problem 
than standard factor analytic or pca approaches.
The CatPCA technique is especially suitable for testing Esping-Andersen’s typology, 
because the number of theoretical dimensions he uses is limited, and the indicators 
listed in table 4.1 mostly have an ordinal or nominal measurement level. If the under-
lying va riables do indeed correlate as expected, it should be possible to represent the 
three regime types adequately in two-dimensional space. Because CatPCA produces opti-
mal scaling of both countries and regime characteristics, countries and regime traits 
which share many features will obtain more or less the same scores on the dimensions, 
whereas cases and categories with little in common will be positioned a long way apart. 
This makes it possible to identify the degree to which formal institutions empirically 
coincide, and to ascertain whether countries actually form distinct clusters.
The variables10 in the CatPCA that has been performed are largely based on quantitative 
international comparisons relating to the first half of the 1990s, and together present a 
fairly complete empirical operationalisation of the theoretical traits of Esping-Andersen’s 
ideal regime types. This implies that the emphasis lies with formal social security rights 
(benefit levels, replacement rates, duration, coverage), duties (mainly contribution lev-
els) and, to a lesser extent, conditions (means testing, disability thresholds); and the 
main focus is, in Titmuss’s terminology, on social welfare, with some fiscal elements. 
Bearing in mind the social security definition and the interaction models of formal social 
security that have been outlined in the previous chapter, several other institutional traits 
theoretically could have been included as well11; but the aim of the current selection is 
to approximate empirically the elements of the original theoretical typology, as recon-
structed in table 4.1, as closely as possible.
The institutional characteristics were generally scaled at an ordinal level. All variables 
have been categorised into distinct classes. Sometimes this discretisation is self-evident 
(e.g. whether survivor’s pensions are means-tested or not), but especially for quantita-
tive variables it may be more complicated. To classify these, cut-off points were chosen 
wherever natural gaps in the distribution occurred (cf. Wildeboer Schut et al., 2001: 35-39, 
where the data are reported in more detail). The large number of variables means that the 
scaling results are quite stable: sensitivity analyses showed that adding or deleting a few 
does not lead to different principal components or other clusters of variables and coun-
tries. The same applies if one looks at solutions across more dimensions, or with other 
scaling restrictions.12
Figure 4.1 displays the component loadings: the correlations of the ordinally scaled 
va riables with the two principal components. Variables pointing in the same direction 
are highly correlated on both dimensions. The graph suggests three major clusters of 
regime features and a single outlying indicator.
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The first group of variables shows high loadings on the first dimension, but low ones on 
the second (numbers 1-26 in figure 4.1). The horizontal axis is largely associated with vari-
ables measuring whether a regime is residual or extensive. Low scores generally indicate 
frugal benefits of limited duration, combined with strict entry regulation through means 
testing. As a corollary, the funding required is low. For high scores the opposite holds: 
more generous benefits which last longer, less means testing, and higher costs.
More specifically, a scaling on the negative side of the horizontal axis corresponds to 
low replacement rates (benefits as a percentage of former earnings) in the first and fifth 
year of unemployment. Child benefits are meagre, and earnings-related occupational 
pensions may substitute only a small part of previous employment income13. There is no 
link between the duration of the insurance period and the level of collective old age pen-
sions. The limits on duration are manifest in earnings-related unemployment benefit, 
which is usually paid for a maximum of one year. A low score on the first dimension also 
indicates that means-tested social assistance makes up a large part of total social security 
spending, and that child benefits and collective old age and surviving dependants’ pen-
sions are means-tested as well.
Another entry restriction is the threshold in disability benefit schemes covering the 
risque social (a multiple-nominally scaled variable, not in the graph). A low score on the 
first dimension generally indicates an individual has to be almost fully incapacitated (80-
100%) in order to be eligible for such a disability benefit. The risque professionnel is only 
covered for employees, not for the self-employed, trainees, interns, and so on.
A number of characteristics related to funding also score highly on the first dimen-
sion. A low score on the horizontal axis means a comparatively small part of gdp consists 
of tax and social security contributions. It also indicates low average contribution rates 
at the level of the oecd average production worker, and limited marginal contribution 
rates for single people and double-earners with an income one third above that refer-
ence income. A negative score on the first dimension also coincides with low employer’s 
contributions.
On the labour market, the degree of residualism is reflected particularly in maternity 
and parental leave arrangements. A low score is associated with a limited proportion of 
working women being entitled to these schemes, a low level of maternity benefits and the 
absence of earnings-related leave arrangements. Tax breaks for work-related expenses are 
limited as well, which theoretically is a further disincentive to take up employment.
For two variables in this group the component loadings are somewhat contrary to 
expectations, although these are admittedly rather low (numbers 11 and 25 in the graph). A 
high statutory minimum wage is associated with otherwise residualist system characteris-
tics, and vice versa14. Moreover, the existence of a separate orphan’s pension was theoreti-
cally expected to be a trait of extensive regimes, especially of the corporatist type. However, 
this feature also turns out to load on the ‘residualist’ direction of the first dimension15.
The second major group of variables shows high negative component loadings on the 
vertical axis, and low to moderate16 values on the horizontal one. It consists of features 
which are theoretically associated with corporatist regimes (numbers 27 to 39 in the 
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graph). First of these is a high degree of occupationalism: the provisions for specific occu-
pational groups aimed at maintaining their standard of living are extensive. Expenditure 
on social security for civil servants, for example, is high.
Occupationalism goes together with a tight link between employment or past labour 
experience and benefit entitlements. For instance, disability benefits are high when 
medical impediments are due to occupational activity, accidents or diseases (the risque 
professionnel). Sometimes employees who become incapacitated due to their work even 
continue to receive their full salary. On the other hand, the coverage of disability that 
is not related to salaried employment (the risque social) is limited. The early disabled, the 
self-employed, students, housewives and unemployed persons who become incapaci-
tated, usually are not entitled to disability benefits.
These characteristics are associated with rather good (semi-)collective pensions for 
the surviving dependants of employees, without duration limits up to the pensionable 
age17. This contrasts sharply with widows, widowers and orphans of persons without an 
employment contract, who have to rely on their own means or on social assistance.
In the same category, child benefits are generally linked to family size, with no spe-
cific targeting of the low-income groups. This is reflected in the tendency to grant high 
child benefits to large families which cannot be considered poor; and in the fact that 
poor lone-parent families are not especially favoured.
A considerable share of funding is contribution-based, which implies a strong empha-
sis on compulsory solidarity between workers under the responsibility of the state.
On the labour market, employment contracts are largely covered by collective labour 
agreements, and specific incentives often coincide. Maternity and paternal leave lasts 
fairly long, but is largely unpaid. It is combined with a low coverage of formal child care 
facilities in the 0-3 years age bracket. The tax allowances for couples with children are 
high. However, the additional tax advantages a single-earner family receives (over single 
persons) that do not relate to children are limited. This suggests that fiscal work disincen-
tives in this cluster of ‘corporatist’ traits are not linked to having a partner, but rather to 
the presence of children.
A third group of variables combines high positive component loadings on the second 
dimension with moderate loadings on the first18. These traits, numbered 40-49 in the 
graph, are theoretically associated with social-democratic regimes. In the sphere of pen-
sions all inhabitants are entitled to a collective old age pension, and the minimum level 
is comparatively high. Most employees are covered by a compulsory, earnings-related 
pension scheme. The statutory retirement age for men is rather high (65 years or more), 
and full early retirement pensions are limited19. A threshold is applied when disability is 
related to occupation. After five consecutive years of unemployment, social assistance 
benefits for families with children are high. However, child benefits for poor families 
with many children are not especially generous. As regards funding, the marginal tax 
rates for couples with children are substantial.
Based on the category scores, two multiple-nominally scaled variables (not shown 
in graph) are also placed within this cluster in a consistent manner. Spending on active 
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labour market policy is relatively high (over 1.1% of gdp), as is the statutory minimum 
amount of annual leave (more than four weeks).
One variable (number 50 in the graph) does not belong to any of these three groups. In 
most countries, entitlements to disability schemes covering the risque social were earn-
ings-related in the period considered here. However, two liberal and one social-demo-
cratic country had flat-rate benefits, which leads to a component loading in between 
these clusters20.
All in all, the component loadings indicate a clear interpretation of the two dimensions. 
On the horizontal axis, observations are ranked on a continuum stretching from residu-
alist (negative scores) to extensive (positive scores) regime characteristics. This resembles 
what is sometimes referred to as the scope of social security, or the social security effort – 
although the first dimension reflects many variables, not just expenditure as a percentage 
of gdp, the commonly adopted effort indicator (see for instance Wilensky, 1975). On the 
vertical axis observations are scaled between two poles which may be termed ‘particular-
istic’ (negative scores) and ‘universalistic’ (positive scores); hence, this can be regarded 
as a dimension indicating the degree of universalism.
Figure 4.2 shows the object scores: the values attributed on these two dimensions to 
countries as a result of the optimal scaling procedure. Three distinct clusters and one 
mixed case may be discerned; the classification is corroborated by additional cluster anal-
yses and by latent profile modelling of the object scores21. First, there is a liberal group of 
nations, which comprises the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. 
Countries with a liberal social security regime score low on social security scope (the first 
dimension), and are scaled about average on the y-axis, mostly with a slight bias toward 
the universalistic side. Based on the characteristics studied here, the usa is far and away 
the most ‘residual’ country. It displays many traits which are typical of the liberal regime, 
and quite often these fall into the most extreme category. The usa is closely followed by 
Australia, which is therefore also a rather clear specimen of the liberal social security 
regime. Since Australia in no way falls outside the liberal group, the scaling results do 
not corroborate the ‘Antipodes’ thesis as proposed by Castles (1996, 1998). The discrep-
ancy compared with the United States is caused mainly by the fact that Australian benefit 
levels and the required funding are somewhat higher. Contrary to the usa, the Austral-
ian collective old age pensions scheme covers all its residents. However, in Australia the 
gross replacement rate of the total old age pension (including occupational benefits) is 
the lowest of all countries analysed here, probably as a result of means testing.
Within this set of countries, Canada and the United Kingdom are less characteristic 
representatives of the liberal type. Their scores on the first dimension indicate that the 
formal institutions of these countries are more extensive than those of the usa and Aus-
tralia. This applies particularly for the higher replacement rates in unemployment and 
social assistance schemes, better income provisions covering the cost of children, and 
higher minimum levels of the collective old age pension for persons with no past labour 
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experience. Tax and contribution rates in Canada and the uk are correspondingly higher 
as well.
In a number of respects these two watered-down versions of the liberal regime differ, 
however. Replacement rates are generally slightly higher in the uk, but this is offset by 
the limited importance of means-testing in Canada, and its extensive coverage of mater-
nity leave22. It should also be noted that the uk has the most universalistic regime within 
the liberal cluster. The above-average score on the second dimension suggests that some 
elements reflecting the Beveridgean heritage still prevail in the British social security 
system. Esping-Andersen (1999:87) regards Britain as “an example of regime-shifting or, 
perhaps, of stalled ‘social democratization’…”23.
The second cluster consists of three countries which Esping-Andersen designated as cor-
poratist: Belgium, France and Germany. These countries do indeed achieve fairly extreme 
scores on the second dimension, tending towards the corporatist pole. However, they 
also fall on the positive side of the x-axis, which indicates a substantially higher social 
security scope than in the liberal group. Thus the exponents of the corporatist regime 
studied here also have rather extensive social security systems.
This cluster is the most homogeneous of all. However, there are slight differences 
between the three corporatist countries. The German system appears to be somewhat 
more extensive than Belgium; and France has the more residual social security arrange-
ments within this group. On the second dimension Germany seems somewhat less cor-
poratist than either Belgium or France. Moreover, each country has some specific pecu-
liarities. In Belgium, unemployment benefit is not limited in duration, but its level is 
lower than is customary in corporatist countries. If one includes the benefits for specific 
target groups, France has fairly substantial social assistance regulations. And in a num-
ber of respects, the German disability benefit schemes are comparable to what one would 
expect in a social-democratic regime.
The Nordic nations of Europe form a third distinct group. On the first dimension these 
score higher than the corporatist countries, while on the second they surpass the liberal 
cluster. This means that the social-democratic regime, as was expected, is the most exten-
sive and universalistic type. Countries belonging to this cluster are less homogeneous 
than the corporatist group. Sweden and Denmark are the purest representatives of the 
regime, but both have a specific bias: the Swedish social security system seems slightly 
more extensive, while the Danish system is more universalistic. The outlying position of 
Denmark reflects its scores on variables loading high on the second dimension. Far more 
often than in Sweden, Norway and the nations representing the liberal type, the scaled 
values of Denmark are the opposite of the corporatist countries’ scores.
Norway comes out lower than Sweden on the first dimension and lags behind Den-
mark on the second, just below the Swedish score. This makes Norway a less characteristic 
example of the social-democratic regime. Compared with their Nordic counterparts, the 
scope is smaller, which is due mainly to slightly lower replacement rates and more mod-
est contribution rates. Also, less money is spent in Norway on activating labour market 
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policy. The limited coverage of earnings-related occupational pensions indicates a lower 
degree of universalism. This is a voluntary insurance in Norway, which reaches approxi-
mately 25% of employees. In Sweden and Denmark this insurance is compulsory for all.
These are all primarily differences of degree, however. The scope of the Norwegian 
social security system exceeds that of the three corporatist countries, and in terms of 
universalism the score is well above average. Norway may be a less typical example, but it 
certainly belongs to the social-democratic cluster.
The Netherlands, finally, is the only one of the countries analysed here which cannot be 
placed squarely in one of the three clusters. For the early 1990s the Dutch system emerges 
as a hybrid of social-democratic and corporatist traits. The first dimension indicates that 
the Netherlands is rather similar to the Nordic countries in terms of scope: slightly less 
extensive than the regimes of Denmark and Sweden, but comparable to Norway and out-
ranking the corporatist countries. This stems especially from rather generous benefit 
conditions and correspondingly high costs of social security.
On the second axis, however, the Netherlands turns out to be not as universalistic as 
the social-democratic countries, although the Dutch score leans over to their side. Like 
in Sweden and Denmark, the target groups of social security tend to be comprehensive, 
most manifestly in social assistance and in the national insurance schemes for the eld-
erly, surviving dependants and children. But in a number of other respects the Nether-
lands resembles a corporatist regime: the protection of the acquired standard of living in 
case of unemployment and disability, the large share of social insurance contributions in 
funding, the high level of protection for civil servants, and the disincentives to the labour 
supply of women and less productive workers. These empirical scaling results therefore 
confirm Esping-Andersen’s (1999: 88) observation that “the Netherlands remains a Janus-
headed welfare regime, combining both social-democratic and conservative attributes”. 
However, in the period considered here the Dutch social security system also had a 
number of unique features. This concerns especially the absence of a distinction between 
risque professionnel and risque social in disability regulations; and the combination of a uni-
versal pay-as-you-go state pension with extensive funded occupational benefits in old 
age schemes.
4.3 The generality of regime types
Regime types are not eternal givens, but constructs of history. One hundred and fifty 
years ago the collective agreements on nationwide social security institutions were 
very rudimentary everywhere, falling well behind what would currently be considered 
a ‘residual’ regime. And there are no compelling reasons to assume that the social secu-
rity regime types described in the previous section will continue to exist forever. Future 
political scientists may very well regard them as exemplary of a certain historical phase, 
reflecting the diverging social consensus prevailing in these countries in the second half 
of the 20th century. From the figural model in chapter 2 it follows that social security 
regimes may change. The consensus on the ‘right attribution of social security rights’ in 
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a community can evolve in a different direction if historical developments fundamen-
tally alter the incentive to regulate, and strategic actors respond to this in an effective 
way during the process of policy-making. In the near future, various factors could induce 
such divergences of the present institutional paths. The influence of globalisation on 
economic performance and labour markets could make certain revisions of social secu-
rity systems efficient and inevitable. The ageing of populations may have a severe impact 
on the financial sustainability of the more elaborate social security systems, a pressure 
which may clash with the social stratification effects the electorate would prefer. Social 
trends towards individualisation and less gender inequality could make a different attri-
bution of rights desirable. And the extension and economic integration of the European 
Union – coordinated by a Brussels policy apparatus which may be less inclined to act as 
an agent of the national principals – might lead to a convergence in the direction of a 
new ‘European social model’, blurring the distinctions between the social-democratic, 
corporatist and liberal regime types found here.
This makes it relevant to discuss the generality of regime types in some more detail. 
A first question that may be raised is their actual stability over time. Several empirical analy-
ses suggest that the three welfare regime types are fairly continuous phenomena during 
the period that will be studied in the next chapters, the final decades of the 20th century. 
The analysis performed above confirms the existence of the three ‘institutional worlds’ at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Shalev (2007) carried out a secondary analysis of the 13 policy 
indicators in the original Esping-Andersen data, which relate to the late 1970s and early 
1980s. A linear factor analysis resulted in two dimensions, labelled by him as ‘institu-
tionalism’ and ‘corporatism’. The clusters of nations found by Shalev correspond rather 
closely24 to those in figure 4.2. Finally, we performed a similar CatPCA for the period 
1998-2001 for a project which sought to map out the current regime types in the enlarged 
eu. Although a wider set of variables and countries was taken into consideration, very 
similar clusters of countries emerged (Soede et al., 2004)25.
Taken together, these studies corroborate for the period 1980-2000 the existence 
of the ‘worlds’ as originally proposed by Esping-Andersen. Because both the underly-
ing dimensions and the clustering of countries are fairly consistent over time, it may be 
assumed that the classification is empirically valid during these two decades. Of course, 
as was pointed out, this does not guarantee that the different regime types will continue 
to exist in the future. On the other hand, path dependence could play a decisive role. 
The material and social costs of complete regime shifts may be quite high, the cognitive 
frames and interests of policymakers could stand in the way, and the informal rules of 
the electorate may set limits to the direction and degree of change that is attainable.
A second issue is the applicability of the typology to other domains of welfare, such as health, 
housing policy and education. In their overview article Arts & Gelissen (2002: 153) con-
clude that “if one looks at other social programmes than the ones applied by Esping-
Andersen, it becomes clear that they do not conform so easily – if at all – to his welfare 
regime patterns”.
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This is backed, for instance, by comparisons of the public sector in various countries. 
If it exists at all, the dividing line in the type of health system seems to lie between the 
Protestant countries of Northern and Western Europe, and the Catholic nations in the 
southern regions, especially where the higher medical consumption in the latter is con-
cerned (scp, 2001: 281-295). In housing policy the picture is even less clear:
The typology of welfare states […] offers little help in understanding the situation. One would 
expect to find a strong social rented sector in social democratic countries, but this applies 
only to Denmark. Austria is the only country were housing has clear corporatist elements 
[because] landlords in the fairly large social rented sector are affiliated to trade unions and 
political parties (scp, 2001: 49).
In the design of the education system26, on the other hand, the three welfare regimes 
emerge rather clearly. The Scandinavian countries have a uniform school type for all chil-
dren aged six to sixteen, with a strong focus on equal opportunities and aiming to attain 
the highest educational levels possible – although this does not necessarily imply that 
these goals will be achieved. In the uk, the government plays a rather weak regulatory 
role, and there is ample room for private initiatives, leaving a lot of freedom to schools 
and other educational actors – just as one would expect of a liberal welfare regime. Ger-
many and Austria show a distinct corporatist pattern. Pupils “are divided among pro-
grammes with different labour market and social prospects at an early stage, with the 
dual system – in fact a continuation of the guilds – later training them for a particular 
occupation” (scp, 2001: 496). The dual system requires close cooperation between the 
government, employers and employees, and has the effect that “youngsters have good 
job prospects on leaving school, [but] are closely tied to a particular occupation in their 
further career” (scp, 2001: 496), thus replicating the existing social stratification. In 
France the corporatist structure is less clear, however. Here education is considered a key 
public responsibility, with an important role for the central government, which in theory 
advocates rigid meritocratic selection through a system of concours 27.
All in all, wider welfare regimes do not necessarily coincide with the social secu-
rity regimes of the previous section. Esping-Andersen’s position is rooted in the ‘power-
resource theory’, as summarised by Korpi (2003: 590): “Welfare regimes to a significant 
extent are the outcomes of distributive conflicts involving class-related interest groups 
and political parties, conflicts were the relative power of actors is significant”. Such con-
flicts of course take place; but theoretically it is not evident that the outcome should be 
the same in every domain of welfare. Following the institutional analyses in chapters 
2 and 3, it may very well be that social security, health care, housing policy and educa-
tion have a specific history. New formal rules which shape these domains are generated 
and transformed during interaction processes among political actors. This may happen 
in diverging historical contexts (periods of economic boom or recession, pre- or post-
war, etc.), with different stakeholders (political parties, social partners, specific interest 
groups, professionals) and a considerable variation in relative prices, the structure of 
power and interests, and ideals. From this theoretical point of view, welfare domains 
need not be fully interdependent. In certain historical circumstances they may even not 
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correspond at all, with each ‘province of policy’ having different actors, a specific agenda 
of issues, and a separate path of institutional development. Esping-Andersen’s notion 
of welfare regimes therefore seems rather wide, even if one considers it as an ideal-type 
in Weber’s (1988 [1922]: 190-214) sense. The concept of social security regimes provides a 
more accurate demarcation of the phenomena he refers to theoretically.
A third, and from a theoretical point of view rather interesting, question relates to the 
correspondence of formal regimes and informal institutions. Research in this area has not pro-
duced conclusive results so far (see for instance, Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Gundelach, 1994; 
Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Svallfors, 1997, 2003; Bonoli, 2000; cpb/scp, 2003; Pfau-Effinger, 
2005; van Oorschot & Arts, 2005; Larsen, 2006). An elaborate analysis was carried out by 
Arts & Gelissen (2001; see also Gelissen, 2002: 89-123). They stress the determining role 
of Esping-Andersen’s regime types, as one of their key questions is: “does living under 
a specific welfare regime cause people to adhere to a particular conception of [a] moral 
community?” (my emphasis). Theoretically Arts & Gelissen treat welfare regimes as con-
textual factors at the macro-level. ‘Cognitive factors’ (learning, habit formation, and 
framing processes) are presumed to have certain individual effects: knowledge of the 
distributive rules in society, habituation to its distributive arrangements, and solidarity 
frames. Collectively this would translate into notions of solidarity and justice principles, 
shared by the populations of different countries.
In their empirical analysis Arts & Gelissen present several dependent variables to 
indicate such collective fundamentals. They use seven items from the International Social 
Survey Programme 1996 (issp) on tasks the government should, or should not, perform, from 
which they construct a factor score for the preferred level of solidarity. The responses to 
three questions from the European Values Study 1999 (evs) are treated as separate indicators 
for preferred justice principles: to what degree should a just society strive for equality, 
take care of basic needs, and stimulate equity?28 Arts & Gelissen subsequently build a 
number of multilevel models, through which they seek to assess the effects of welfare 
regimes (the macro-level) and several individual characteristics on the solidarity notions 
and preferred justice principles of people living in various countries. Their results are 
somewhat indeterminate. There is a significant relationship between welfare regime type 
and the preferred level of solidarity, but the correspondence is not very close. As Arts & 
Gelissen theoretically expected, the populations of social-democratic countries prefer a 
high degree of solidarity; but in countries belonging to the Mediterranean type this incli-
nation is even stronger. All other nations come out much lower on the preferred degree 
of solidarity. The corporatist countries fall slightly below the liberal regimes, where one 
would theoretically expect the lowest level of preferred solidarity (Arts & Gelissen, 2001: 
294). The remaining results are rather singular. On ‘preferred equality’ the inhabitants of 
countries with a social-democratic regime actually fall behind people living under a lib-
eral welfare type; and the gap compared with the Mediterranean countries is even more 
striking (Arts & Gelissen, 2001: 295). The same happens with ‘need’: in order for their 
society to be just, the population of countries with a social-democratic regime think it 
less important that basic needs are met than people living in liberal welfare states. Only 
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in terms of equity do the differences run in the direction one would expect, with the 
greatest adherence to a meritocratic justice principle in the liberal countries. The vari-
ance that could be attributed to the regime types turned out to be rather low, however29 
(Arts & Gelissen, 2001: 295).
Although Arts & Gelissen answer their question on the influence of regime types on 
public opinion with a qualified ‘yes’, the evidence they present for their causal hypothesis 
is not overwhelming. There may be theoretical reasons for this. Arts & Gelissen assume, 
essentially, that regimes determine opinions because they form a context of socialisa-
tion. Through learning, habit formation and framing, citizens would acquire certain 
notions of social security which reflect the regime type they live in. However, in chapter 3 
it was stipulated that social security institutions are fundamentally undersocialised. Young 
people and their socialising agents do not need such rules in everyday life, which leads 
to a low incentive to pick up or install them at an early age. Moreover, modern social 
security regimes are often complicated and may be rather ambiguous. This makes them 
hard to learn or to become accustomed to at a later stage, even where people are willing 
to do so. Finally, educational curricula provide little explicit training in social security 
rules, with the exception of a small group of professionals (specialist lawyers, employees 
of benefit agencies). All of this makes an intensive and uniform ‘socialisation of welfare 
regimes’ rather unlikely – especially in the sense that these systems of formal rules are 
differentially internalised by the citizens of various countries. If there is a correspond-
ence between formal regimes and informal institutions, socialisation does not seem a 
likely candidate to explain the nexus.
In the previous chapters it was pointed out that theoretically there is no evident causality. 
The adherents of the ‘new institutional economics’ often assume that formal institutions 
determine informal ones. From their point of view official regulations, such as state ben-
efit schemes, are created because they are collectively efficient. However, formal rules 
cannot possibly cover all alternatives that may arise in actual economic and social inter-
actions; and values, social norms and conventions serve to fill in these gaps. If formal 
regulations stay efficient over a longer period of time, informal institutions eventually 
will follow. Or, in North’s more sophisticated version of this theory: formal and infor-
mal rules will in the end converge in a new efficient equilibrium. Sociologists, on the 
other hand, usually attach prime importance to informal institutions. They often take 
the existence of values and social norms for granted (cf. chapter 2, especially Coleman’s 
criticism of this point). From there it is a small step to presume these give direction to the 
creation of public rules. In this line of reasoning formal institutions are the coagulum, or 
codification, of socially defined moral standards.
As was argued in chapter 2, the causal links between formal and informal institutions 
should be an empirical issue. In the case of social security regimes and their informal 
counterparts this would require an extensive analysis of the historical genesis of these 
different institutions in various countries. This goes beyond the more modest aim of this 
section, which seeks to explore the actual degree of correspondence between formal 
regimes and the informal social security rules of different nations – a matter of empirical 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   235 21-9-2009   15:09:01
236
4
coherence, not the testing of a certain causal order. However, previous empirical analyses 
of the relationship between regime types and informal rules are not convincing, because 
these often show one or more of the following shortcomings:
1) Inadequate regime classification. This may relate to both between-cluster and 
within-cluster variance. The first occurs when countries are assigned to regime types to 
which they do not actually belong. The latter may happen if clear examples of a certain 
regime type are lumped into one and the same category with less straightforward cases30.
Of course, if the classification of formal institutions into regimes is partially invalid 
empirically, this will distort its correlation with informal institutions.
2) Inapt measurement of informal rules. Such institutions theoretically refer to the 
division of rights and obligations a community or society actually prefers. Following this 
definition attitudes towards government spending on welfare (e.g. Papadakis & Bean, 
1993: 236) are, for instance, bad indicators for informal rules. These are not about the 
rights and obligations actors currently hold: spending preferences cannot be considered 
values, social norms or conventions, but refer to the aims policymakers should pursue in 
formal social security legislation. Moreover, they have no bearing on the actual situation, 
because they often relate to the course to be taken in the future. With such indicators, 
it is quite likely that Standortsgebundenheit will sometimes show effects that run opposite 
to the current design of social security. People living under a residual regime type may 
generally prefer a limited social security system, but it could be that they want to see the 
basic protection somewhat extended in the future. And it is conceivable that the popula-
tion of a country with comprehensive social provisions largely supports such an extensive 
regime, but thinks the current system is ‘over the top’31. If the informal rule indicators are 
ill-suited, it is evident the relationship with regime types will become blurred.
3) One-dimensional selection of informal institutions. Quite often indicators for 
informal institutions are chosen that theoretically correspond to the first dimension of 
figures 4.1 and 4.2. The preferred degree of collective responsibility for the coverage of 
certain risks, inequality aversion, meritocratic justice principles, and the like all theo-
retically reflect the ‘scope’ dimension. On the other hand, indicators of the second prin-
cipal axis (universalism/particularism) are rare: informal pendants of occupationalism, 
the special position of civil servants, the labour disincentives for women and less produc-
tive workers, etc., are hardly ever included. This of course means that if one finds country 
clusters in terms of informal institutions, one can expect these to reflect the contrasts on 
the first dimension, with the main dividing line between countries with small (liberal, 
Mediterranean) and extended (corporatist and especially social-democratic) social secu-
rity regimes. Whereas Esping-Andersen’s typology is multi-dimensional, most research 
on the informal rules associated with regime types refers to the first component only32. 
This of course implies that the distinction between countries of the corporatist and 
social-democratic types tends to become unclear, as the difference is made mainly by the 
second dimension.
Owing to these limitations, it may be that much of the former work in this field was not 
wholly adequate to detect the actual correspondences between social security regimes 
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on the one hand, and the informal rules held by the various populations on the other. To 
test this, an exploratory analysis was performed on data from the 1996-1999 waves of the 
International Social Survey Programme. The same countries were included as in the previous 
section, with the exception of Belgium, which did not take part in the issp-waves analysed 
here33. This leaves four nations belonging to the liberal regime type (the usa, Australia, 
Canada and Great Britain), three social-democratic ones (Sweden, Denmark and Norway), 
two corporatist examples (Germany and France) and one hybrid (the Netherlands).
Variables were selected on a number of grounds. First, they had to relate to social 
security, labour market orientations or taxes, thus excluding more general value orien-
tations as analysed, for instance, by Gundelach (1994). Further, variables should refer to 
informal pendants of formal institutions: the rights and obligations of actors, the actual 
responsibilities the government should have in providing social security, the legitimacy 
of informal defection of formal rules, or sanctioning. Thirdly, they should be indicators 
of either scope or particularism/universalism. This was empirically validated by inspect-
ing the bivariate correlations with the regime clusters. A few pragmatic considerations 
played a role in the selection process as well. Variables which were fairly similar in these 
four issp waves were left out, as were indicators with too many missing values. The proce-
dure resulted in 16 items, which were used as input for yet another categorical principal 
components analysis34.
As the component loadings35 in figure 4.3 make clear, there are three distinct groups of 
variables. The first dimension is dominated by five informal rules with negative loadings 
(items 1-5 in the graph). Theoretically these are mostly in line with a liberal regime. A 
low score on the x-axis indicates that a comparatively small part of the population think 
the government should be responsible for providing a decent standard of living for the 
elderly and the unemployed, for providing jobs and for reducing income differentials. 
This often coincides with less aversion to inequality at the top of the income distribution, 
measured over six typical occupations36.
The second cluster of variables combines high positive loadings on the second 
dimension with moderate positive ones on the first (items 6-10). This consists of informal 
rules that theoretically fit in well with the social-democratic regime type. Meritocratic 
wage criteria are considered less important than elsewhere, and the preferred earnings 
inequality between lower and higher occupations is comparatively low. Furthermore, a 
relatively large share of people would enjoy their jobs if they did not need the money. In 
line with this, the share of the respondents who think that a job should offer good career 
opportunities is comparatively limited. Finally, there is a female bias in the preferences 
for working in the collective sector. This indicator was chosen because, following Esping-
Andersen, a high labour participation rate of women obliged to pay taxes is a precondi-
tion for the financial sustainability of the social-democratic regime. This is largely real-
ised through a high labour demand in the sectors of welfare, care, education and social 
security37. A positive score on the y-axis therefore suggests more aversion to income ine-
quality between the top and the bottom, a comparatively post-materialistic work ethic, 
and a rather strong inclination of women to work in (semi-)government jobs.
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The third group of items (numbers 11-16) has high negative loadings on the second 
dimension, and low or moderately positive ones on the first. Theoretically these features 
are mainly associated with the corporatist regime. A fairly high proportion of the pop-
ulation think that family life will suffer if mothers work full-time. More than in other 
countries, people think seniority should be a wage criterion. The high ranking of the 
cabinet minister in the distribution of preferred earnings suggests a considerable pres-
tige of state officials. The latter is corroborated by the comparatively large proportion of 
men that would prefer to work in the collective sector. A high negative scale value on the 
second y-axis also indicates that a lenient interpretation of formal rules is more common 
than elsewhere: the percentage of respondents who think that tax evasion or obtaining 
social security rights through presenting false information is not wrong (or only slightly), 
is higher than in other countries38.
Summarising, the first dimension measures the degree to which the population sup-
ports or rejects liberal principles on government responsibility for living standards and 
employment. The second dimension mainly reflects a distinction between social-dem-
ocratic and corporatist informal rules. Both of these are negatively correlated with the 
‘liberal’ principles on the first dimension.
The scale values of the countries on these two axes are presented in figure 4.4. From this 
it can be concluded that the first cluster of variables (negative loadings on the x-axis) 
mainly indicates the differences between the usa, Canada, Great Britain and Australia on 
the one hand, and the remaining cases on the other. The second group of variables (posi-
tive loadings on the second dimension) mostly shows a distinction between Norway plus 
Sweden, and the other countries. The third group (negative loadings on the y-axis) largely 
measures the contrasts between Germany plus France, and the rest.
The resulting clustering of countries is quite similar to that of the regime types in the 
previous section. The first dimension shows a contrast between countries with liberal 
informal rules and the rest, while the second differentiates between countries having 
social-democratic and corporatist informal institutions. Once again the latter cluster is 
quite homogeneous (although it consists of only two countries here, due to the miss-
ing Belgian data), while within the liberal and social-democratic groups some dispersion 
occurs. The classification is supported by the outcomes of a cluster analysis of the object 
scores on the two dimensions39.
The usa, Canada and – to a lesser extent – Great Britain and Australia form a liberal cluster, 
with low scores on the first dimension. This implies that less than elsewhere the citizens 
of these countries think that the government should be responsible for ensuring a decent 
standard of living for the elderly and unemployed, for the provision of jobs and for reduc-
ing income inequality. They also show less aversion to income differentials at the top. 
Within this group of countries, the scale values of the United States and Great Britain are 
consistent with figure 4.2. The usa has the most residual social security regime, and this 
is backed up by the informal rules of its population, which are generally the most ‘lib-
eral’ – or libertarian, as some Americans might prefer to say – of all the countries. The uk 
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social security regime is a less pure specimen of the liberal type, and in line with this gov-
ernmental interventions and smaller income differentials at the top are more favoured 
by the British than in the other liberal countries. The relative positions of Canada and 
Australia, however, are not wholly in line with the scaling of their regime types. Just as in 
the uk, the Canadian social security regime is by no means a perfect example of the lib-
eral type; but the Canadian informal social security rules are fairly liberal, although they 
lag behind the usa level. In Australia the opposite occurs; here, the rather residual social 
security regime of figure 4.2 coincides with informal institutions that are considerably 
less liberal than in the usa. This can only partially be explained by missing data40.
Sweden and Norway are scaled close to each other, with high scores on the positive side 
of both the first and the second dimension – the direction of the social-democratic traits 
of figure 4.3. A high proportion of people have a strong aversion to inequality, and want 
the government actively to combat it. Governmental intervention to ensure work for all 
and a decent standard of living is considered desirable. To a lesser extent than elsewhere, 
people feel that job performance ought to be the central wage criterion. Postmaterialis-
tic work orientations prevail, and females have a stronger preference for working for the 
government or the civil service than in other countries.
Although according to figure 4.2 Norway is a less pure representative of the social-
democratic regime type, the informal rules of its population seem very similar to those 
prevailing in Sweden. Denmark shows the reverse pattern: a social security regime which 
is clearly social-democratic, but informal institutions that are on the verge of this cluster. 
On the first axis, the comparatively low Danish score may be explained by the fact that two 
high-loading variables are missing. If social-democratic responses are imputed for these 
data, Denmark moves closer to Norway and Sweden, but still remains a less typical case. 
On the postmaterialism items, Denmark scores considerably lower than Sweden and Nor-
way, and the female preference for working in the government sector is less pronounced as 
well. On the second dimension, the Danish resemble the Swedes and Norwegians in their 
comparatively strong rejection of traditional family roles, benefit fraud and tax evasion, 
but they are corporatist in two other respects: many people think seniority should be a 
key wage criterion, and a fairly high proportion of men favour working in the government 
sector. Thus, Denmark seems decidedly less social-democratic in terms of informal rules 
than Norway and Sweden, whereas it is a rather pure type in its regime characteristics. This 
result is in line with findings from other sources. According to the European Values Study 1999 
and a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2001, the Danish frequently score lower on such 
informal issues than Swedish and Finnish respondents (cf. cpb/scp, 2003: 25, 27).
The third cluster comprises France and Germany. These countries attain high negative 
scores on the second dimension of figure 4.4, in the direction of the corporatist traits. 
Their populations have strong preferences for traditional gender roles and for seniority 
as a wage criterion, and show a rather lenient interpretation of formal rules. The desired 
earnings of a Cabinet minister are comparably high and males favour working for the 
government, suggesting that the prestige of civil servants is substantial.
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Once again, the Netherlands may be considered a hybrid, with scale values rather close to 
the origin of figure 4.4. On the first dimension, the scores on the government’s responsi-
bility for providing jobs and reducing income differentials are relatively high, which sets 
the country apart from the liberal regimes. However, two other variables loading high on 
the first dimension (items 1 and 3) were missing in the data set, which reduces the scaling 
value. A sensitivity analysis showed that if ‘social-democratic’ or ‘corporatist’ responses 
are imputed for these variables, the Netherlands attain a higher value on the first dimen-
sion, close to the position of France.
The second dimension is a very mixed bag in the Dutch case. Because all high-loading 
items have valid scores here, imputing for missing values does not affect the in-between 
position of the Netherlands on the y-axis. In some respects the Netherlands resembles 
Sweden and Norway, but in others it is more similar to France and Germany. The Dutch 
favour postmaterialism, but to a lesser degree than the Swedes and Norwegians; and the 
female preference for working in the collective sector lags far behind the Scandinavian 
level. The Dutch attain a ‘corporatist’ level on traditional gender roles and the acceptabil-
ity of tax evasion. On the other hand, they record fairly low scores on the preference of 
males for working in the collective sector, on the importance of seniority as a wage prin-
ciple, and on the acceptance of benefit fraud. Therefore, it is likely that the Netherlands 
has a truly hybrid score on the second dimension, and in fact occupies a higher position 
on the first than figure 4.4 suggests.
The hypothesis of correspondence between formal regimes and informal rules thus 
seems to be confirmed more clearly than in the previous work. The correlation of coun-
try scores on the first dimension of figures 4.2 and 4.4 is 0.84, that between the scale 
positions on the second dimension about the same (0.85). The support found here is a 
consequence of both the way regimes were scaled in the previous section, and of the 
informal institutions that were chosen here. The inclusion of indicators for the specific 
informal traits of the corporatist and social-democratic regimes seems especially impor-
tant in this respect.
The question at issue was to what extent formal social security systems and informal 
institutions coincide: a matter of correlation, not one of causality. Having established 
this correspondence, some further remarks can be made in the light of the institutional 
theory addressed in the previous chapters.
Larsen (2006: 50) has suggested that cross-national differences in ‘welfare attitudes’ 
may be explained by the way regimes structure society in terms of job opportunities, 
generosity and selectivism. In his view, these subsequently shape peoples’ perception of 
how social relationships should be, especially in terms of ‘deservingness’, in the sense 
that this concept was elaborated by Van Oorschot (2000, 2005). According to Larsen this 
would translate into cross-national differences in support for welfare policy.
Although there are interesting similarities with the analysis performed here, the 
theo retical line of reasoning Larsen proposes is somewhat different. A first distinction is 
that informal institutions refer to a wider concept than the notion of deservingness. In 
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the previous section, the structural traits of formal social security regimes were reduced 
to their scope and the degree of universalism/particularism41. The current analysis 
showed these to be linked to their normative counterparts. The deservingness of social 
security recipients is one aspect of these; but the informal rules considered here also 
refer to other matters, such as the obligations of actors (e.g. paying contributions), the 
tolerability of breaking the rules (defection and sanctioning), the social status of govern-
ment officials, etc.
A more fundamental difference is that Larsen (2006: 50) considers his deservingness 
and ‘welfare attitudes’ as dependent variables, which logically result from the structural 
features of regime types at the macro-level; while following the theoretical notions of 
the previous chapters, causality does not seem to be as straightforward as that. Let us 
briefly reiterate some of the main arguments that were put forward earlier:
– institutions are socially constructed rules indicating the rights and duties of actors, 
including conditions and sanctions. Formal institutions are based on legislation, or 
on public enforcement of private arrangements. Informal institutions refer to general 
values, social norms, conventions and agreements prevailing in the community;
– formal and informal institutions are theoretically correlated. This is not because 
either one determines the other, but is due to the fact that both types of institution 
aim to realise collective goals by steering behaviour through the allocation of rights 
and duties; and because both are vested and evolve in the same historical process. 
Their correspondence is not necessarily perfect, because several formal rules may fit 
in with a given informal rule (and vice versa); and because the outcomes of the formal 
and informal rule negotiations do not necessarily coincide (e.g. as a result of compro-
mises in the policy process);
– modern social security institutions are largely formal in nature: the allocation of rights 
and duties is to a large extent codified in government regulations. Present-day ‘vol-
untary’ social security (communal or familial schemes) tends to be rather marginal. 
Informal rules are largely subsidiary to the official ‘rules of the game’, in the sense that 
they complement and support the formal institutions. However, certain groups may 
hold informal views which deviate from the standard (‘benefit cultures’ among the 
underclass in certain neighbourhoods);
– regime types refer to specific configurations of formal rules: diverging national sets 
of coherent formal social security institutions at national level, which are intended to 
bring about specific collective goals.
From this point of view, for a number of reasons the correspondence between formal 
social security regimes and the informal rules prevailing in the various countries is likely 
to be high. National social security laws can by definition not cover all individual cir-
cumstances, and informal institutions may specify the latitude allowed by the formal 
schemes. For example, the official job-search requirements of the unemployment laws 
may be elaborated and endorsed by local community norms. Conversely, all social secu-
rity regimes require some degree of informal support: in a democratic society the dif-
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ferent ‘worlds’ will not be able to survive if they are fundamentally at odds with voters’ 
notions of what is a legitimate attribution of social security rights and obligations.
A third reason why regimes and informal rules may coincide is their common origin. 
As stressed by Esping-Andersen, regimes are products of history; in terms of the figural 
model in §2.3, they result from a specific configuration of relative prices, power relations, 
conflicts of interest and support for ideals. In the 20th century the corporatist, social-dem-
ocratic and liberal systems of formal institutions generally emerged because they were 
regarded as more efficient solutions to the problems of mass unemployment, poverty, 
etc. than their predecessors. They also reflect the diverging group interests (industrial 
workers, farmers, new middle classes) that prevailed in the various countries at the time. 
These were traded off in the policy process, where the introduction of universal suffrage 
had made it possible to obtain a democratic majority for ‘red-green’ or Catholic-Socialist 
coalitions, for example. The ensuing social security legislation reflected elements of the 
ideals of their various founders. Thus, historically informal notions of justice, solidarity 
etc. among the population at large and the national elites were instrumental in the vest-
ing of social security regimes. If these ideals are still echoed in the current informal rules 
on social security entitlements, duties etc. among the population, the shared history will 
imply a high correlation of informal rules and formal regimes.
A final aspect has to do with adaptation of informal rules as a result of the long-term 
exposure of the population to the various regime types. Once established, social security 
regimes tend to be rather stable as a result of path dependency. Changes in the formal 
regulations are often based on the principle of ‘maximising regime consistency, mini-
mising regime divergence’ (cf. Soede et al., 2004: 59-64), because this incurs the lowest 
costs and electoral risks for the traditional governing elites and their supporters. This 
stability of the regime typology over time can have an impact on the informal rules. The 
mere fact that people have been exposed to the different regime types for several dec-
ades may have resulted in a growing correspondence of formal institutions and informal 
social security rules over the years. Within each type, it is possible that the general pub-
lic have increasingly come to regard the existing attribution of entitlements as acquired 
rights, and the attached obligations of taxpayers as self-evident.
Yet each of these grounds may be disputed, and a high correlation of regime types and 
informal rules is therefore not inevitable. Informal institutions do not necessarily imply 
an elaboration and endorsement of the official rules; if ‘benefit cultures’ and tax-payers 
resistance are widespread, the opposite holds. Some public support for social security 
regulations may indeed be required; but informal notions of rights and obligations can 
be connected to formal institutions in many ways, and the link with the abstract level of 
regimes is particularly flexible. Although informal rules and formal regimes often have 
common roots, this does not mean they have to coincide. Historically ideals were only 
one of the factors in the vesting of the regimes, and at the time these may have been com-
promised in the process of rule negotiation. For instance, after the Second World War 
Dutch social democrats did not manage to introduce the universal old age state pension 
which was their  aim, but had to accept a social minimum based on compulsory national 
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insurance, which was topped up by earnings-related occupational pensions (cf. Roebroek 
& Hertogh, 1998: 289-306). It is also possible that the ideals which prevailed then are no 
longer shared by the present-day population; for example, in social-democratic regimes 
the decline of the traditional working class may imply that fewer people currently sup-
port the solidarity principle of national social insurance schemes.
Finally, the relevance of the ‘exposure’ argument – which is rather similar to the 
line of reasoning proposed by Larsen (2006) – should not be exaggerated. The regime 
types have existed for several decades, but perhaps not long enough to make a lasting 
impression on the informal rules of the general public, especially because, like all formal 
social security rules, the institutions expressing the different regime types tend to be 
under socialised (cf. §3.5). As a result the regimes are probably not deeply rooted in the 
populace; and this implies that in a different historical context they may come to hold 
other views on the right attribution of social security rights and duties. If changes in the 
‘incentive to regulate’ are sufficiently great – as a result of a war, a major recession, mass 
unemployment, marked ageing of the population, high migration, famine – the consen-
sus is likely to alter, and even regime shifts may not be unthinkable.
4.4 Conclusions
The first part of this chapter described the theoretical traits of social security regimes: 
diverging systems of coherent formal social security institutions at a national level. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) identified ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’. His ideal-type of a 
liberal regime theoretically has residual collective social security schemes: low benefits 
of limited duration, strong targeting of the needy through means testing, low spending 
on activating labour market policy, no collective child care provisions, and so on. On the 
other hand the type has a rather well-developed private insurance system for the middle 
classes. De-commodification (the extent to which one can attain an acceptable standard 
of living, independently of one’s market value) is low, and the liberal regime tends to 
sharpen social stratification into three layers: welfare clients and the working poor; the 
middle classes; and the privileged.
The social-democratic welfare regime is theoretically located at the other extreme. 
Here benefits are available for all, at a generous level, and may continue for as long as the 
social risk is apparent. The high collective costs this implies can only be afforded through 
an effective activating labour market policy. The participation rate of women is consider-
able, but they mainly work in the services sector. Private insurance is less important. This 
system aims at high de-commodification and a reduction in stratification.
Esping-Andersen’s third type is the corporatist one. Such a regime is theoretically 
well-developed, but benefits have a more selective basis. Rights are often tied to paid 
contributions and past labour experience. Certain groups, such as civil servants, have 
benefit schemes of their own – often at a higher level, corresponding to their elevated 
social status. Families with children are well-protected through collective schemes, with-
out striving for economic independence of both spouses. The labour market participation 
of women is therefore low, as is the participation rate of elderly men and disabled people. 
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The degree of de-commodification is theoretically limited. In terms of stratification, cor-
poratist regimes seek to reproduce the existing differences between status groups.
Empirical validity of the typology
Although Esping-Andersen’s typology may be criticised – especially his equating of 
regime traits with certain social results – the concept is interesting if one wishes to 
analyse the variety of formal institutions. His regime types indicate general, qualitatively 
different and coherent systems of formal rules. However, their empirical status is open 
to debate, as the many alternative classifications of regime types published over the 
last decades prove. The main object of this chapter was to test the empirical validity 
of  Esping-Andersen’s theory. Previous empirical analyses in this field have often only 
covered a part of the social security regime (e.g. pensions or health insurance), which 
cannot be considered the core of the regime types. Moreover, the number of variables 
was generally rather limited, and the multivariate techniques applied often assumed 
linear relationships, while the essence of the typology consists in categorical differences 
on a limited number of underlying dimensions.
A categorical principal components analysis (CatPCA) was performed over 54 formal 
regime traits. These referred, firstly, to the main formal social security regulations: pen-
sion schemes, disability benefits, surviving dependants’ pensions, unemployment and 
social assistance schemes, and provisions to accommodate the cost of children. The spe-
cific bias of corporatist countries was measured by the existence of separate schemes for 
occupational groups, and the level of social protection for civil servants. Besides this, 
a number of indicators for funding and labour market disincentives were included. For 
the scaling procedure a sample of countries was selected that would theoretically cover 
Es ping-Andersen’s three regime types. Sweden, Denmark and Norway were expected 
to be social-democratic, and Belgium, France and Germany to be corporatist. The usa, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia were theoretically considered to be liberal, 
although some authors claim the latter country to be part of a separate ‘Antipodean’ type. 
The Netherlands was hypothesised to be a hybrid case, combining social-democratic and 
corporatist traits.
Generally speaking, the CatPCA results confirm the existence of Esping-Andersen’s 
‘three worlds of welfare’. The component loadings of the variables fall into a number of 
consistent groups. They allow for a clear interpretation of two underlying dimensions, 
one referring to the scope of the rights and obligations implied (residual/extensive), the 
other to the degree of selectivity in social security (particularistic/universalistic). On these 
two principal components the clustering of countries largely corresponds to what was 
expected. Seven countries scale as characteristic exponents of the regime types: Sweden 
and Denmark for the social-democratic regime type, which is extensive and universalis-
tic; Belgium, Germany and France for the corporatist model (extensive-particularistic), 
and the usa and Australia for the liberal group (residual, and neither clearly universalistic 
nor particularistic). Three countries are less clear specimens, although they belong to 
the clusters as expected. In the social-democratic group, Norway is less extensive than 
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Sweden, and less universalistic than Denmark. The United Kingdom and Canada have 
social security regimes with a somewhat wider scope than the other liberal countries. 
The Netherlands emerges as the only true hybrid, however, occupying the expected posi-
tion between the social-democratic and corporatist countries.
Generality of regime types
Finally, the generality of the regime types was analysed. If the empirical findings pre-
sented here are combined with those of Shalev (1996, 2007) and Soede et al. (2004), the 
three ‘worlds of social security’ can be considered relatively stable phenomena during 
the final decades of the 20th century. However, they cannot be translated easily into more 
general welfare regime types. Esping-Andersen’s trichotomy is not clearly manifest in 
other domains of welfare. Although there seems to be a fairly close match with the design 
of education systems, this is much less so in the health sector or in housing policy.
On the other hand the link between regime types and informal rules turned out to be 
rather straightforward. In countries with a liberal social security regime, a smaller pro-
portion of the population wants the government to be responsible for reducing income 
inequality, and for providing jobs and a decent standard of living for people who are out 
of work than in countries belonging to the social-democratic and corporatist types. Also, 
in the liberal group there is generally less aversion to income differentials at the top.
The social-democratic regime type comes with social-democratic informal rules:  people 
are in favour of government intervention, they have a predilection for income equality, 
show postmaterialistic attitudes towards work, and women massively opt for (semi-)
government jobs. In countries with a corporatist regime, the population also prefers a 
‘strong’ government. Apart from that they favour traditional gender roles, attribute a 
rather elevated status to state officials, think seniority should be an important earnings 
criterion, and have a relatively lenient interpretation of formal rules. Finally, the Janus-
headed Dutch social security regime is backed by a set of informal rules that resemble 
those of the corporatist countries in some respects, and the social-democratic regimes 
in others. Thus, the correlation between formal regime types and informal institutions 
is quite high. Small differences occur in Denmark and Australia on the one hand – which 
are informally less pure than their formal system – and Norway and Canada on the other 
(less pure specimens of their regime types, but quite typical examples in terms of the 
informal rules). The main finding, however, is that all countries belong squarely to the 
same clusters in figures 4.2 and 4.4.
The results presented in this chapter suggest that social security regimes are real phenom-
ena, not mere ideal constructs invented in what Abrahamson (1999) called the “welfare 
modelling business” of political science – a trade which may incidentally not always be 
a particularly profitable one. The conclusions provide a good starting point for the issue 
that is at stake in the next two chapters: do the various regime types produce diverging 
collective outcomes?
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5  Benefit dependency
The fact that a section of the population receive benefit is one of the most important 
collective outcomes of the institutions of social security. This ‘benefit dependency’ is a 
direct consequence of the attribution of rights that forms a key element of all social secu-
rity rules. The number of people living on benefit not only impacts on public expendi-
ture, but also has a broader historical significance: the degree of benefit dependency can 
influence the economic process and social structuring of a society considerably. Theo-
retically, relationships may be assumed in particular with the growth and distribution 
of collective prosperity, the differentiation of social groups and their position on central 
stratification ladders (cf. §3.6.3).
This chapter explores whether the empirical types of social security regimes dis-
cussed previously exhibit differences in the number of benefit recipients they produce. 
It examines to what extent developments in the benefit volume in ten countries in the 
period 1980-1999 can be linked to the social security regimes to which they belong: the 
social-democratic, corporatist and liberal types and the hybrid Dutch system. Regime 
types – clusters of countries with diverging systems of coherent formal institutions at a 
national level, which aim to realise distinct collective goals – can be regarded as sparse 
models of institutional variety, at a high level of abstraction. It is reasonable to assume 
that the production of benefit dependency in the various regime types will vary, precisely 
because they strive to achieve different collective objectives.
The scientific importance of an analysis of the relationship between regime types and 
benefit dependency is twofold. In the first place, empirical research in this field is scarce, 
primarily because of the limited availability of data on benefit dependency. Since the 
design of social security arrangements takes place at national level, data collection tends 
to be country-specific, often lacking in uniformity for the various benefit schemes. Thus, 
within each country, there may be a wide divergence in the registration methods and 
accuracy of the figures on the take-up of pensions, unemployment insurance, social 
assistance benefits, etc. This data problem is even more apparent when it comes to inter-
national comparisons of trends in benefit dependency. Until fairly recently there were 
virtually no cross-comparative volume figures available with any degree of reliability and 
consistency, and none at all for a time series of any length.
A second reason is related to a proposition that was put forward in the previous 
chapter: rather than defining regimes a priori in terms of the outcomes they generate, 
the relation ship between such institutional configurations and their collective results 
should be a matter of empirical research.
The question explored here is also relevant from a policy perspective. Most Western 
governments have been attempting to curb the number of benefit recipients in recent 
decades. Several policy objectives underlie this drive. Apart from a desire to resolve 
short-term budgetary problems and concerns about the financial sustainability of social 
security schemes in the light of population ageing, it is also directed at increasing labour 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   249 21-9-2009   15:09:03
250
5
market participation and at targeting the available means on the neediest members of 
society. If a particular regime type facilitates better ‘volume curtailment’, this can guide 
the formulation of future policy – though it may be desirable to look not only at the trend 
in the number of benefits, but also at other factors such as the likely consequences for 
income differentials, labour market participation and the poverty rate (cf. chapter 6).
The terms ‘number of benefits’, ‘benefit dependency’ and ‘benefit volume’ are used 
here to refer to the same phenomenon. Three different aspects of this phenomenon are 
addressed in the empirical analyses: relative volume, volume growth and volume compo-
sition. First, in §5.1, the theoretical relationship between the different regime types and 
the benefit volume is discussed. This generates hypotheses concerning the influence of 
social security regimes on the three aspects referred to. Some of the problems in meas-
uring the number of benefits are discussed in §5.2, where the data used here will also be 
explained briefly. Attention then turns to the question of whether there is a direct cor-
relation between regime type and the three aspects of benefit dependency, and whether 
the differences operate in the expected direction (§5.3). The growth figures are then sub-
jected to a multivariate analysis. In §5.4 a causal model is developed and tested for a 
pool of countries; this incorporates the most important exogenous factors (demograph-
ics, economy, labour market) and institutional changes. Country-specific versions of the 
model are presented in §5.5, where an attempt is made to establish whether there really 
is a relationship with the type of social security regimes after the impact of other factors 
has been discounted. The main conclusions of the chapter are set out in §5.6.
5.1 Regimes and benefit dependency: theoretical expectations
In his theory, Esping-Andersen devotes little attention to the theoretical relationship 
between regime types and the number of benefits. His original analysis is concerned 
mainly with the divergent policy strategies employed by countries in the 1980s, stressing 
the growing interconnectedness of the labour market and social security policy in that 
period (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 144-161). However, a number of observations on the devel-
opment of the benefit volume in European welfare states are relevant. Esping-Andersen 
points out that many corporatist welfare states opted for a labour market exit strategy 
from 1980, which was aimed primarily at combating rising unemployment. In countries 
such as France and Germany, but also in the hybrid Netherlands, the labour supply was 
constrained by the policy of allowing older workers to exit from the labour market via 
fairly generous schemes for early retirement, disability benefits and long-term unem-
ployment. Moreover, the entry of women to the labour market has traditionally been dis-
couraged in this regime type by offering high child benefits, good surviving dependants’ 
insurance and tax breaks for breadwinners with children. Both policy strategies tend to 
foster a relatively high benefit volume.
In the social-democratic regimes of Sweden and Denmark, by contrast, the main 
thrust of policy was to maximise labour supply. Unlike in the Western European welfare 
states, older workers were not pushed into early retirement schemes en masse in the 1980s. 
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Moreover, labour participation, especially by women, is actively promoted in this regime 
type by creating employment in the public services sector (typically in the fields of care, 
welfare and education). These factors in theory mean that benefit dependency in social-
democratic regimes is lower than in corporatist regimes. Yet Esping-Andersen makes an 
important qualification in this respect. To promote labour participation, the Scandina-
vian welfare states have extensive provisions for working parents and sick employees: 
leave arrangements related to maternity, the caring for close relatives and the medical 
incapacity for performing one’s job. This implies that there is a relatively high level of 
‘benefit dependency’ within the employed population. In other words, the high labour 
participation in the social-democratic regimes is accompanied by high rates of absentee-
ism and large-scale take-up of legally guaranteed occupational social security benefits. 
In Sweden, for example, not only is the female participation rate very high, but it is also 
the case that “on any given day, more than 20 percent of employed women are absent with 
pay” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 155).
Esping-Andersen does not however formulate a very explicit hypothesis on the rela-
tionship between regime types and the benefit volume. Based on his observations cer-
tain differences between the corporatist and social-democratic regimes may be assumed. 
The large-scale exits of elderly from the labour market may imply that the benefit volume 
in the first type of regime is higher, though this probably will be partly offset by the high 
absenteeism rates of employed persons in the second regime type. The composition of 
the total population of benefit recipients also is likely to differ between the two regime 
types. In the corporatist countries, arrangements for surviving dependants, child benefit 
and early retirement possibly account for a large proportion of total benefit volumes. By 
contrast, social-democratic countries may be expected to have a relatively high propor-
tion of employee benefits, including sick leave. With regard to the liberal regime type it is 
not possible to derive any straightforward hypotheses on the size and composition of the 
benefit volume from Esping-Andersen’s analysis. One could be inclined to suppose that 
the number of social security recipients will be lower in these systems (because of means 
testing, the less generous benefits, the more limited duration of benefits), and that a 
rather large share of benefit dependency will consist of social assistance provisions.
In principle, the outcomes of the analysis of social security regimes in the previous chap-
ter could offer avenues for the development of more substantiated hypotheses. A first 
assumption that may be posited is that the scope of the system is the most important 
determinant of the number of benefits. Countries with a high score on the first dimen-
sion in figure 4.2 would then be expected to produce a high benefit volume, while coun-
tries with a limited scope would generate relatively few benefits. This assumed oppo-
sition between ‘extensive’ and ‘residual’ regimes can be supported by reference to the 
relative generosity of the benefits provided, the long duration of entitlements, the lack 
of means testing, and so on. However, an argument against this ‘scope hypothesis’ is that 
it is precisely the regime type with the broadest scope, the social-democratic systems, 
which explicitly try to limit benefit dependency, among other things by pursuing an acti-
vating labour market policy. If that policy is successful, then theoretically a wide scope 
need not by definition imply that the number of benefit recipients is high.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   251 21-9-2009   15:09:03
252
5
An alternative is to base the hypotheses on the second dimension of the typology 
from the previous chapter (universalism/particularism). For instance, the benefit vol-
ume might be expected to be greatest in the particularistic corporatist regimes, due to 
the high take-up in occupational social security and civil service schemes, the advanced 
age of statutory retirement, the extensive protection of widows and orphans, the low 
entry thresholds and high levels of employee disability benefits, and the lack of atten-
tion for activating labour market policy in such systems. On the other hand, it might also 
be assumed that the volume would be greatest in the universalistic social-democratic 
regimes, as a result of the large target group of public social security in this regime type. 
The contrasts on the second dimension are thus difficult to interpret in terms of the 
number of benefits they are likely to bring about.
This leads to the conclusion that it is not possible to link the benefit volume unequiv-
ocally to the ranking of countries on the two dimensions which emerged in the earlier 
typological analysis of formal institutions. A more focused approach is required in order 
to develop theoretically substantiated hypotheses.
Figure 5.1 shows the score on a theoretical ‘benefit dependency boost index’ for the same 
eleven countries which figured in chapter 4. The index was constructed by analysing the 
differences between countries for 60 formal institutions – partially overlapping with 
those in figure 4.1 – with regard to their potential impact on the number of benefits. In 
the first step, separate indices were constructed for the boosts ensuing from the formal 
rules on the risks of old age, unemployment, social assistance, etc., and from a number 
of labour market institutions (activating labour market policy, collective labour agree-
ments, statutory minimum wage). The general index was obtained by adding up these 
scores, after weighting in accordance with the potential influence of the various schemes 
on the total number of benefits in the population. This weighting is necessary because 
there are, for example, far more people aged over 65 who are eligible for old age pension 
than there are parents with an entitlement to care leave. In the former case we are dealing 
with full year cohorts, who will make use of the provision until their death, while the sec-
ond case concerns a group of working parents who will withdraw fully or partially from 
the labour market for a limited period. The index reflects the situation in around 1990; 
the details of the procedure followed are set out in Annex 1.
Based on this analysis, the four countries belonging to the liberal regime type theo-
retically have the lowest volume-boosting effect, with an average index score of -1.00. 
They score lowest on average on the arrangements for disability, unemployment and 
early retirement as well as on the statutory employee benefits (sickness benefit, mater-
nity and parental leave arrangements). Higher index values are reached only for social 
assistance schemes and labour market institutions. The liberal countries theoretically 
have a relatively high social assistance benefit volume; not because this provision is more 
open or generous than elsewhere, but primarily because the other arrangements are less 
extensive so that, all other things being equal, more people are forced to rely on the 
social safety net. In the area of labour market institutions, the low spending on activating 
labour market policy theoretically pushes up the benefit volume. The retirement pension 
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arrangements, which weigh heavily in the total index, score around the average in the lib-
eral countries, mostly because the formal retirement age for men (65 years) is lower than 
in most social-democratic countries but higher than in the corporatist welfare states.
There is a fairly wide dispersion within the liberal group, although their index score is in 
all cases lower than that of the representatives of the social-democratic and corporatist 
social security regimes. The United States has far and away the lowest score of all coun-
tries, and on the grounds of the formal institutional structure should therefore theo-
retically generate the lowest number of benefits. This is primarily a result of the limited 
scope of the social assistance and unemployment arrangements, the absence of mass 
early exit programmes and the lack of a lowered formal retirement age. In addition, the 
usa records the lowest score of all countries on collective employee benefits (sickness 
benefits and leave arrangements), though these do not carry much weight in the total 
index and the differences compared with the other liberal countries are not very great. 
It is remarkable that the usa achieves a much lower score on the constituent index for 
social assistance benefit than the other liberal countries, while it scores comparatively 
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high on labour market institutions – mostly because activating labour market policy is 
limited – and survivor’s benefits.
The benefit volume in Australia should theoretically be curtailed because retirement 
pensions are means tested. The same applies for survivor’s pensions, though they carry 
less weight in the total volume. The benefit volume is further constrained by the absence 
of a collective unemployment insurance system. This implies that in principle unem-
ployed persons have to rely on social assistance, on which Australia attains the highest 
boost score. The country also ends up high on the formal retirement age (which is low 
for women) and labour market institutions (little in the way of activating labour market 
policy).
The relative number of benefits paid in Canada is expected to be higher than in Aus-
tralia, primarily because of Canada’s score on unemployment insurance and survivor’s 
benefits, which is more elevated than in the other liberal countries. The fact that the 
retirement age has not been lowered (65 years for both sexes) exerts some downward 
pressure on the benefit volume.
In the liberal group, the benefit volume in principle should be highest in Great Britain, 
among other things because there are more opportunities here for exiting the labour 
market early than in the other liberal countries. In addition, the low formal retirement 
age for women theoretically pushes up the volume of these benefits in Great Britain, 
though this is offset to some extent by the fact that people can also choose to retire after 
the age of 65. Great Britain also theoretically scores higher than the average for the liberal 
countries on social assistance, unemployment benefit and sickness benefit. However, the 
benefit volume is expected to be constrained by the flat rate disability benefits.
The three countries in the social-democratic regime cluster occupy a middle position, 
with an average index value of 0.03. Typically, they score low on some arrangements but 
high on others. Little benefit boost is expected in general from the pension and early 
retirement schemes (because of the fairly high formal retirement age and the limited 
opportunities for early exit), survivor’s pensions and social assistance benefit. The exten-
sive activating labour market policy also theoretically constrains the benefit volume in 
the social-democratic regimes. However, this is partly cancelled out by the expected high 
volumes of disability benefit, unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and employee 
leave arrangements.
The spread within the social-democratic cluster is smaller than in the liberal group. 
Norway theoretically has the lowest benefit dependency. This is due to the low scores on 
unemployment and social assistance benefits, the high standard retirement age (67 years) 
and the limited early exit opportunities. When it comes to disability benefit and survi-
vor’s pensions, however, the Norwegian score is higher. The activating labour market 
policy, which is more limited than in the two other social-democratic countries, also 
theoretically boosts the volume somewhat.
Denmark occupies a middle position, both within the social-democratic group and 
across all countries together. The number of benefits is in theory depressed fairly sub-
stantially by the high statutory retirement age (which until 2004 was 67 years; it has since 
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been lowered to 65 years) and the lack of a separate arrangement for surviving dependants. 
The take-up of disability benefit is also theoretically lower than in Norway and Sweden 
because the entry thresholds (the required minimum percentage of incapacity for work) 
are higher and the benefit levels lower (a flat rate benefit is paid for non-occupational dis-
ability). Against this, however, Denmark theoretically achieves a fairly high score on the 
number of unemployment benefits, early exits, social assistance and employee benefits, 
so that ultimately it ends up in the middle.
Sweden comes out on top in the social-democratic cluster. Retirement pensions are 
decisive here: Sweden has a standard retirement age of 65 years, which generates addi-
tional benefits compared with Norway and Denmark. If this factor is left out of consid-
eration when calculating the benefit dependency boost index, Sweden is overtaken by 
the other two countries1. Theoretically, Sweden has the lowest benefit volume boosting 
effect for early exits and labour market institutions (because of the high expenditure on 
activating labour market policy). However, in around 1990 Sweden scores the highest of 
all countries on sickness benefits and leave arrangements, while the volume of disability 
benefits, unemployment benefits2 and survivor’s pensions was also theoretically sub-
stantial.
Of the three regime types, the countries in the corporatist regime may be expected to 
generate the highest benefit volume (average index value 0.71). In theory, they bring 
about especially large numbers of retirement and early exit benefits, and also score 
highly on unemployment and survivor’s benefits. The score is never low on the other 
arrangements, with the exception of the expected volume of social assistance benefits. 
This latter arrangement is less generous than in the social-democratic countries, and the 
extensive nature of the other provisions earlier in the ‘benefit chain’ imply that people 
less often have to rely on social assistance benefit.
Belgium theoretically has the lowest number of benefits in the corporatist group. Its 
score on the index is comparatively low because of the limited nature of disability benefits, 
social assistance benefits and sickness leave and the fairly high spending on activating 
labour market policy. However, the benefit volume in Belgium is theoretically driven up 
by the low statutory retirement age for women, the ample opportunities for early exit and 
the high expected take-up of survivor’s pensions and unemployment insurance.
Germany records a slightly higher score on the benefit dependency boost index. The 
volume is expected to be fairly high for the relatively generous social assistance benefits, 
sickness benefits and survivor’s pensions. The take-up of unemployment insurance and 
early exit arrangements is also theoretically rather high in Germany, though is somewhat 
lower than the expected volume in Belgium and France. Compared with those two coun-
tries, there is theoretically a substantial reduction in the benefit volume in Germany due 
to the higher formal statutory retirement age (65 years for both sexes).
It is largely this latter factor which ensures that France comes out highest in this clus-
ter; the comparatively low retirement age for both men and women (60 years) is expected 
to lead to large numbers of additional benefits. France also achieves a higher dependency 
boost score than all other countries on early exits. In addition, a high volume of benefits 
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is made more likely by the institutional traits of the disability schemes (especially the 
high benefit level and the low entry threshold for the risque professionnel) and the limited 
activating labour market policy. France scores lower than the other corporatist countries 
on unemployment insurance and social assistance, which at the time of this study had 
recently been introduced and which had a limited duration (three months, with a pos-
sibility of extension).
The Netherlands, with its hybrid system, achieves the highest score on the index (1.77). From 
the perspective of the benefit volume, the Dutch benefit arrangements in around 1990 
can be theoretically characterised as ‘the worst of three worlds’. As with the corporatist 
countries, a high volume may be expected in the early exit arrangements, survivor’s ben-
efits and unemployment insurance. The Netherlands theoretically shares a large number 
of benefits with the social-democratic cluster because of its sickness and disability ben-
efits. And although the number of social assistance benefits is expected to be somewhat 
lower than in Australia, Canada and Great Britain, the Netherlands scores fairly high on 
this typically ‘liberal’ benefit, too. The only areas where this hybrid system did not score 
highly in around 1990 were the formal retirement age (65 years for both sexes), employee 
leave arrangements and the spending on activating labour market policy. On the two lat-
ter institutional characteristics, the Netherlands lags behind the social-democratic coun-
tries and tends more towards the corporatist level.
The constituent scores for disability and unemployment benefit are the highest in the 
Netherlands of all 11 countries. The fact that the disability benefit volume is expected to 
be so high is due to the extensive coverage, low entry threshold and high benefit levels for 
the risque social; the Dutch benefits for occupational disability are not in the top group. The 
number of unemployment benefits in around 1990 is theoretically considerable as well, 
because the benefit conditions in the Netherlands were almost as favourable as those in 
Sweden or Denmark, while activating labour market policy targeted at the unemployed 
(training for unemployed people, specific measures for unemployed and disadvantaged 
youth, support for unemployed people starting businesses) was much more limited than 
in those countries.
It is not surprising that this combination of institutional arrangements implies 
that the benefit volume in the Netherlands is likely to be the highest of all countries 
considered here – though the high score for this hybrid regime on the benefit depend-
ency boost index may be inflated somewhat as a result of the substitutability of certain 
benefits3.
The ranking of the countries on the index thus suggests that there are clear differences 
between the regime types in the number and type of benefits they can be expected to 
generate on the basis of their formal institutions. The ranking found – the lowest benefit 
volume in countries in the liberal cluster, the highest in the corporatist group, with the 
social-democratic regime taking a middle position – is not consistent with the position 
of the regime types in the typological analysis in the previous chapter (the country scores 
on the first and second dimensions in figure 4.2). It can be expressed in a number of 
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hypotheses about the three aspects of the benefit volume distinguished earlier: relative 
volume, volume growth rates and volume composition.
(1) Relative volume
The differences between the country clusters on the benefit dependency boost index lead 
to the following theoretical expectations with regard to the relative benefit volumes:
(1A) In the hybrid Dutch social security regime, the relative volume of benefits is higher than in 
countries with a corporatist regime;
(1B) In countries with a corporatist social security regime, the relative volume of benefits is higher 
than in countries with a social-democratic regime;
(1C) In countries with a social-democratic social security regime, the relative volume of benefits is 
higher than in countries with a liberal regime.
Thus, the relative volume hypothesis can be simply expressed as follows:
vhyb  >  vcrp  >  vsd  >  vlib
where v =   number of benefit years as a percentage of the population in the 
relevant age group
hyb =   hybrid social security regime (nl)
crp =   representatives of the corporatist social security regime type (be, de, fr)
sd =   representatives of the social-democratic social security regime type (se, dk, no)
lib =   representatives of the liberal social security regime type (us, au, ca, gb)
By way of extension, it may also be interesting to look at the within-cluster ranking. Does 
the usa, as figure 5.1 theoretically suggests, rank much lower in the liberal cluster than 
Australia and Canada, which in turn rank lower than Great Britain? Is the relative benefit 
volume in Denmark larger than in Norway but smaller than in Sweden? And does France 
have more benefits than Germany, while Belgium comes lowest in the corporatist clus-
ter? However, these are secondary hypotheses, which will be looked at only briefly.
(2) Growth rates
Similar expectations can be derived from the benefit dependency boost scores with 
regard to the annual percentage growth in the absolute number of benefits. The latter 
indicator differs from the relative volume in two respects: looking at the annual changes 
means that the differences between countries in the level of benefit dependency are left 
out of consideration; and there is no link with the relevant age group.
One advantage of using growth figures is that they provide a very direct measure 
of the number of benefits generated in a specific period, i.e. the difference between 
the number of people moving onto and off social security benefits within a given year, 
abstracting from the historically determined stock. If we wish to analyse the causes of 
benefit dependency, growth rates moreover offer a number of practical and technical 
advantages (these will be explored further in the discussion of the causal model in §5.4). 
There are however also a few potential problems. High growth figures may arise partly 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   257 21-9-2009   15:09:04
258
5
autonomously – if the size of the population increases, the benefit volume will expand 
for that reason alone – and they then say little about the performance of a specific social 
security regime. In addition, growth rates are sensitive to base rate and ceiling effects. 
If the initial benefit volume is very low, there is a strong chance that it will grow steeply 
in percentage terms over time, while in absolute terms the increase may be fairly small. 
Conversely, the higher the initial volume, the more likely it is that the number of benefits 
will not rise very sharply in percentage terms, whereas the increase in the size of the 
groups concerned may well be considerable.
This also implies that looking at growth rates can lead to different conclusions than 
when considering relative volumes. For example, welfare states that are ‘late develop-
ers’ may experience strong percentage growth in the number of benefit recipients, while 
benefit dependency expressed as a percentage of the total population may still be negli-
gible. In comparative analyses they may then end up near the top of the country ranking 
in terms of the growth rates, whereas they remain at the bottom of the list in the relative 
volume figures.
Although the two indicators are of course related, it is therefore useful to formulate 
separate hypotheses on the growth in the number of benefits, in line with the scores on 
the theoretical index4:
(2A) In the hybrid Dutch social security regime, the number of benefits grows more strongly than 
in countries with a corporatist regime;
(2B) In countries with a corporatist social security regime, the number of benefits grows more 
strongly than in countries with a social-democratic regime;
(2C) In countries with a social-democratic social security regime, the number of benefits grows 
more strongly than in countries with a liberal regime.
In abbreviated form the benefit dependency growth rate hypothesis can then be represented as 
follows:
Δhyb > Δcrp > Δsd > Δlib
 
where Δ =   percentage change in the number of benefit years (compared with the previous  
calendar year)
hyb =   hybrid social security regime (nl)
crp =   representatives of the corporatist social security regime type (be, de, fr)
sd =   representatives of the social-democratic social security regime type (se, dk, no)
lib =   representatives of the liberal social security regime type (us, au, ca, gb)
Here again it is possible to examine whether there is a within-cluster ranking, which 
would be expected for the regime types on the basis of figure 5.1 (see the above second-
ary hypotheses).
(3) Volume composition
Based on the constituent scores which underlie the benefit dependency boost index, a 
number of hypotheses can also be formulated concerning the composition of the benefit 
volume. These apply to schemes for people below the standard pensionable age, where 
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according to the constituent indices one type of social security regime theoretically 
brings about more benefits than others. Expectations are that:
(3A) The relative volume of early exit schemes (early retirement pension, long-term unemploy-
ment benefit for older persons, disability benefit for former employees) is highest in coun-
tries with a corporatist social security regime;
(3B) The relative volume of unemployment insurance benefit is highest in countries with a corpo-
ratist social security regime;
(3C) The relative volume of survivor’s benefits is highest in countries with a corporatist social 
security regime;
(3D) The relative volume of employee benefits (sickness benefit, leave arrangements) is highest in 
countries with a social-democratic social security regime;
(3E) The relative volume of disability benefits for people not gainfully employed is highest in 
countries with a social-democratic social security regime;
 (3F) The relative volume of social assistance benefits is highest in countries with a liberal social 
security regime;
(3G) The relative volume for all types of benefit is above average in the hybrid Dutch social secu-
rity regime.
In brief, the volume composition hypothesis can also be formulated as follows:
v (a,b,c)crp > v 
(a,b,c) 
lib, sd, hyb
v (d,e)sd > v 
(d,e) 
lib, crp, hyb
v (f)lib > v 
(f) 
sd, crp, hyb
v (a-f)hyb > v̄  
(a-f) 
crp, lib, sd, hyb
where
v a = benefit years early exit schemes (as % of the relevant reference group)
v b = benefit years unemployment insurance (ditto)
vc =  benefit years survivor’s benefits (ditto)
vd =  benefit years employee dependency (ditto)
ve =  benefit years disability insurance for non-employees (ditto)
vf =  benefit years social assistance (ditto)
v̄  (a-f)crp, lib, sd, hyb = average relative volume in the individual arrangements
crp =  representatives of the corporatist social security regime type (be, de, fr)
lib =  representatives of the liberal social security regime type (us, au, ca, gb)
sd =  representatives of the social-democratic social security regime type (se, dk, no)
hyb = hybrid social security regime (nl)
These expectations with regard to the volume composition in different regime types do 
not derive purely from the scores on the benefit dependency boost index, but can also 
be substantiated on other grounds. For example, hypothesis 3A is in line with Esping-
Andersen’s assertion that corporatist countries deliberately use early retirement schemes 
to regulate labour supply and unemployment.
That the volume of unemployment insurance benefits is expected to be highest in the 
corporatist regime type (hypothesis 3B) is a result from the typical combination of high 
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benefits, long potential duration, and a fairly passive labour market policy. The latter aspect 
marks a key difference compared with the social-democratic regime, where the favourable 
benefit conditions are linked to an intensive policy of activation. The liberal group can 
be expected to have lower volumes because unemployment insurance has limited cover, 
benefits are far below previously earned salary, and benefit duration is limited, as the enti-
tlements are intended to tide people over periods of temporary unemployment.
The high volume of survivor’s benefits in the corporatist regime type (hypothesis 3C) 
can be argued from the basis of the breadwinner model prevailing in these countries. 
Sustaining that model means that the non-working female partner and children have to 
be well protected in the event of the loss of the man from the family. The arrangements 
are generous, long-lasting and do not require widowed women to go out to work. By con-
trast, in the social-democratic regime type the assumption is that the partner left behind 
already has a job or will go out to work; and in the liberal regime the collective provisions 
for surviving dependants have limited coverage, and are often wholly or partly means-
tested. This explains why these two types theoretically have a lower benefit volume than 
the corporatist regimes.
In line with Esping-Andersen’s observation on the large-scale take-up of benefits 
among the gainfully employed (the other side of the high labour participation rate), the 
social-democratic regime is expected to have the highest volume of employee benefits, 
especially for sick leave and care leave (hypothesis 3D). In the corporatist regimes cov-
erage and duration are more limited (and the benefit volume is constrained by the low 
labour participation rate of women), while in the liberal cluster these provisions are low 
across the board.
The expectation that the social-democratic regime will generate the highest volume 
of non-employee disability benefits (hypothesis 3E) is based on the fact that groups such 
as the early disabled, the self-employed, housewives and students are covered by this 
collective arrangement. Elsewhere they are forced to rely on private insurance or social 
assistance. The picture here may be complicated somewhat by the substantial number of 
disability benefits paid to military veterans in some countries.
The reason for the high expected volume of social assistance benefits in the liberal 
regime type (hypothesis 3F) lies mainly in the limited role of the arrangements earlier 
in the ‘benefit chain’ (in particular employee insurance benefits), so that more people 
are forced to rely on the social safety net. The United States may be a special case here, 
because its social assistance benefit is fairly ungenerous, in terms of the net replacement 
rates, duration, and the indexing of benefits. The usa is far below the average on the 
social assistance score that forms part of the benefit dependency boost index, while the 
other representatives of the liberal regime type score significantly higher.
As stated above, the hybrid Dutch regime theoretically combines the ‘worst of three 
worlds’. In practice, however, the volumes may not be extreme across the board, because 
of the substitutability of some benefits mentioned above. This is reflected in the termi-
nology chosen in hypothesis 3G: a large number of benefits is expected for all of these 
arrangements in the Netherlands, to be understood as a relative volume which is higher 
than the average.
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The remainder of this chapter examines whether the available empirical data support 
the assumptions. The possibilities for statistical testing of the hypotheses are limited, 
because we are dealing here with macro-data with a small number of observations. This, 
however, is only one of the complications in the comparative empirical analysis of these 
issues. It will therefore be useful first to look more deeply at the problems that can arise 
when measuring benefit dependency, and to explain the data used.
5.2 Measuring benefit dependency
Although the concept of benefit dependency is fairly straightforward, this does not imply 
that the phenomenon can be measured easily. At the collective level, the term simply 
refers to the number of people in receipt of social security benefits; or, following the 
logical fundamental structure of social security institutions discussed in chapter 3, to 
the size of the subset of group A (entitled actors) that actually takes up benefits, plus the 
group of non-entitled recipients. The rights R are related to the occurrence of certain 
risks (old age, unemployment, etc.) and are granted in a process of application of social 
security rules that includes monitoring and sanctioning (see the theoretical interaction 
models in the previous chapter). In the case of benefit dependency, R typically refers to 
transfers which target a lack or loss of income on the part of the recipients. Although the 
rules may allow for preventive and restorative interventions, these are not relevant for 
the calculation of benefit dependency.
Conceptually this is fairly clear; yet measuring benefit dependency at national level is not 
simple, and in cross-comparative research issues of data reliability and validity tend to 
multiply. A first measurement topic that arises is what kinds of social security one should 
study. Theoretically it is desirable to include all theoretical risks, no matter how they 
are covered. This implies that one should take into account the volume of regulations 
which target both the classic and new risks mentioned in chapter 3: not only pensions, 
early retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, 
survivor’s benefits, social assistance benefits, family benefits and health costs insurance, 
but also arrangements covering the costs of parental leave and divorce, income fluctua-
tions as a result of freelance labour, the costs of social participation, etc. These should 
preferably include both formal and informal social security schemes; i.e. social security 
provided or enforced by central and local government, occupational schemes, and com-
munal and familial arrangements. In practice, however, an analysis of benefit depend-
ency in such a wide institutional sense tends to be impossible because a complete set of 
data on all these different types of arrangements cannot be obtained.
Even where data on benefit volumes are available, they may be measured inadequately. 
Due to low response rates by benefit recipients, and under-reporting of benefit receipt by 
respondents, surveys are generally not a reliable source for assessing the total benefit vol-
ume. Figures on benefit dependency therefore usually need to be compiled from several 
different administrative databases and national statistics, often designed for the specific 
regulations they cover. These sources may not be accurate or up to date, and even if they 
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are, they may not be very ‘rich’: in practice they often contain only the basic information 
that is essential in terms of the specific regulation and the current administrative proce-
dure (e.g. little data on the accumulation of benefits, employment history, level of educa-
tion, distribution by age and gender). It is also quite common for each database to have 
its own specific design, with its own variables and specific definitions. Trend-breaks may 
occur due to changes in the statutory regulations, in the structure and administrative 
processes of the social security organisation, or in the data-gathering procedure. This 
makes it difficult to integrate volume figures from different benefit schemes, even at the 
national level. If the aim is to compare benefit dependency internationally, such integra-
tion becomes more problematic as the number of countries increases.
The unit of benefit payment is also a matter of interest. Some types of benefit may be 
provided to individuals, while others may be paid to households. An integrated national 
database needs to apply some kind of conversion formula, preferably to the level of indi-
viduals (because a member of a household is covered, even if he or she does not receive 
the benefit in person). In comparing national benefit volumes, an additional complica-
tion may arise, in that the same kind of benefit may in some countries be paid to individ-
uals, in others to households. This difference is especially prominent in national pension 
schemes and social assistance arrangements.
Another complication is the treatment of benefits of different duration. Person 
A may receive an unemployment benefit for just a few weeks, while person B’s benefit 
dependency could last for years. Of course, it is not sound arithmetic to count these as 
two equivalent benefits. The obvious solution is not to look at the number of people 
receiving a benefit, but to convert volume figures to a standardised unit of time, for 
instance benefit years. However, this requires detailed data on benefit duration, which 
are not always available.
It is also possible that the same person may receive several benefits within a certain 
period of time. This can happen sequentially, for instance if the unemployment benefit 
of person C expires, and he or she applies for social assistance. But it may also be a con-
juncture: if person D has lost his job, but is partially disabled, he or she may receive both 
unemployment and disability benefit. If these do not add up to the national minimum 
income standard, a partial social assistance benefit may even be granted on top of this. Of 
course, theoretically this can also be accommodated by a correction to full-time benefit 
years, provided the administrative databases are linked. In cross-national studies, both 
the number of coinciding benefits and the possibilities for applying corrections may vary. 
This of course may lead to different degrees of reliability.
A final issue is how to deal with partial benefits. Take person E, who used to work 
part-time. If he applies for unemployment benefit, it is commonly awarded in propor-
tion to the level the applicant would have received if he had worked full-time. In terms of 
duration, however, there is often no difference between unemployed part-timers and full-
timers. Should one then count the part-timer’s benefit as, say, half a benefit year? Once 
again, in comparative research the complications that arise are even greater. Countries 
may differ in the prevalence of part-time work, in the rules for granting partial benefits, 
and in the possibilities for detecting and correcting them in the available databases.
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Precisely because of measurement problems such as these, official international statis-
tics have to date contained few data on the number of people in receipt of benefit, though 
the situation has improved somewhat in recent years (see e.g. Eurostat, 2004a). The best 
available database contains time series for a number of countries based on national 
statistical data for the period 1980-1999, with consistent definitions being used where 
possible. These data were originally gathered by Ecorys/nei at the request of the Dutch 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (cf. Arents et al., 2000; Moor et al., 2002). The 
oecd subjected the data to secondary analysis and added a number of countries (oecd, 
2003a: 171-235; see also Carcillo & Grubb, 2006: 55-60; Grubb et al., 2009: 21, 70). The lat-
ter dataset has been adapted here and used to test the hypotheses formulated earlier as 
adequately as possible5. Even so, in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of all the 
different regulations in the various countries, it was unavoidably necessary to introduce 
assumptions and estimates in some parts of the data; and in order to obtain complete 
time series, interpolations were sometimes necessary.
In the analysis, social security has been limited to formal institutions only; the 
data relate to regulations founded in national law, whether these are administered by a 
govern ment agency or otherwise. As a result, occupational social security arrangements 
are included as long as they have a statutory basis6; e.g. Dutch sick leave figures have been 
incorporated even after the privatisation of 1996, because the legislator obliged employ-
ers to continue payment of salary for a certain period in the event of sickness. A further 
selection has been made by confining the dataset to the major income replacement pro-
grammes: statutory old age and survivor’s pensions, early retirement schemes, sick leave, 
disability benefits, unemployment insurance, maternity and care leave, and periodic 
social assistance payments. Child benefit, childcare facilities, incidental benefits (such as 
one-off social assistance payments), benefits for earmarked costs (e.g. housing benefit) 
and benefits in kind, such as medical care, are left out of consideration.
The measurement issues discussed above have been tackled by adopting the follow-
ing strategies (see also Arents et al., 2000: 8-12):
– All benefits, including partial benefits and benefits which were not paid for a full year, 
are in principle converted to complete benefit years of persons. Supplementary ben-
efits were counted only if they do not coincide with other benefits7.
– The problem that certain benefits are paid to households applies particularly for retire-
ment pensions and social assistance. The number of retirement benefit years for peo-
ple aged over 65 has been maximised to the size of the population in that age group in 
each calendar year. In virtually all countries studied, social assistance benefits are paid 
to households and usually cannot be converted to individualised benefit years. As a 
result, the social assistance volume tends to be underestimated for couples, possibly 
in differing degrees across countries8.
– A correction for conjuncture of benefits was applied by using the available national 
information. Where there is a clear risk of duplicate benefits (e.g. early retirees who 
also receive unemployment benefit) the volume of an entire regulation has sometimes 
been discarded for certain groups (for example on the basis of the age distributions of 
benefit recipients).
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A complication is that the data were only available at the aggregate level of countries, not 
for individual benefit recipients. This rules out the use of certain statistical methods, such 
as multi-level analysis (cf. chapter 6). Furthermore, the effects of the regime types on ben-
efit volume cannot be studied for all countries included in the previous chapter, because 
Norway is missing from the data set. The volume trend between 1980 and 1999 is therefore 
analysed here for two social-democratic social security regimes (Sweden and Denmark), 
three corporatist regimes (Belgium, Germany and France), four liberal regimes (Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain and the United States), and the hybrid Netherlands9. These ten 
countries offer sufficient institutional variety to enable us to study whether social security 
regimes differ in the volume and type of benefits they generate; but of course the number 
of observations at the collective level remains rather small, especially considering the fact 
that the underlying data on individual recipients are not available.
The limitations noted above call for a degree of caution, but the data used here probably 
still give a fairly accurate indication of the volume and composition of benefit depend-
ency in the countries studied. Undoubtedly, however, the information provision on this 
point leaves room for future improvement (see also oecd, 2003a: 221-222).
5.3 The development of benefit dependency
This section investigates whether the data on the development of benefit volume sup-
port the theoretical expectations formulated above. The relative volume hypothesis is 
first examined (§5.3.1), followed by the benefit dependency growth hypothesis (§5.3.2) 
and the volume composition hypothesis (§5.3.3). The analyses in this section are bivari-
ate: the aim is to ascertain whether there is a direct relationship between the regime 
type and the three volume aspects. This not only provides a detailed picture of the actual 
trends in benefit volume in the various countries, but also enables the adequacy of the 
simplest explanation (there is a monocausal relationship between regime type and ben-
efit volume) to be tested. Bearing in mind Ockham’s Razor and Popper’s ideas on methodo-
logical simplicity10 a more complex, multivariate approach should only be preferred if the 
bivariate hypothesis proves untenable. A priori the latter seems rather likely, because the 
countries studied here differ not only in terms of their social security regime, but also in 
their demographic structure and wider socio-economic context. Aspects such as these, 
however, will be explored in the next section; first, the explanatory power of the simplest 
approach will be assessed.
5.3.1 Relative volume
The expectation was expressed earlier that the relative benefit volume in the hybrid 
Dutch regime would be higher than in countries with a corporatist social security regime 
(hypothesis 1A); the latter would score higher than the social-democratic cluster (1B), 
which would in their turn generate comparatively more benefits than the liberal group 
(1C). Figure 5.2 shows the ranking of the ten countries studied as regards relative volume 
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in three reference years: 1980, 1990 and 1999. The relative volume is defined here as the 
total number of benefit years divided by the population aged 15 years and older11.
In none of these years the picture corresponds entirely with the theoretical expectations. 
In 1980 the Netherlands is not at the top of the ranking: the benefit dependency of the 
hybrid regime is comparable with the medium score of the United States. The relative 
benefit volume is highest in Denmark and Sweden, where one third of the population are 
in receipt of benefit. These countries thus come higher than the corporatist countries: 
Belgium follows the social-democratic countries fairly closely, but Germany and France 
rank much lower than hypothesised. In the liberal social security regimes, only Canada 
and Australia occupy the expected positions at the bottom, with relative benefit volumes 
that are much lower than in all other countries, no less than 10 percentage points behind 
Denmark and Sweden. Great Britain and the usa, however, do not record extreme low 
scores; in 1980, Great Britain comes slightly higher than the corporatist France in the 
benefit dependency rankings, and the usa slightly lower. In the first measurement year, 
therefore, support is only found for hypothesis 1C: the relative volume is indeed higher in 
the countries with a social-democratic regime than in all countries in the liberal cluster. 
According to the bivariate analysis, the other hypotheses must be rejected.
Between 1980 and 1990 the benefit volume swells in most countries. The biggest increase 
is in Canada, but Belgium, France and the Netherlands also show strong growth. Two 
liberal countries are exceptions to the rule: the number of benefits in the usa keeps pace 
almost precisely with population growth during this period, while in Australia the rela-
tive volume actually falls12.
These developments lead to a somewhat changed ranking of countries in 1990, but 
the picture still does not correspond with the hypotheses formulated earlier. In line with 
the expectations, a corporate country, Belgium, does now top the ranking (with over 
38%). The bottom three positions are now also occupied by the liberal regimes (Canada, 
usa and Australia), and the Netherlands has climbed up the rankings – though is still far 
from the postulated top position. Even so, benefit dependency in the two countries in 
the social-democratic cluster is still higher than in France and Germany, while one liberal 
regime, Great Britain has a rather large share of benefit recipients. To sum up: for 1990, 
too, based on the bivariate analysis only hypothesis 1C (vsd  > vlib) is not rejected.
In the 1990s there was wide divergence between the developments in different coun-
tries. Australia, France and Germany saw a sharp increase in the relative benefit volume; 
reunification had an impact on the figures for the latter country – the new Bundesländer 
were incorporated in the volume figures from 1992. Belgium, Great Britain and Sweden13 
showed a modest increase between 1990 and 1999. The third group consists of Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Canada and the United States, where the relative volume reduced in this 
period.
The result of the changes in this decade is that the outcomes in 1999 correspond most 
closely with the postulated hypotheses. Corporatist Belgium and France are at the top of 
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the ranking, followed by the two countries with a social-democratic regime. Germany has 
overtaken Great Britain, but ranks below Sweden and Denmark. There is a fairly homoge-
nous grouping of countries in the liberal cluster at the bottom of the ranking. The hybrid 
Netherlands remains the odd one out, however: as in 1980, the benefit dependency is 
lower than in the corporatist and social-democratic countries. Thus, hypothesis 1A is still 
rejected in the final measurement year: the relative volume in the Netherlands is lower 
than in all corporatist countries. It is less easy to discard hypothesis 1B in 1999, since two 
of the three representatives of the corporatist regime now rank higher than Sweden and 
Denmark, and the group averages differ as expected. The relative volume in Germany, 
however, still lags behind that of the social-democratic cluster. Sweden and Denmark 
rank higher than the countries in the liberal group, which means that hypothesis 1C can 
also not be rejected in 1999.
The fact that the relative volume in the usa is significantly lower than in Canada in 
1999, which in turn lags behind Great Britain, is in line with the country scores on the ben-
efit dependency boost index. However, Australia comes out lowest in the liberal group, 
and that was not expected. The slightly higher score for Sweden compared with Denmark 
does in turn correspond with the secondary hypothesis concerning the within-cluster 
ranking, though the difference is small. This does not apply in the corporatist group, 
within which Belgium, instead of having the lowest volume, in fact has the highest.
All in all, hypothesis 1 is supported to a limited extent by these empirical data. The the-
oretically expected ranking of countries is reproduced most clearly in 1999, especially 
if one considers the group averages. This is somewhat remarkable, because the benefit 
dependency boost index reflects the situation in around 1990 (though the typology as 
such is empirically valid over the entire period; cf. §4.3).
Relative volume among the population of working age
One possible explanation for the weak support for the relative volume hypothesis is 
that figure 5.2 may not be based on the optimum indicator for differences in the relative 
number of benefits between the regime types. A large share of the total benefit volume 
in all countries (roughly half ) is made up of old age pensions. Since the coverage of the 
benefits for the over-65 population is generally high, the total volume encompasses a 
large demographic component. As a result, the volume data in figure 5.2 will be relatively 
low for countries with a comparatively young population and higher in countries where 
population ageing has proceeded further. With this in mind, it is perhaps better to test 
hypothesis 1 by considering benefit dependency below the age of 65 years.
Figure 5.3 portrays this. Here, for the same measurement years the total number of ben-
efits paid to people younger than 65 years is divided by the size of the potential labour 
force (the population aged 15-64 years). Compared with figure 5.2, the relative benefit 
volume in all countries is significantly lower (13-24% instead of 23-39%). This is logical, 
because benefit dependency in the group left out of figure 5.3, namely the over-65s, is 
much higher than among the potential labour force. Moreover, the dispersion at each 
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measurement point is smaller in figure 5.3: below the age of 65 the relative benefit vol-
ume in the various countries differs less than for the population as a whole.
However, the relative volume compared with figure 5.2 does not decrease to the same 
extent in all countries. This is due to differences in the share of older people in the total 
population in 1980, diverging population ageing rates in the subsequent two decades, 
and small variations in the coverage of old age pensions. The alteration due to leaving out 
the over-65s is smallest in two countries with a relatively young 15+ population (Canada 
and Australia). This pushes these two countries up the rankings. The same applies, albeit 
to a slightly lesser extent, for the Netherlands and the United States. Sweden, by contrast, 
falls rather sharply through the rankings, because the proportion of people aged 65 years 
and older is the highest in all measurement years. Denmark and Great Britain come out 
somewhat higher due to the incomplete pensions coverage for the elderly (which implies 
relatively fewer benefits have been discarded in figure 5.3).
The rankings presented in figure 5.3 do not correspond fully with the expectation expressed 
in hypothesis 1 either. In 1980, the top position is not occupied by the Netherlands, but by 
the social-democratic Denmark (20%), followed at some distance by a very mixed cluster 
consisting of a corporatist, a liberal, a hybrid and a social-democratic country (Belgium, 
usa, Netherlands and Sweden: 16-17%). Great Britain and Australia are some distance 
behind (15%) and at the bottom we find two representatives of the corporatist regime and 
only one from the liberal cluster (Germany, France and Canada: 13-14%).The relative posi-
tions of Denmark, the usa, Great Britain and Australia are much higher than expected, 
while those of Germany, France and the Netherlands are substantially lower. Hypotheses 
1B must certainly be rejected for this year; but according to the group averages, hypothesis 
1A and 1C are sustained. In spite of its moderate score, the hybrid Netherlands exceeds the 
average of the corporatist group. And although the usa attains a higher relative volume 
than Sweden, the liberal group average is clearly below the social-democratic one.
Between 1980 and 1990 Belgium, France and Canada rise strongly through the rankings, 
with an increase in the relative benefit volume of around 7 percentage points. In Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Germany the growth is less marked (between 
+3 and +5 percentage points), while in Sweden it is modest (+0.9 percentage points). 
The relative volume in Australia remains constant in this period, while in the usa it falls 
slightly (-0.9 percentage points).
This of course changes the ranking. Although the Netherlands moves up, it remains 
more than 3 percentage points behind the leader, Belgium. However, because Germany 
and France achieve only middling positions in 1990, the relative volume in the hybrid 
regime is higher than the corporatist group average; and in that sense hypothesis 1A 
is corroborated. Similarly, on average the relative volume of the corporatist countries 
exceeds that of the social-democratic group, even though Denmark attains a much 
higher level than Germany and France. The ranking of the social-democratic and lib-
eral group averages is consistent as well, in spite of the fact that the relative volume in 
 Sweden is lower than in Canada and Great Britain. Within the liberal cluster, it is notable 
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that the usa and Australia are in the postulated position at the bottom of the rankings, 
as expected. On balance, according to the group averages hypotheses 1A-1C cannot be 
rejected for 1990; but there is a rather wide dispersion within each country group, and 
therefore no clear clustering of countries by regime type.
In the period 1990-1999, the benefit volume in four countries rises sharply (Australia, 
Sweden, France, Germany: +3 to +4 percentage points). Great Britain records a small 
increase (+0.4 percentage points) while Denmark and Belgium show a slight reduction 
of between 0.2 and 0.8 percentage points. In the remaining three countries, the relative 
benefit volume falls fairly sharply between the measurement points in the 1990s (Canada, 
the usa and the Netherlands: approx. -2 percentage points).
Due to these changes, the ranking in 1999 corresponds somewhat more closely with 
the theoretical expectations14. The biggest exception remains the Netherlands, which 
has sunk to a position in the middle – far from the anticipated position at the top of 
the ranking. The corporatist Belgium and France, however, move above the two social-
democratic regimes, as predicted. Germany has overtaken Sweden, though still has rela-
tively fewer benefits than Denmark. The corporatist group average clearly lies above the 
social-democratic one in this year. The four countries in the liberal cluster are at the bot-
tom of the ranking as expected. Taking all this information together, hypothesis 1A must 
be rejected; in 1999 the Netherlands has by no means the highest benefit volume among 
15-64 year-olds and is well below the corporatist group average. It is less evident that 
hypothesis 1B has to be discarded; although the position of Germany relative to Denmark 
is not as expected, on average the volume in the corporatist group is higher than in the 
social-democratic cluster. Hypothesis 1C cannot be rejected, as there is a large difference 
in the anticipated direction between the countries representing the social-democratic 
and liberal regime types, and the latter form a distinct cluster in the ranking.
The secondary hypotheses on the within-cluster ranking are not supported in 1999. 
In the corporatist group the score of Belgium is too high, while in the social-democratic 
cluster Sweden turns out lower than Denmark, and in the liberal cluster the relative vol-
ume in Australia is on the high side. On the other hand, the usa is firmly in bottom place, 
as expected.
Yet the results provide a rather narrow basis for concluding that hypothesis 1 holds 
entirely. In 1980 the regime typology is hard to recognise in the rankings, with the high 
score in Denmark and the low to moderate benefit dependency in France, Germany and 
the Netherlands going against expectations. This is incidentally not accompanied by a 
comparatively high number of employment years in the latter group: viewed over the 
whole period, the participation rate in the corporatist countries and the Netherlands 
is significantly lower than in the representatives of the liberal and social-democratic 
regime types. The difference lies mainly in the large residual category of housewives, 
students, etc.15.
For the moment, therefore, the relative volume hypothesis receives limited support 
from the empirical data. It is by no means the case that the Netherlands is consistently at 
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the top of the ranking, that the benefit volume in all corporatist countries is structurally 
higher than in all the social-democratic regimes, or that the members of the latter group 
come out higher in all years than all the liberal countries. Often there is a wide dispersion 
within the country groups, implying a considerable overlap of the regime types (no clear 
clusters). Nevertheless, some outcomes are very much in line with the theoretical expec-
tations. At all measurement points, the average relative volume in the social-democratic 
group is clearly higher than in the liberal cluster, both in the total population and in 
the population of working age. According to that criterion it is a robust conclusion that 
hypothesis 1C cannot be rejected. The contrast between the corporatist and social-dem-
ocratic type seems to become sharper over time. In the population at large, hypothesis 
1B only holds for 1999; but in the category below the age of 65 years, the average relative 
volume of the corporatist countries was already higher than that of the social-democratic 
group in 1990, and became increasingly so in 1999. In the total population, the relative 
volume of the Netherlands is below the corporatist group average at all points of meas-
urement, which was not expected. Yet among the population of working age some sup-
port was found for hypothesis 1A in 1980 and 1990; while the Netherlands did not reach a 
top position in those years, its relative volume was somewhat higher than the average of 
the corporatist countries. This difference was reversed during the 1990s, though.
5.3.2 Growth rates
The hypotheses formulated earlier on growth rates were in similar vein. The expectation 
was that the percentage growth in the number of benefits would be greater in the Neth-
erlands (hybrid regime) than in the countries with a corporatist social security regime 
(hypothesis 2A). The latter would score higher than the countries in the social-democratic 
cluster (hypothesis 2B), which were supposed to show stronger volume growth than the 
representatives of the liberal social security regime (hypothesis 2C).
Figures 5.4a-5.4c show the growth rates as compared in the various hypotheses. 
There is little surprise that the volumes in all countries go against the economic tide to 
some degree, with large increases in periods of stagnating economic growth, as in the 
first half of the 1980s and 90s. This anticyclical pattern is related to the fact that in times 
of recession unemployment rises, and this translates into a growing number of unem-
ployment and social assistance benefits. Sometimes the economic trend has a similar 
impact on the take-up of other schemes with a hidden unemployment component (such 
as disability or early retirement benefit). The pattern is broken somewhat by the fact that 
the growth in the number of benefits paid to people in employment (sickness benefit, 
leave arrangements) generally runs in line with the cycle: if the economy stagnates, there 
are fewer working people and the take-up of such arrangements tends to decline.
There are some phase differences in the economic cycles in the countries studied 
here: periods of economic recovery and downturn often manifest themselves earlier in 
the usa and Great Britain than elsewhere, something which was particularly apparent in 
the volume growth figures in the early 1990s.
One pronounced outlier has been excluded from figure 5.4a: following reunification, 
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the number of benefits in Germany rises very strongly in 1992 (+31%), as a result of the 
inclusion of the new Bundesländer in the statistical data.
Hypothesis 2A would be empirically supported in the strongest sense if the percentages 
in figure 5.4 at all measurement points were higher in the Netherlands than in the cor-
poratist countries. This is anything but the case, however. Although the hybrid regime 
comes on top in the period 1981-1984, this is countered by seven observations in the 
1990s where the growth rate in the Netherlands is lower than that in Belgium, France and 
Germany. If we look at a weaker criterion – the average growth rates over the period 1981-
1999 – the expectation is still not borne out. France has far and away the highest average 
growth (2.2% per annum), while the Netherlands, with 1.5%, ranks only slightly above 
Germany and Belgium (the German outlier in 1992 is left out of consideration here) and 
lags behind the average of the corporatist countries. In the 1980s, however, the Dutch 
per annum volume growth is clearly higher than the corporatist group average; but in the 
1990s the reverse happens. If the analysis is limited to the population aged 15-64 years, 
the data contradict the hypothesis even more: the average growth rate in the Netherlands 
is much lower than in France, Germany and Belgium (1.7% versus 2.1-3.6%), and a full 
percentage point below the per annum average of the corporatist group. Based on this 
bivariate analysis, hypothesis 2A must therefore be rejected, possibly with the exception 
of the 1980s.
Hypothesis 2B is not contradicted by the figures in every respect (see figure 5.4b). 
Denmark and Sweden do not record a lower score than Belgium, Germany and France in 
each year; in 1981, 1988 and 1992-1993 the mean growth is higher in the social-democratic 
group. However, if we consider the entire twenty-year period, the growth rates of the 
two Nordic countries are much lower (0.9-1.0% per annum) than in Belgium, Germany 
and France. Among the population aged 15-64 years, the differences between the social-
democratic and corporatist regimes run in the expected direction as well, and are even 
more marked.
Comparison of the growth rate in the liberal and social-democratic regimes (figure 
5.4c) shows that the us, Australia, Great Britain and Canada do not come lower in all 
years than Sweden and Denmark. In 10 years (1982-1984, 1986, 1990-1992 and 1996-1998) 
the group average of the liberal countries is distinctly higher as well. This can be partly 
explained by the high volatility of Canada and Australia: these countries attain compara-
tively high peaks and deep troughs in their growth figures16. Over the entire period, the 
average growth rates of Great Britain, Australia and Canada lie above the Swedish and 
Danish figures; and the mean of the liberal group is clearly higher than the social-demo-
cratic one as well. This applies both for the total volume and for the benefit dependency 
among the population of working age. It is only in the usa that the average 1981-1999 
growth rates are lower than in Sweden and Denmark – most prominently among the pop-
ulation aged under 65 years, where the growth in the American liberal regime is nil taken 
over all years together. However, this provides insufficient support for the hypothesis, 
and on the basis of this analysis hypothesis 2C must also be rejected.
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This leads to the conclusion that hypotheses 2A, 2B and 2C to a large extent are not 
backed by the empirical data. Neither the annual growth rates of the individual countries 
nor the annual mean scores of the regime types show a consistent ranking as predicted. 
If the weaker criterion of the average growth rates over the entire twenty-year period 
is applied, hypotheses 2A and 2C must also be rejected. Hypothesis 2B is corroborated, 
however: in 1981-1999, the average per annum growth rate of the corporatist group is 
clearly higher than the social-democratic one (both in terms of the individual countries 
and the regime type means.) Even so, the empirical support for the benefit dependency 
growth rate hypothesis is rather limited.
These conclusions are underscored by the relatively arbitrary ranking that is obtained 
when viewing the average twenty-year growth figures across all countries together. For 
the population as a whole, benefit volume growth is strongest in the liberal Canada (2.8% 
per annum), followed at some distance by another liberal country, Australia, and the cor-
poratist French regime type (2.1-2.2%). The Netherlands (hybrid) and Belgium (corporat-
ist) occupy a middle position (1.4-1.5%), followed by Germany (also corporatist) with 1.3% 
and Great Britain (liberal: 1.2%). The two social-democratic countries and the liberal usa 
have the lowest average volume growth (0.9-1.0%). The strong growth in Australia and 
Canada, the rather high growth in France, the moderate growth in the Netherlands and 
the comparatively low growth in the two social-democratic countries, in particular, are 
not as postulated.
The ranking of the countries is also ambiguous when it comes to the average twenty-
year growth in the benefit volume among the population of working age. The corporat-
ist France heads the ranking (3.6% per annum), followed by a liberal/corporatist cluster 
comprising Canada, Australia and Germany (2.5-2.9%). Belgium follows at some distance 
(2.8%), while Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden constitute a group of mixed 
regime types with average growth of between 1.6% and 1.7%. Denmark scores notably 
lower (1.1%) and the usa has the lowest average growth (0.0%). It is above all the moderate 
growth in the Netherlands, the very high growth rate in France, the high growth figures 
in Canada and Australia and the relatively limited growth in the social-democratic coun-
tries (especially Denmark) which run counter to expectations.
One explanation for the limited support of the hypothesis may be that the growth rates 
are not determined just by the regime type, but also by other factors, such as demo-
graphic changes, country-specific economic developments, expansion and curbing of 
social security schemes, and so on. This is discussed later in this chapter. First, however, 
the next subsection explores whether the representatives of the regime types differ in 
terms of benefit dependency in specific social security arrangements.
5.3.3 Volume composition
Expectations were articulated earlier regarding the extent to which certain forms of ben-
efit dependency would occur in the population aged under 65 years in the different regime 
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types. Hypotheses 3A to 3F inclusive postulate which social security regime theoretically 
generates the highest relative benefit volume in exit routes, unemployment insurance, 
survivor’s benefits, benefits among the gainfully employed, non-employee disability 
insurance and social assistance, respectively. Hypothesis 3G postulates that the hybrid 
Dutch regime will score above the average on all social security schemes (the ‘worst of 
three worlds’ hypothesis).
A theoretical profile of the volume composition for the population aged below 65 
years can be derived for each regime type from these hypotheses. This information can 
be presented succinctly in the form of a wind rose graphic, which is used in meteorology 
to portray the prevailing wind directions and speeds. Such graphs are also informative 
for detecting patterns in other multivariate data. Figure 5.5 plots the theoretical rela-
tive benefit dependency in each of the six schemes for the regime types in this way. For 
each social security arrangement the expected volume is plotted on a separate axis (a 
‘wind direction’). If a regime theoretically has the highest volume for a certain scheme, a 
maximum value of 10 has been assigned, while arrangements which are a-typical for that 
regime are given a score of 1. A value of 6.5 has been assigned in the graph for volumes 
that are predicted to be above the average. The higher the expected relative volume in a 
given arrangement, the stronger the ‘wind’ from that direction becomes (a longer and 
broader line towards the centre of the wind rose). In combination, the six dimensions 
represent the profiles of the expected composition of the benefit volume in typical cor-
poratist, social-democratic and liberal regimes and in the hybrid Netherlands.
A corporatist regime will theoretically score highly on three of the six dimensions: 
exit routes, survivor’s benefits and earnings-related unemployment insurance. This is 
visualised in figure 5.5 as lots of ‘wind’ from the easterly and southerly directions. The 
social-democratic regime type is predicted to score highly on employee dependency and 
disability insurance for non-employees, which is represented in the figure as northerly 
winds. A liberal regime is expected to score highly only on social assistance, depicted as 
a westerly wind. In the hybrid Netherlands the wind blows from all directions; for each 
arrangement the expected volume is lower than in the pure regime types, but is well 
above the average.
To test whether these patterns occur in practice, the volume figures for the popula-
tion below the age of 65 years were broken down by type of scheme17. Social assistance as 
defined here relates to means-tested benefits that are not linked to past earnings, which 
are funded out of the general revenue18. Unemployment insurance relates to earnings-related 
income replacement schemes for the unemployed, without means testing and funded 
from contributions. Exit routes include both pre-pension benefits and social assistance 
benefits paid to older persons who no longer have a statutory duty to apply for work. The 
take-up of disability benefits by former employees has also been included here19. Disability 
insurance for non-employees refers to benefits paid to the former self-employed, early disa-
bled people, housewives, veterans, etc. The classification used by the oecd (2003a) is fol-
lowed for survivor’s benefits. The employees’ dependency consists of maternity, paternity and 
care leave benefits, in so far as they relate to current or former employees (i.e. excluding 
the self-employed and people without an employment history).
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The relative volume in the years 1980, 1990 and 1999 is taken as a basis for each type of 
scheme. This produces 30 observations per arrangement: ten countries with three meas-
urement points for each. Per type of scheme, these observations have been placed on a 
scale ranging from 1 to 10. The value 1 was assigned to the observation that produced the 
lowest relative volume over all countries and all three measurement years, while a score 
of 10 was assigned to the observation with the highest relative volume. The remaining 
observations have been ranked in between proportionally (based on the ratio of their 
relative volume vis-à-vis the minimum and maximum values).
Figure 5.6 shows the scores per arrangement for each country at the three measurement 
points, combined in a wind rose graphic. This makes it possible to compare the actual 
country profiles with the theoretical expectations in figure 5.5 at any given point in time. 
A number of trends appear to occur in virtually all countries between 1980 and 1999: the 
relative volume in exit routes and social assistance increases over time, while depend-
ency on survivor’s benefits generally falls20.
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The corporatist profile in Belgium is very clear: the scores from the easterly and southerly 
directions are high, as expected. In 1990, Belgium even achieves the maximum scores on 
exit routes and unemployment insurance, and the relative volume in the survivor’s ben-
efits is also high, though does fall somewhat over time. A part of the high Belgian take-up 
of unemployment insurance can be attributed to a benefit arrangement for people who 
are involuntarily working part-time. The volume in employees’ dependency, disability 
insurance for non-employees and social assistance benefit21 is limited, as predicted.
Germany does not show a pronounced corporatist pattern in 1980. The score on survi-
vor’s benefits is very high, as expected, but the volume of unemployment benefits and 
exit routes is moderate. The low take-up of social assistance and disability benefits for 
non-employees is in line with expectations, but the employees’ dependency (especially 
sickness benefit) is higher than would be expected for a corporatist regime. The score on 
the unemployment dimension rose slightly in 1990, but the score for exit routes hardly 
changed. This is surprising, since on the basis of Esping-Andersen’s analysis it would be 
expected that there was a large influx of workers into exit routes in Germany in the 1980s, 
as a prime example of the corporatist strategy for dealing with unemployment. In prac-
tice, the volume in the German exit routes in the period 1980-1990 did grow, but only 
slightly more than the number of potential recipients. Two explanations can be offered 
for this. The first is that the growth in this type of benefit dependency was partly offset by 
the reduction in the number of disability recipients in the 1980s. The second explanation 
is that the effect of the temporary arrangement for early retirement (1984-1988) – which 
very much shaped the image of the German early retirement policy – is reflected to only 
a limited extent in the figures for 199022. By contrast, at the final measurement point the 
distortion in the southern and easterly direction is clearly visible in Germany. The volume 
of unemployment insurance and exit routes in the 1990s increased relatively strongly, 
while the volume of survivor’s benefits remained high, though did fall somewhat. This 
corporatist pattern is however found only in 1999, and it is questionable whether this 
would have been so manifest without the effects of German reunification.
France exhibits no clear profile in 1980: the volume is limited in all six arrangements, sug-
gesting a welfare state in a nascent stage rather than a fully developed corporatist social 
security regime. In the later measurement years, it is the score on early exits and social 
assistance which increases particularly strongly. The first rise is in line with expectations, 
but the second is not. Following the introduction of the Revenu minimum d’insertion in 1988, 
France saw strong growth in the take-up of social assistance, which of course does not 
fit the theory for a corporatist regime. In 1999 only three countries in the liberal cluster 
(Australia, Canada and Great Britain) achieved a higher relative volume. The number of 
recipients of survivor’s benefits in France, by contrast, is much lower than expected in 
the corporatist type. Although there is an extensive system of survivor’s insurance23, the 
number of recipients aged under 65 years is rather low because of the fairly stringent 
entry conditions (related to employment history, care for young children, insufficient 
means of subsistence) and the sometimes limited duration (the Allocation de veuvage ends 
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after three years). In addition, the take-up of unemployment insurance in France is not 
especially high, though does increase over time, while the employee dependency volume 
is certainly not low in 1999 (partly because of the strong growth in the take-up of the Allo-
cation parentale d’éducation after 1995). The consistently low score for disability insurance 
for non-employees is in line with expectations.
The composition of the benefit volume in France thus cannot be described as dis-
tinctly corporatist. In 1980 the volume is low in all respects. In the two later measure-
ment years, France achieves higher scores on exit routes and employment insurance, so 
that some of the expected pattern becomes visible. In most other domains, however, 
the picture does not correspond with the theoretical predictions. The number of social 
assistance benefit recipients and the employee dependency are higher than postulated in 
1990 and 1999, while the volume in survivor’s benefits is lower than expected. The corpo-
ratist profile is approximated most closely at the last measurement year.
Sweden shows the expected Nordic bias in all three years in figure 5.6, though there is 
some variation between the points of measurement. The score on employees’ depend-
ency is already fairly high in 1980 and rises over time, reaching the maximum of 10 in 
1999. The reverse trend occurs with disability benefits for non-employees: the volume at 
the start of the series is high (partly because of a benefit housewives were entitled to) but 
is much less pronounced in 1999.
The profile in the first measurement year is also less clear, because Sweden at that 
time had an unexpectedly high volume of survivor’s benefits. However, this volume fell 
sharply over time, especially in the 1990s, when the arrangement was gradually phased 
out. The substantial increase in the number of unemployment insurance benefits during 
the 1990s means that Sweden also scores fairly highly in 1999 for this theoretically non-
characteristic dimension. In all years, the low volume of social assistance benefits and 
exit route arrangements is in line with expectations, though the latter rises over time. All 
in all, Sweden fits the postulated social-democratic pattern reasonably well, especially in 
terms of the high employees’ dependency.
The composition of the volume in Denmark is also in line with expectations. Although the 
relative number of benefits due to employees’ dependency is lower than in Sweden in all 
years, it is higher than that in all other countries. The benefit volume in disability insur-
ance for non-employees is also considerable and more consistently so than in Sweden. 
Between 1980 and 1999 the relative take-up of these schemes rises, overtaking Sweden, 
and in the final measurement year this type of benefit dependency is highest in Denmark 
of all countries studied.
Yet the relative number of unemployment benefits in Denmark is higher than would 
be expected for a social-democratic regime, especially in 1990. The score on exit routes 
increases over time and is above the average in 1999, though Denmark is still below the 
three corporatist welfare states. The take-up of social assistance benefit is not high, 
though there are comparatively more benefits than in Belgium, Germany and Sweden. 
This makes Denmark a somewhat less pure representative of the social- democratic re gime 
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type than Sweden as regards the composition of the benefit volume. The characteristic 
bias is however still visible.
Among the liberal social security regimes, the postulated pattern emerges clearly in 
 Australia, with a predominantly westerly wind in 1999 in particular. The social assist-
ance benefit volume reaches the maximum score in that year, while the take-up of other 
schemes is low. The employees’ dependency remains limited to a fairly modest level of 
sickness absenteeism24, and the number of surviving dependants and former employ-
ees in early exit schemes is rather small (though the latter group grows in the 1990s). 
Australia has no social insurance for unemployment, and therefore achieves the lowest 
possible score on this dimension in all years. This helps to explain the high social assist-
ance distortion: Australian unemployment benefits are to be regarded as a form of social 
assistance25.
In the earlier years the liberal pattern in Australia is less clear. The relative social 
assistance volume is lower in 1980 and 1990, though even then Australia comes in third 
place. By contrast, the take-up of survivor’s benefits is higher, as is the take-up of dis-
ability insurance for non-employees (especially service pensions for military veterans). 
Despite this, the composition of the benefit volume in Australia corresponds fairly well 
with the hypothetical pattern in all years.
Canada has relatively fewer social assistance benefits than Australia, but the volume is 
still high: in all years Canada comes in second place in the rankings. The volume in exit 
routes, employees’ dependency and disability insurance for non-employees is limited, 
as expected; in fact the exit of employees via collective retirement schemes in 1980 is 
the lowest of all observations (score 1). The liberal pattern is less clearly evident than in 
Australia, not only due to the lower score on social assistance, but also because Canada 
achieves a fairly high ranking on two typically corporatist arrangements: the volume of 
survivor’s benefits is among the highest of all countries – and actually increases over time 
– while unemployment insurance also has a fairly high take-up, especially in 1990.
The composition of the benefit volume has become more and more liberal over time in 
Great Britain. Initially the score on virtually all dimensions, including social assistance 
benefit, is fairly low; only the volume in survivor’s benefits is on the high side in 1980, but 
this reduces in the two later measurement years, as does the volume of  unemployment 
insurance benefits. The number of people on social assistance benefits, by contrast, rises 
sharply in 1990 and 1999. These shifts are in line with the observation by Eardley et al. 
(1996: 388), that the system reforms in Great Britain in the 1980s implied a break with 
Beveridgean principles, with “social assistance becoming a mass scheme instead of a 
residual safety net”. As a result, the liberal profile is clearly visible in the final measure-
ment year, though the take-up of social assistance benefits in 1999 is still relatively lower 
than in Australia and Canada. In addition, the British volume in exit routes, disability 
insurance for non-employees and survivor’s benefits is greater than would be theoreti-
cally expected.
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The assumed liberal distortion is the least clear in the United States. In 1980 the number 
of social assistance benefits is not extremely high in the us, being relatively lower than 
in Australia and Canada. Contrary to the theoretical expectation, in that year there is 
a fairly high take-up of survivor’s benefits and disability insurance for non-employees 
(mainly war veterans). In 1990 the latter distortions have disappeared, while the number 
of social assistance beneficiaries has risen in relative terms. The postulated liberal profile 
is approached most closely in that year, with the caveat that the social assistance volume 
is still not very high: at the second measurement point the three other liberal regimes 
achieve higher scores.
The last measurement year shows a reduction in the relative social assistance volume 
to a level far below that in the other three liberal countries and France. In the 1990s there 
is also a slight fall in most of the other arrangements, where the relative volume was 
already modest; only the take-up of early exit arrangements remains virtually constant in 
relative terms. As a result, the usa scores fairly low in 1999 on all dimensions and shows 
no characteristic bias at all. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the com-
position of the benefit volume in the usa does not correspond with the expected picture, 
and that the composition hypothesis for the final year therefore has to be rejected. Sub-
stantively, this could be interpreted to imply that during the course of these two decades 
the usa intervened so radically in its benefit schemes that in 1999 it was no longer a true 
liberal social security regime, but more of a welfare state in decline. The fact that the pro-
file of the usa at the last measurement point in figure 5.6 corresponds so closely with that 
of the French system in its build-up phase (1980) supports this interpretation.
Given the rather pure liberal character of the American social security regime which 
emerged from the theoretical analyses, however, it may not be entirely correct to reject 
the composition hypothesis. Another possible interpretation is that the residuality prin-
ciple which is central in the liberal regime (see chapter 4) is strictly applied in the United 
States in the social assistance arrangements as well – a view that is supported by the fairly 
low score for social assistance on the theoretical benefit dependency boost index around 
1990. The radical changes made to the American social assistance arrangements in the 
1990s26 can be regarded as the ultimate consequence of this principle. Seen from this 
perspective, the absence of any social assistance bias in the last measurement year does 
not disqualify the usa as a liberal regime, but rather means that the regime is plus libéral 
que les libérals: the take-up of all arrangements is reduced as far as possible, including the 
last resort that is social assistance. The limited duration of the Temporary Aid to Needy Fami-
lies (tanf) is a clear example of this.
The hybrid regime in the Netherlands would be expected to score highly for all arrange-
ments, but without reaching the level that characterises the purer types. In 1980 this is 
found to be only partially the case: the Dutch volume of social assistance, unemploy-
ment insurance and non-employee disability insurance benefits was relatively limited in 
that year. On the other hand, the volume in employees’ dependency was substantial (as 
expected, mainly sick leave and little parental and other leave), as was the take-up volume 
for exit routes (especially disability benefits for former employees). The number of peo-
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ple in receipt of survivor’s benefits is so great that it would fit in with a pure corporatist 
regime.
In 1990 the ‘worst of three worlds’ pattern is clearest. The number of survivor’s ben-
efits remains high and there is a substantial increase in early exits (more disability benefit 
recipients, but also a growing take-up of early retirement schemes and unemployment 
arrangements for the elderly), to slightly below the volume of Belgium and France. The 
relative volume in the four arrangements where the Netherlands achieved a low score ten 
years earlier, has risen in 1990 to a score of between 5 and 6. This approaches the postu-
lated value, though the volume in unemployment insurance is lower27.
In the final measurement year, however, the expected pattern is again less clear. In the 
1990s the relative volume of exit arrangements, social assistance, unemployment insur-
ance and employees’ dependency fell in the Netherlands. To some extent this has to do 
with system changes, but the economic climate and rising labour participation of women 
also had an influence28. Changes in the legislation on survivor’s benefits, culminating in 
the introduction of the Algemene Nabestaandenwet, reduced take-up, but because this also 
happened in most other countries the Netherlands still scores highly in 1999 in relative 
terms; only Germany and Canada rank higher in that year. It is only for disability insurance 
for non-employees that the Dutch relative volume rises in the period 1990-1999.
If countries are compared with each other, the assumed corporatist pattern emerges 
most clearly in Belgium. In Germany it is only observable in 1999; in the other measure-
ment years the relative volume in the exit routes and unemployment insurance is lower 
than postulated. France had a limited take-up of all benefit schemes in 1980, and was at 
that time more a welfare state in formation than an example of the corporatist type. At 
the later measurement points the volume of exit routes rises strongly, and the number 
of recipients of unemployment insurance benefits also increases; but for a corporatist 
regime, the score on survivor’s benefits is too low, that for social assistance and employ-
ees’ dependency too high (especially in 1999). The corporatist pattern is approached most 
closely in France in 1990.
Due to the high employees’ dependency, Sweden is the prime example of the social-
democratic regime type. The score on the other characteristic Nordic scheme, disability 
insurance for non-employees, however, decreases over time; and in the 1990s the take-
up of unemployment insurance benefit and early exit schemes is somewhat higher than 
expected. Denmark also fits the theoretical type fairly well. It has a less marked profile 
than Sweden in terms of employees’ dependency, but a more consistently high score on 
disability benefits for non-employees. In the 1990s, the volume of unemployment ben-
efits and exit route schemes became larger than was expected.
In the liberal cluster, the postulated profile is most evident in Australia, especially in 
1999. The pattern is also rather clear in Canada, though this country also has a number 
of corporatist traits: large numbers of survivor’s benefits and (in 1980 and 1990) unem-
ployment insurance benefits. Great Britain does not have a liberal pattern in 1980, but 
develops this increasingly during the period studied due to the strong rise in the number 
of social assistance benefit recipients. Even so, in 1999 there is still a fairly high take-up of 
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exit route schemes, survivor’s benefits and disability insurance for non-employees. The 
postulated pattern is least evident in the United States. There is a substantial social assist-
ance volume in 1980, but also a rather high take-up of the (corporatist) survivor’s insur-
ance benefit and the (social-democratic) disability insurance benefit for non-employees 
(due to war veterans). In the later years the social assistance bias has disappeared, and the 
volume in all other arrangements is also relatively low. As stated earlier, however, this 
need not necessarily be in conflict with a liberal social security regime.
The following conclusions can be drawn regarding the hypotheses formulated above:
– Hypothesis 3A cannot be rejected. At all three measurement points, the relative number 
of recipients of early exit benefits is highest in the countries with a corporatist social 
security regime (in 1980 the differences are rather limited, though). Belgium comes in 
first place in all years, and the average score of the corporatist group is 2 to 4 points 
above that of the liberal and social-democratic clusters. However, in the earlier years 
the hybrid Netherlands also achieves a ‘corporatist’ score (2nd place in 1980, 3rd in 
1990).
– Hypothesis 3B cannot be rejected either, though the pattern here is somewhat less con-
vincing. In all years the number of recipients of unemployment insurance benefits is 
highest in the corporatist Belgium, and the group average is highest in the corporatist 
cluster. In 1999 the two other representatives of this regime type occupy second and 
third place, as expected. In the earlier measurement years, however, this is not the 
case; in 1980 Germany scores fairly low (8th place), while France achieves a low score 
in 1990 (6th). In those years the social-democratic Denmark (2nd place) and the liberal 
Canada (3rd) take the other two places in the top three;
– Hypothesis 3C receives limited support. The number of recipients of survivor’s benefits 
in Belgium and Germany is relatively high in all three years, as expected; but in 1980 
and 1990 the top position is taken by the hybrid Dutch regime, and in 1999 by Canada 
(where the relative volume hardly falls at all over time, in contrast to most other coun-
tries). The difference between Belgium and Germany compared with some other non-
corporatist countries (in particular Great Britain and Sweden in 1980) is moreover not 
particularly large.
 In the corporatist France the relative survivor’s benefit volume is low, entirely at odds 
with the expectation: 10th place in 1980, 9th in 1990, 7th in 1999. In the 1990s, however, 
the average of the corporatist cluster is higher than that of the liberal countries, and it 
exceeds the mean of the social-democratic group by a considerable margin.
– Hypothesis 3D cannot be rejected. In all three measurement years the number of recipi-
ents of employee benefits (sickness benefit, leave arrangements) is highest in Sweden 
and Denmark, and over time the differences with the other regime types increase. In 
1980 the average of the social-democratic group on the scale was 3 to 5 points higher 
than that of the corporatist and liberal clusters; by 1999 the difference had risen to 4 to 
7 points.
– Hypothesis 3E is supported by the data as well. The number of recipients of disabil-
ity insurance benefits for people who were not gainfully employed is comparatively 
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 highest in Denmark and Sweden in 1980 and 1990. The social-democratic Danish 
regime again comes top in 1999, but Sweden has been overtaken by the Netherlands 
and Great Britain. Over time the average score declines in all regime types (with the 
exception of the Netherlands), with the steepest drop occurring in the social-dem-
ocratic group. Although the differences have become smaller, therefore, in 1999 the 
social-democratic mean is still 3 to 5 points higher than that of the liberal and corpo-
ratist countries.
– Hypothesis 3F also finds support. In all measurement years the first three places on the 
relative volume of social assistance benefits are occupied by representatives of the 
liberal regime type. In Australia, Great Britain and Canada the social assistance bias 
increases over time. The United States distorts the pattern somewhat: the relative vol-
ume falls steadily here, causing the usa to drop from third place in 1980 to a middle 
position (5th) in 1990 and 1999. In terms of group averages, the difference between the 
liberal and corporatist clusters remains fairly constant over the years (3 points), while 
the gap between liberal and social-democratic countries becomes wider (3 points in 
1980, 5 points in 1999).
– Hypothesis 3G cannot be rejected for 1990. In that year the hybrid Dutch social secu-
rity regime has an above-average number of recipients of all the above arrangements, 
though the threshold value of the theoretical profile is not always achieved. However, 
the position in the ranking is largely as expected. In 1990 the Netherlands has fewer 
social assistance benefits than the liberal countries, but much more than the social-
democratic and corporatist regimes. The employee dependency and disability insur-
ance for non-employees are lower than in Sweden and Denmark in that year, but higher 
than in all other countries. In the exit routes, only Belgium and France come higher. 
The hybrid regime also scores below the corporatist group average on unemployment 
insurance benefits, but that is mainly a result of the very high level of Belgium; in 
the Netherlands, the take-up of this scheme is comparable with France and Germany. 
Finally, the Netherlands comes on top for survivor’s benefits, and thus overtakes the 
corporatist countries. To a large extent, the ‘worst of three worlds’ hypothesis is cor-
roborated in 1990. The picture in 1980 and 1999 is less convincing, largely due to the 
fairly low volume of social assistance and unemployment insurance benefits. As a 
result of the absence of a social assistance bias, the situation in the Netherlands in 
these years can at most be described as ‘the worst of two worlds’. A fairly high volume 
in employees’ dependency and disability insurance benefits for non-employees (char-
acteristic for the social-democratic regime) is combined with a rather large number of 
exits and survivor’s benefits, as would be expected in a corporatist system. The com-
position of the benefit volume is therefore still hybrid in these years, but in a different 
way from that postulated.
5.3.4 Summary of the bivariate analyses
Reviewing the results in this section, hypothesis 1, concerning the relative volume in 
the three regime types and the Netherlands, is confirmed to some degree. While there 
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is no consistent ranking of countries in distinct clusters in the three years considered 
here (1980, 1990, and 1999), the expected pattern emerges to some extent from the group 
averages. Both in the total population and among the population of working age, the 
average relative volume generated by the social-democratic group is clearly higher than 
that of the liberal regime; in that sense hypothesis 1C cannot be rejected. In addition, as 
time goes by the distinction between the corporatist and social-democratic types shows 
more prominently in the average scores. In the population at large, it is only in 1999 that 
the relative volume was higher in the corporatist group than in the social-democratic 
cluster, as presumed in hypothesis 1B. Among the population of working age this already 
occurred in 1990, and more convincingly so in 1999. The expected difference between the 
hybrid Dutch type and the corporatist group average only showed in 1980 and 1990, in the 
category below the age of 65 years.
The empirical results on growth rates are not entirely as expected. In the early 1980s, the 
percentage change in the number of benefits is higher in the Netherlands than in the 
corporatist regime, but it lags far behind in the 1990s. The growth in France, Belgium 
and Germany is not higher than in the social-democratic countries in every year, and they 
in turn are not structurally higher in the rankings than the liberal regimes. Even when 
the average growth rates over the period 1981-1990 are considered, the support for the 
benefit dependency growth rate hypothesis is rather limited. Both in the total popula-
tion and in the population of working age, only the assumption that the growth in the 
corporatist countries would be greater than in the social-democratic regimes (2B) cannot 
be rejected. The high average growth rate in France, Australia and Canada, the moderate 
rate in the Netherlands and the relatively limited growth in Sweden and Denmark are all 
contrary to the expectations.
On the other hand, the assumptions on the composition of the benefit recipient pop-
ulation below retirement age are largely supported by the empirical data; none of the 
hypotheses can be completely rejected. In the population of working age, corporatist 
countries have a large number of early exits, recipients of unemployment benefits and 
– with the exception of France – survivor’s pensions. Representatives of the social-dem-
ocratic regime type have comparatively large numbers of employees’ dependency and 
disability insurance benefits for non-employees, while the liberal cluster (with the excep-
tion of the us) has a large social assistance volume.
The volume composition in Belgium meets the postulated corporatist profile best. 
In the liberal group this applies for Australia. In the terms of Arts and Gelissen (2002), 
these ‘real’ types most closely approach the theoretically expected volume composition 
of their regime. Denmark and Sweden both score highly on the expected dimensions, 
but also have a number of atypical deviations (large numbers of survivor’s benefits in the 
earlier measurement years in Sweden, considerable unemployment insurance and early 
exit volumes in Denmark).
The Netherlands scores fairly highly on all arrangements in 1990, and thus combines 
‘the worst of three worlds’, as predicted. Yet the composition pattern in 1980 and 1999 
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tends towards a more partial hybrid, with a high benefit volume in schemes that theoreti-
cally are characteristic of the social-democratic and corporatist regime types.
One possible explanation for the limited support for the relative volume and growth 
hypotheses is that the development of benefit dependency has been analysed in this sec-
tion only in relation to the type of social security regime. As pointed out in chapter 3, 
however, the benefit volume theoretically also depends on other factors. If these were 
taken into account it is possible that the pattern of the regime types could be observed 
better. This requires a multivariate model-based approach, which is the topic of the next 
sections.
5.4 A causal model for benefit dependency growth
It can be deduced from chapters 2 and 3 that there are many factors which theoretically 
affect the benefit volume. The formal social security institutions of modern welfare states 
lay down rights, duties, conditions and potential sanctions (see figure 2.1 and §3.5). These 
determine the conditions under which people may receive benefits for unemployment, 
old age, disability, etc. The number of benefit recipients thus depends in the first place on 
the statutory or government-enforced social security rules: the retirement age, the entry 
and duration conditions for unemployment benefits, the existence of arrangements for 
early or flexible retirement, the definition of incapacity for work, etc. Regime types are 
sparse models of the wide variety of possible formal institutions.
The impact of formal institutions on benefit volumes is not fixed in stone. Rules gov-
ern behaviour at a certain point in a historical process, something that was described 
earlier as the ‘context of rule application’. This means that the number of benefits, with 
unchanged formal rules, can vary according to the economic, demographic, social, tech-
nological and ideological developments. The interplay of institutions and historical cir-
cumstances in the evolution of the number of benefit recipients can be illustrated using 
a simple example. Suppose two countries have the same number of inhabitants, but that 
in country A the effective retirement age is 65 years and in country B 63 years. If all histori-
cal circumstances are identical, this will mean that the number of retirement pensions 
is higher in country B. But if, for example, the demographic profile of the two countries 
differs, this need not be the case. This can happen if country A has experienced a baby 
boom at some point in the past and this generation is now reaching retirement age, while 
country B did not go through a comparable demographic peak. Similarly, if certain pen-
sion cohorts are small in country B, the total number of retirement pensions in country 
A can turn out higher as well, even though the prevailing social security rules imply that 
country B has two extra year-cohorts that are eligible for pensions. Such a historical situ-
ation may occur, for example, as the result of the victims of a war which country B went 
through around 40 years ago, or due to a low birth rate around 65 years earlier, when a 
high proportion of the country’s young men were fighting on the Front. Long-term his-
torical processes like these may influence the benefit take-up just as much as the internal 
rules of the social security system. Theoretically this applies for the entire context of rule 
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application: if the population ages, the economy falls into recession, the divorce rate 
increases, people wish to retire earlier, the social definition of disability broadens, etc., 
this can have a substantial effect on the number of benefit recipients.
However, this is not an automatic process: the motivations of individual and col-
lective actors, and their mutual relationships, theoretically ‘filter’ the prevailing set of 
formal institutions and the historical context of rule application. In addition, the benefit 
volume is also determined by the actual course of the rule-driven social security inter-
actions. The application behaviour of potential recipients; fraud and non-take-up; the 
actions of social security organisations; the approach to the principal-agent problem 
within these corporate actors; the hiring and firing behaviour of employers; the actions 
of supervisory board and the social security court: in principle these all have their own 
influence on the number of benefits for a given set of rules and historical circumstances. 
The models of rule-driven social security interactions discussed at length earlier (see 
§3.5) indicate that there may be wide variety in this intermediary process.
In formal systems, informal rules can partly determine the course of such interac-
tions, and thereby also influence the benefit volume. Examples include the impact of 
public opinion on how ‘deserving’ different categories of social security recipients are. 
In addition, defective cultures can occur among benefit recipients, which may imply that 
residents of certain neighbourhoods have a low work ethic or consider social security 
fraud acceptable. The officials of the social security organisation can also base their 
behaviour on diverging informal rules, because they themselves gain from such a course 
of action (e.g. because their own caseload is reduced), because they regard this as effi-
cient for the organisation, or because this is in line with their professional ethic (e.g. 
medical assessors who for health reasons award or continue a disability benefit contra 
legem). Chapter 3 also looked at these aspects in more detail.
Finally, the number of benefit recipients may also change because the formal institu-
tions themselves are transformed, via a sometimes complex process of rule generation 
(cf. §2.9 and §3.7). Such institutional change can take many forms: a new scheme is intro-
duced or an old one abolished, the statutory definition of ‘unemployment’ or ‘incapacity 
for work’ is tightened up or relaxed, the group of entitled beneficiaries is restricted or 
enlarged by setting different conditions in terms of employment history, supplementary 
income, household status, job search behaviour, etc. Where these and similar system 
changes are radical, do not lead to a substitution of recipients from one benefit scheme 
to another, and are introduced suddenly (without a lengthy transitional period for cur-
rent beneficiaries), they can lead to major increases or reductions in the benefit volume.
As the benefit volume is theoretically not determined solely by the formal configuration 
of the social security system, it is plausible that the weak contrasts found in the previ-
ous section between the different regime types are connected to the divergent impact of 
non-institutional factors and system changes. In order to test this, an aggregate model 
is developed in this section. The model explores the influence of a number of character-
istics on the benefit volume at the country level. For two reasons, however, the results 
of the model have to be interpreted with caution. In the first place, as is often the case 
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in international comparative studies, the number of theoretical determinants is large, 
whereas there are only a few observations. This ‘small-N problem’ makes it necessary to 
restrict the number of explanatory variables in the model, and implies that the impact 
of causal factors cannot be estimated simultaneously. As Goldthorpe (2000: 49) remarks, 
this means that it is difficult to make a decisive evaluation of the various determinants of 
the benefit volume on the basis of the model developed here29. Because the volume data 
used here are available only at the macro-level of countries, the small-N problem can-
not be circumvented by performing a multi-level analysis on micro-data (with individual 
recipients as the basic unit and various country traits as second-level determinants; cf. 
Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The restriction in terms of the number of variables which can be 
included in the model implies that estimates are somewhat uncertain; given the small set 
of countries, it is not possible to include all theoretically important factors in the model 
simultaneously for each nation.
But even if more country observations were available, the model would still be par-
tial, because for some theoretical determinants there are simply no internationally com-
parable, reliable quantitative time series on hand covering the period studied here. This 
is notably the case for the informal social security rules analysed in §4.3. Data on the 
preferred distribution of rights and duties (government responsibility for the standard 
of living, the provision of jobs etc.; income differentials; post-materialism; the labour 
participation of women; the position of civil servants, and the like; cf. figure 4.3) are not 
available on an annual basis for all countries considered here. This makes it difficult to 
relate the development of the national benefit volumes to country-specific changes in 
such informal rules. The data problems are even greater when it comes to differences in 
the administrative processes of the social security organisation in the various countries. 
Here, only fairly rough national budget figures and performance indicators are available, 
for which it is often unclear how they impact on the number of benefits. For example, 
if the per capita administrative costs of the social security organisation are on the rise 
in a given country, this could indicate that more efforts are being made to help benefit 
reci pients find work, possibly leading to a reduction in the national benefit volume. How-
ever, rising per capita outlays may also be the result of more inefficient case management, 
growing expenditure on office rent or ict facilities, or may reflect the growing weight of 
fixed costs if the number of unemployed or disabled benefit recipients falls (implying a 
reverse causal relationship).
Figure 5.7 describes a rather simple theoretical model that was developed for the causal 
analysis. The dependent variable is the benefit dependency growth rate among the popu-
lation aged 15 years and older in the last two decades of the 20th century, as discussed 
earlier in §5.3.2 (cf. figures 5.4a-5.4c). The basic analytical unit consists of the countries 
(representing various regime types) analysed in the previous section, in as far as adequate 
data were available. For each country included in the analysis, the data consist of time 
series of the annual percentage mutations in the dependent and explanatory variables in 
the period 1981-1999; this amounts to a maximum of 19 observations per variable in each 
country (evidently there is no mutation for 1980, the starting year of the benefit depend-
ency data).
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It was decided to use annual percentage mutations30 because this offers a number of 
practical advantages. The scale differences between the absolute changes in the various 
countries disappear, while time series for the determinant variables in the model are 
also largely available as annual changes in percentages or percentage points. This has the 
technical advantage that the model is less sensitive to autocorrelation31. Substantively, 
the variable definition chosen implies that unstandardised regression coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities: the estimated values indicate the percentage change in the 
benefit volume if the independent variable increases by one percentage point32.
There are three types of determinant in the model: demographic developments (D), 
changes in the economy and on the labour market (E), and institutional changes (I). Other 
things being equal, the total benefit volume may be expected to increase if:
– the elderly population grows (D);
– the population of working age grows (D);
– the population of working age becomes older (D);
– the number of lone parents increases (D);
– the number of unemployed within the labour force rises (E);
– the labour participation rate of elderly men falls (E);
– the labour participation rate of non-elderly women rises (E);
– the coverage of pension schemes increases (I);
– major expansions of the social security system occur; if benefit schemes are curtailed 
the total benefit volume may be expected to decline (I).
These nine variables are assumed to have a direct impact on the benefit volume, which in 
some cases is reinforced or mitigated by indirect effects via the number of unemployed. 
In addition, four variables influence the number of benefits only through their effects on 
other determinants. Ceteris paribus the benefit volume is expected to rise indirectly if:
– the gross domestic product falls in real terms (E);
– real labour costs increase (E);
– the share of the services sector in total employment grows (E);
– the level of unemployment benefits rises (I).
Obviously, the model covers the process which theoretically may bring about benefit 
dependency only partially. Due to its aggregate nature, it is confined to the relation-
ship between the historical process at country level and the collective outcomes. What 
happens in between – the translation of the context of rule application into actors’ per-
ceptions and motivations, the individual outcomes of social security interactions in 
the various nations, the impact of informal rules – remains hidden in a black box. This 
implies that it cannot be ascertained to what extent similar historical circumstances and 
institutions produce diverging results (or varying contexts lead to comparable outcomes) 
due to different processing at the micro-level. Furthermore, the historical process has 
been reduced to a limited number of demographic, economic, and labour market devel-
opments. And although it includes some institutional factors, the actual interaction 
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of the causal variables with social security regimes is not observed empirically in the 
model (cf. below). 
Finally, the model does not allow for any feedback mechanisms. These occur if, for 
instance, an increase in benefit dependency results in less economic growth, higher 
labour costs, fewer work incentives, a reduction in the unemployment benefit level, or 
the implementation of major system changes. Theoretically some of these processes 
may apply, but, given the small number of observations available in each country, their 
impact could not be tested here. Following the analysis in §3.6.3, it could be added that 
some of these inverse effects are likely to be less influential than the causal mechanisms 
postulated in the model. Thus, the impact of economic growth on the level of unemploy-
ment and on the benefit volume is theoretically rather straightforward and substantial; 
whereas the number of benefits, and the ensuing social security expenditure, is only 
one of the factors determining gdp growth (in addition to a country’s natural resources, 
human capital, infrastructure, technology, etc). Similarly, major system changes may be 
implemented as a result of the evolvement of benefit dependency, but other factors can 
also be quite important in bringing them about. This is demonstrated by the two biggest 
system overhauls in the current dataset. The revision of us social assistance in the 1990s 
occurred while the relative benefit volume was low by international standards (it even 
fell in the previous decade; cf. figures 5.3 and 5.6), and was partly inspired by ideological 
motives; and obviously the Revenu minimum d’insertion has not been introduced because 
benefit dependency in France was comparatively limited or decreasing during the 1980s, 
but as a result of the political commitment to fight poverty and social  exclusion.
Simple as it may be, the model allows us to grasp some of the main forces driving 
benefit dependency; and by cancelling out the impact of other factors, it may be possi-
ble to obtain a more accurate picture of the impact of regimes than through the bivari-
ate analyses of the previous section. Before discussing the empirical results, some of the 
causal relationships require further qualification, and a few comments need to be made 
on the data that have been used for the independent variables.
Pension population
The model assumes that if the number of people aged 65 or over increases, more benefits 
will be taken up. Because recipients of old age pensions are a subset of the total group of 
benefit recipients, this direct effect will be inelastic. Given the size of this age category 
and the generally high benefit take-up, it is likely that the benefit volume will be fairly 
sensitive to changes in this variable. Data for this factor are taken from the Ecorys/nei 
database as adapted by the oecd (2003a), and consistent with the series on the benefit 
volume.
Population of working age
The direct effect of changes in the size of the population of working age refers to changes 
in the number of benefits awarded to the persons outside the labour force: if there are 
more people in the 15-64 years age bracket, there will be more recipients of early exit 
benefits, disability benefits, survivor’s benefits and social assistance.
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The indirect effect postulates that an increase in the number of 15-64 year-olds will 
lead to more unemployed persons (given constant participation and unemployment 
rates): any accrual to the labour force partly becomes unemployed or displaces existing 
workers. In the short run this growth in the number of unemployed will cause a higher 
take-up of unemployment benefit and social assistance.
The total effect of changes in the size of the potential labour force can be presumed 
to be inelastic, because these changes also affect only a part of the total benefit volume 
(not pensions, for example). The data source is the same as for the pension population.
Ageing of the potential labour force
The ageing of the potential labour force is important because elderly persons are more 
likely to retire early, to lose their spouse, and to become sick, unemployed or disabled; 
ageing therefore leads to higher benefit dependency. The variable has been defined as 
percentage changes in the number of 50-64 year-olds, corrected for the growth in the 
total potential labour force and the number of lone-parent families (two factors that are 
already in the model). The impact of ageing on the benefit volume is also broken down 
into a direct and an indirect effect, with the former reflecting the greater risk of early 
exits, incapacity for work and death of the partner, and the indirect effect representing 
their higher likelihood to lose their job. The effect on the benefit volume can be postu-
lated as being inelastic, because the benefits to this group also make up only part of the 
total. The time series on this factor was constructed from several international databases 
(mainly Eurostat and ilo) and has been made consistent with the size of the potential 
labour force according to the oecd series.
Lone-parent families
The development in the number of lone-parent families is important because this group 
are relatively frequently dependent on social assistance and survivor’s benefits; more sin-
gle parents therefore implies more benefits. No indirect effect is specified in the model 
via the number of unemployed, because the growth in the number of lone-parent fami-
lies theoretically impacts mainly on benefits for the population outside the labour force. 
Here again, the annual mutations have been adjusted for the portion that can be attrib-
uted to other model variables (the size and ageing of the potential labour force), and it 
may be assumed that the effect on the volume is inelastic.
No comparative time series are available for the number of lone-parent families 
covering the period 1980-1999. Use was therefore made of data from national statisti-
cal agencies, where necessary supplemented by estimates. Lone-parent families are in 
principle defined as households with one adult head and at least one child aged under 18 
years living at home33.
Number of unemployed
The effect of this variable is considered positive: an increase in the number of unemployed 
will lead to higher benefit dependency. Although this may seem an evident assumption, 
the theoretical relation with the benefit volume is rather complex. More unemployed 
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people of course translates into more unemployment benefits, but there is also an effect 
in the opposite direction. If the number of unemployed people grows, the number of 
people gainfully employed34 reduces (assuming a constant labour force size and partici-
pation rates). This leads to a fall in employees’ dependency: if there are fewer people 
working, the take-up of sickness benefits and leave arrangements will decrease. This is 
theoretically due not only to the fact that the working population has become smaller, 
but is also related to behavioural and selection effects: in a weak economy, employees 
will be less inclined to make use of such arrangements (they take less leave and fewer 
days off sick, out of fear of losing their job) and employers will dismiss people with a high 
absenteeism risk first.
The effect of the number of unemployed on the benefit volume reflects the net result 
of these opposing developments. The relationship is supposedly inelastic: a one percent 
change in the number of unemployed persons will lead to a proportionally smaller change 
in benefit dependency. This is mostly because unemployment benefit recipients form a 
subset of the total volume. In addition, the trade-off noted above, and the fact that not 
every unemployed person will be entitled to a full benefit (as a result of means testing, 
conditions on labour  experience), imply that changes in the volume of unemployment 
typically do not translate fully in benefit mutations35.
The mutations in the number of unemployed are based on the standardised oecd 
series, with the unemployment definitions and population demarcations for the dif-
ferent countries being harmonised. In practice the figures are reasonably comparable, 
though there are a number of subtle differences, in particular between the usa and the 
European countries (see e.g. Sorrentino, 2000). Their influence is limited, however, and 
the oecd-based series is therefore preferable to the unemployment figures provided by 
the national statistical offices.
Labour participation of elderly men
In all countries studied, the labour participation rate of men aged 55-64 years declined 
between 1980 and 1999, and there was a general increase in the take-up of early exits 
(cf. figure 5.6). In line with the assumptions of Esping-Andersen, this growth was found 
to be fairly pronounced in the corporatist welfare states (Belgium and France), but was 
also occasionally substantial elsewhere (the Netherlands, Denmark, Great Britain). In the 
model, the effect of changes in the gross participation rate of elderly men on the benefit 
volume is intended to quantify the influence of this process. The gross participation rate 
equals the number of working people and unemployed divided by the size of the popula-
tion in the relevant age category. The participation effect among elderly men does not 
refer to the impact of changes in the size of this age group, which has already been taken 
into account via the volume and ageing of the potential labour force.
Here again there is both a direct and an indirect relationship. The direct negative 
effect indicates that the take-up of early exit arrangements rises when the participation 
rate of older men declines. The indirect effect operates via unemployment, and theo-
retically runs in the opposite direction: if the labour participation of elderly men falls, 
the actual labour force becomes smaller and the number of unemployment benefits and 
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employees’ dependency (sick pay, leave arrangements) will shrink. It is assumed that on 
balance the direct correlation dominates, so that the total effect with respect to the ben-
efit volume will be negative; due to size of the group in relation to the total number of 
benefits, it will probably also be inelastic.
The data series on the gross participation of the older section of the male labour 
force are taken from the Labour Force Statistics (oecd, 2000, 2003b). In some countries cor-
rections were applied to compensate for trend breaks in these series36.
Labour participation of women
Many countries saw an increase in the participation rate of women in the period studied 
here, though it was not equally strong everywhere: in Sweden and Denmark, for example, 
the labour participation of women was already high in 1980 and could not rise as much 
as in countries with a lower base rate. Both a direct and an indirect effect are assumed for 
the variable ‘labour participation of women aged 25-64’, too37. The negative direct effect 
mainly indicates that a higher female participation rate will be reflected in fewer widow 
pensions and social assistance benefits. The positive indirect effect again operates via 
the unemployment variable: more working women theoretically leads to more unem-
ployment benefits and higher take-up of sickness benefit and leave arrangements. Here, 
it is assumed that the overall effect is positive. This means that the indirect effect is the 
stronger, something that can be substantiated by the fairly limited share of widows and 
lone-parent families in the non-working population. Data are from the same source as 
the series on elderly male participation.
Pension coverage
In the event of incomplete pension coverage, the number of pension beneficiaries aged 65 
years and older is smaller than the population in this age group. This may occur in coun-
tries where deferred retirement is possible or where the formal retirement age is above 65 
years. Where this is the case, the development of the pension volume not only depends on 
changes in the size of the population aged 65 years and older, but also on mutations in the 
pension coverage. In so far as this is driven by changes in the formal entitlements struc-
ture (such as increased opportunities for flexible retirement), this variable can be regarded 
as an institutional determinant of the total benefit volume. During the two decades stud-
ied here, pension coverage of the over-65s is incomplete in Denmark and Great Britain. In 
the other countries this is a constant to which a value of 0 has been assigned38.
Major system changes
It was stressed earlier that formal institutions need not be unchangeable; and revisions 
of the social security system can influence the benefit volume substantially. Examples 
might include the introduction of entirely new arrangements, or extensions of the scope 
of existing arrangements, but also volume restrictions through the application of stricter 
entry or duration conditions, or through the complete abolition of certain schemes. Such 
system changes are of importance for the estimation of the benefit dependency growth 
mainly where they create major effects in the short term, and are not accompanied by 
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substitution of benefit recipients from one benefit scheme to another39. If there are gen-
uine system expansions or restrictions, it can be desirable to incorporate these in the 
model in the form of dummy variables. The system changes that have been included will 
be discussed at length in the country-specific analyses.
Economic growth
Economic growth has no direct impact on the benefit volume; it operates mainly via a 
negative relation with unemployment. A real increase in gross domestic product boosts 
the number of people needed to achieve the higher production. Assuming a constant 
potential labour force, stable participation rates and unchanged labour costs, unemploy-
ment will fall as production increases, and this in turn leads to a decrease of the total 
benefit volume.
However, there are also theoretical effects via the participation rate: in a growing 
economy, women and older men will less readily withdraw from the labour market, 
while a recession can lead to discouraged workers. The effect of economic growth on the 
two participation variables is thus positive. Given the theoretical total effects discussed 
above, this will lead to a fall in the number of benefits via the labour participation of 
el derly men, and to an increase via the participation of women. It is assumed that the 
overall effect of economic growth operates mainly via unemployment, and is thus nega-
tive: real growth in gdp leads to a fall in the number of benefits.
For this variable the series of annual percentage changes in gross domestic product 
(gdp) from the oecd Economic Outlook database was used. This indicator refers to the real 
changes in the total added value of the goods and services produced within a country in 
one year, valued at market prices40.
Labour costs
The central assumption here is that wage moderation makes it more attractive to employ 
personnel. If labour costs rise less than productivity, unemployment will fall, leading 
to a reduction in the benefit volume. This need not happen at once: wage mutations in 
preceding years may determine the amount of labour that employers wish to hire. Wage 
moderation therefore leads theoretically to a fall in the benefit volume after a certain 
period has elapsed; a wage explosion, on the other hand, eventually will cause the 
number of benefits to rise.
The development of labour costs was derived from the deflated oecd-series ‘Unit 
labour costs in the total economy’. This variable is expressed in the form of deviations 
from the economic growth rate, and therefore indicates the degree to which labour costs 
keep pace with changes in productivity. It can therefore be interpreted as an indicator for 
(a lack of ) wage moderation. Based on a sensitivity analysis, a lag of one year has been 
applied for all countries. Since the labour cost variable is exogenous, building in a lag 
does not introduce autocorrelation into the model (cf. Ostrom, 1990: 58-74).
Relative size of the services sector
Two indirect causal paths are specified here, both deriving from Esping-Andersen’s analy-
sis. First, a negative effect is assumed on the labour participation rate of elderly men. This 
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is based on the notion that in the period studied here a considerable part of this group 
did not have the skills to enable them to switch from jobs in the shrinking primary and 
secondary sectors to positions in the growing private or public services sector. As a result 
they ended up outside the labour force and went on to benefit; the saving in terms of a 
lower number of unemployed is not sufficient to offset this effect.
The impact of a growing services sector on the gross participation rate of women 
aged 25-54 years is considered positive. It is assumed that more women go to work as the 
share of the services sector increases. This corresponds with Esping-Andersen’s expecta-
tion that it was mainly women who benefited in the period studied from growing post-
industrial employment. Following the assumption on the total effect of female labour 
participation made earlier, this will lead to an increase in the benefit volume. A growing 
services sector implies that more women go out to work; this will lead to an increase in 
the number of unemployment benefits and the take-up of leave arrangements, a develop-
ment only partly offset by the reduction in the number of recipients of social assistance 
and survivor’s benefits.
On balance, the different causal paths on benefit dependency growth are expected 
to show a positive overall effect. A growth of the services sector has a negative impact on 
the participation rate of elderly men; and because the total effect of the latter variable 
on the benefit volume was assumed to be negative as well (cf. above), the effect of this 
path is positive. Changes in the relative size of the services sector have a positive impact 
on the participation rate of women, which in its turn is assumed to have a positive total 
effect on the benefit volume. Through this path, a relative growth of the services sector is 
therefore also expected to have a positive impact on the number of benefit recipients.
Data for this independent variable have been taken from the oecd Labour Force 
Statistics.
Unemployment benefit level
The effect of this institutional variable operates entirely indirectly, via the number of 
unemployed and the participation variables. The influence of benefit levels on unem-
ployment was considered at length in §3.6.3. The main effect in the model is a standard 
assumption in the neo-classical economy: if the replacement rate increases, unemployed 
people will seek work less intensively and workers will be more inclined to fall back on 
unemployment benefit. Assuming an unchanged labour supply, an increase in the benefit 
level will therefore lead to a higher unemployment rate, which translates into a growing 
take-up of unemployment benefits.
The model also incorporates indirect supply effects via the two participation vari-
ables. If benefits increase, the labour participation rate of elderly men is expected to 
rise; and given the assumed negative total elasticity of this participation factor with the 
dependent variable, a net fall in the number of benefits will ensue. If unemployment ben-
efits increase, the participation rate of women also increases. Because this latter factor is 
assumed to drive up the benefit volume, the total impact of this path will be positive.
The overall effect of all paths emanating from changes in the unemployment benefit 
level on benefit dependency growth is assumed to be positive. If unemployment benefits 
increase, this leads in theory to more unemployment in the labour force and a greater 
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labour supply of women, and both paths are supposed to increase the benefit volume. 
This effect will only partially be mitigated by the positive impact of the benefit level on 
the participation rate of elderly men, which on balance reduces the number of benefits.
For this variable, the benefit entitlement index as constructed by the oecd was used. 
This index is an average of the gross replacement rates – the percentage of a person’s 
salary that they receive back in the form of benefit when they lose their job – for vari-
ous income levels, types of household and unemployment durations (oecd, 1994: 171-
181; oecd, 1997a: 17-20; oecd, 2002; and supplementary data provided by the oecd)41. It 
therefore provides some insight into the financial appeal of unemployment regulations, 
but the measure is a fairly crude one. Gross figures may offer an inadequate view of the 
financial incentives to work or remain dependent on benefit, because people are more 
likely to respond to the (perceived) net differences between earnings and benefits. A fur-
ther limitation is that the index is calculated by the oecd only for uneven years; the even 
years have been interpolated here.
Theoretically, it could be assumed that changes in benefit levels will work through 
with some delay into the unemployment and gross participation rates. Following a sensi-
tivity analysis, however, it was decided not to apply a lag to this variable.
Test of the causal structure across countries
As a preliminary step, consideration was given to whether the structure outlined in 
 figure 5.7 matches the empirical data. A set of regression equations was estimated using 
the Amos program (Analysis of Moment Structures; see Arbuckle, 2006). Because the 
number of observations per country is limited, a simultaneous analysis across countries 
was first performed, with Canada and Australia being excluded due to limitations in the 
available data42. Based on 19 years and showing the mutations for eight countries, the 
number of observations then turns out at 152. Since outliers can easily occur in such 
a small dataset, a sensitivity analysis was performed in order to detect any influential 
observations43. This proved to be the case in years when unemployment rose very steeply 
in some countries, and in Germany in 1992, the year that reunification was incorporated 
in the figures44. These measurement points were removed from the analysis; ultimately, 
the model was tested on the basis of 120 observations.
The structure of the across-country model is as depicted in figure 5.7, with the excep-
tion of the variable ‘system changes’. Modifications of social security schemes which are 
important in the country-specific analyses (cf. below) – such as the introduction of Revenu 
minimum d’insertion in France at the end of the 1980s – were not influential enough to war-
rant the incorporation of dummy variables in the across-country model. In addition, a 
number of covariates between the exogenous variables were introduced; e.g. the ageing 
process occurring in most countries is reflected in a negative relationship between the 
percentage changes in the pension population and the number of 50-64 year-olds in the 
labour force. Of course it would have been possible to include dummy variables for the 
regime type in the model as well, so as to obtain estimates which could be used to test 
the hypotheses directly. However, because it is quite likely that some of the effects of the 
independent variables will diverge between nations – whereas they have been assumed 
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to be constant across countries in the current model – this would probably not be very 
informative. Regime impact will be discussed separately in the next section, after various 
country-specific models have been developed.
Table 5.1 shows that of the 21 direct effects in the model, 17 operate in the postulated 
direction, and 10 of them are statistically significant (two others are borderline cases)45. 
Of the four unexpected results, only one cannot be attributed to chance factors: a sub-
stantial negative direct effect (-0.22) of the number of 50-64 year-olds on the benefit vol-
ume. On closer inspection, however, this anomaly is easy to explain46.
Among the expected relationships, the standardised total effect on the benefit volume 
is strongest for the number of unemployed (0.60), followed by economic growth (0.39; 
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indirect effect only). In addition, changes in the number of pensioners and lone-parent 
families, and in the employment rate of elderly men, are fairly influential factors, with 
coefficients of 0.15 or more. Mutations in the size of the potential labour force largely 
impact via the number of unemployed. From the unstandardised coefficients (not included 
in the table) it is apparent that all direct effects on the benefit volume are inelastic, as pre-
dicted. The elasticities are highest for the relationship of benefit dependency growth with 
changes in the size of the pension population. The model factors explain a good deal of 
the variance in the benefit volume (r2=.60) and in the number of unemployed (r2=.64). The 
two endogenous participation variables, however, have low explained variances.
A common method to assess the goodness of fit of the entire model is the chi-square test. 
χ2 indicates to what extent the relationships specified in the model reproduce the origi-
nal variance/covariance matrix. A χ2 value of zero means there is no difference between 
the estimated and the actual (co)variances, thus indicating a perfect fit. For higher values, 
the significance of χ2 can be assessed using a standard statistical test. However, since 
the level of χ2 is sensitive to the number of degrees of freedom47 it is standard practice 
to correct for this (χ2/df ). Even then, this goodness of fit indicator has a number of dis-
advantages, including sensitivity to the sample size48. For this reason, many alternative 
fit indicators have been developed; a number of these (various fit indices, the root mean 
square error of approximation) have been included in table 5.1. According to all criteria, 
the specified model is in line with the empirical observations: the fit exceeds the appli-
cable threshold values.
Both the direction of the standardised effects and the fit indicators therefore suggest 
that the specified model reflects the actual causal structure across countries fairly well.
5.5 Country-specific models
In principle, each coefficient in the model can differ for each country. To investigate the 
extent to which this is the case, it is theoretically most appropriate to specify what is 
known as a multi-group model. In such a model the specific coefficients for each country 
are estimated simultaneously, and it is possible to test whether the differences found 
between the countries are statistically significant (Arbuckle, 2006: 381-388). However, 
the ‘small-N problem’ highlighted earlier (a maximum of 19 observations are available 
per country) means that the estimates obtained by such an approach will not be robust 
and there is a considerable risk of multicollinearity. In a test of the multi-group model 
in which all coefficients were left free, the fit was found to be too low. This was the case 
both for an analysis of the individual countries and for an analysis in which nations were 
grouped by regime type. It was therefore decided to perform a separate modelling for 
each country, in which an attempt was first made to minimise the number of parameters 
that had to be estimated. Subsequently, for each country the remaining coefficients were 
modelled through a stepwise procedure.
The coefficient is fairly easy to establish for some of the causal relations in the model. 
For example, the influence of the growth in the pension population on the benefit vol-
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ume does not have to be estimated using a regression analysis, but – assuming constant 
pension coverage – can be determined exactly. If it is known how many over-65s have 
been added to the population, and what proportion of them are in receipt of benefit, the 
unique effects of changes in the size of the pension population and in the pension cover-
age on the benefit growth rates (the elasticities) can be calculated directly49.
The direct effect of the size of the population of working age on the benefit growth 
seeks to map the extent to which changes in the size of this group work through into 
the number of benefits assigned to the population outside the labour force (early exits, 
survivor’s benefits, social assistance and disability benefits). The elasticity has been cal-
culated on the basis of the country-specific benefit fractions that applied in 1980, given 
a constant gross participation rate. The same approach was followed in estimating the 
direct effects of the two other demographic variables: the number of 50-64 year-olds and 
the number of lone-parent families50.
The indirect effect via unemployment of changes in the size of the population of 
working age and its ageing was determined in a similar fashion. It was assumed that 
both the gross and net participation rates do not change: thus, the labour force is a con-
stant proportion of all 15-64 year-olds, and the unemployment rate remains constant 
from 1980. Given these assumptions, the elasticity of the potential labour force with 
the un employment volume is by definition equal to 1 (if the number of 15-64 year-olds 
changes by 1%, the number of unemployed rises by the same percentage). The effect of the 
ageing of the labour force is smaller (and therefore inelastic), since the 50-64 years-old 
account for only a fraction of the potential labour force.
The impact on the unemployment volume of changes in the participation rate of 
older men and of women aged 25-54 years was determined in a comparable way. It was 
assumed that the size of these groups had remained constant since 1980, and that the 
unemployment rate in these two groups also remained unchanged. Based on these 
assumptions, it is possible to calculate directly how much the number of unemployed 
people has changed due to changes in the participation rates, and an elasticity can be 
determined. By contrast, the direct effect of these two participation variables on the ben-
efit growth rate had to be estimated51.
Using this method, nine parameters were fixed in advance. The other 12 causal effects 
in the model and any influence of system breaks were then estimated using a stepwise 
hierarchical procedure. First, the impact described above of the demographic variables 
and the pension coverage on the benefit volume and unemployment were incorporated. 
Stepwise regression analyses were then performed on the residual variance in the endog-
enous variables. The variable which according to the analysis offered the most explana-
tory power as a determinant for all eight countries was included first. On the residual 
variance that remained, the next strongest explanatory factor was regressed, and so on 
until the entire hierarchy of determinants had been analysed. A detailed inspection of 
influential outliers was carried out in each regression analysis, in the same way as indi-
cated earlier for the across-country model52. For a number of weak relationships, how-
ever, these outliers proved to be too dominant, and in these cases it was decided to con-
strain the coefficient for all countries to be equal53.
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Some allowance was made in the country-specific models for the potential influence on 
the benefit volume of changes in the formal social security schemes (system expansions 
or curtailments), of which each country went through many in the decades studied here. 
Provided the following criteria were met, an estimate was made of the volume effect of 
such system breaks:
– There must be a documented change in the national legislation in specific years;
– This is combined in these years with a high residual in the benefit volume in the model 
without any system breaks. This implies that the rule change has not already been 
incorporated in the model through the impact of one of the independent variables54; 
and that the system break impacts suddenly on the benefit volume, with little substitu-
tion to other benefit schemes (as there would be no high residuals in these cases);
– It must also be possible to trace the system break at detailed level in the original data, 
i.e. in one of the time series underlying the mutations of the total benefit volume. 
There must for example have been a sudden marked decrease in the number of recipi-
ents of survivor’s benefits.
5.5.1 Impact of model variables
The country-specific models are reproduced in detail in Annex 2. In all countries, the 
unstandardised coefficients (elasticities) have the sign that was assumed in figure 5.7, in 
other words all relations operate in the theoretically expected direction. As expected, 
among the demographic factors the pension population has the highest elasticity with the 
benefit growth rate. If the size of this group increases by 1%, the number of benefits 
grows by 0.5-0.6%. This reflects the large share taken by pensions in the total number 
of benefits: a substantial proportion of the population are of pensionable age, and the 
take-up is generally very high.
Changes in the size of the population of working age also weigh fairly heavily, with a total 
unstandardised effect that is usually55 around 0.40. The direct effect among the popula-
tion outside the labour force (the take-up of early exit arrangements, survivor’s pensions, 
disability benefits and non-unemployment related social assistance) is generally stronger 
than the indirect effect via the unemployment variable. As noted, the latter relationship 
reflects the net take-up of unemployment, sickness and leave benefits in the labour force. 
This indirect effect is around 0.15 in most countries, but is lower in Sweden, Germany and 
the Netherlands (0.08-0.10), as a consequence of the wide dispersion of the unemploy-
ment variable in these countries56.
The ageing of the potential labour force has a substantial impact as well: in most countries, 
a mutation of 1% leads to an increase in the benefit volume of around 0.2%, chiefly due to 
the direct effect. The coefficient of the number of lone-parent families is lower (0.02-0.09), 
because this group is relatively small in all countries compared to the total number of ben-
efit recipients (though in the period studied here it did grow strongly in some countries).
The dominant causal path of the two participation variables differs. The participa-
tion rate of elderly men has a considerable direct effect on the number of benefits (-0.20 to 
-0.40), which is only slightly mitigated by a weaker indirect effect via unemployment. 
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Substantively, this suggests that a declining participation rate leads to a net increase in 
the number of benefits: the rising take-up of early exit arrangements is offset to only a 
small degree by the fact that those who leave the labour market completely can no longer 
become unemployed and no longer have an entitlement to sickness benefit and occu-
pational leave arrangements. The participation of women aged 25-54 years, by contrast, has 
a weak negative direct effect and a somewhat stronger positive indirect effect via unem-
ployment. On balance, the increased participation rate of women appears to have driven 
up the benefit volume slightly: more women receive an employment-related benefit, and 
the reduction in the number of social assistance and survivor’s benefits does not com-
pensate for this. The total unstandardised effect on the benefit volume is however limited 
in all countries (0.02 to 0.06).
Economic growth has a strong effect on the unemployment volume57, with an elastic, 
negative coefficient: a growth mutation of one percent reduces the number of unem-
ployed by between 4.3% and 8.7%. Compared with the effect of the number of unem-
ployed on the benefit volume, the ranking of the countries is reversed. The peaks which 
occur in certain years in the changes in unemployment in Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands ensure that these countries this time have the highest coefficients. Since 
the country differences in the two effects are more or less compensatory this way, the 
total unstandardised effect of economic growth on the benefit volume is around 0.70 in 
all countries.
System changes have a considerable impact on benefit dependency in some countries, 
and will be discussed further below. The total effect of the remaining model variables, 
however, is limited. Worthy of note are the rather more substantial effects of labour costs 
on the number of unemployed (0.48 in Sweden, around 0.40 elsewhere), and the effect of 
the size of the services sector on the labour participation rate of elderly men (between -0.32 
and -0.43).
The predictive power of the model for the final dependent variable, the benefit volume, is 
fairly high. Table 5.2 shows that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted change 
in the benefit volume over the entire period 1980-1999 amounts to less than one percent-
age point in all countries. The proportion of explained variance in benefit dependency is 
high in all cases as well: 0.51-0.52 in Belgium and Denmark, 0.70 in Sweden and 0.80-0.84 
in the other countries.
A second dependent variable, the trend in the number of unemployed, also has a high 
explained variance, generally between 0.55 and 0.65. The usa comes out higher (0.81), 
Belgium somewhat lower (0.45). The two participation variables are less well predicted by 
the model, however. The explained variance is generally less than 0.06; it is only higher 
in Denmark for the labour participation of elderly men58 (0.17).
Table 5.3 indicates the extent to which each model variable changed in the period 1980-
1999, and how this influenced the number of benefits at the end point59. The table shows 
clearly that the number of benefits in all countries is influenced to a substantial extent 
by demographic changes. In four countries the number of benefits grows as a result by 
12-16%; the growth in Denmark is lower (+8%), and is substantially higher in France, the 
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Netherlands and the usa (+22 to +33%). These differences arise in the first place due to 
the growth in the pension population. This group saw the strongest growth in the latter 
countries between 1980 and 1999. In the usa the rising number of people aged over 65 
led to an 18% increase in the benefit volume; the increase in the Netherlands was 17%, in 
France 14%.
The growth in the size of the population of working age reinforces these differences. The 
potential labour force increased by 20% in the usa, driving up the number of benefits 
by an estimated 10%. Here again, France and the Netherlands also saw strong growth, 
so that the number of benefits increased more (+5% to +6%) than in the other European 
nations (+2% to +4%).
The ageing of the potential labour force had virtually no impact on the number of bene-
fits in most countries. There was a slight rejuvenation of the labour force in the usa and 
Great Britain, which translates in a very modest decrease of benefit dependency. In Bel-
gium, Sweden and France the potential labour force aged very little in the period consid-
ered here, resulting in a rise of less than 1% in benefit dependency. The Netherlands, Den-
mark and Germany are the exceptions here; in the first two countries the benefit volume 
rose by an estimated 2% due to this factor. This was because in the 1980s the labour force 
was rejuvenated to a lesser degree than elsewhere, while it aged markedly in the 1990s. 
The effect in Germany is somewhat stronger (+3%); it occurs mainly in the 1980s, and is 
fairly  complex60.
The impact of the growth in the number of lone-parent families on benefit dependency 
varies: in four countries it is significant (approx. +3%), while in another four it is slight 
(less than 1%). The influence of this variable depends on three factors: the number of 
lone-parent families in 1980 (the base rate), the proportion of these families who were in 
receipt of benefit, and the growth in the size of this group between 1980 and 1999. The 
Table 5.2 
Predictive power of the country-speci c models 
 Benefi t dependency 1999
 (Index value, 1980=100)                         r 2
       male labour female labour
  model  benefi t number of participation participation 
model actual estimate  difference dependency unemployed (55-64 years) (25-54 years)
   
 US 117.8 118.1  0.3 0.816 0.812 0.056 0.014
 GB 123.6 123.1 -0.5 0.844 0.565 0.022 0.031
 DK 118.4 117.8 -0.6 0.515 0.621 0.170 0.024
 SE 121.3 121.6  0.3 0.702 0.647 0.036 0.007
 BE 130.0 129.9 -0.1 0.513 0.449 0.005 0.005
 DE 125.0 125.3  0.4 0.838 0.548 0.022 0.033
 FR 150.4 149.6 -0.8 0.810 0.653 0.005 0.011
 NL 133.5 133.6  0.2 0.801 0.558 0.011 0.008
Table 5.3 
Impact of changes in model variables on bene t dependency, 1980-1999
 US GB DK SE BE DE FR NL
  Demography
Pension population (age ≥ 65 years)
- changes in X a 135 111 108 114 118 108 123 132
- impact on benefi t dependency b 17.9 6.7 3.9 8.5 10.4 5.0 14.3 16.5
Population of working age (15-64 years)
- changes in X a 120 107 106 106 104 111 113 115
- impact on benefi t dependency b 9.9 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.7 3.6 4.8 6.1
Elderly (50-64 years)
- changes in X a 99 97 111 104 102 116 105 115
- impact on benefi t dependency b -0.2 -0.5 1.7 0.8 0.4 3.3 0.9 2.2
Lone parents
- changes in X a 138 192 113 130 227 142 170 198
- impact on benefi t dependency b 3.1 3.5 0.3 0.5 2.7 0.6 0.8 2.6
        
  Economy and labour market
Number of unemployed
- changes in X a 77 100 108 219 142 199 202 108
- impact on benefi t dependency b -2.2 2.2 3.0 10.6 6.5 8.3 12.1 3.1
Economic growth
- changes in X a 184 158 143 145 146 144 146 161
- impact on benefi t dependency b -2.1 2.3 2.9 10.8 6.7 8.2 12.1 3.1
Labour costs
- changes in X a 56 60 67 63 59 64 65 53
- impact on benefi t dependency b -3.1 -2.9 -2.0 -1.7 -2.9 -1.8 -2.2 -2.4
Male labour participation (55-64 years)
- changes in X c -4 -17 -11 -6 -22 -9 -23 -16
- impact on benefi t dependency b 0.6 4.0 4.4 1.1 6.1 3.5 7.2 3.8
Female labour participation (25-54 years)
- changes in X c 14 10 6 3 23 14 16 32
- impact on benefi t dependency b 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.4 0.6 0.2
Relative size of services sector
- changes in X c 9 17 8 11 11 16 17 12
- impact on benefi t dependency b 0.4 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.1 2.3 1.7 1.0
        
  Institutional developments
Unemployment benefi t level
- changes in X c 0 -7 9 -1 -6 -2 10 -7
- impact on benefi t dependency b 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1
Pension coverage
- changes in X c -  5  6 - - - -  -
- impact on benefi t dependency b -   3.2 3.3 -  -  -  -  - 
Major system changes
- impact on benefi t dependency d -7.5 0.5 -1.2 -2.5 -  -  4.2 -2.0
        
  All variables
- impact on benefi t dependency b 18.1 23.1 17.8 21.6 29.9 25.3 49.6 33.6
a. Index value 1999; 1980=100.
b.  Estimated change in benefi t years 1980-1999, in % (expected value).
c.  In percentage points, 1980-1999.
d.  Estimated change in benefi t years 1980-1999, in % (net result of all system changes).
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Relative size of services sector
- changes in X c 9 17 8 11 11 16 17 12
- impact on benefi t dependency b 0.4 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.1 2.3 1.7 1.0
        
  Institutional developments
Unemployment benefi t level
- changes in X c 0 -7 9 -1 -6 -2 10 -7
- impact on benefi t dependency b 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1
Pension coverage
- changes in X c -  5  6 - - - -  -
- impact on benefi t dependency b -   3.2 3.3 -  -  -  -  - 
Major system changes
- impact on benefi t dependency d -7.5 0.5 -1.2 -2.5 -  -  4.2 -2.0
        
  All variables
- impact on benefi t dependency b 18.1 23.1 17.8 21.6 29.9 25.3 49.6 33.6
a. Index value 1999; 1980=100.
b.  Estimated change in benefi t years 1980-1999, in % (expected value).
c.  In percentage points, 1980-1999.
d.  Estimated change in benefi t years 1980-1999, in % (net result of all system changes).
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increase in the number of benefits is strongest in Great Britain (+3.5%); this country com-
bines a fairly high starting level and a high benefit fraction with a sharp increase in the 
number of lone-parent families (+92%). The usa scores highs as well (+3.1%). Here, both 
the number of lone-parent families and the benefit fraction were already high in 1980. As 
a consequence, the more modest growth in the size of this group (+37%) still leads to a 
substantial growth of benefit dependency.
The Netherlands and Belgium combined a high initial benefit fraction with a fairly low 
number of lone-parent families in 1980 and the strongest increase in the size of this group. 
On balance, the number of benefits grows fairly strongly in the Low Countries (+2.6-2.7%).
The Scandinavian nations score lowest, with a volume increase of between +0.3 
and +0.5%. Although Denmark and Sweden already had a large number of lone-parent 
families in 1980, these did not often receive benefit. The modest increase in the size of 
the group accordingly has virtually no effect. The volume increase in France was slightly 
higher (+0.8%), due to a combination of a low starting level and low benefit depend-
ency in 1980 with fairly strong growth in the number of lone-parent families. Germany 
achieves a comparable score (+0.6%). Here, the base rate was similar as in France, and the 
initial benefit fraction was slightly higher; but the increase in the number of lone-parent 
families was comparatively smaller.
The table then shows the impact of the variables relating to the economy and the labour 
market. The development in the number of unemployed leads to a modest fall in the benefit 
volume in the usa (-2%) and to a slight increase in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Den-
mark (+2 to +3%). In Belgium and Germany, the influence of the unemployment variable 
on the benefit volume is more marked (+7 to +8%), and is greatest in Sweden and France 
(+11 to +12%). In the three latter countries the number of unemployed was almost twice 
as high in 1999 as in 1980; in Sweden and Germany the impact on the benefit volume is 
somewhat mitigated by the low elasticity (cf. Annex 2).
Economic growth was highest in the usa between 1980 and 1999 (+84%), followed at 
some distance by the Netherlands and Great Britain, where gdp rose by around 60%. The 
economies of the other countries grew by around 45% over the period as a whole. Because 
the influence of economic growth operates mainly via the strong effect on the unemploy-
ment variable, the estimated impact on the benefit volume is in all cases virtually equal 
to that of the number of unemployed.
Labour costs in all countries lag a fairly long way behind economic growth between 
1980 and 1999 (the index stood at between 53% and 67% of the initial value). After allowing 
for the lag of one year referred to earlier, this leads to a fall in the number of bene fits of 
between 2% and 3% everywhere. The (small) differences between the countries are mainly 
caused by the divergent effects of unemployment on benefit volume. Wage moderation 
was most marked in the Netherlands in this period, but because here the unemployment 
effect is somewhat weaker than in the usa, Great Britain and Belgium, the impact on the 
number of benefits is less marked than in those three countries.
Although the downward trend came to an end in the second half of the 1990s, the 
labour participation of elderly men in 1999 was lower everywhere than in 1980. The devel-
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opment in the Netherlands is most remarkable, where the participation of this group 
rose by 5 percentage points from 1994 onwards. The influence on the benefit volume is 
cumulatively the highest in Belgium and France (+6% to +7 %), followed at some distance 
by  Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Denmark (approx. +4%). The usa and 
 Sweden score much lower (+0.6% to +1.1%)
The labour participation of women rose very strongly in Belgium and the Netherlands 
(+23 to +32 percentage points), and also moved ahead considerably in the other non-Scan-
dinavian countries. Yet this had virtually no influence on the number of benefit recipi-
ents, because of the low elasticity already mentioned: the weak direct negative effect of 
higher female participation (fewer recipients of social assistance and survivor’s pensions) 
is offset by a slightly stronger indirect positive effect (more women who become unem-
ployed and make use of sickness benefits and leave arrangements). Only in Belgium, 
where the indirect effect is greatest, does benefit dependency increase by more than 1% 
because of this factor.
The relative size of the services sector also had a modest influence on the number of ben-
efits. In most countries the estimated impact over the entire period was no more than 
1.1%. The three countries where the services sector grew most strongly – Great Britain, 
France and Germany – score slightly higher, with between 1.3% and 2.3%. The influence 
operates almost exclusively via the labour participation of elderly men. The growth of 
the services sector was accompanied by a reduction in the participation of this group, 
something which resulted in a rising take-up of early exit arrangements (early retire-
ment, incapacity for work, long-term unemployment) and a small fall in the number of 
recipients of unemployment, sickness and leave benefits.
A further block consists of institutional developments. In all countries, the unemployment 
benefit level as measured by the oecd index does not change particularly strongly in the 
period considered here (between -7 and +10 percentage points). Combined with the low 
total elasticity (a maximum of 0.024), this leads to a limited cumulative impact on the 
number of benefits (between -0.1% and +0.2%). Given the somewhat problematic nature 
of this variable (see §5.4), this result may not be surprising. It could be that the postulated 
effect would show more clearly if benefit entitlements were assessed more adequately 
(use of the net rather than growth replacement rates, and of annual rather than biennial 
mutations; including non-unemployment entitlements in the index; weighing the cover-
age of the schemes). For the time being, however, it must be observed that this factor 
appears to have less of an influence on the growth in the total benefit volume than is gen-
erally assumed in neo-classical economic theory. In the current analysis, demographic 
changes and general developments in the economy and on the labour market emerge as 
more important driving factors61.
A second institutional variable, the pension coverage, is relevant only in Denmark and 
Great Britain, where it causes the number of benefit years to rise by more than 3%. This 
partly compensates for the fairly modest impact of the growth in the population aged 
65 years or more in these countries.
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Finally, system changes which met the criteria listed at the start of this section occurred in 
many countries. France underwent relatively large system expansions. The introduction 
of the Allocation parentale d’éducation (1985), and more especially the general social assist-
ance legislation (Revenu minimum d’insertion, 1989), drove up the benefit volume by an esti-
mated 4%62. In Great Britain, too, a system extension took place in the 1980s; the Invalid 
Care Allowance pushed up the British benefit volume by approximately half a percent63.
The benefit volume fell due to system changes in four countries. Denmark introduced 
a restriction in the sickness benefit scheme in 1983 (introduction of a maximum benefit 
duration), leading to an estimated fall in the total number of benefits of more than 1%64. 
In the Netherlands, changes in the sickness benefits and surviving dependants’ arrange-
ments65 resulted in an estimated reduction in the benefit volume of 2%. Sweden imposed 
limits in 1995 on the arrangements for parental leave, contact days, caring for sick chil-
dren, etc. Moreover, survivor benefits were gradually phased out, which was reflected from 
1997 in a sharp fall in the volume. These changes led to a reduction of 2.5% in the total 
number of benefits.
The biggest system contraction took place in the usa (-7.5%). The most important 
change was the amendment of the social assistance scheme in 1996/97, with the aboli-
tion of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (afdc) and the introduction of Temporary 
Aid to Needy Families (tanf). The number of social assistance benefits in the usa fell from 
6.7 million in 1995 to 3.2 million in 1999. This can be explained only partially by the fall-
ing unemployment rate in this period (an effect which is moreover mitigated by the rising 
number of lone-parent families); a considerable share of the reduction in benefit depend-
ency is a result of this system change (an estimated -5.5% of the total volume in 1999). In 
addition, a number of modifications introduced in the early 1980s also helped push down 
benefit dependency in the usa66.
All in all, the benefit volume in the majority of countries is driven up mainly by demo-
graphic trends, in particular growth in the number of pensioners, the size of the poten-
tial labour force and – in four countries – the number of lone-parent families. Unem-
ployment (and the underlying economic growth) also led to a substantial increase in 
the number of benefits in some countries in 1999 compared with 1980; this applies in 
particular for France, Sweden, Germany and Belgium. The falling labour participation of 
elderly men also had a clear upward impact on the number of benefits in all countries; 
Sweden and the usa are the only countries where this effect was more limited. The trend 
in labour costs reduced the benefit volume everywhere, with little variation between the 
countries. System breaks had a major influence mainly in the usa and France.
In most countries, the number of benefits grew by 21-30% in the period considered 
here (cf. table 5.2). The somewhat lower growth in the United States is found to be pri-
marily the result of the stable number of benefits among the population of working age: 
the total increase of almost 18% is accounted for entirely by the growth in the number of 
pension recipients. Below the age of 65, the growth of the potential labour force and in 
the number of lone-parent families leads to a fairly sharp increase in the benefit volume 
(+13%), but this is cancelled out by the strong influence of the system changes in the usa 
and the fall in the number of unemployed.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   310 21-9-2009   15:09:15
311b e n e f i t d e p e n d e n c y
 5 
Denmark also saw a relatively modest increase in benefit volume (just over 18%). This 
is due chiefly to the low growth of the labour force and the pension population, even 
allowing for the rising coverage. The limited increase in the number of lone-parent fami-
lies and unemployed people also plays a role here.
The Netherlands scores higher than most countries (+34%). This is due mainly to pop-
ulation growth, which was the second-highest after the United States in both the popula-
tion below and above the age of 65 years. This effect is reinforced by the growth in the 
number of lone-parent families, the ageing of the labour force and the decreased labour 
participation of elderly men (although the latter improved considerably since 1994).
France records far and away the highest volume increase (+50%). The influence of 
the growth in the pension population and in the population of working age is also fairly 
strong (in third place after the Netherlands). The benefit volume is driven up even fur-
ther by the higher number of unemployed and the falling labour participation of elderly 
men, two variables whose influence is highest in France. In combination with the fact 
that France is the only country where system changes had a considerable positive impact, 
these developments led to the benefit volume in 1999 being one and a half times as high 
as at the start of the 1980s.
5.5.2 Regime impact
The above results say little about the impact of the different types of social security 
regime. To determine that influence one could try to argue for every relationship in the 
model whether there is a theoretical interaction with the type of social security regime. 
Sometimes, assumptions of this type can be deduced from Esping-Andersen’s theoreti-
cal argument. The most interesting67 is his thesis that corporatist regimes pursued a 
mass exit strategy from the 1980s onwards, leading to a strong increase in the benefit 
volume in countries with this institutional structure. This assumption is supported to 
some degree by the model outcomes. The labour participation of elderly men did indeed 
decrease most strongly between 1980 and 1999 in the corporatist Belgium and France (by 
between 22 and 23 percentage points), leading to the biggest increase in the number of 
benefits in these countries (+6-7%). Germany scores slightly lower (partly because one 
observation year was left out of the model), but still records a substantial increase in 
benefit volume (+3.5%) due to the falling labour participation of elderly men. However, 
the effect also occurs in some non-corporatist countries. The fairly strong volume growth 
that can be attributed to this factor in the Netherlands (+4%, comparable with Germany) 
may perhaps still be reconciled with Esping-Andersen’s assumption, in the sense that the 
hybrid system shares this characteristic with the corporatist type. This does not however 
apply for the considerable increases in benefit volume attributable to the falling elderly 
male labour participation which occurred in the liberal Great Britain and the social-
democratic Denmark (again approximately +4%). This confirms the picture that emerged 
earlier in the decomposition of the benefit volume (see figure 5.5). The growth in the 
number of early exits is a broad phenomenon which drove up the number of benefits in 
many nations. In the group of countries studied here, only Sweden and the United States 
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were able to avoid this to any extent. At most the phenomenon occurs to a slightly greater 
extent in some corporatist countries than elsewhere; it is however by no means reserved 
exclusively for this regime type.
In many cases, however, the theoretical interaction effect of the regime type with 
the causal relationships specified in the model is less clear. To test the plausibility of 
the hypotheses formulated earlier, it may be useful to try and answer a more general 
question: how did the benefit volume develop after equalising the countries in terms of 
model characteristics which are not likely to be related to social security regimes? Both 
the relative volume (hypothesis 1A-1C) and the growth rates (hypothesis 2A-2C) may be 
examined in this respect. The volume composition (hypothesis 3A-3G), however, is left 
out of consideration here, since no statements can be made about this on the basis of the 
dependent variable in the model. This would require that the volume be broken down 
into the six types of benefit shown in the earlier wind rose graphics, with all direct effects 
in need of re-estimation.
The equalisation of countries was achieved in three ways. First, demographic factors 
were cancelled out by imposing the initial situation and subsequent developments of the 
United States on all countries68. In this us demography simulation, the population size for 
each country remains unchanged in 1980, but the composition in terms of the pension 
population, the potential labour force, the number of 50-64 year-olds and the number of 
lone-parent families is made the same as in the usa. The countries also undergo the same 
percentage change in these four variables as in the usa in later years. In this simulation 
the elasticities with the benefit volume were recalculated, based on the assumption that 
the country-specific benefit dependency risks of the different demographic groups do not 
change. As a corollary to this, a number of other effects in the model were also re assessed, 
because they are sensitive to changes in the population composition69 (cf. Annex 2). This 
simulation results in an estimate of the benefit volume produced by the representatives 
of the various social security regimes under the same demographic conditions.
A second means of equalising the countries relates to the influence of system revisions. 
As we saw earlier, these changes can have a considerable impact on the benefit volume 
in different countries, and in divergent directions. It is therefore better to investigate 
how the number of benefits would have developed if the countries had not undergone 
these major changes. The qualifying comment can be made here that system revisions 
can theoretically be path-dependent (see e.g. Soede et al., 2004). In that case, to obtain 
a pure comparison between the countries it would perhaps be better not to leave them 
out of consideration. And indeed, some of the alterations to the various social security 
schemes do seem to be in line with basic regime principles; especially the further target-
ing of American social assistance at the most needy (thus making it even more liberal)70 
and the abolition of surviving dependent’s benefits in Sweden (thus eliminating the cor-
poratist regime’s favourable treatment of breadwinners) could be considered exemplary 
in this respect. In practice, however, the majority of the system changes incorporated in 
the model do not appear to be particularly consistent with any institutional path. The 
introduction of a large-scale social assistance scheme would by no means be regarded as 
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typical for the corporatist French system, any more than the introduction of a care allow-
ance for invalid persons in Great Britain is a textbook example of the principles of the lib-
eral regime; and most system curtailments in the model reflect austerity measures rather 
than path-dependent redesigns. For that reason, all schemes have been analysed frozen 
in time; i.e. in this simulation the basic assumption is that no major system changes 
meeting the criteria listed earlier occur after 1980. As a corollary to this, the comparison 
between countries becomes more accurate if the rising take-up of pensions in Denmark and 
Great Britain is discarded. These increases are probably not characteristic of the regime 
types to which these countries belong.
The third means of correcting for non-institutional differences between the coun-
tries is to eliminate the influence of the economic cycle. As became clear from figures 
5.4a-5.4c, volume growth rates tend to show an anticyclical pattern, with more (hidden) 
unemployment benefits as economic growth decreases (partly mitigated by a reduc-
tion in employee dependency). Since the level and phasing of economic booms and 
recessions may vary across countries, the comparison of benefit dependency can eas-
ily become biased. The obvious way of correcting for this is to take the development in 
structural unemployment as the reference point in all countries and to determine how this 
has impacted on the number of benefits. Here this was achieved by imposing the ‘non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (nairu) in the model: the unemployment 
rate above which inflation is expected to fall, and below which inflation is expected to 
rise. The nairu is more or less synonymous to the ‘natural unemployment rate’; it is not 
a constant, but may change as a result of technological developments, the availability of 
natural resources, the skill level of the population etc.  Use was made of the historical 
nairu series provided by the oecd (Turner et al., 2001).
Simulations of benefit dependency growth
Since the simulations carried out with the help of the model relate to the percentage 
changes in the volume, it is logical to look first at the assumptions on the benefit depend-
ency growth (hypotheses 2A-2C). The first ranking in figure 5.8 shows the development in 
the actual volume figures as already discussed, as well as the minor deviations from those 
figures in the estimates based on the country-specific models. As established earlier, it is 
only in the 1980s that hypothesis 2A cannot be rejected. In that period, the volume grew 
more strongly in the Netherlands than in the three corporatist countries and the hybrid 
regime occupied the expected top position, as the solid bars in the graph show. Viewed 
over the entire period (including the shaded bars), however, the increase in France is by 
far the strongest, and the average growth of the corporatist countries exceeds the Dutch 
score71. By contrast, the expectations in hypothesis 2B held: the growth in the benefit 
volume is indeed substantially greater in the corporatist group than in the social-demo-
cratic one, both on average and in the individual countries (although Denmark recorded 
stronger growth in the 1980s than Belgium). Hypothesis 2C had to be rejected, because 
there are virtually no differences between the representatives of the social-democratic 
and liberal regimes. The benefit volume in Denmark grew just as little as in the us, while 
Sweden came out slightly lower than Great Britain. If Canada and Australia would have 
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been included in the model-based analysis, the hypothesis probably still would have to 
be rejected, as these two liberal countries showed a theoretically unexpected strong vol-
ume growth (cf. figure 5.4c)72.
The second ranking in the figure shows the result after the imposition of us demography. 
The models depicted in Annex 2 also contain the elasticities that apply for this variant73. In 
most countries the demographic equating with the usa means that in 1980 there are fewer 
over-65s, but that this group grows more strongly in the subsequent years than in the orig-
inal figures. If the American population data are used, the group younger than 65 years is 
greater in 1980, and this category also expands more quickly in the period 1981-1999 than 
on the basis of the countries’ own demography. On balance, the growth in the number 
of benefits based on these factors is greater in most countries after the us demography 
simulation. The smaller number of pensioners in 1980, in particular, does however mean 
that this growth usually starts from a lower base rate74. The exception to this general pic-
ture is the Netherlands. Here, the ratio of the over-65s to younger people in 1980, and the 
subsequent development in the pension population, do not differ markedly from those in 
the United States. As a result, the simulation leads to less changes in the Netherlands than 
elsewhere. The volume increase is slightly greater than previously, because the population 
aged under 65 years grows more strongly after imposing us demography.
In addition, after this simulation the potential labour force is younger in almost all 
countries: the share of 50-64 year-olds in the initial year shrinks, and increases to a lesser 
extent between 1980 and 1999. This reduces the growth in the benefit volume, most nota-
bly in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Great Britain is the exception here; the 
original figures already implied a slight rejuvenation of the potential labour force, and 
this is less clearly so in the us demography variant. This means that the volume decrease 
attributable to changes in the size of the 50-64 year-age group is less after the simulation 
than before it.
The share of lone-parent families assumes a higher starting point in most countries 
after the imposition of the us demography, but the growth between 1980 and 1999 is gen-
erally less strong. This does not however apply for Sweden and Denmark, which already 
had a large number of lone-parent families in 1980 and subsequently experienced rather 
lower growth than in the us. The impact of this variable on the benefit volume is rendered 
slightly smaller by the simulation in Belgium and Great Britain, while it increases some-
what in the remaining countries.
The relative position of the Netherlands and the United States has changed markedly after 
imposing the us demography in all countries. In these two nations, the percentage muta-
tion in the benefit volume over the entire period remained (virtually) the same, while 
elsewhere the simulation gave rise to a much stronger volume growth (+16-20 percent-
age points in most countries). In France, the estimated additional increase in the benefit 
volume is somewhat less (+10 percentage points); here, total benefit dependency rises by 
almost 60% between 1980 and 1999 after applying the American population figures, more 
than three times as much as in the usa.
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Hypothesis 2A is rejected even more empathically in this variant. After imposition of 
the American demography, the Netherlands still experiences less benefit growth than the 
average of the corporatist group, but the difference in the ‘wrong’ direction has increased 
(-15 percentage points, against -1 percentage point with the countries’ original demogra-
phy)75; and over the entire period Belgium, Germany and France each show more growth 
than the hybrid regime. Only in the 1980s the Dutch volume growth was high, though 
the Netherlands no longer occupies the top position (France comes higher) and the dif-
ference with the corporatist group average has become much smaller.
The theoretical expectations in hypothesis 2B still hold. After imposing the American 
demography, the growth in the corporatist group is substantially higher (+11 percentage 
points) than in Sweden and Denmark. Hypothesis 2C is partially confirmed in this vari-
ant: as expected, the group average in the social-democratic group is decidedly higher 
than in the liberal one (+9 percentage points). However, this is due to the very low score 
of the usa: the benefit volume in Great Britain has in fact grown slightly more strongly 
than in Denmark and Sweden.
Although the division in three regime types is clearly manifest in the us demography 
variant, this does not apply to the low growth in the hybrid regime in the 1990s: with the 
exception of the us, the Netherlands produces the fewest benefits over the whole period, 
leaving it far removed from the postulated top position. In Great Britain the number of 
benefits increases fairly sharply for a liberal social security regime, to a level just above 
the social-democratic group.
However, the picture is influenced by the system changes which took place in many 
countries. In Denmark and Great Britain, the growth was also determined by the rising 
pension take-up in the 65+ age group (elsewhere this was already incorporated almost 
fully in the volume figures for 1980). In the third ranking in the figure, the impact of 
these factors is left out of consideration, once again after application of the American 
demographic trends. In this simulation volume growth in the usa increases considerable, 
especially in the 1990s, because the Aid to Families with Dependent Children would not have 
been replaced by the Temporary Aid to Needy Families. The growth in France is substantially 
lower, mainly in the first decade, because the Allocation parentale d’éducation and the Revenu 
minimum d’insertion would not have been introduced in the 1980s. Great Britain also comes 
out significantly lower down the rankings: the scope of Invalid Care Allowance would not 
have been extended and the pension take-up would not have increased. In Denmark the 
latter factor also reduces the volume growth, but this is partially cancelled out by the 
assumption that a number of system restrictions would not have occurred; in comparison 
with the previous variant, a slight fall remains. Sweden and the Netherlands do see a small 
increase in benefit dependency growth due to the elimination of the effect of volume-
reducing measures (among other things in the surviving dependants’ legislation).
The difference between the countries with the highest and lowest growth figures 
shrinks in this variant: the volume increase in France is now less than twice as high as 
in the usa. Little support is still found for hypothesis 2A, though the difference between 
the hybrid regime and the average of the corporatist group in the unexpected direction 
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(-10 percentage points) over the entire period has become smaller. However, the Neth-
erlands does top the ranking as expected in 1990: in the 1980s the volume growth here 
was the highest. Hypothesis 2B seems tenable at the level of group averages: benefit 
dependency in the corporatist regime grows stronger than in the social-democratic one, 
although the gap (+8 percentage points) is less wide than in the previous simulation. 
However, in the individual ranking Sweden occupies a midway position between that 
of Germany and Belgium, so the contrast between the groups is mainly based on the 
low Danish growth. Regarding hypothesis 2C the expectations are met more closely: the 
difference in the averages of the liberal and social-democratic group remains roughly 
the same (8 percentage points), but Sweden and Great Britain swap places in the country 
ranking. As a result, Sweden leaves both liberal countries behind, as expected; the Swed-
ish score even appears to be on the high side for a social-democratic regime. Moreover, 
Great Britain now ranks considerably lower than the corporatist countries; yet the British 
volume growth is still greater than in Denmark. The gap of the latter country with the usa 
has closed somewhat.
If the structural unemployment rates are taken as a basis, the differences between the coun-
tries are much smaller. Belgium now shows the biggest increase in the number of ben-
efits in this final simulation: +44%, more than one third higher than in the usa (+32%). 
Compared with the previous variant, the benefit volume in Great Britain and the usa is 
between 2 and 4 percentage points higher, while in the other countries it declines. The 
fall is fairly modest (-1 to -2 percentage points) in the Netherlands, Denmark and  Germany, 
and rather more substantial in Belgium (-5 percentage points). The steepest drop occurs 
in Sweden and France (-8 to -9 percentage points).76
In this final variant, too, hypothesis 2A has to be rejected. After imposing the 
structural unemployment levels, the benefit volume in the Netherlands still grows less 
between 1980 and 1999 than in the three corporatist countries, though the difference 
has become smaller (+36% versus +42% on average). In the 1980s, the benefit volume 
increases to roughly the same extent as in Belgium, France and Great Britain, giving the 
Netherlands one of the highest growth figures – though not a clear top position, just 
above the corporatist group average. In the following decade, however, according to this 
variant the Dutch benefit volume grows the least of all countries.
Hypothesis 2B is corroborated more clearly than in the previous simulation model. 
Not only is the average of the social-democratic group clearly below the corporatist level 
(+34% versus +42%), but due to the considerable decrease in Sweden the expected diver-
gence also shows in all individual countries.
Hypothesis 2C, on the other hand, can no longer be maintained. There is hardly any 
difference between the group averages; in fact, the social-democratic average lags behind 
the liberal one (-1.0 percentage points). While, as expected, Sweden and Denmark come 
out higher than the usa (which holds the bottom position), in terms of volume growth 
these countries are surpassed by Great Britain. It was noted earlier that the British system 
could be regarded as an example of regime shift, where a fairly social-democratic system 
(designed on the basis of Beveridgean principles) was largely liberalised in the Thatcher 
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years. The result may be characterised as an example of ‘stalled social democratization’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999:87) or, bearing in mind figure 4.2, perhaps more accurately as a 
liberal system with social-democratic residues. In terms of volume growth, however, the 
British system appears to perform less well than the purer representatives of the regime 
types with which it shares characteristics.
The secondary hypotheses relating to the within-cluster ranking cannot be rejected 
for the liberal and social-democratic regimes. As expected, the volume growth in the usa 
is lower than in Great Britain, and in Denmark it is lower than in Sweden. In the corpo-
ratist cluster the ranking is not as postulated: while the number of benefits in Germany 
grows less than in France, in line with expectations, Belgium ranks at the top and there-
fore has the highest rather than the lowest growth within its cluster.
Taking everything together, the final variant indicates that the benefit dependency growth 
hypothesis is supported to a limited extent. In the period analysed here, the representa-
tives of the corporatist social security regime did indeed undergo stronger growth in the 
benefit volume than the representatives of the social-democratic type; these in turn, as 
expected, surpassed the liberal regime of the usa (but not Great Britain, a less pure rep-
resentative of the type). The Dutch hybrid regime exceeds the corporatist group (but not 
France) in the 1980s, but had the lowest estimated growth rate in the 1990s.
This conclusion needs to be further qualified with the comment that the differences 
between the regime types are fairly limited after correcting for the influence of non-
institutional factors (demographic differences, major system changes, the influence of 
pension take-up in Great Britain and Denmark, and the impact of the economic cycle on 
unemployment). On an annual basis, the number of benefits in the corporatist regime 
grows by an average of 0.4 percentage points more than in the social-democratic cluster, 
which in turn exceeds the growth in the liberal regime of the usa by slightly more than 
0.1 percentage points per year. If Denmark, the country with the fewest inhabitants in 
this comparison, would have had a corporatist system, the volume of benefits in 1999 
would have increased by around 6,000, while under an American system the decrease 
would have been approximately 2,000 benefits. If the usa, the most populated country, 
would have had a social-democratic regime, the 1999 benefit volume would be higher by 
almost 90,000; and a corporatist regime would add another 260,000 benefits – a fairly 
limited change, given the fact that actual us benefit dependency amounted to more than 
59 million that year.
A point that must be considered is whether it is plausible that these fairly limited differ-
ences are actually ‘produced’ by the regime types. It is after all possible that the variation 
in benefit production between the country groups is a chance outcome; or that it is not 
brought about by diverging formal social security institutions, but reflects discrepancies 
in other factors that were not included in the model (such as the education level of the 
labour force, the prevailing informal rules, and the interaction processes occurring at 
the micro level).
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Looking at the contributions of the individual direct determinants to the develop-
ment of the benefit volume, rather more specific conclusions can be drawn. In the first 
place, a substantial part of the volume growth in all countries can be attributed to gen-
eral population developments. According to the final simulation model, the benefit vol-
ume in most countries increases between 1980 and 1999 by 17-18% due to the growth 
in the population aged 65 years and older77, and by 5-7% due to changes in the size of 
the group below this age. Thus, these basic demographic trends together account for a 
growth in the number of benefits of around a quarter everywhere, all other things being 
equal. These two variables are therefore the most important factors driving up the ben-
efit volume. At the same time, however, the country variation in their combined impact 
is limited; in equalised circumstances, a large share of benefit dependency growth is not 
related to the regime typology.
With regard to the differences between the hybrid and corporatist regime types (hypoth-
esis 2A) the question may be raised of whether the fairly strong growth in benefit depend-
ency which occurred in the Netherlands during the 1980s does indicate some support for 
the ‘worst of three worlds’ thesis. On the basis of the benefit dependency boost index it 
was expected that the Netherlands would have high volume growth due to widespread 
early exits and survivor’s benefits, like the corporatist countries; due to a high take-up of 
disability insurance and employee dependency, like the social-democratic group; and due 
to considerable social assistance dependency, like the liberal countries. It was therefore 
postulated that the hybrid regime would generate the highest volume growth overall, 
exceeding the corporatist group. And indeed, between 1980 and 1990 the actual growth 
in the number of benefits was higher in the Netherlands than in the three corporatist 
countries; and over the entire period the Netherlands comes in second place in this set of 
eight countries78 (see the first series in figure 5.8). Yet the results of the simulations sug-
gest a different picture. The difference in the volume growth of the Netherlands and the 
corporatist group average in the period 1980-1990 dwindles from +10 to only +2 percent-
age points after the application of us demography; and this is reduced even further, to an 
estimated +0.7 percentage points, after correcting for system breaks and using structural 
unemployment rates. This indicates that the Netherlands was to a large extent a victim 
of its demography, not so much of its institutions. The strong increase in the number of 
benefits in the 1980s largely ensued from the growth in the labour force and the pension 
population, which was much larger than in the other European countries. The conclusion 
is that hypothesis 2A must ultimately be rejected, even for the 1980s: by the end of that 
decade the Netherlands may appear to have combined the worst of three worlds, but in 
fact it is far more likely that the high Dutch volume growth in this period reflects a gen-
eral rise in benefit take-up due to specific demographic circumstances.
In the 1990s the actual volume growth contradicted the theoretical expectations: 
in the hybrid regime, the number of benefits increased far less than in the corporatist 
group. According to the final simulation variant, this was mainly achieved by a falling 
structural unemployment rate and the rising labour participation rate of older persons 
in the Netherlands, something that did not happen in the corporatist cluster, or only to 
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a very limited extent. Somewhat speculatively, the suspicion could be voiced that the 
Dutch reform policy in the 1990s pushed some corporatist elements of the hybrid system 
to the background, but that this did not lead to a further liberalisation (i.e., greater take-
up of social assistance benefits). The discouragement of the labour participation of older 
workers became a much less central feature of social policy, and the many changes in the 
Dutch unemployment benefits and social assistance schemes may have helped to reduce 
structural unemployment.
According to the final simulation, the fact that the corporatist countries are found to 
produce more benefits than the social-democratic cluster (in line with hypothesis 2B) 
is partly due to the regulation of the exit process. The benefit volume growth owing to 
the dwindling labour participation of older men is much stronger in Belgium, France 
and Germany than in Sweden (+4 to +7% versus +1%, respectively). This is consistent with 
the high score for the corporatist group and the low score achieved by Sweden on early 
exits in the theoretical benefit dependency boost index. The Danish case is more com-
plex; here, the falling labour participation of men aged 55-64 years leads to a fairly sharp 
increase in the number of benefits, and the gap with respect to the corporatist group 
average (-1%) is much smaller than Sweden’s (-5%). This difference, however, is enlarged 
by the fact that the benefit volume among the over-65s in Denmark grew less strongly 
than in the corporatist countries (-2%) owing to the higher statutory retirement age. The 
Danish strategy was to make early exits possible, but to curb the total benefit volume by 
a full retirement age which was high by international standards. This also showed in the 
theoretical benefit dependency boost index, where Denmark scored fairly high on early 
exits but was lowest on pension arrangements79. The Danish volume growth was fur-
thermore mitigated by the development of structural unemployment, which over time 
increased more moderately than in the corporatist countries and Sweden.
Finally, the corporatist countries come out higher than the social-democratic group 
because lone-parent families are more likely to be on benefit in Germany, France and 
Belgium than in Sweden and Denmark. The impact of this factor is limited, however 
(a difference of 0.4 percentage points in the benefit volume in the final simulation).
The outcome that the volume of benefits increases more in the social-democratic countries 
than in the liberal usa (in line with hypothesis 2C) is attributable to the trends in structural 
unemployment and in the labour participation of elderly men. Over the entire period, the 
mutations in structural unemployment lead to a volume change in the usa of less than 1 
percentage point, the lowest of all countries. This is due both to the fact that this form of 
unemployment increased to the smallest extent in the usa between 1980 and 1999 (though 
as stated, starting from a fairly high initial level), and also to the lower elasticity: a change 
in the number of unemployed has less of an impact on the benefit volume in the usa than 
it does elsewhere. This latter aspect can be regarded as characteristic of a liberal regime. 
The changes in the labour participation of men aged 50-64 years also leads to the lowest 
volume increase in the usa, slightly below the Swedish level and well below the Danish 
level. The usa would have seen an even smaller increase in the number of benefits if the 
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potential labour force and the number of lone-parent families had not led to somewhat 
stronger growth than elsewhere80. The lower volume growth in the usa compared with 
the social-democratic countries seems partly a result of the institutional setup: the lower 
probabilities of unemployed people to be on benefit and the extent to which early exits are 
promoted. This is in line with the theoretical index, where the usa achieved a low to very 
low score on boosting the benefit volume via unemployment benefits and early exits.
Because Great Britain was a less pure example of the liberal regime than the usa, 
theoretically the more substantial increase in benefit volume according to the final simu-
lation does not come wholly unexpected; yet it is striking that Great Britain comes out 
higher than Denmark and Sweden. This can be traced to two factors. The labour partici-
pation of older men pushes up the volume of benefits in Great Britain far more than in the 
social-democratic countries (taking into account the Danish volume curtailment due to 
the higher retirement age). Secondly, the growth in the number of lone-parent families 
in Great Britain leads to far more benefit dependency than in the Scandinavian countries: 
the likelihood of becoming dependent on welfare is much higher. According to the con-
stituent scores on the benefit dependency boost index, Great Britain was presumed to 
generate a fairly large benefit volume via early exits and social assistance, so both devel-
opments are in line with the theoretical expectations. However, compared with Sweden 
and Denmark the volume was supposed to be pegged back by the flat-rate nature of the 
disability benefits and the less attractive sickness and unemployment insurance benefits. 
In practice, especially the presumed dampening effect of the disability arrangements 
appears to be absent in Great Britain. This ought to be reflected in a relatively low direct 
impact of the size of the potential labour force on the benefit volume, but this is not 
found to be the case. In practice, the British disability benefit volume in 1980 was sig-
nificantly lower than in the two social-democratic countries, but the growth in the two 
decades thereafter was much stronger. Expressed as a percentage of the population of 
15-64 year-olds, the disability benefit volume81 in Great Britain rose from just over 4% in 
1980 to almost 10% in 1999. The latter is comparable with the relative number of benefits 
in Sweden and Denmark in the same year, but those countries started from a much higher 
level (7.5% and 9%, respectively, in 1980).
The general conclusion must be that hypothesis 2A has to be rejected, while hypothesis 
2B is supported. Hypothesis 2C only holds if one compares the social-democratic regimes 
with the usa, as a purer specimen of the liberal type than Great Britain. The difference 
between the regime types is caused primarily by the influence on the benefit volume of 
the exit of older men from the labour market and of lone-parent families. The oppor-
tunity for early exits is greater in the corporatist than the social-democratic countries, 
while in the latter group (Denmark in particular) they are in turn more generous than in 
the usa. All other things being equal, this translates into concomitant differences in the 
growth in the benefit volume. The same applies for the operation of the factor ‘lone-par-
ent families’: in demographically comparable circumstances the corporatist countries 
entitle lone-parent households more often to benefits than the social-democratic coun-
tries. The impact of this variable on benefit volumes in the usa is however much greater 
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than in the corporatist group – something that may be related to the large number of 
young single mothers, and to the fact that in the usa divorce is more concentrated in the 
lower social strata than in most European countries (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006).
To the extent that differences between the regime types derived from the trend in 
structural unemployment, it is less clear-cut that this purely reflects the influence of the 
different labour market and social security institutions. It is only in the usa that the elas-
ticity of the changes in the number of unemployed with the benefit volume is clearly 
lower than elsewhere, but the differences between the other countries are small. Except 
where the usa is compared with the rest, therefore, the differences between the coun-
tries are primarily the result of the divergent development of structural unemployment, 
not of differential benefit probabilities among the unemployed. It is conceivable that the 
development in the level of structural unemployment is linked to the regime types; it 
could for example be assumed that the monies that are locked up in a corporatist regime 
in costly exit arrangements for older workers drive up structural unemployment, since 
they cannot be used to fund investments by businesses or to increase the production 
capacity via education. In practice, however, this is a complex relationship (cf. §3.7), and 
the development of structural unemployment also depends on non-institutional factors 
which are left out of consideration here: changes in the availability and price of natural 
resources, the skills level of the population, the degree to which countries implement 
technological innovations (such as ict), migration flows, etc. Therefore the differences in 
the benefit production due to the evolution of structural unemployment can probably be 
ascribed only partially to the institutional structure embodied in the regime types.
Ultimately, this implies that the ranking of the purer representatives of the regime 
types (excluding the Netherlands and Great Britain) can to a certain degree be linked to 
their institutional differences: the regulation of labour market exits, the benefit proba-
bilities of lone-parent families, and to some extent the level of structural unemployment. 
The theoretical expectation that the three social security regimes will differ in their ben-
efit production under comparable circumstances thus finds some empirical support as far 
as benefit volume growth is concerned.
Simulation of relative volume
Figure 5.9 shows the benefit volume as a percentage of the population aged 15 years and 
older for three measurement years, after the final simulation (imposition of us demog-
raphy and structural employment rates, no major system changes). This sheds light on 
the expectations regarding the relative volume (hypotheses 1A-1C) in equalised circum-
stances. Compared with the similar figure 5.2, the dispersion has reduced at all three 
measurement points – and this is not due solely to the fact that Canada and Australia have 
been left out of consideration in the simulation model.
In 1980, the relative volume after the simulation is lower in most countries than it is 
according to the original data (26-30% instead of 28-33%). This fall is due mainly to the 
fact that the imposition of the American demographic model leads to a reduction in 
the number of pension benefits. The Netherlands is the only country where the relative 
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 volume in the starting year has increased. The correction due to the imposition of the 
American demography is relatively small here, and because structural unemployment 
in the Netherlands was higher in 1980 than cyclical unemployment, the relative volume 
turns out higher on balance. This means that hypothesis 1A cannot be rejected for the 
first measurement year: in 1980 the relative volume in the Netherlands was higher than in 
the three corporatist countries. Hypothesis 1B does not hold for that year, however. Den-
mark has the highest relative number of benefit recipients of all countries, and comes 
well above the representatives of the corporatist regime type. The relative volume in Swe-
den in 1980 is lower than that in Belgium, but comparable with Germany, and slightly 
higher than in France. As a result, the average of the social-democratic regime is clearly 
higher than that of the corporatist cluster. Hypothesis 1C is corroborated: the average of 
the social-democratic countries exceeds that of the liberal group. Yet the ranking in the 
latter group is contrary to what was assumed in advance, with the usa having a relative 
volume comparable with that in Germany and Sweden, and Great Britain attaining the 
lowest score of all countries.
Ten years later the dispersion among the countries is again smaller than in the 
original data (29-35% versus 29-38% according to figure 5.2). This not only reflects the 
imposition of the American demographic trend and the changes in the level of structural 
unemployment; the effect of system changes in the 1980s has also been eliminated here, 
and this pushes up the volume growth in some countries while holding it back in others 
(mainly France). According to the group averages all hypotheses hold in 1990, but there 
is little homogeneity within the regime types. The Netherlands has been overtaken by 
Belgium, but still has a higher relative volume than the average of the corporatist group; 
and in that sense hypothesis 1A is tenable. Sweden comes in below all corporatist coun-
tries now, as expected; the relative volume in Denmark is still high, but lower than in Bel-
gium. Consequently, the social-democratic group average is well below that of the corpo-
ratist cluster, and hypothesis 1B cannot be rejected for 1990. The usa has dropped to the 
expected bottom position; and although Great Britain has overtaken Sweden (and two 
corporatist countries), the average of the liberal group is still below that of the social-
democratic cluster, and hypothesis 1C is therefore also upheld.
In the final measurement year there is a threefold clustering. The usa has far and away 
the lowest relative volume (30%), while Belgium and Denmark clearly come out highest 
(39%). The other countries are clustered fairly close together, with a maximum difference 
between them of one percentage point: just over 34% in the Netherlands and France, 
slightly more than 35% in Germany, Sweden and Great Britain. Hypothesis 1A has to be 
rejected in 1999: the relative volume of the Netherlands is below the corporatist group 
average (due to the high score of Belgium). Hypothesis 1B is not supported either. In the 
corporate group a single high score (Belgium) is combined with two medium scores (Ger-
many and France), while the social-democratic group has a single high (Denmark) and 
a single medium score (Sweden). Obviously, this results in a higher average in the latter 
cluster, something which was not predicted. Only hypothesis 1C cannot be rejected: due 
to very high relative volume in Denmark, and the low level in the usa, the group averages 
diverge considerably, and in the expected direction. Sweden and Great Britain do how-
ever achieve very similar scores.
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In sum, support for the hypotheses concerning the relative volume increases follow-
ing the simulation with the American demography, removal of the impact of system 
changes and pension take-up, and the use of the structural unemployment rates. In 1990 
all hypotheses were sustained, and hypothesis 1C (the social-democratic versus the lib-
eral regime) remained intact in all years. Hypothesis 1A (the hybrid versus the corporatist 
regime) was corroborated for both 1980 and 1990. This makes the contrast between the 
corporatist and the social-democratic types the least convincing, as hypothesis 1B had to 
be rejected in 1980 and 1999.
5.6 Conclusions
At the outset of this chapter it was stated that the number of benefit recipients is the 
most direct indicator for the output of the social security system. It was also commented 
that the size and development of this benefit volume theoretically depends on the formal 
institutions: the allocation of rights, or entitlements, to the potential beneficiaries. A 
priori it seems feasible that the rule-driven benefit production diverges between social 
security regimes; but there is no evident premise, either based on Esping-Andersen’s the-
ory or on the scaling of the formal institutions of the countries in the previous chapter, 
indicating the degree to which the regime types theoretically differ in this regard.
Theoretical expectations
For this reason, a benefit dependency boost index was developed in §5.1 (see also Annex 1). 
This was an attempt to map the extent to which the benefit volume in each country is 
theoretically driven up by 60 formal institutions. Constituent indices were calculated for 
different aspects of the social security system and the labour market (old age pensions, 
early exit regulations, unemployment insurance, disability benefits, social assistance, 
survivor’s pensions, sickness benefit, leave arrangements and labour market measures). 
These were then weighted and added together, taking into account the maximum poten-
tial impact of the various regulations on the total number of benefits in the population 
aged 15 years and older. The total index reflects the situation in around 1990.
Based on this benefit dependency boost index, a number of hypotheses were then 
formulated which run as a common thread through this chapter. It was postulated in 
advance that the hybrid Dutch regime would come out higher than the three representa-
tives of the corporatist regime (Belgium, France and Germany) both for the relative vol-
ume (the number of benefit years as a percentage of the population in the relevant age 
group) and for the growth rates (the annual percentage change in the number of benefit 
years). The corporatist countries, it was hypothesised, would in turn score higher than 
the social-democratic countries (Sweden and Denmark), while the latter were expected 
to come above the liberal group (usa, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom). A 
number of expectations were also formulated regarding the composition of the benefit 
volume among the population of working age. In the corporatist social security regimes it 
was expected that a relatively high proportion of the benefits would relate to exit routes, 
unemployment insurance and survivor’s benefits. The social-democratic regimes were 
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expected to score relatively highly on employees’ dependency (sick leave and care leave) 
and on disability insurance for non-employees. The liberal welfare states were postu-
lated to have a relatively high number of social assistance benefits owing to their residual 
design. In the hybrid Dutch system, a ‘worst of three worlds’ hypothesis was formulated 
for the volume composition: an above-average volume on all six arrangements, without 
reaching the levels that characterise the pure representatives of a regime.
Data
The plausibility of these hypotheses was tested in ten countries for the period 1980-1999, 
on the basis of adapted time series of the annual benefit volume at the national level. 
These were originally published by the oecd (2003a), and derive partly from data gath-
ered by nei/Ecorys for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Arents et 
al., 2000; Moor et al., 2002). There are some limitations to the time series, and for Nor-
way (one of the social-democratic regimes in the previous chapter) no commensurable 
information was available; but they probably still provide a fairly accurate picture of the 
historical development of benefit dependency (cf. §5.2).
Bivariate approach: volume indicators by regime type
A direct comparison revealed that the relative volume (the number of benefit years as a 
percentage of the eligible population) varies between the countries, but is linked rather 
weakly to the regime typology (cf. figures 5.2 and 5.3). The Netherlands is not consistently 
at the top of the ranking, nor do all corporatist countries structurally surpass Sweden 
and Denmark; and the latter two countries do not come out higher than all the liberal 
countries in each year considered here. While there are no consistent clusters (the scores 
of members of different regimes partially overlap at all measurement points), the group 
averages indicate that the regime typology does have some predictive value. Hypoth-
esis 1C could not be rejected: on average, the relative volume in the social-democratic 
group clearly exceeded the liberal score at all measurement points, and both in the total 
population and among the population of working age. Hypothesis 1B had to be rejected 
in 1980. Yet in the category below the age of 65 years, in 1990 the average relative vol-
ume of the corporatist countries was higher than that of the social-democratic group, 
as expected; and the difference became even more marked during the 1990s. The pos-
tulated difference between the hybrid Dutch regime and the corporatist group average 
only emerged in 1980 and 1990, among the population of working age. The Netherlands 
did not reach the expected top position in those years, however, indicating little support 
for hypo thesis 1A.
The growth rates (the percentage changes in the number of benefits) also failed to pro-
vide support for the theoretical expectations (see figure 5.4). The annual changes do not 
reveal consistent differences between the countries in the different regime types. Based 
on the average annual volume growth, only hypothesis 2B could not be rejected: for both 
the total population and the population of working age, the benefit volume grows over 
the period as a whole less strongly in Sweden and Denmark than in the three corpora-
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tist countries. Unexpected findings, however, include the high average growth rate in 
France, Australia and Canada and the modest growth rate in the Netherlands.
The assumptions concerning the composition of the benefit recipient population below 
retirement age, as shown in the theoretical profiles in figure 5.5, received more empiri-
cal support. The actual composition in many countries completely or largely matches 
the profile of their regime type (cf. figure 5.6). A characteristic feature of the corporatist 
countries is indeed a high share of early exits among the population of working age, as 
was theoretically posited in §5.1 (hypothesis 3A). This mainly occurred in the 1990s, how-
ever. Similarly Belgium, France and Germany score highly on unemployment insurance; 
this is in line with hypothesis 3B, with the caveat that the corporatist countries occupy the 
first three places only in 1999. When it comes to survivor’s benefits, however, the reality 
matches the expectation formulated in hypothesis 3C less closely. Belgium and Germany 
do score highly here, but are not always in the top position (the Netherlands comes out 
higher in 1980, Canada in 1999). Contrary to expectations, for the population aged under 
65 years France has a relatively low benefit volume in survivor’s arrangements. Overall, 
Belgium has the most characteristic corporatist profile.
In the social-democratic group of countries, the expected bias towards employees’ 
dependency and disability insurance for non-employees is indeed found. In all three 
measurement years considered here, the take-up of sickness benefits and leave arrange-
ments is the highest in Sweden and Denmark, so that hypothesis 3D cannot be rejected. 
The benefit volume in disability insurance for people without an employment history is 
also very high in the social-democratic countries (hypothesis 3E), although Sweden is 
overtaken in 1999 by the Netherlands and Great Britain. Sweden most closely approaches 
the theoretical social-democratic profile of the benefit volume. However, both countries 
also exhibit a number of discrepancies: in the first decade of the time series Sweden has 
a large number of survivor’s benefits, while in Denmark the benefit volume in unemploy-
ment insurance and early exits is not much lower than in the corporatist group.
As expected, the liberal countries – with the sole exception of the United States – 
have a high volume of social assistance benefits, as posited in hypothesis 3F: in all meas-
urement years the first three places are occupied by representatives of this regime type. 
The usa falls steadily through the rankings over time, reaching a middle position by 1999. 
This difference was predicted theoretically; on the benefit dependency boost index, the 
usa achieved a low constituent score for social assistance, whereas the other liberal coun-
tries came out well above the average. This was a consequence of the low net replacement 
rates, the method of indexation and the strictness of the fraud policy prevailing in the 
usa at the time; and it has probably been reinforced by the transition from Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children to Temporary Aid to Needy Families in the 1990s.
The hybrid Dutch social security regime achieves a fairly high score in 1990 on all 
arrangements studied, in line with expectations. There are many social assistance benefits 
(though not as many as in the liberal group), and also a high take-up of sickness benefit 
and leave arrangements and disability insurance for non-employees (but lower than in 
the social-democratic countries). The Netherlands also scored highly in that year on the 
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‘corporatist’ schemes: a large number of early exits, just as many unemployment insurance 
benefits as in France and Germany, and the highest score for survivor’s bene fits. The ‘worst 
of three worlds’ assumption encapsulated in hypothesis 3G is thus not refuted in 1990. In 
the other two measurement years, however, the composition of the Dutch benefit volume 
points more in the direction of a hybrid regime which combines the worst of two worlds, 
since the volume of social assistance benefits is less high in 1980 and 1999.
Modelling
A multivariate approach was then adopted for eight countries; Canada and Australia were 
left out of consideration because of data limitations. The analysis in chapters 2 and 3 
had already made clear that it was not only the formal institutions, of which the regime 
types are a condensed manifestation, which theoretically determine the production of 
benefit dependency. Even if the statutory or government-ratified ‘rules of relief’ are con-
stant, the number of benefits still may vary depending on the context of rule application; 
economic, demographic, social, technological and ideological variations all may exert 
their influence, and lead to diverging outcomes. Different informal institutions among 
the actors concerned – the values, norms and conventions of benefit recipients, workers, 
employers, individual agents of the social security organisation, etc. – can also have an 
impact on the benefit production. Such influences can explain why the bare figures may 
not reveal a very strong relationship between social security regime types and the evolu-
tion of benefit dependency.
For this reason, an attempt was made to link the growth in the number of benefits 
in the eight countries cited above to the main underlying factors. A causal model was 
developed (see figure 5.7) in which the growth in the benefit volume is related to demo-
graphic trends, economic and labour market developments and a number of institutional 
changes, including major system changes in the countries concerned. The model has 
some limitations, the most important of which is that the influence of informal institu-
tions and administrative processes cannot be quantified due to a lack of suitable inter-
nationally comparable time series. The most evident structural factors were however 
incorporated in the model. The causal model proved to fit the data used well; an explora-
tory analysis covering all countries revealed a satisfactory goodness of fit, and virtually 
all relationships operated in the expected direction.
Model outcomes per country
It emerged from the country-specific analysis that in most nations the benefit volume 
rose during the period studied due to the growth in the number of pensioners and the 
swelling of the potential labour force. In four countries the number of lone-parent 
families also pushed up the level of benefit dependency quite strongly. The evolution of 
cyclical unemployment meant that the number of benefits in France, Sweden, Germany 
and Belgium was substantially higher in 1999 than in 1980. In the model, the number of 
unemployed is largely determined by economic growth, which consequently has a large 
indirect impact on the benefit volume. The development of labour costs also exerts its 
influence on the number of benefits through unemployment, but the indirect impact of 
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this variable on the volume does not differ widely between the countries.
The reduction in the labour participation of elderly men was also found to be a fac-
tor which drove up benefit volumes substantially, with the exception of Sweden and the 
United States. System breaks were of major importance in the usa (fewer benefits due to 
cuts in social assistance in the 1990s) and France (more benefits due to the introduction 
of the social assistance laws at the end of the 1980s). The influence of the growth of the 
services sector, the rising labour participation of women and the level of unemployment 
benefits was found to be limited.
The number of benefits rose most strongly in France, growing more than one and a half 
times between 1980 and 1999. The model indicates that this was due to a combination of 
factors. In the period studied here, France saw fairly strong growth in the pension popula-
tion and the potential labour force, and experienced the greatest impact of all countries 
of the rise in the number of unemployed and the falling labour participation of elderly 
men. All this was reinforced by the fact that France was the only country which saw a major 
 system expansion, due to the introduction of the new social assistance legislation.
The Netherlands, where the number of benefits rose by a third, occupies second 
place. This country was largely the victim of its demographic development, which differs 
from that in the majority of Western European countries; both above and below the age 
of 65 years the Netherlands experienced the biggest relative population increase between 
1980 and 1999, beaten only by the United States in this set of eight countries. The number 
of lone-parent families, the reduced labour participation of elderly men and the ageing 
of the labour force all helped to boost the Dutch benefit volume.
The usa and Denmark saw by far the smallest increase in the number of benefits 
(+18%). In the usa this was due to the fact that the number of benefits paid to the popu-
lation aged below 65 years remained virtually stable between 1980 and 1999 because of 
the system changes and the favourable development of the unemployment rate. Without 
these two factors, this country would have realised a much bigger increase in the number 
of benefits, due to the growth of the pension population, the potential labour force and 
the number of lone-parent families. The limited volume growth in Denmark is the result 
of the modest increase in the size of the labour force, the pension population and, to a 
lesser extent, the number of lone-parent families and unemployed.
Impact of regime type in equalised circumstances
In order to establish the influence of the social security regimes on the benefit volume 
more precisely, the model was used to investigate how the benefit volume would have 
developed if all countries had started from the American demographic situation in 
1980, and had undergone the same development up to and including 1999 as regards the 
number of pensioners, the potential labour force, the 50-64 year-old population and the 
number of lone-parent families. In this ‘us demography’ simulation the regime typology 
emerges more clearly than in the original growth figures (figure 5.8). This applies even 
more in a further simulation variant, in which the effects of system changes and the ris-
ing pension take-up in some nations have been discarded, and structural unemployment 
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figures have been imposed for all countries, based on the oecd time series estimates of 
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (nairu).
According to this latter simulation, the percentage growth in the number of benefits 
between 1980 and 1999 was lowest in the liberal usa, slightly higher in Denmark and Sweden 
and highest of all in the three corporatist countries. This is in line with the expectations 
expressed in the benefit dependency growth rate hypothesis, in particular the sub-
hypotheses 2B and 2C formulated in §5.1. The Dutch hybrid regime exceeded the corporatist 
group only slightly in the 1980s (by less than one percentage point); much of the previous 
difference was attributable to the specific demographic circumstances in the Netherlands. 
Hypothesis 2A therefore had to be rejected. However, the main thrust of the hypotheses 
cannot be discarded as long as the analysis is confined to the purer representatives of the 
regime types in this eight-country comparison (i.e., if the estimated growth rates of the 
hybrid Netherlands and Great Britain are ignored). Even so, the differences between the 
regime types are not very marked; under equalised circumstances the annual growth rate 
in the social-democratic countries is an average of 0.1 percentage points higher than in the 
usa, and 0.4 percentage points lower than in the corporatist cluster.
As regards the relative volume, hypothesis 1C holds at all measurement points (1980, 1990 
and 1999) in the final simulation model. Under equalised circumstances, the number of 
benefits as a percentage of the population was higher on average in the social-democratic 
countries than in the liberal group. The difference between the average relative volume 
in the corporatist and social-democratic groups was in line with the expectations only 
in 1990; for the starting point and end point of the time series, hypothesis 1B had to be 
rejected. Hypothesis 1A was corroborated in 1980 and 1990, but not in 1999.
Thus, in 1990 none of these hypotheses can be discarded. At the end of the 1990s, only 
the average scores of the liberal and social-democratic regime types differ as expected in 
hypothesis 1C. According to the simulation many countries are grouped close together 
(34-35%) in 1999. The usa has the lowest relative volume in that year (30%), while Belgium 
and Denmark score highest (39%).
It should be added here that, based on the simulation model, no statements are pos-
sible on the composition hypothesis (3A-3G in §5.1); other dependent variables would 
need to be analysed for this.
An important question when considering the observed differences in the growth figures 
is whether it is plausible that the small differences can really be attributed to the dif-
fering formal institutions that characterise the regime types. Further analysis showed 
that in all countries the number of benefits increases mainly because of general demo-
graphic trends. The growth in the pension population and the potential labour force are 
the main factors driving up the benefit volume. The differences between the countries 
in this regard are small, however: under comparable conditions the resultant volume 
increase is approximately 25%, with no systematic deviations between the different 
regime types. Demographic factors therefore do explain a substantial part of the benefit 
volume growth, but in equalised circumstances are not linked to the regime type, so that 
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they offer no explanation for the regime-specific differences.
Despite this, it would seem that the fact that the growth in the benefit volume is 
lower in the usa than in the social-democratic countries can be attributed largely to the 
formal institutionalisation. The difference is due mainly to the fact that there are fewer 
early exits in the usa than in the social-democratic countries (especially Denmark), and 
that the unemployed have a lower probability of receiving benefit. This is in line with the 
theoretical expectation, given the low score of the usa on the aspects ‘early exits’ and 
‘unemployment benefits’ on the benefit dependency boost index.
The stronger growth in the corporatist countries compared with the social-demo-
cratic countries can also be linked to specific system characteristics. The regulation of 
the exit process is the most important. Under equalised conditions, Belgium, France and 
Germany undergo stronger volume growth than Sweden owing to the decreasing labour 
participation of elderly men. Denmark experiences a rise in early exits which is not much 
smaller than in the corporatist group, but the increase in the total benefit volume is held 
back by the higher retirement age in the period studied here (though this strategy became 
less successful over time due to the rising pension take-up). These differences in volume 
growth due to the exit process are consistent with the country scores on the aspects ‘early 
exit regulations’ and ‘old age pensions’. In addition, there is a greater chance of benefit 
dependency among lone-parent families in the corporatist countries, where the rising 
structural unemployment also led to stronger volume growth than in Denmark.
One unexpected finding was that the less pure liberal regime in Great Britain under-
went stronger volume growth than the two social-democratic countries under the simu-
lation to make circumstances comparable. It seems that this can perhaps be ascribed to a 
strong increase in the take-up of disability benefits in Britain, something which was not 
predicted by the benefit dependency boost index. The Netherlands also did not occupy 
the expected top position over the whole period, so that hypothesis 2A proved not to be 
tenable. At the end of the time series the Netherlands, under equalised circumstances, 
occupies a middle position, with stronger volume growth than the usa and the countries 
in the social-democratic regime, but lower than Great Britain and the corporatist group.
In sum, the postulated unique position of the hybrid Dutch regime was not supported by 
the empirical analysis. After the equalisation procedure the relative volume ( hypothesis 1A) 
and the volume growth (2A) were not clearly higher than in the corporatist group; and the 
‘worst of three worlds’ hypothesis (3G) for the Netherlands holds only for 1990.
The corporatist countries do not exceed the social-democratic group in terms of rela-
tive volume (hypothesis 1B); but under comparable circumstances the average growth 
rates in the corporatist countries are indeed higher than in the social-democratic clus-
ter, as postulated in hypothesis 2B. The differences between the social-democratic and 
liberal countries are largely as expected: in equalised circumstances the relative volume 
(1C) of Sweden and Denmark exceeds the average level of the liberal group, and with the 
growth rates (2C) the expected contrast was also found (though only if one compares the 
social-democratic regimes to the usa). It is plausible that the disparities in the growth 
figures are largely attributable to the differing design of the regimes.
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Hypotheses 3A-3F, on the differences between the main regime types as regards the 
composition of the benefit volume in the population of working age, are also largely sup-
ported by the bivariate empirical analysis. The ‘corporatist’ distortion in survivor’s ben-
efits (hypothesis 3C) is however not very pronounced.
Some caution is needed with these conclusions. The limited number of observations 
meant there was little point in investigating the statistical significance of the differences 
between the countries and regimes using a multi-sample model, which implies that the 
hypotheses could only be tested here at face value. In addition, the model developed here 
could not be used to verify the composition hypothesis, because it concerns the trend in 
the total benefit volume, not in individual social security arrangements. It is therefore 
not clear whether the same findings would emerge for hypotheses 3A-3G if the demo-
graphic development of the countries were equalised, if the influence of major system 
changes was eliminated, and if the evolution of structural unemployment were taken as 
the starting point.
The analysis performed here does however confirm to a certain extent that there is 
a relationship between the type of social security regime and the ‘production of ben-
efit dependency’. Of theoretical importance is the fact that fairly abstract and coherent 
variations in the formal institutions of countries lead to differences in the growth in the 
benefit volume which correspond with predictions. The ranking found here in terms of 
benefit production is also two-dimensional, in line with the typology of formal institu-
tions in chapter 4. The most extensive welfare states do not automatically generate the 
largest benefit volume, because if that were the case Sweden and Denmark would have 
come out much higher in the figures. That the regime types are not meaningless concoc-
tions of social scientists is also evident from the fact that they are found in practice to 
produce very different kinds of benefit dependency.
Policy implications
From a policy perspective, the findings imply that a country wishing to curb the growth 
in the number of benefits would probably do best not to opt for a corporatist path of 
development. Under comparable circumstances, a liberal or social-democratic regime 
performs better in this respect, though a number of caveats need to be mentioned here. 
In the first place, the differences between the regimes are not very great if a correction 
is applied for the impact of non-institutional differences, system changes and cyclical 
unemployment. In addition, the conclusion about the fairly good performance of the 
social-democratic regime as regards the growth in the benefit volume is based on results 
for only two countries, Sweden and Denmark, which moreover achieve that performance 
in partially different ways. Similarly, the favourable results of the liberal system emerge 
from the analyses chiefly as an ‘American’ achievement; in the British case, this regime 
type showed a growth in benefit volume which in equalised circumstances approaches 
the corporatist level (and in the raw data Australia and Canada ended up even higher). 
This may perhaps be expected with a less pure exponent of this regime type such as Great 
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Britain. However, it is also possible that the liberal regime scores well mainly with us 
institutions in an American context of rule application: a politically powerful country 
with a great deal of economic capital and natural resources, which leads the way in tech-
nological innovations; a strong focus on competition and entrepreneurship; a stringent 
selection of migrants at the national borders based on economic motives, etc.
Finally, it is important to note that any policy choice for a specific path of institu-
tional development must be made not only on the grounds of the expected impact on the 
benefit volume. Consideration must also be given to its significance for the fulfilment of 
the primary objectives of social security schemes: ensuring what is collectively deemed 
to be an optimum standard of protection in terms of income, employment, health and 
social participation. In addition, the expected external consequences of a given develop-
ment path should play a role in the decision: the impact on economic growth and the 
financial sustainability of benefit schemes, the public support for the arrangements, the 
labour market participation rates, the redistribution of income, etc. It will therefore be 
interesting at this point to turn to the question of whether the effects of the different 
social security regimes go beyond the benefit volume.
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Annex 1
Construction of the benefit dependency boost index
The benefit dependency boost index is the weighted sum of scores calculated for the main 
income-replacement social security arrangements and a number of labour market char-
acteristics. It covers retirement pensions, early exit arrangements, survivor’s pensions, 
disability insurance, unemployment insurance, sickness benefit, social assistance, leave 
arrangements for employees and labour market institutions. The constituent scores on 
these aspects are based on a total of 60 characteristics per country. These were calculated 
by first performing a categorical principal component analysis (CatPCA; see chapter 4) 
across the countries for each aspect. The degree of correlation between the individual 
characteristics was investigated, and also whether the scaling on the first dimension is 
consistent from the point of view of driving up the benefit volume. Items which did not 
scale, or which operated in the ‘wrong’ direction from the theoretical perspective, were 
removed from the CatPCA. This was the case, for example, if a short duration of benefits 
(which theoretically has less impact on the benefit volume than a long duration) empiri-
cally correlates mainly with benefits of a high level, with a low entry threshold, etc. (which 
theoretically push up the benefit volume). Such characteristics were added to the score on 
the first principal component in standardised form as separate items, in the theoretically 
correct direction. These were assigned a weight that was in proportion to the number of 
items remaining in the CatPCA. Such an added separate variable would thus for example 
have a weight of 0.167 if the scale of the other variables were based on six items.
A weighting was applied when adding the individual scores to the total index in pro-
portion to the potential volume impact among the population aged 15 years and older. 
In theory, this depends on the size of the target group which may be affected by the risk 
or the arrangement, as well as the duration of take-up. For retirement pensions full year 
cohorts are eligible for benefits over a long period, while maternity leave, for example, 
is taken up by a part of the female labour force that is affected, and for a fairly limited 
period. The first score accordingly theoretically should weigh more heavily than the sec-
ond in the benefit dependency boost index. To prevent tautologies, the potential volume 
impact was determined as far as possible on the basis of exogenous criteria, i.e. sepa-
rately from the actual take-up of benefits. The weight of each arrangement in the total 
index was determined on the basis of the 1980-1999 average of the theoretical impact 
factors of the various countries.
The sources for the variables used in the construction of the index are largely the same as 
those reported in figure 4.1. Additional variables and data used for determining the weight 
of the constituent indices were drawn from several publications by the oecd (1993; 2001: 
153-154; 2004), and the oecd Labour Force Survey database. Use was also made of demo-
graphic data from Eurostat and the United Nations, the European Foundation’s eiro system, 
and of Eardley (1996), Beaujot & Liu (2002) and Scherer (2002). The variables used to deter-
mine the theoretical impact factors and the weights are discussed in more detail below, in 
order of the contribution of the schemes to the benefit dependency boost index.
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Old age pension (6 variables)
Variables: the statutory retirement age for men; the number of years by which the statu-
tory retirement age is lowered for women; the number of years by which retirement may 
be deferred beyond the statutory age limit; means-testing of retirement pensions; the 
coverage of the collective retirement pensions; and the entitlement conditions in terms 
of domicile in the country, nationality or residence permits.
Impact factors and weight: for the statutory retirement the impact factor has been 
assessed as the average share of seven cohorts (aged 60-66, being the difference between 
the countries with the lowest and the highest statutory retirement age) in the population 
aged 15 years and older. The other characteristics weigh less heavily, because they are 
theoretically less important. This results in a weight of just over 39% for old age arrange-
ments in the benefit dependency boost index.
Unemployment and financing (13 variables)
Variables: the maximum benefit duration; the minimum period needed to qualify for 
benefit (years in paid employment, payment of contributions); the statutory benefit level 
as a percentage of previous earnings; the net replacement rates at the onset of unem-
ployment for a couple with children at two different income levels (that of the average 
production worker and two-thirds of this); the marginal tax rate for a double earner with 
two children and an above-average income; the average contribution for employers; the 
presence of means-testing; and the spending on activating labour market policy aimed 
specifically at the unemployed.
Impact factors and weight: the standardised unemployed figure according to the oecd 
definition was taken as a basis, corrected for the average benefit duration according to the 
Labour Force Surveys. Once again, this has been related to the 15+ population. It should 
be noted that this definition of unemployment does not look at receipt of benefit, so that 
housewives in search for a job, for example, are also included. This type of arrangement 
has a weight of 14% in the index.
Early exit regulations (6 variables)
Variables: the minimum age for early retirement in collective arrangements; the number 
of years that this lies below the statutory retirement age for a full regular pension; the 
possibility of exiting via unemployment or disability arrangements; the effective median 
early retirement age for men (1987-1992); the expected replacement rates for the coming 
five years in the event of early retirement at age 60.
Impact factors and weight: determined on the basis of the number 55-64 year-olds who 
have stopped working (based on the participation figures and the average exit ages in the 
period 1987-1992), as a proportion of the population aged 15 years and older. This results 
in a weight of 11% in the index.
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Disability (6 variables)
Variables: coverage of employment-related disability; minimum disability threshold in 
case of employment-related disability; benefit level in case of employment-related dis-
ability; coverage (risque social); minimum disability threshold (risque social); benefit level 
(risque social).
Impact factors and weight: first, the proportion of 15-64 year-olds reporting that they 
suffer from a ‘chronic physical or mental health problem, illness, or disability’, are con-
sequently ‘severely hampered in their daily activities’ and regard their own health as ‘bad 
or very bad’ was determined for each country on the basis of the European Community 
Household Panel Survey (echp). This percentage was then standardised by age and gen-
der, averaged out across the countries, and converted into absolute numbers of 15-64 
year-olds according to the population statistics. The latter was then related to the popula-
tion aged 15 years and older. This offers an approximation of the potential target group of 
the disability arrangements, regardless of whether people are currently receiving benefit. 
The weight in the total index was determined in this way at 10%.
Social assistance (13 variables)
Variables: strictness of means testing (four indicators: income test; capital test; housing 
test; work test); conditions regarding nationality or legal residence; minimum qualifying 
age for benefits; net replacement rates on social assistance after five years of unemploy-
ment (three household types: single person, lone-parent family with 2 children, couple 
with 2 children); indexation of social assistance benefits; limits on benefit duration; 
intensity of benefit fraud monitoring; take-up of preceding benefits.
Impact factors and weight: first an estimate was made for each country of the size of 
the main target group for social assistance, namely lone-parent families with a female 
head without work. No solid data are available on the number of potential users of social 
assistance who do not fit into this category (e.g. single men with social or medical prob-
lems, addicts, etc.). A somewhat arbitrary choice was therefore made for a multiplier, 
which is derived for each country from the proportion of lone-parent families versus 
other recipients of social assistance benefit. The number of non-working lone-parent 
families multiplied by this factor was then related to the size of the population aged 15 
years and older. This results in a weight for social assistance benefit of 8% in the benefit 
dependency boost index.
Sickness benefit (5 variables)
Variables: coverage of sickness pay; conditionality of benefit on insurance period or pay-
ment of contributions; level of sickness pay; maximum benefit duration; number of wait-
ing days.
Impact factors and weight: information is available in the oecd statistics for a limited 
number of countries on self-reported absence from work due to illness, regardless of 
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whether the employee’s salary continues to be paid by the employer or is met from a 
sickness benefit scheme. The average number of days’ absence was divided by the average 
number of working days in a standard employment contract (less leave entitlements and 
public holidays). This percentage was multiplied per country and per calendar year by the 
number of employment years, producing an estimate of the absolute extent of sickness 
absenteeism. The potential impact on the total benefit volume was obtained by relating 
this figure to the size of the population aged 15 years and older. After averaging across all 
countries and years, sickness benefit contributes 8% to the total index.
Survivor’s benefits (4 variables)
Variables: coverage of widow’s pension; level of widow’s pension; means testing; sepa-
rate orphan’s pension.
Impact factors and weight: the number of widows aged 15-64 years as reported by Eurostat 
for the 1990s was taken as a basis. This was adjusted for widows who are not eligible for 
benefit because they are working or have remarried. Widowers were left out of consid-
eration. Their higher labour participation rate means they less often apply for this ben-
efit (although their number is growing in most countries); moreover, widowers were not 
legally insured for this benefit in many countries during the first half of the period stud-
ied here (the 1980s). The number of potentially entitled widows younger than 65 years was 
related to the population aged 15 years and older in the countries. Calculated in this way, 
survivor’s benefits contribute 4% to the benefit dependency boost index.
Labour market institutions (3 variables)
Variables: public expenditure on active labour market policy (as % of gdp); coverage of 
collective labour agreements; existence and level of statutory minimum wage.
Impact factors and weight: because the empirical material is limited, somewhat arbitrary 
assumptions were made concerning the proportion of people in receipt of sickness ben-
efit, disability benefit, unemployment benefit and social assistance that are confronted 
with reintegration measures, and for what proportion of this group this leads to success-
ful entry to the labour market. Here again, the shares were translated into absolute vol-
umes. A multiplier was then applied to reflect the prevention of benefit dependency among 
workers through labour market policy. The numbers thus obtained were again related to 
the population aged 15 years and over to produce a weight in the total index (4%).
Leave arrangements for working parents (4 variables)
Variables: level of maternity benefit; coverage of maternity leave; total duration of mater-
nity and parental leave; duration of paid and earnings-related maternity and parental 
leave.
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Impact factors and weight: for maternity leave, an estimate was made for each country 
of the number of employed women giving birth on an annual basis, based on labour par-
ticipation and fertility figures. This was related to the population aged 15 years and older, 
with a correction being applied for the generally limited duration of this type of leave. A 
multiplier was then applied to allow for other care tasks; it was assumed that this leave 
is generally shorter than maternity leave, but that the reasons for taking it (e.g. sickness 
of dependent children) will occur more regularly. The weight of these provisions in the 
benefit dependency boost index was determined in this way at 3%.
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Historically, one of the main objectives of social security is to provide income protection; 
and in its early forms, this was reflected mainly in regulations that attempted to combat 
poverty. The first institutions, which were rooted in the family, the guilds and the local 
community, were concerned mainly with offering material and financial support to peo-
ple facing acute want. In the process of the ‘collectivisation of care’ (see chapter 1), the 
fight against indigence gradually became the task of the government. In England, the 
Elizabethan Poor Law came into effect as early as 1601 and remained in force for more than 
two centuries, until the radical amendments1 of 1834. Elsewhere, the first social legisla-
tion was also often concerned with combating poverty. In Germany, for example, gov-
ernment provisions had been in force long before Bismarck’s social insurances (e.g. the 
Prussian Armenpflegegesetz2 from 1842), and the Netherlands passed its Armenwet in 1854.
Other objectives of social security only later found their way into the formal rules. As 
the welfare state expanded, guarantees for the income continuity of workers were estab-
lished, statutory regulation of the labour market and working conditions was imposed, 
and minimum standards of health care and social participation evolved. These develop-
ments can be regarded as later ‘skins’ around what is still the core of every social secu-
rity system: provisions that bring down poverty to a level which the community consid-
ers acceptable. That level has risen over time. The old Poor Laws were replaced in many 
countries by a collective social assistance scheme, which covered more than just the bare 
minimum required for physical subsistence.
The social security regime types discussed in the previous chapters are all concerned with 
combating poverty, though each adopts a different strategy for doing so. From a social-
democratic perspective, it is important that the entire population has access to a fairly 
high basic standard of living, regardless of how active (or inactive) they are on the labour 
market – although the system does aim to maximise the labour market participation rate. 
The purpose of this approach is to minimise the risk of poverty for all inhabitants.
In the liberal regime type, the key notion is self-reliance. The system aims to max-
imise the incentives for people to meet their own basic needs and secure their incomes 
(including their future pensions) through work. Those who fail to achieve this can fall 
back on a spartan subsistence provision which is subject to strict admission conditions 
and – as in the usa – may be of limited duration. This system type seeks to maximise col-
lective wealth, partly by keeping social security spending to a minimum. The underlying 
idea is that even those with few resources will ultimately benefit from the resultant jobs 
growth and rising prosperity. This in turn will ultimately lead to a reduction in poverty, 
without the government having to redistribute money that could be used productively 
from the wealthier to the poorer members of society.
The corporatist regime type focuses mainly on the ‘insiders’; people with a long 
employment history are assured of a high degree of income continuity, and this is espe-
cially profitable for persons whose occupational status is high. Theoretically there is little 
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risk of poverty for these groups. This applies to a much lesser extent for the ‘outsiders’: 
people who have never worked, people in low-paid jobs or people with a short or inter-
rupted employment history, including their dependent relatives. However, if such groups 
are not too large, this strategy can also keep poverty within bounds.
Against this background, it is useful to examine whether the regimes differ not just in 
the number of benefit claimants they generate, but also in their ‘poverty production’. 
That is the central question addressed in this chapter. Before it can be answered, it is 
important to consider what can be defined as poverty, since the concept is theoretically 
much more complex than the benefit volume. Part of this chapter will therefore consist 
of an analysis of the meaning of poverty in prosperous societies, and of how the extent 
to which the phenomenon occurs can be investigated empirically. §6.1 outlines some of 
the main contours of the theoretical poverty debate in political philosophy. Taking this 
as a starting point, §6.2 discusses a number of basic principles and presents a theoretical 
definition of poverty. This section also analyses how this theoretical concept differs from 
two related notions in the scientific literature, namely inequality and social exclusion. In 
§6.3 a normative issue is raised: is it possible, from a sociological point of view, to make 
general statements about the rights that ought to be granted to the poor?
The operational poverty lines that have been used in empirical research to date are 
examined in §6.4. A central question here is whether practical measures of poverty such 
as these can be regarded as valid: do they adequately cover the theoretical content of the 
concept, as established in the basic principles and the definition? The operational lines 
are also assessed in terms of their reliability (do they make it possible to measure poverty 
accurately?); their ease of application; and their social and policy relevance.
Since none of the existing measures is satisfactory in all respects, §6.5 discusses 
an alternative operational criterion. This poverty line is based on a ‘generalised budget 
approach’, and will be used here to investigate whether there is an empirical relationship 
between social security regime types and poverty.
To this end, the theoretical relationship is first explored in more detail in §6.6. A the-
oretical ‘institutional poverty risk index’ is constructed and used as a basis to formulate a 
number of hypotheses concerning the degree to which the various regime types generate 
poverty. Whether or not these hypotheses correspond with the empirical data is assessed 
in §6.7, through a comparative analysis of 11 countries. The concluding section presents a 
summary of the main findings.
6.1 The theoretical poverty debate in political philosophy: some key elements
If we wish to study poverty, it is important to stipulate what we understand the concept to 
mean, in other words: what does the theoretical construct ‘poverty’ signify? Only when 
this is clear is it possible to specify an observable criterion for measuring poverty, which 
can then be used to test hypotheses empirically.
Based on the assumption that poor people lack something essential, it is first and 
foremost important to state what that deficit entails. It is then desirable to consider 
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whether this concerns an absolute or relative shortage, and how much people have to do 
without in order to be classified as poor. Once this is clear, the next question to arise is 
whether there is a need to compensate the poor’s deficits; and if so, who is to be responsi-
ble for that remuneration, and should it be tied to conditions? An extensive political and 
philosophical debate has been conducted on all these issues, of which only a few main 
points will be outlined here (see also e.g. Hayek, 1993 [1960]; Nozick, 1974; Harsanyi, 1976; 
Ackerman, 1980; Roemer, 1996; Scanlon, 1998).
6.1.1 Nature of the deficits: equality of what?
The question as to the aspects of life poverty relates to lies at the heart of the ‘Equality of 
what?’ debate in political philosophy (see e.g. Rawls, 1999 [1971]; Sen, 1980, 1992; Dwor-
kin, 2000). There are three main trains of thought here: welfarism, the capabilities approach 
and resourcism (see White, 2004). The first perspective fits within the utilitarian philo-
sophical tradition, and posits that welfare equates to happiness, generally defined as the 
net balance of pleasure and pain experienced by the individual. In the modern economic 
variant, this is equivalent to the satisfying of desires, preferences or needs. According to 
welfarism, a person is better off when they are happier or as they are able to fulfil more 
of their desires, preferences or needs. A poor person fails to achieve such a state to an 
adequate degree.
One frequently cited objection to this approach relates to adaptivity: people may get 
used to living under very unfavourable circumstances. It is questionable whether some-
one who has become accustomed to a very spartan way of life should be described as hav-
ing an acceptable level of welfare if they – as in the ‘poor but happy’ stereotype – claim 
that they are content; or if they have resigned themselves to their fate, and their desires, 
preferences and needs go no further than short-term physical survival. A second point of 
criticism is that the ‘core of existence’ in the welfarism approach tends to be interpreted 
in too narrow a way: it may be that more is needed for an acceptable life than simply the 
achievement of utilities.
These criticisms are central to the approach advocated by Sen (1980, 1992, 1993, 1999), 
in which capabilities are the most important aspects. This concept refers to a person’s 
ability to achieve certain functionings (valuable acts or states of being). It is more about 
possibilities than actual realisations3 (Sen, 1999: 75):
A person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible 
for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve 
alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various 
lifestyles). For example, an affluent person who fasts may have the same functioning achieve-
ment in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute person who is forced to starve, but the 
first does have a different ‘capability set’ than the second (the first can choose to eat well and 
be well nourished in a way the second cannot).
Another important difference compared with the previous approach is that capabilities 
embrace more than just welfare. As an example of capabilities, Sen cites in addition to 
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the ability to be happy and to satisfy elementary desires or needs (food, health), aspects 
such as self-respect and possibilities to participate in social life. According to Sen it may 
be useful to acknowledge a ‘capability for welfare’; theoretically, however, there are more 
capabilities than this. Following this approach, a poor person is not able to achieve the 
essential ‘beings and doings’ of the community in which they live at a minimal level. 
Poverty is about “the failure of basic capabilities to reach certain minimally acceptable 
standards” 4 (Sen, 1992: 109).
A criticism that can be levelled at the capability approach is that it easily becomes 
bogged down in abstractions. Although Sen mentions a number of examples of capabili-
ties, he does not state clearly whether this is an exhaustive list, nor does he say anything 
about their relative weights5. Others have attempted to make the approach more spe-
cific (see e.g. Nussbaum6, 2000; undp, 1995: 11-23; undp, 2007: 229-354). However, they are 
often accused of ‘sectarism’: if a list of capabilities is drawn up, it is often difficult to make 
a neutral choice regarding the functionings to be included in the list; the preferences of 
the theoreticians concerned often play a decisive role. In addition, it is difficult to deter-
mine the relative importance of various capabilities on theoretical grounds.
In the resourcism approach, as propounded among others by Rawls and Dworkin, an 
attempt is made to avoid such sectarism7. It is assumed that certain resources are of uni-
versal importance for people, regardless of their actual circumstances or the lifestyle they 
prefer. These resources are often equated to income, financial assets and the attainment 
of a certain education level. Rawls (1999 [1971]) also sees ‘basic liberties’, ‘equal opportu-
nities’ and ‘the social basis of self-worth’ as examples of the primary goods to which he 
believes people must have access8.
In a more sophisticated version of this perspective, a weighting is often included to 
take into account personal circumstances. According to Dworkin (2000: 79-81), for exam-
ple, someone with a physical or mental disability in principle has a resource deficit. He or 
she will need a higher income or more support in order to achieve the same initial posi-
tion as someone without such a deficit. The issue is then to determine which resources 
are the most important, how many of those resources people in a given society generally 
need, and how any resource deficits can be compensated. In this approach, a person can 
be described as poor if the resources to which they have access, allowing for any resource 
deficits, are insufficient for a minimally acceptable existence.
The resources approach is also not uncontroversial. The definition of resource defi-
cits can readily become contaminated with value judgments about disabilities; which 
deficits prevent somebody from achieving a life that is good enough? Being blind or deaf 
probably do; but what about not having access to the latest textbooks or the most modern 
means of communication? And how are the deficits to be weighed against each other and 
translated into a total deficit in key resources? The more sophisticated form of resour-
cism often makes implicit choices on these issues, so that the danger of sectarism looms 
here, too, and the difference compared with the two earlier approaches becomes smaller 
than it initially appears. Its simpler manifestation, in which personal circumstances are 
not taken into account, is by contrast potentially ‘fetishistic’: the theoreticians concen-
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trate on the presence or absence of resources, without asking themselves what kind of 
standard of living people are actually able to achieve with these.
6.1.2 Absolute or relative deficits
Given a particular selection of the aspects of life, a second question arises when concep-
tualising poverty: how can it be determined whether someone has too little in the way of 
welfare, capabilities or resources? A key point here is whether this should be determined 
in absolute or relative terms. Traditionally, the concept of poverty elicits mainly absolute 
connotations: people are poor if they suffer from hunger, become ill due to poor housing 
or are unable to afford medical care, have no shelter, and so on.
One result of the genesis of modern social security systems is that absolute poverty in 
such guises has become rather rare, though has by no means been eradicated entirely in 
prosperous societies (think of the homeless, illegal immigrants, etc.). If we were to limit 
ourselves exclusively to these phenomena, we would find relatively little poverty in the 
countries studied here. Yet it is questionable whether this is correct: in prosperous com-
munities, attaining an acceptable standard of living generally requires more than simply 
being able to meet the most basic needs or being free of immediate threats to physical 
survival.
An alternative is to treat poverty as a completely relative matter. Individuals or house-
holds are then poor if they are considerably worse off than a reference group9. This 
approach has become the norm in recent decades in international comparative empirical 
research on poverty in developed societies. An example is the poverty line employed by 
the European Union (60% of median disposable income), which is intended to map out 
the ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ rate in the member states. This threshold not only raises all kinds 
of practical objections (these are dealt with in more detail in §6.4), but also objections 
of principle. In an entirely relative approach to poverty, the link is lost with what needs 
people have to meet in their society. Adam Smith (1909 [1776]: 541) long ago noted that the 
demarcation of this is not fixed, but depends on what is common practice in a society10:
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for 
the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable 
people, even of the lowest order, to be without.
This was an attempt by Smith to highlight the contextual nature of poverty. If people do 
not have the things that are necessary in their own community in order to survive not just 
physically but also socially, they are poor – even if they would not be poor according to 
the poverty standards used in the past or in distant countries.
Since a relative approach ignores the physical and social necessities it can give 
a distorted picture of poverty. An example is the case of an oil state with large income 
differentials, which however gives the least well off a high guaranteed income, good 
housing, free education, etc. In these circumstances relative ‘poverty’ will  be substantial 
because inequality is high, but it is doubtful whether one would wish to describe those 
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on the lowest incomes as poor: their necessities have after all been met. Conversely, in a 
country with a low level of prosperity and little inequality, people with an average income 
may have to do without the most basic goods and provisions. For example, in a communist 
society where incomes are virtually equalised around the median no one will fall below 
the relative poverty threshold. However, if that median income is not enough to buy food 
and clothing, one would still be inclined to describe the situation as one of mass poverty.
This problem also has a temporal aspect: in a relative perspective, people can become 
poor if the income of others increases to a greater degree than their own – even where 
in a material sense they lack nothing, and have experienced a considerable improvement 
in prosperity.
These limitations to an interpretation of poverty in terms of relative deficits do not how-
ever mean that it is better to measure poverty against an absolute criterion which applies 
everywhere and which fixes everything once and for all. The fact that 73% of the inhabit-
ants of Eritrea were chronically undernourished in around 2002, or that many Europeans 
were confronted with housing shortages in the period after the Second World War, is not 
necessarily relevant for an assessment of current poverty levels in prosperous societies. 
As a society becomes richer and every one of its members benefits from this to some 
degree, a fixed and absolute criterion will in the long run imply that there are no poor 
people left. However, it is plausible that the higher level of prosperity also leads to a rais-
ing of the social standard of minimum necessities. A fixed, absolute approach does not 
reflect this evolution.
Sen (1983, 1985) chooses an elegant approach to this absolute/relative dilemma. He argues 
that the minimal necessary capabilities are invariant between communities and over 
time, and are absolute in that sense. However, the means needed to achieve them can 
diverge socially and historically. He elaborates on this as follows (Sen, 1985: 669-670):
Poverty is not just a matter of being relatively poorer than others in the society, but of not 
having some basic opportunities of material well-being – the failure to have certain minimum 
‘capabilities’. The criteria of minimum capabilities are ‘absolute’ not in the sense that they 
must not vary from society to society [...] or over time. […] People’s deprivations are [to be] 
judged absolutely, and not simply in comparison with the deprivations of others in that soci-
ety. If a person is seen as poor because he is unable to satisfy his hunger, then that diagnosis 
cannot be altered merely by the fact that others too may also be hungry (so that this person 
may not be, relatively speaking, any worse off than most others). The same applies to capabil-
ity failures of other kinds, e.g., the more ‘social’ ones, such as being ashamed to appear in 
public because of the poverty of one’s clothing. […] In the context of poverty analysis, it is a 
question of setting certain absolute standards of minimum material capabilities relevant for 
that society. Anyone failing this absolute level would then be classified as poor, no matter 
what his relative position is vis-à-vis others.
In Sen’s view, therefore, poverty is ultimately absolute in nature: it is about whether peo-
ple are able to achieve the minimum standards in respect of material things that are rele-
vant in their society. Everyone who fails to achieve that absolute level should be regarded 
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as poor, irrespective of their relative position compared with others. This does not mean 
that the content of those minimum standards is fixed; they can vary from time to time 
and from place to place, and in that sense can be regarded as ‘relative’. The social and 
historical variation is related to what is regarded as socially necessary at a particular time 
and place, the statutory rules, the level of and trend in prices and prosperity, the avail-
ability of goods and services, and so on. However, this form of ‘relativity’ is not the same 
as equating poverty to not attaining a certain reference level of income or consumption. 
A person’s relative position in such distributions in itself says little about whether or not 
they are poor, since such a ranking provides no direct measurement of their distance 
from the minimum standards which prevail in their society11.
6.1.3 Establishing thresholds
If one wishes to argue theoretically what poverty consists of, the next question that arises 
is where precisely the line demarcating the minimum standard should be drawn. This 
problem of establishing poverty thresholds occurs always. Whether the focus is on wel-
fare, capabilities or resources, and whether an absolute or relative approach is chosen, 
a threshold value has to be declared, below which the deficits are so great that those 
concerned can be regarded as poor. In an absolute, welfare-based approach, for example, 
the problem of setting thresholds relates to the minimally required amount and quality 
of nutrition, housing, etc. In a relative approach based around resources, it is essential 
to establish how much income people should have vis-à-vis the reference group in order 
not to be classed as poor.
Several attempts have been made to resolve this issue theoretically. Dworkin (2000: 65-71), 
for example, has suggested the following thought experiment. Suppose a group of people 
have just arrived on an uninhabited island and have to distribute the available resources 
(land, water, timber, fruit trees, etc.) in an initial auction. Everyone receives an equal 
amount of ‘money’ (clamshells) and can bid in the auction. Initially, therefore, the exter-
nal resources are equally divided. If the talents and disabilities of the people concerned 
were also equally distributed, the result of the auction would reflect the preferences of 
those involved, and would in that sense be fair. In practice, however, people’s talents 
and disabilities differ, and in principle it is necessary to compensate for these resource 
deficits. According to Dworkin this can be resolved using the notion of a hypothetical 
insurance market. In this second part of his thought experiment it is assumed that the 
newly arrived islanders are not aware of their personal capabilities and limitations, but 
do know the distribution of limitations and talents across the group as a whole. It is then 
possible to determine what rationally acting persons would want to insure themselves 
against, and from this a theoretical threshold value for the necessary collective protec-
tion can be derived.
Dworkin (2000: 307-319) clarifies the problem using the example of health care. Every 
individual has an interest in ensuring their health. A community to some extent may 
regard this as a collective risk, and try to realise minimum health standards by funding 
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medical provisions directly, or via a compulsory health insurance system, or by allowing 
people to deduct medical expenses when they make their income tax declaration, etc. 
However, not everything can be included in the collectively guaranteed minimum pack-
age; the ever burgeoning and often expensive medical technology and care tends to swal-
low up an increasing share of the communities’ resources. At some point the rising medi-
cal expenditure will come into conflict with other things that people probably also regard 
as collectively desirable, such as the funding of infrastructure and good education, a fair 
remuneration of productive labour and encouraging business investments. Yet if limits 
are imposed on the package of communal health provisions, individual stakeholders are 
likely to oppose this. Such curtailments may seriously affect their quality of life, and in 
the most extreme cases can even be life-threatening. Where exactly should the limits of 
the collective guarantee be set in such a case?
In order to address the threshold-setting problem in relation to health risks, Dworkin 
proposes a fictitious rational young person operating on a hypothetical insurance mar-
ket. He argues that such a person would not choose an insurance package which meant 
that in old age his life could be extended by a few months through expensive medical 
treatments, if he has to pay much higher contributions over the course of his life. Rather, 
he would probably prefer to invest the amount in things that produce greater returns on 
a lifetime basis (education, investments in shares) or to spend it on covering other risks 
which he considers more important (e.g. incapacity for work at an earlier age). Based on 
this argumentation, Dworkin states that it is possible in principle to decide whether spe-
cific provisions or treatments should or should not be included in the collectively guar-
anteed minimum package.
Rawls (1999 [1971]: 102-168) follows a somewhat comparable approach. In his thought exper-
iment, people are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. They do not know what their natural 
resources are, how these can be exploited productively in their community, or what relative 
advantages and disadvantages ensue from their social, economic and cultural background. 
Rawls argues that a rational actor in this ‘original position’ will opt for the ‘liberty prin-
ciple’ (secure all their basic political freedoms) and the ‘difference principle’12. The latter 
means that differences in income and wealth are only to be regarded as fair if the worst-off 
group does better than they would have done without this inequality; and where such dif-
ferences are linked to positions and offices which are attainable by everyone.
In order to resolve the threshold-setting problem, Rawls suggests starting from the 
assumption that people regard themselves as bound to the allocation principle which 
was chosen in the original position (‘the strains of commitment’). Behind the veil of 
ignorance a rational actor must therefore also ask themselves whether, if the chosen allo-
cation would imply that that actor turns out to be one of the least well off, he would actu-
ally be able to live under those circumstances. If he feels this would be unendurable for 
him, a rational actor would not wish to impose such a way of life on others. He therefore 
should opt for an allocation which makes the living conditions of the worst-off as good as 
possible, or in other words, a set of rules which maximises the minimum (maximin).
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It is anything but certain whether the approaches put forward by Dworkin and Rawls can 
resolve the threshold-setting problem adequately. The elaboration of both the options of 
the rational young actor on the hypothetical insurance market and that of the maximin 
principle easily becomes bogged down in the detail. In many cases it will not be clear in 
advance what Dworkin’s rational young actor will choose. What if a very expensive medi-
cal treatment extends the life of older people by three good or five ailing years? How to 
deal with costly interventions from which young people personally gain but which do not 
serve a clear collective purpose, such as breast enlargement for aesthetic reasons? Simi-
larly, Rawls’ maximin principle involving people operating behind a veil of ignorance can 
only be applied in fairly general terms. When seeking to utilise it in practice, the rational 
actor who tries to cast aside his own preferences and interests will need more informa-
tion about the prevailing social conditions. The way of life that such a person considers 
the ‘acceptable minimum’ for themselves is difficult to ascertain in isolation from the 
customs and the prosperity of their community.
6.1.4 The need for compensation
Suppose that theoretically unambiguous answers were available to the above questions, 
so that one has arrived at a philosophical demarcation of what constitutes poverty: the 
aspects of life involved in poverty are given, the absolute/relative dilemma has been 
resolved satisfactorily, and the line which separates rich from poor is clear. In such a 
case, it is possible to identify the poor in a specific community; the question which then 
arises is whether there is a need to compensate the deficits of the poor, and if so, who 
should be responsible for doing so.
The contributors to the ‘Equality of what’ debate mentioned above tend to answer the 
question concerning the need for compensation in the affirmative. In their view, a cer-
tain minimum level of welfare, capability or resources has to be collectively guaranteed 
for three reasons: because it is useful for the community, because it serves freedom in 
society, or because it is fair. The welfarism approach generally attaches greatest impor-
tance to the first point, that of the net collective gains. If income has a declining mar-
ginal utility, and the utility of every citizen carries equal weight, the introduction of a 
guaranteed minimum will increase collective prosperity. Under those conditions poor 
people gain more utility through the extra means they obtain than wealthier people lose 
through the additional contributions they have to pay.
In the capabilities approach the freedom argument is stressed. If a certain minimum 
level is collectively assured, this increases the freedom of actors to realise ‘valuable acts or 
states of being’13. In resourcism, fairness is often given the heaviest emphasis. In Rawls’ 
view, for example, a self-interested rational actor operating behind the veil of ignorance 
would inevitably opt for fair principles which uphold a certain minimum standard 
(maximin and equality of opportunity). All three approaches accord a central role to 
government in compensating for the deficits, based on the idea that the government 
stands above the parties and is tasked with promoting general interests. The government 
is moreover in the ideal position to enforce the required redistribution via legislation.
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However, from a theoretical standpoint it is not self-evident that the deficits experienced 
by the poor have to be compensated, nor that the government should bear a special 
responsibility for this. In neoclassical economic theory and libertarian political philoso-
phy, both points are disputed. The argument that it is collectively useful to alleviate the 
indigence of the poor can be countered with the argument that the net result of income 
transfers may not positive at the level of the economy as a whole. Chapter 3 looked at 
this in some detail in the discussion of the economic repercussions of social security 
institutions. In addition to the potential benefits (promotion of public gains, prevention 
of public bad), it was pointed out that there are a number of potential negative effects of 
income transfers, and in particular the perverse incentives they can provide for economic 
actors: a reduced propensity to save, higher labour costs, more unemployment, and com-
petition between income transfers and other government investments which could gen-
erate greater returns for the community. This puts into perspective the collective utility 
argument put forward by proponents of welfarism to underpin the need to compensate 
for deficits – though it is by no means firmly established that the negative effects will 
always dominate. Whether or not the collective benefits of a social minimum outweigh 
the drawbacks is ultimately an empirical rather than a theoretical question. In a certain 
socio-historical context, specific institutional arrangements guaranteeing a minimum 
standard of living may increase collective wealth; but it cannot be taken for granted that 
this would also be the case at a different time or place (cf. §3.6.3).
The logic of the freedom argument can also be contested from a theoretical standpoint 
(see e.g. White, 2004). Compensation for deficits by the government may well increase 
the freedom of the disadvantaged, but it also constrains the behavioural freedom of 
other actors (the wealthier, businesses), since they are no longer able to spend the lev-
ies they have to pay at their own discretion. A more subtle variant of this argumentation 
centres on the right to self-ownership. Through its taxation of productive labour, the 
government compels working people to support others. In this way the tax system uses 
their efforts, and such ‘effort-harnessing’ undermines individual freedom. The right to 
self-ownership is fundamentally attacked, because talented and productive persons are 
put in a position of being slaves: they have no choice other than to work for the untal-
ented and the unproductive.
An argument against such ‘freedom objections’ is that at a collective level deficit 
compensation by the government does not by definition lead to less freedom, but rather 
to a different distribution of that freedom. One may also argue that the effort-harness-
ing by modern welfare states still leaves many freedoms unaffected, so that it is absurd 
to compare taxation with slavery. People who are obliged to pay taxes can still choose 
whether they wish to work and how much, and also what kind of work they do, and what 
remuneration they consider adequate – freedoms which a slave does not have. In this 
line of argumentation, some effort-harnessing is defensible as long as central freedoms 
continue to be guaranteed14. Finally, it is possible to take the stance that, while effort-
harnessing is in principle undesirable, the right of some people to be spared any taxation 
has to be weighed against the right of all citizens to a minimal acceptable standard of 
living – and that the latter should weigh more heavily in the balance.
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Although such refutations of the freedom objection to deficit compensation may be 
attractive to some, there is no theoretical need to regard them as decisive. Such argu-
ments will not convince a consistent libertarian, who puts the right to self-ownership 
above all else.
The need to compensate the deficits of the poor can also be contested from the perspec-
tive of fairness. Suppose someone does not share the freedom objection, and thus in prin-
ciple considers it acceptable that productive people should be forced to support those 
who are less productive. In that case, he may still feel that income transfers from the 
wealthier to the poor are not always fair, for example if hard workers are forced to main-
tain those who are too lazy to accept a job, or if those who are prudent and save are taxed 
to the benefit of spendthrifts. This is the ‘fairness objection’; and the standard response 
to it is that such undesirable transfers can be avoided by conditioning the rights of the 
poor, for example by requiring that they actively look for work, follow a certain training 
course or be placed under tutelage. However, from a theoretical point of view there may 
also be drawbacks to such conditioning, which demand brief consideration here.
6.1.5 Conditions for compensation
If one thinks that deficits should in principle be compensated and that the government 
should be responsible for doing so, does this then apply for everyone and under all cir-
cumstances? Or should this compensation be subject to conditions? Such conditions may 
relate to certain qualifying properties; for example: the government only compensates 
for deficits if other actors (family, the Church, the employer) are unable to do so. The 
conditions may also refer to specific forms of conduct: moral requirements (behaving 
in a virtuous fashion, not having a criminal record), or obligations to do something in 
return (e.g. participating in sheltered employment). Rights are often also conditioned in 
the sense that certain eventualities (indigence, disability) must have occurred (cf. §3.2); 
and an important clause may be that compensation is withheld entirely or partially if the 
eventualities have been induced by the actions of the person concerned, i.e. when the 
deficits are self-inflicted.
Conditions of the latter type are regularly encountered in the political and philosophical 
debate, because they touch on a matter of principle15: it is perhaps not fair to compen-
sate people who have become poor due to their own doings, at the expense of taxpayers 
and other contributors. Take a person who has the talents and qualifications to earn an 
adequate income through employment, and who has no impediments which prevent him 
from doing so. If jobs are available but the person concerned is lazy and chooses not to 
work, and as a result eventually ends up in financial difficulties, is it then fair that the 
 government should compensate them for these deficits? Or, to give another example: 
what happens if someone is unable to generate sufficient income due to a physical dis-
ability which is the result of an accident during a risky leisure activity, such as mountain-
eering or parasailing? From a fairness perspective, it can be argued that compensation 
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should only be granted on condition that the poor person did not cause their income 
deficit themselves.
Deficits that arise due to high expenditure which could in principle have been avoided 
can also be regarded as self-inflicted, leading to the argument that compensation should 
perhaps be ruled out via conditioning. Dworkin (2000: 48-59) describes this situation 
clearly in the examples he cites of cultivated expensive tastes, such as laying down an 
expensive wine collection, eating plover’s eggs and visiting the opera frequently. If this 
causes someone to become poor, it is perhaps not logical that these deficits should be 
compensated.
If one wishes to exclude self-caused deficits from compensation, it must be possible to 
define them unambiguously. One way of doing this is to allow deficits to be eligible for 
compensation only if they do not ensue from the preferences of the person concerned. If 
the latter is the case, the deficit could have been avoided. Rawls (1999 [1971]) argues that 
people should always be held responsible for their preferences, regardless of how they 
arose. From that premise, it is logical to regard preference-related deficits as self-caused 
and therefore to exclude them from compensation.
Other political philosophers consider this unfair and argue that only preferences 
where people have a choice, and which they themselves would in reality not wish to have, 
should lead to a deficit being regarded as self-inflicted. Daniels (1990) illustrates this view 
using the following example. Suppose a family is poor because the wife prefers to stay 
at home to look after the children, while her husband would prefer it if she “brings the 
bacon in rather than cooking it”. If this is her own will and free choice, the deficit should 
not be eligible for compensation. However, the situation is different if the woman in 
question would like to work but is unable to do so because her parents have brought her 
up in a traditional view of her role, and because her circle of friends hold very negative 
views on working women. In that case, the deficit should be compensated: although it 
is based on preferences, those preferences are unchosen and unwanted. A complicating 
factor in this approach is that it is necessary to investigate in detail which motives under-
lie the preferences, and that it may conflict with another notion of fairness, namely that 
people in equal circumstances and with identical preferences (not wanting to work in 
order to look after the children) are treated unequally if their preferences are based on 
different grounds.
Dworkin (2000) attempts to circumvent such problems by placing the emphasis on 
‘handicaps’, which, as stated, he interprets as resource deficits that should in principle 
be eligible for collective compensation. As regards preferences, it makes no difference 
in his view whether they are wanted or freely chosen. The only thing that is important is 
the extent to which people impose certain mental or emotional constraints which cause 
them to become disadvantaged. He refers in this connection to ‘handicapping tastes’ 
(Dworkin, 2000: 82):
Suppose someone finds he has a craving (or obsession or lust or, in the words of an earlier psy-
chology, a ‘drive’) that he wishes he did not have, because it interferes with what he wants to 
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do with his life and offers him frustration or even pain if it is not satisfied. This might indeed 
be some feature of his physical needs that other people would not consider a handicap at all: 
for example, a generous appetite for sex. But it is a ‘preference’ (if that is the right word) that 
he does not want, and it makes perfect sense that he would be better off without it. For some 
people these unwanted tastes includes tastes they have (perhaps unwittingly) themselves cul-
tivated, such as a taste for a particular sport or for music of a sort difficult to obtain. They 
regret that they have these tastes, and believe they would be better off without them, but nev-
ertheless find it painful to ignore them. These tastes are handicaps; though for other people 
they are rather an essential part of what gives value to their lives.
Dworkin argues that in such circumstances preferences are the same as normal handi-
caps, and like other resource deficits should be eligible for compensation. Someone who 
is too lazy to work and becomes poor as a result has a right to compensation if that lazi-
ness is a personality trait which dictates his behaviour, no matter whether he wants it to 
or not; thus, if Ivan Goncharov’s novel character Oblomov had been poor, he could have 
appealed to his ‘handicapping taste’. And if excessive spending drags someone into pov-
erty, but is the result of a physical dependency on alcohol or other drugs, compulsive 
gambling or addictive bargain hunting, he or she has a right to compensation for the 
resultant deficits – despite the fact that those deficits are self-inflicted. Deficits which 
result from tastes that are not handicapping, by contrast, need not be compensated from 
the collective purse.
Yet it is doubtful whether, in presenting this argument, Dworkin has produced the golden 
rule for conditioning the compensation of deficits. A first problem lies in establish-
ing once and for all when a certain taste should be regarded as handicapping; it always 
depends on the traits of a specific person, their circumstances, and the one who is judg-
ing those. This implies that application of the principle may lead to arbitrary or unstable 
outcomes.
It is also difficult to determine whether deficits should be compensated if other fac-
tors are involved. For example, if someone does not work because they are fairly indolent 
by nature (a handicapping taste), and also because they do not find the work that they can 
find attractive enough (an ‘ordinary’ preference), should their deficit then be compen-
sated fully, only in part, or not at all?
A final point is that it may also be considered unfair not to compensate for deficits 
when there are no handicapping tastes involved. An example is the familiar observation 
that poor people sometimes spend a lot of money on smoking, pets or lotteries, without 
being really addicted. This means that they could cease these activities, but prefer not to 
do so. This choice prolongs their poverty: they would be materially better off if they did 
not incur these expenses. Often, however, they justify their deeds with the argument that 
the easing of their material indigence that would result from abandoning such ‘luxuries’ 
is outweighed by the welfare gains that their unwise behaviour delivers: smoking and 
pets provide consolation, and the possibility of winning a top prize keeps alive the hope 
that they will be able to leave poverty behind them for good. Is it fair not to compensate 
people for their deficit if that deficit is not the result of a handicapping taste but of a sub-
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jectively understandable choice? Or, to put it in sharper terms, should poor unemployed 
dog owners, ceteris paribus, receive less social assistance than poor unemployed alcohol-
ics who spend the same amount not on pets, but on hard liquor? When reviewing this 
debate, it is difficult to settle once and for all the issue of the forms of conditioning that 
are required from a theoretical point of view16.
6.2 The meaning of poverty
As stated earlier, the theoretical poverty debate in political philosophy breaks down into 
two core questions: what does poverty mean, and which rights should in principle be 
granted to poor people? The first is a ‘What is?’ question, on which a position will be 
developed here. The second is a ‘What ought?’ problem, which will be discussed in the 
next section.
The answer to the question as to the phenomena to which the notion of poverty refers 
depends among other things on the way the construct is embedded in theory, of which 
the debate outlined above provides various examples. The first issue to be addressed here 
relates to the theoretical meaning that one wishes to assign to the concept – the ‘poverty 
concept by postulation’, which cannot be observed directly (cf. Northrop, 1947). It is useful 
to say something about this, because in empirical research many divergent operational 
criteria are used. An ex ante theoretical conceptualisation may provide a touchstone for 
assessing the suitability of the empirical poverty lines that will be discussed in §6.4. The 
aim here is to formulate a limited number of basic principles of poverty. These should 
have heuristic value, in the sense that poverty and non-poverty are separated from each 
other theoretically in an unambiguous, straightforward and non-trivial way. After these 
principles have been elucidated a theoretical definition of the concept will be given, and 
the differences between poverty and a number of other theoretical constructs will be 
discussed.
6.2.1 Basic principles
As a corollary to the discussion sketched above  – and in line with some of the ideas put 
forward in chapters 2 and 3 – four basic principles on the theoretical meaning of poverty 
may be posited.
1. Poverty relates to the aspects of life that are minimally necessary within a community.
This means that the question as to the aspects of life which are important in relation to 
poverty cannot be answered definitively; what is necessary at the minimum level cannot 
be seen in isolation from the society in which one wishes to debate or investigate pov-
erty. It may thus relate to the most basic welfare (e.g. the need for sufficient food), but 
can also refer to higher capabilities, such as the opportunities to participate in social life. 
One point worth noting here is that it seems wise not to interpret the concept of poverty 
so broadly that we lose sight of the fact that we are talking here about a social minimum. In 
most communities it would probably be going too far to include people among the ranks 
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of the poor if they are unable to attain Sen’s ‘capability for self-respect’ or Nussbaum’s 
lofty ideal of the ‘capability for connection with other species’17. Sen did not in fact mean 
this: as noted earlier, he sees poverty as “the failure of basic capabilities to reach certain 
minimally acceptable standards”.
The premise is that an aspect of life is a minimum necessity if it is virtually indispensable 
for the members of a community to have access to it, because its absence would seriously 
affect their functioning within that community. This means in the first place that people 
must be able to obtain – in a socially acceptable manner – the things which are required 
for their physical survival: adequate food in terms of both quantity and quality, suitable 
clothing, satisfactory housing (including heating, water and energy) and sufficient medi-
cal care. What is considered the minimal acceptable level of these biologically rooted 
‘functionings’ can vary according to time and place. Mindful of Adam Smith, for clothing 
this might be limited to a utilitarian minimum (enough to provide adequate protection 
against local weather conditions); but it could also include elementary social desiderata 
(clean clothing every day, which is not visibly worn out).
In addition, in order not to be poor a person must be able to meet the material obliga-
tions ensuing from the formal institutions of the community in which they live. In terms 
of the figural model from chapter 2, this relates especially to the rules which regulate gov-
ernment production, and private contracts that have been ratified officially (third-party 
recognition). Put simply: if a government levies taxes and social security contributions in 
order to pay for certain provisions, or makes it mandatory for people to take up medical 
insurance with a private company, this generates financial obligations which are almost 
impossible to avoid. If a citizen evades them he or she infringes the formal rules, and 
risks formal penalties if this defection comes to light (fines, dismissal, imprisonment); 
and possibly, by extension, negative informal sanctions, such as reputation damage.
Finally, to avoid poverty people must also be able to meet the (quasi-)universal 
material obligations associated with the informal institutions of their community, the 
infringement of which may have serious repercussions. It may be that there is consider-
able latitude in the way people are expected to dress, and that even a large deviation from 
the convention attracts no greater sanction than a curled lip or raised eyebrow. In such a 
community, it is not necessary to wear specific and possibly expensive clothes. However, 
where strict dress codes apply, and even a slight deviation from the standard brings great 
disadvantage (positions that become unattainable, public ridicule, expulsion from the 
peer group), a certain way of dressing may be considered a minimally necessary aspect of 
life. This can happen, for example, with school uniforms. If these are a de facto condition 
for being admitted to a mainstream secondary school, parents who cannot afford to buy 
a uniform for their children are poor.
2. Poverty implies that it is impossible to attain the minimum communal necessities with the available 
resources.
Following the capability approach, it is theoretically useful to conceptualise poverty as 
a lack of freedom: the inability to achieve the minimum that is indispensable in a given 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   358 21-9-2009   15:09:22
359p o v e r t y
   6
community. It is not a matter of whether someone actually possesses all minimum neces-
sary goods and services, but rather whether they could in principle achieve the prevailing 
minimum standard given their means of support.
There is a connection here with theoretical resourcism. It was noted earlier that it is 
‘fetishistic’ to assess poverty by the presence or absence of resources if no link is made 
with the living standard that can be achieved with a certain income, financial assets, or 
education level. Thus it theoretically makes little sense to regard resources as an element 
of minimal necessities. However, if the latter have been specified, the available resources 
do offer an indication for the ability to achieve them. If a substantial part of the popu-
lation has too little to eat, this can only be described as poverty if it is due to a lack of 
income, low yields from subsistence farming or home production, or a shortfall in other 
resources. However, if hunger ensues from widespread anorexia nervosa, the mass fol-
lowing of diets or compliance with religious rules dictating fasting (whereas those con-
cerned have the resources to feed themselves), one would not wish to regard this as an 
indication of poverty.
3. Poverty entails deficits in relation to an absolute standard.
As argued by Sen, poverty is not about relative disadvantage. A person who is unable to 
realise the minimally necessary aspects of life of the community in which they live is 
poor, regardless of their position relative to others. Of course it is fairly likely that the risk 
of ‘absolute’ poverty will in many cases be greatest for those with a relatively low position 
on the central stratification ladders in their community (people with a comparatively low 
income, level of education, job prestige). However, this is not a one-to-one relationship: 
it is theoretically perfectly possible that even those on the lowest incomes are not poor, 
because they are able to achieve the minimum necessities.
It is important to stress that the absolute standard is flexible; it relates to what is 
minimally necessary within a community at a certain point in time. What is required 
for adequate shelter today in the Netherlands, Sweden or the usa, must not be assessed 
against the yardstick of housing conditions in 1900 or of the slums of Calcutta.
The absolute standard can change due to modifications in the formal and informal 
institutions (e.g. taxes may go up, the norms for socially acceptable housing may rise), 
but also due to developments in supply and demand (higher rents due to housing short-
ages) or technological innovations (the rise of the Internet is making it increasingly nec-
essary to be connected). A general change in the level of prosperity (e.g. a real increase or 
decrease in median disposable income) does not of itself however mean that the poverty 
line has to be adjusted.
4. A threshold value for the absolute standard can be identified if the minimum communal necessities can 
be valorised in terms of the available resources.
It was concluded earlier that theoretical solutions for the problem of establishing a pov-
erty threshold, such as the decision a rational young person would take on a hypothetical 
insurance market, or application of the maximin principle by a rational actor behind the 
‘veil of ignorance’, are not satisfactory in all respects. The universalistic pretension is 
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especially problematic: any adequate solution for the threshold-setting problem demands 
that a limit is chosen which reflects the situation of real actors in real communities.
Given the above principles, a threshold value may be determined if it is clear what the 
minimal necessities are within a community, and what resources are needed in order to 
obtain them. This valorisation can be carried out for example by assessing the price of a 
certain minimum basket of goods and services and translating this into the net income 
required for its purchase. However, theoretically it is not self-evident that such a valorisa-
tion will be possible. If the minimal necessities in a given community also include things 
which are inherently difficult or impossible to observe (e.g. the frequency with which a 
person’s aura turns dark brown must be minimised)18, it will be impossible to identify 
what resources this requires. Similarly, if the available resources are unclear – for exam-
ple in a community which does not recognise individual property and which does not 
grant rights of access to collectively owned goods and services – the valorisation is prob-
lematic. In such cases no threshold value separating the poor from the wealthier people 
can be established, and the degree of poverty cannot be assessed.
6.2.2 A theoretical definition of poverty
Based on these principles, poverty can be defined as follows:
An individual actor is poor if he consistently lacks the means to obtain the minimum necessities of his 
community.
What the ‘minimum necessities of one’s community’ are was elucidated in the discussion 
of the first principle. A few other elements in the definition may require some explana-
tion, however. First and foremost, poverty is interpreted as a characteristic of individual 
actors. Collective actors as described in chapter 2 (companies, the government) can thus 
not be poor. In principle, poverty is also not a trait of sets of individual actors, i.e. groups 
or communities; the theoretical reasoning behind this is that these cannot perform acts 
and can therefore not experience behavioural constraints due to a lack of means19. If so 
desired, such social entities can be called ‘poor’ when a substantial part of the group 
or community is unable to obtain the minimum necessities. However, this is then an 
aggregation of the poverty of the individual members, rather than a trait of the group 
or community as such. Empirically, there may be a high probability that all members of 
a household, an extended family or a particular caste will be poor; yet theoretically this 
cannot be taken for granted. It is possible that the available resources within such an 
entity are unequally distributed (a parent who goes without a meal so that the children 
can eat; a family head or clan leader who claims a high share of the limited collective 
means), or that some household members have specific necessities (for example because 
a child suffers from an illness for which the family cannot afford the medicines).
In a similar vein, countries are not necessarily poor if their national income is con-
siderably less than elsewhere, or distributed more unevenly. They may be called poor if 
the means at the collective level are in principle not sufficient to meet the minimum 
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necessities of each and every citizen; or if these means would be sufficient to achieve this 
goal had they not been allocated in such a skewed fashion that many people cannot fulfil 
their basic requirements, while others prosper. In both cases, however, ultimately it is 
the situation of individual actors that is decisive; a country can only be considered poor 
if its aggregate number of persons living in poverty is high.
In a different way communities are important in arriving at a demarcation of poverty 
as carriers of informal rules. In the definition, their ‘rule-setting capacity’ is reflected in 
the linkage of poverty to the minimal necessities as perceived within the community.
As stated, ‘lack’ must be interpreted absolutely: a person who does not have sufficient 
means to obtain the minimum communal necessities is poor, regardless of whether he 
is the only one or is one of many. When establishing the existence of poverty it is desir-
able to make a statement about the required duration of the absolute deficit. Describ-
ing someone who is short of money for a day or week as poor carries little conviction; 
therefore the deficit should be consistent. This means a longer period has to be taken as a 
basis, for example a calendar year. Where the deficits stretch over multiple years one can 
speak of ‘protracted poverty’; if people move in and out of poverty over the years, this can 
be described as ‘shuttle poverty’.
When it comes to means, the focus is on those resources which can be converted into 
economic value at short notice. They comprise the total of income from wages, profits 
and social security transfers, assets and income from assets, subsidies received, benefits 
in kind and home production (such as self-cultivated fruit and vegetables, subsistence 
farming). Even where such resources are obtained informally or illegally, they should 
in principle be taken into account. A drug dealer who has a lot of money obtained on 
the black market is not poor from a theoretical standpoint, although given the obvious 
observation problems it will generally be difficult to establish this empirically. Individual 
actors can in practice pool their resources within a certain group (e.g. a household), but 
this is theoretically not necessary.
Not all resources to which actors have access are relevant for poverty. A high educa-
tion level, an attractive appearance or extensive social networks are only important to 
the extent that they increase the resources that can be deployed economically. This may 
be the case, for example, where an actor is able to obtain a well-paid job because of their 
qualifications, or is able to find work as a photographer’s model because of their beauty, 
or if donations and bartering occurs within a group of relatives.
In the definition, the term ‘obtain’ signifies that actors in principle have access to the 
necessities via their available resources, not that they actually possess or consume those 
necessities. This is an expression of the second principle. It aligns with the emphasis 
placed on freedom of choice by the capability approach, and with the premise of resour-
cism that poverty has to do with universal opportunities to lead a minimally acceptable 
life, irrespective of the lifestyle individual actors would in fact prefer or adopt.
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The definition deliberately says nothing about the voluntary or involuntary nature of pov-
erty. In the approach chosen here, if deficits are self-inflicted it does not imply that peo-
ple are not to be regarded as poor. If a person is not willing to work and ends up with too 
few resources, they are in principle poor. It is plausible that in such cases the community 
will take the view that the deficits should not be compensated, or at least not fully, from 
collective means. This does not however alter the fact such people are not able to attain 
the minimal communal necessities; and in that sense they have to be classed as poor. 
Their poverty has a clear reason, and an attempt can be made to show this by drawing a 
distinction between ‘guilty’ and ‘deserving’ poor – though in many cases it will not be 
simple to establish clear criteria for this, or to assess the guiltiness of individual actors. 
Theoretically, however, such a distinction is of secondary importance.
6.2.3 Poverty, inequality and social exclusion
Following on from this definition, it is important to indicate how poverty relates theo-
retically to two other concepts, namely inequality and social exclusion20. In chapter 2 it 
was argued that social inequality refers to the allocation of social positions and to the 
distribution of scarce goods at a given moment. As such, it is the outcome of the differ-
entiation and ranking of groups in terms of the prevailing principles of hierarchy in the 
community (the social structuring process) and the growth and distribution of wealth 
(the economic process)21. Income inequality is a specific manifestation of this. Poverty 
is related to such forms of inequality, but cannot be equated to them theoretically; a 
distinctive difference is that poverty refers to absolute deficits in relation to the minimal 
necessities, whereas inequality is by definition concerned with relative differences. In 
practice, a certain correspondence is to be expected between those in poverty and those 
who are at the bottom of the social ladders, but this is not theoretically necessary: in an 
egalitarian community mass poverty may occur, while in a country with great inequality 
but a high level of prosperity poverty may be virtually non-existent.
Since the second half of the 1990s, combating social exclusion has become an important 
element of policy in the European Union22. It is one of the goals set out in the Lisbon 
Strategy that was introduced in 2000. This obliged member states to frame their pol-
icy efforts in National Action Plans against poverty and social exclusion (subsequently 
renamed ‘nap-inclusion’), and led to the adoption of a set of quantitative measures to 
monitor their progress (the ‘Laeken Indicators’).
Historically, the theoretical distinction between social exclusion and poverty runs 
parallel to developments in the French and Anglo-American scientific tradition. The 
French school builds on Durkheim’s (1897) theories on social cohesion and solidarity, 
the importance of normative integration and the risk of social alienation (anomie). This 
perspective tends towards the concept of social exclusion, which, according to Paugam 
(1996: 13-14), became a key issue in the 1990s after the new social assistance law (rmi) was 
introduced in France (see chapter 5). Poverty is still the dominant issue in the Anglo-
American literature, where it is a separate line of research in the economic analysis of 
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income distribution (Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2000). It is also prominent in the British 
sociological tradition which builds on Runciman’s (1966) theory of relative deprivation, 
and in American studies of the inner-city underclass (Wilson, 1987, 1997; Small & New-
man, 2001).
In the literature several theoretical distinctions between poverty and social exclusion 
are mentioned (cf. Room, 1995a, 1995b; Berghman, 1995; Saraceno, 1997, 2001; Littlewood 
et al., 1999; Hills et al., 2002). An important difference is that the aspects of life to which 
poverty theoretically relates are rather limited (a consistent lack of the means required 
to obtain the minimum necessities of one’s community), whereas social exclusion would 
refer to a broader set of deficits (such as social isolation, a low work ethic, non-recogni-
tion of the rights of citizenship, etc.). One might thus be socially excluded without being 
poor, and vice versa; and indeed, in empirical work, the correlation between a low of 
income and several features of social exclusion often is not particularly strong (Gallie & 
Paugam, 2000; Saraceno, 2001)23.
Jehoel-Gijsbers (2004) and Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2007) therefore propose 
a direct definition of social exclusion, which separates it from the poverty concept. In 
their view, social exclusion may be conceived of as a state which reflects the economic-
structural and socio-cultural positions of individuals in a community24. This implies that 
social exclusion refers to an actual situation, rather than a possibility; and that it is an 
inherently relative concept, while poverty as defined here is absolute. The authors sug-
gest four theoretical sub-dimensions of social exclusion:
– actual material deprivation and financial hardship, such as non-possession of con-
sumer durables, problematic debts and payment arrears;
– inadequate access to social rights provided by government and semi-government pro-
visions. This includes obstacles to health care, education, housing, legal aid, social 
services, debt assistance, employment services and social security, but also to com-
mercial services such as banking and insurance (e.g. not being able to obtain a loan);
– insufficient social participation: limited social networks, inadequate social support 
and social isolation;
– cultural non-integration: a lack of compliance with norms and values associated with 
citizenship, such as a weak work ethic, a low willingness to become sufficiently edu-
cated, tolerance of social security abuse and tax evasion, delinquent behaviour, and 
deviating views on children’s education and the rights and duties of men and women.
In an empirical study conducted in the Netherlands, Jehoel-Gijsbers (2004) found three 
reliable sub-dimensions, which could be added together to construct a general index for 
social exclusion25. A causal model showed social exclusion, thus measured, to be mainly 
determined by health, income, benefit recipiency and command of the native language. 
Similar results were obtained in cross-comparative analyses based on a more limited set 
of social exclusion indicators (Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman, 2008a, 2008b). This suggests 
that a theoretical distinction between social exclusion and poverty makes sense empiri-
cally. The concepts relate to different phenomena, each with distinct underlying causal 
mechanisms, and for that reason should not be equated.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   363 21-9-2009   15:09:22
364
56
6.3 Granting rights to the poor
A further question concerns the rights that should in principle be granted to the poor; 
as stated, this is a ‘What ought?’ question. From a sociological point of view it is doubt-
ful whether a satisfactory solution can be derived from the theoretical poverty debate in 
political philosophy with regard to the issues discussed earlier – the need to compensate 
for deficits, the government’s responsibility in this regard and the best ways to condition 
deficit compensation. This will be illustrated here using the analysis put forward by Cole-
man (1990), as discussed in chapter 2. His central postulate is that there is in principle no 
‘right division of rights’.
6.3.1 Compensatory rights
If we follow Coleman’s argumentation, the question of whether compensatory rights 
should be granted to poor people is always an endogenous question, which can only be 
answered from within a certain system of action. Rights and the associated obligations, 
conditions and sanctions are always social constructs that apply within a given historical 
community. How this institutionalisation takes place in practice, as was argued in the 
earlier theoretical analysis, depends on changes in relative prices, power relations, con-
flicts of interest and support for ideals within the community.
Rawls and Dworkin, by contrast, deliberately choose an exogenous theoretical stand-
point in their thought experiments (the ‘original position’, the residents of an uninhab-
ited island). They ask which rights and obligations an abstract individual would want to 
assign, regardless of membership of any historical community. In that situation there 
are no predetermined formal and informal rules which have to be taken into account, 
the power relations are equal, there are no ideals, and relative prices initially play no 
role. Interests are important in the allocation of rights and obligations, but only in a very 
generic way; they do not ensue from personal talents, experiences and handicaps on the 
part of real actors within a specific community, but are ascribed to an abstract rational 
actor who is completely unaware of the actual circumstances.
In Coleman’s view, such attempts at ‘objectification’ are fairly meaningless in the 
practice of social systems. There is no reason whatsoever why the members of a particu-
lar community should accept the outcomes of the hypothetical insurance market or the 
judgments made behind the veil of ignorance as a moral higher ground. They may do this; 
but then these are philosophically motivated ideals, which are in principle not of a dif-
ferent order from, for example, the expected salvation that drives Christian charity. From 
the perspective of the theoretical institutional analysis, it is not self-evident that poverty 
should be regarded as a social problem which has to be combated by granting certain 
rights. If there is a consensus in the community that only the strongest should survive, 
within that system it may be considered legitimate to leave the poor to languish – just as 
in certain social contexts actors may regard the duty to commit suicide or the offering of 
human sacrifices as justified. Such a consensus may arise if the ‘incentives to regulate’ 
identified in chapter 2 foster this. This is the case, for example, if powerful groups believe 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   364 21-9-2009   15:09:22
365p o v e r t y
   6
they can profit from large-scale poverty (e.g. because of the cheap labour); if the poor are 
completely powerless (no suffrage, no possibility for migration); if the dominant ideals 
regard poverty as the natural state of certain groups (as in a fatalistic religion or caste-
based society); or where the poor are not able to defend their interests (ban on trade 
unions, repression of social protest).
However, the same critical comments can be stated here as were levelled earlier at 
Coleman’s ethical relativism. Individual actors cannot interpret what constitutes poverty 
as they see fit, or decide independently what is a fair way of dealing with poverty. They are 
tied to the view that prevails in their community, and often perceive this as natural. It is 
also possible that certain notions of poverty acquire more or less universal status, forcing 
governments to combat the phenomenon in a certain way. This has in fact happened to 
a certain extent in the European Union over the last ten years, via the formulation of tar-
gets and action plans aimed at combating poverty and social exclusion. Also worth not-
ing is that in most Western societies empirical data show a good deal of support among 
the population for some form of deficit compensation by the community26.
6.3.2 The role of the government
If people wish to grant rights to the poor, it is also by no means self-evident that the 
government should play a central role in this. This is clear from the simple fact that poor 
relief and other forms of social security initially consisted mainly of family and com-
munal arrangements, as discussed at length in chapter 3. The theoretical conditions for 
regulation by the government were however present in most Western countries from the 
end of the 19th century, so that in practice social security rights were increasingly formally 
institutionalised (see §3.7). Even so, a strong government role is not a natural law, but is 
the outcome of a lengthy rule-generation process in a specific historical context, with 
variations between nations in its course and the results it produces. A salient point here 
is that over the last decades in many countries the scope of government intervention 
was actually reduced in a number of respects: lower benefits of shorter duration, more 
attention for activation and integration of benefit recipients, targeting of social secu-
rity rights at the most needy groups, growing importance of individual and occupational 
social security arrangements. This underlines the fact that the rights guaranteed by the 
government are fluid even in a prosperous society, although the conditions for some kind 
of government regulation are often present. Once again, empirical research does show 
that a considerable share of the population of prosperous societies consider some gov-
ernment responsibility for combating poverty as desirable, though this does vary from 
group to group: some social categories are more deserving than others27.
6.3.3 Conditioning
Coleman’s statement that there is no ‘right division of rights’ can also be extrapolated 
to apply to the conditioning of the rights of the poor. Whether deficits are compensated 
only under certain conditions is something that is determined endogenously, and can 
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therefore not be seen separately from the community that establishes the rules. Thus, 
the 19th-century ‘Regulations governing the provision of care to the home-dwelling poor 
in the town of Den Bosch’ discussed in chapter 1 attached conditions to poor relief that 
were not uncommon at the time, but which are rarely found in modern welfare states. For 
instance, the then poor were not eligible for assistance if they could obtain support from 
their town of birth if this was somewhere other than Den Bosch, and the officials could 
exclude them from poor relief for “any ground deemed valid”. In modern formal social 
security schemes, too, the conditioning is found to vary according to time and place. For 
example, countries operate differing work and means tests in their social assistance regu-
lations, and these need not remain constant over time; in recent decades such conditions 
have in many cases been tightened up. Self-inflicted deficits may wholly or partly be cov-
ered by collective compensation, but this is not inevitably so. Examples are cases of ‘cul-
pable unemployment’ (where a person has quit their job themselves, or has been fired for 
misconduct), or people who have landed in precarious financial circumstances because 
they have taken on debt in what is regarded as an irresponsible manner. Although these 
people may be poor, the community may not wish to compensate them for this and can 
specify this in its conditioning of rights28.
It follows from this institutionalist view that there is little to be gained from  trying 
to settle the problem of poverty once and for all through a granting of compensatory 
rights that is considered universally fair, a standard demarcation of the government 
interventions this requires and a specification of conditions that should apply in all cir-
cumstances. Rather, it is important to investigate how the goal of combating poverty has 
actually been institutionalised in diverse socio-historical contexts, and what effects this 
has on the actors concerned and on the community to which they belong. That is a socio-
logical, not a philosophical issue.
6.4 Operational poverty lines
Obviously, a general conceptualisation is not enough if one wishes to study poverty 
empirically. The size and composition of the poor population is determined by the way in 
which the concept is operationalised in an observable variable. All manner of such opera-
tional poverty lines are used in empirical research, each of which will be analysed here on 
the basis of a typology. Four criteria are applied to assess their suitability:
– validity: does the operational poverty line adequately cover the theoretical content 
of the concept as laid down in the principles and the definition? In Northrop’s (1947) 
terms: is it plausible that the observable ‘poverty concept by intuition’ shows suffi-
cient correspondence with the theoretical ‘poverty concept by postulation’29?
– reliability: does the operational poverty line allow accurate measurements to be made 
of the incidence of poverty?
– ease of application: is the operational poverty line simple to calculate for households 
in diverse circumstances and different countries? Can it be established using fairly 
general, regularly available data? Can it be easily adapted to changing social circum-
stances, such as growing or decreasing national prosperity?
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– social and policy relevance: is the operational poverty line normatively credible for the 
community to which it relates and for those who are involved in policymaking?
The latter point may require some explanation. As poverty often is a key topic of discus-
sion in the political arena, it is desirable that a poverty criterion should to some extent be 
normatively convincing for policymakers, the media and a notable group of citizens. An 
operational poverty line which is regarded as scientifically valid and reliable but which 
is far removed from everyday notions is unlikely to be able to give much direction to the 
social debate. It will also offer politicians, civil servants and social security organisations 
little help in formulating and implementing the policy on poverty.
In addition to normative persuasiveness, the more practical requirement can also 
be imposed that the outcomes generated by a poverty line must not flagrantly contra-
dict the perceptions of the actors concerned. This occurs, for example, if in a prosperous 
society with a relatively even income distribution a particular poverty line characterises a 
large share of the population as poor; or where an ordinary citizen observes poverty on a 
large scale (e.g. many starving children on the streets), whereas the problem is negligible 
according to the official poverty criterion. Developments over time can also lack credibil-
ity for those concerned. This is the case, for example, if the observed poverty according 
to a particular threshold fluctuates widely, whereas there is little change in the socioeco-
nomic circumstances; or where measured poverty rises sharply when all citizens experi-
ence a strong growth in real income.
It should be emphasised that the social and policy relevance is an additional criterion 
when assessing the quality of a poverty threshold. It is not desirable to operationalise 
poverty in a completely nominalistic way, in the sense that poverty is whatever policy-
makers or the vox populi take it to be. What is necessary is to seek to ensure that the opera-
tional demarcation of poverty corresponds sufficiently with the notions that prevail in 
the community, among policymakers and officials, though without seeking to insist that 
all citizens and stakeholders must concur with it.
6.4.1 Notions on poverty among the population
Something more can be said about the normative persuasiveness of different poverty 
lines on the basis of the scarce empirical research into what the populations of devel-
oped societies understand by poverty30. It emerged from a series of Australian surveys 
that most citizens interpret poverty in a fairly restrictive way, tending to associate it with 
basic necessities rather than higher needs, wide-ranging capabilities or resources; and 
that they predominantly think of absolute lacks rather than relative deficits31. Saunders 
(2004: 7-8) concludes that, in the eyes of Australians, poverty means
[...] not having enough to buy basic items, rather than being unable to buy the items that the 
majority can afford: it reflects need, rather than envy.
The same picture emerges from a Dutch survey in which more than 700 people were 
asked the open question “What do you understand by poverty?” (Vrooman, 2006; Soede 
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& Vrooman, 2008b). The largest group (22%) saw poverty as the inability to buy common 
basic necessities. This ‘basic needs’ interpretation is reflected in responses such as, “pov-
erty means not being able to buy what you need”; “not being able to do anything extra”, 
or “only being able to afford the absolute necessities”. There was also a sizeable group of 
people with a stricter interpretation. One in 10 respondents felt that poverty only occurred 
if there was a threat to physical existence in the short or longer term. This category of 
‘unsustainable subsistence’ included people who conceive of poverty as “dying of hun-
ger”, or who associate the phenomenon with homelessness. Twice as many people (19%) 
did not relate poverty to extreme physical indigence, but to a permanent battle to acquire 
essential goods. According to these ‘sustainable subsistence’ notions, poverty means that 
people “have to fight to eat every day”, or are dependent on the food bank or charity.
Subjective poverty notions which aim at a higher minimal living standard are rare. A 
small group (1%) believe that poverty can be said to exist when people are unable to meet 
higher needs, such as “not being able to go on holiday”, or “not having money for nice 
things”. Perceptions of poverty as aspects of social exclusion are also sporadic: 3% associ-
ate poverty with “not being able to do things with the people around you”, “loneliness”, 
and so on. Notions of poverty relating to capabilities are fairly uncommon as well; only 
1% see poverty as “not being free in your choices”, “not being able to do things that others 
can do due to lack of money”, etc. Sen’s broader capability approach thus appears fairly 
academic; among the Dutch population, at least, the number of people sharing this view 
of poverty is negligible.
As in the Australian surveys mentioned above, few people in the Netherlands see 
poverty in relative terms: only 2% of respondents regard poverty as “lagging behind the 
rest of the population”, or “being well below the modal income”. Perceptions in terms of 
unspecified resources are more common (9%); e.g., “poverty is having too little money 
and too few possessions”. This interpretation is ‘fetishistic’: poverty occurs whenever 
people have limited means, but it remains unclear what living standard they are sup-
posed to achieve with those. The remaining responses (33%) in this Dutch survey were 
fairly mixed32.
These outcomes suggest that most people associate poverty more with an absolute lack of 
necessities rather than with relative shortages. The poverty line is fairly low in the domi-
nant view: whilst it is above the subsistence level, it leaves little room for the fulfilment of 
higher needs and a broad range of capabilities. In order to be socially credible, a poverty 
line therefore probably needs to be absolute and rather strict. Of course, it may be that 
this conclusion does not hold for all modern societies, though the evidence emerging 
from the Dutch and Australian cases is remarkably similar.
6.4.2 A typology of operational poverty lines
The many operational definitions of poverty encountered in the scientific literature can 
be classified on the basis of three characteristic differences33:
– is poverty determined absolutely or relatively?
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– is poverty measured by the available resources or by actual consumption and posses-
sion?
– is poverty established objectively or subjectively?
The absolute/relative distinction has already been discussed in §6.1. With absolute pov-
erty lines, people are poor if they are unable to obtain a certain minimum level of neces-
sities, while in relative approaches it is the disadvantage compared with a reference 
group which is key34. As argued earlier, the latter approach is theoretically less desirable 
for measuring poverty.
Poverty lines based on actual consumption and possession are sometimes described as 
the ‘direct method’ (see Sen, 1981)35. This method involves establishing whether people 
actually have the minimally required goods or services; if this is not the case, they are 
regarded as poor. Resources-based poverty lines focus on the issue of whether people 
have adequate economic means to procure the necessary goods and services, regard-
less of whether they actually achieve the minimum package. This latter approach most 
closely matches the theoretical principles outlined above; even so, operational poverty 
lines based on consumption and possession can sometimes provide useful additional 
information36.
Table 6.1 
A typology of operational poverty linesa
  Objective Subjective
  Relative Means based [a] [b]
  - lower percentiles of income distribution - relative minimum on income ruler
  - percentage of median or average income
 Based on [c]  [d]
 consumption - consumer durables and services - common consensual necessities index
 and possession - relative deprivation index 
  Absolute Means based [e] [f]
  - expert budget standards  - minimum income question (MIQ), 
     subjective poverty line
   - income evaluation question (IEQ), 
     Leyden poverty line
   - income satisfaction question (ISQ)
   - consensual budget standards
 Based on  [g] [h]
 consumption - food ratios - minimum spending question (MSQ)
 and possession - share of fi xed expenditure - consensual necessities index
  - total expenditure
 
a.  In italics: commonly used poverty lines.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   369 21-9-2009   15:09:24
370
56
The terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are commonly used in poverty research, but often 
cause confusion. In reality, the important thing is whether the norms used to measure 
poverty are derived from decisions taken by ‘outsiders’ (e.g. scientists, budget experts or 
politicians), or whether it is the opinions of stakeholders (citizens, experiential experts) 
that are decisive. In the first, ‘objective’ case, people or households are described as poor 
if they are unable to achieve a minimum level defined by others. In the second, ‘subjec-
tive’ approach, they are poor if they are unable to achieve the standard that they them-
selves, or the members of their community, regard as the minimum necessary.
Table 6.1 presents the eight types of operational poverty lines obtained when the three 
dichotomies are combined. This classification builds on the earlier typologies developed 
by Hagenaars and others (1985, 1987, 1988), De Vos (1991) and Vrooman & Snel (1999). The 
variants that are commonly used in empirical research are italicised in the table and will 
be the main focus of the discussion in this section.
6.4.3 Relative poverty lines
Relative operational poverty lines are generally defined by ‘outsiders’. Subjective variants 
are fairly rare and will be treated below; here we will therefore restrict ourselves to dis-
cussing the objective relative criteria.
With relative means-based poverty lines (cell a in the table) a person is regarded as 
poor if they have a substantially lower income than others. According to percentile defini-
tions, people who are in the bottom 10% or 20% of the income distribution, for example, 
are classed as poor. More common are the objective relative approaches in which the 
poverty line is set at a given percentage of the average or median37 income in a particular 
country. In empirical research, a norm of 50% or 60% is often used.
It is also possible to consider whether a person’s actual consumption and possessions 
deviate from those of the average citizen (cell c in table 6.1). An obvious method is to 
explore whether households have to do without certain goods or services which most peo-
ple have38. Examples might include a washing machine, a car, a telephone, a colour tv, 
dvd player or personal computer. It may also be relevant to establish whether households 
are unable to afford certain social activities, such as holidays or membership of clubs or 
associations.
A more elaborate version of this approach is the relative deprivation index, which has 
become known mainly through the work of Townsend (1979). Here, poverty is interpreted 
as the relative deviation from a standard consumption pattern. This is established by sub-
mitting a list of consumer articles and activities to survey respondents and asking them 
to indicate whether they have them or are able to undertake them. Among other things, 
Townsend asked about possession of a refrigerator, having meat on the table at least four 
days a week, regularly being able to invite family or friends round for a meal, being able 
to organise a birthday party for the children, but also being able to afford a cooked break-
fast. The relative deprivation index is obtained by adding up the number of items which 
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people cannot afford. It is possible to see this as a direct indicator for poverty; however, 
Townsend himself preferred to measure poverty using a combination of relative depriva-
tion and low income39.
Assessment of relative poverty lines
If the first assessment criterion – the validity of the poverty line relative to the theoretical 
definition of poverty – is applied strictly, these relative poverty lines have to be rejected 
straight away. In the theoretical demarcation used here, the starting point is that poverty 
should be measured in terms of an absolute deficit in terms of minimal communal neces-
sities, regardless of the circumstances of others. The relative poverty lines based on con-
sumption and possession are moreover in conflict with the second principle, that poverty 
refers to the living standard that a person is able to attain given their economic resources. 
This would quickly end the discussion: following the theoretical principles and definition 
of poverty argued earlier, relative poverty lines are simply not valid. Moreover, they are 
not in line with the notions of poverty that prevail among the public (cf. above), which 
means they generally carry little normative cogency for the actors concerned.
Since some relative poverty lines have proven to be influential in empirical research, 
however, it will be useful to look more closely at their merits. The percentile approaches 
have the advantage that they are very easy to apply. They can also be regarded as fairly 
reliable, with the proviso that the measured income is not necessarily a good proxy for 
the available economic resources – a qualification which also applies to other means-
based measures. There is however one specific reliability issue: the poverty rate obtained 
in this way is a constant rather than a variable. The proportion of poor people remains 
the same by definition; at most, the composition of the poor population can change. This 
implies that this criterion lacks credibility and is unusable from a policy perspective: no 
matter how many measures are taken to combat poverty, according to this criterion they 
will never lead to a reduction of the problem as observed empirically. Percentile-based 
poverty lines can at most be used to broadly identify the nature of the poor group, for 
example if one wishes to map out the evolution in the composition of people at the bot-
tom end of society.
In its ‘Laeken indicators’ the European Union takes 60% of median income as the central 
criterion for measuring poverty and social exclusion. The relative income threshold there-
fore is of major policy importance, being used as a touchstone for the success or failure 
of the social policy of the member states. This threshold is easy to calculate and, unlike 
the percentile approach, does not invariably produce the same outcomes. Advocates of 
this approach often see it as an advantage that there is an automatic correction for differ-
ences in prosperity between different countries; when measuring poverty through this 
criterion, some allowance is made for the fact that per capita gdp in the Scandinavian 
countries, for example, is higher than in the Mediterranean states.
However, from the perspective of the theoretical definition of poverty advocated 
here, the relative income threshold is invalid in two respects. Since it is the income dif-
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ferential relative to the average citizen that is decisive, the poverty issue is equated to an 
issue of distribution. As a result, this operational poverty line refers more to the concept 
of income inequality than to the notion of poverty theoretically postulated here; in other 
words, it is “inequality in disguise” (Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004: 295)40. Moreo-
ver, the relative income criterion completely ignores the extent to which people with an 
income at the threshold level are able to obtain the minimal communal necessities. To 
use Sen’s terms, therefore, this criterion is by definition ‘fetishistic’.
The reliability of relative income thresholds is equally unconvincing. The proportion of 
poor people measured depends on the reference group selected (the average or median 
citizen) and the distance relative to that group (e.g. 60%), both of which are arbitrary 
choices. It would be just as defensible to choose a higher or lower income group as the 
yardstick, or to take different threshold amount (e.g. 40%, 50% and 70% of the median, 
as in the eu’s ‘secondary indicators’). If this leads to divergent trends or rankings of 
countries in terms of the incidence of poverty, there is no substantive argument on the 
grounds of which one outcome should be chosen above another.
Another objection is that the relative poverty line does not comply with Sen’s (1976) 
‘focus on the poor’ axiom. He argued that the degree of observed poverty should depend 
solely on the resources of the poor themselves, and must not be influenced by the income 
and wealth development of the non-poor. If the relative threshold is derived from the 
median41, the poverty rate will rise if there is a real increase in median incomes and lower 
incomes lag behind. This can lead to counter-intuitive findings, especially in times of 
major shifts in prosperity levels. If these increase sharply, as happened in Ireland in the 
1990s42, median incomes often rise more in real terms than the lower incomes. Although 
the standard of living of those on lower incomes improves in this case, there will still be 
an increase in measured poverty.
A final reliability issue is the ceiling effect that may affect median-based relative pov-
erty lines. If one uses median income as a point of reference, the level of relative poverty 
can by definition never rise above 50%43, and in practice the ceiling often lies at around 
30%. Poverty that occurs on a very large scale can thus not be reliably established using 
this criterion.
The social and policy relevance of relative income thresholds is limited. The outcomes 
can sometimes lack credibility for those concerned. The Irish example in the 1990s has 
already been mentioned, but the enlargement of the eu to accommodate 12 new member 
states in the period 2004-2007 is also illustrative in this respect. Some new member states 
in Central Europe traditionally combine a flat income distribution with a low median 
income. As a result, the degree of relative poverty in the Czech Republic is comparable to 
that in Sweden and the Netherlands; Slovakia and Hungary end up close to Germany and 
France, while Lithuania has the same number of poor people as the United Kingdom. In 
some of the new member states, however, the material hardship which people report is 
much greater (Vrooman, 2007, 2008b), as would be expected given their lower per capita 
gdp44.
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The criterion is also problematic from a policy perspective. As long as the bottom 
incomes are distributed sufficiently uneven, through the relative threshold poverty will 
be detected. This gives policymakers a rather perverse incentive: in order to combat pov-
erty it is always best to take measures which transfer income from the median citizen to 
the poorer classes. However, in countries with a comparatively low level of prosperity, it 
may be a more effective strategy to tackle poverty by maximising economic growth and 
accepting a somewhat greater income inequality, as long as the poor benefit sufficiently 
from the increasing prosperity.
Figure 6.1 illustrates some of the limitations of the relative threshold. On the y-axis, the 
poverty rate based on the 60% threshold is plotted for 38 countries, where available at 
six moments in the period 1980-2003. The data are drawn from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (lis) and the European Community Household Panel Survey (echp). In total there 
are 150 observations, 63 of which relate to the 11 countries that are the central focus of 
this study45.
The figure shows that relative poverty does indeed correlate strongly with the degree 
of inequality, which is plotted on the x-axis. The correlation coefficient between the Gini 
indicator of inequality and the relative poverty rate is 0.89. This is thus a strong relation, 
but not perfect. For example, the proportion of people below the relative threshold given 
a Gini coefficient of 0.28 is between 10% (Luxembourg 2000) and 19% (Canada 1981); and 
15% relative poverty corresponds with Gini-scores of between 0.24 (Denmark 1994) and 
0.32 (Hungary 1992).
The ceiling effect is also clearly visible in the graph. If income inequality reaches 
higher levels, the poverty rate no longer rises proportionally, and the relationship 
between the two ceases to be linear. The empirical ceiling lies far below the theoretical 
maximum (50%). In Russia, Mexico and Turkey relative poverty is between 25% and 28%, 
which is much lower than would be expected based on the linear relationship of poverty 
and inequality in the other countries.
The relative deprivation indices put forward by Townsend and his followers are less fetishistic 
than the relative income thresholds. These types of indices generally include indicators 
for the ability to meet basic needs such as food and shelter. This increases the validity of 
this criterion, which is also fairly simple to apply in research (though it does require a 
dedicated data collection). The reliability and social credibility are however more ques-
tionable.
First and foremost, the measurement of deprivation is fairly limited. Relative depri-
vation indices are generally constructed on the basis of surveys, and these do not provide 
sufficient scope to include a complete budget, with detailed items for clothing, hous-
ing, social participation, and so on. The researcher thus has to select from the different 
possible necessities, and that selection may not be representative, but may reflect the 
researcher’s own cognitive frame and moral bias.
In addition, when constructing the index, equal weights are often assigned to each 
of the different necessities; yet theoretically it is not self-evident that the inability to pay 
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the electricity bill should weigh as heavily as having to cut back on going out. The index 
also takes no account of household-specific variations. A washing machine may be indis-
pensable for a large family, whereas for a young single person looking for a partner being 
able to visit a bar may be regarded as crucial. There is also a problem with deviating pref-
erences. If there are groups which do not want to have certain things, this influences the 
measured relative deprivation, whereas they may not see themselves as deprived. Exam-
ples include vegetarians who do not wish to eat meat, deaf people who have little use for 
a cd player, strict Protestants who do not want a tv, and older children who no longer 
want to have a birthday party46.
Once the individual items have been combined to form a single index, there is no 
convincing procedure for determining a threshold which separates the poor from the 
non-poor. In the original list compiled by Townsend (1979: 250-251), which contained 
12 items, a score of 5 to 6 was regarded as “highly suggestive of deprivation”. However, it 
is unclear why this should be the case; and this logically implies that the poverty rate is 
heavily dependent on the limit the researcher prefers47.
Finally, comparisons over time or between countries are often problematic using this 
measure. If certain consumer durables were once commonplace but have become out-
of-date (e.g. a record player), non-ownership of those products initially may have been 
indicative of poverty, but has taken on a different meaning over time. Similarly, some 
items have divergent connotations in different countries. It may even be impossible to 
present them to foreign respondents in a meaningful way: Townsend’s ‘cooked break-
fast’ and ‘a Sunday roast joint’, for example, are eminently British concepts.
These shortcomings make objectively established relative deprivation indices vul-
nerable to criticism by other experts, policymakers and citizens. Depending on the deci-
sions taken by the researcher, the percentage of deprived people may fluctuate widely, 
and sometimes rises to implausibly high levels. With a selection of six items, Townsend 
(1979: 252) found that 20% of British households were relatively deprived. For the Neth-
erlands, Berghman et al. (1988: 33), using a comparable index, counted no fewer than 
38% poor households in 1985. The socio-political credibility of such measures tends to 
be limited.
6.4.4 Subjective poverty lines
In the subjective approach the poverty line is not established by researchers or experts, 
but is determined (indirectly) by the respondents themselves. This often takes place via 
surveys. The oldest example of this methodology has been part of the American Gallup 
Poll since 1946, and seeks to ascertain what respondents consider to be the minimum 
cost of living for a standard family48. There are many variations of such absolute, means-
based subjective poverty lines (cell f in table 6.1). The most usual formulation is the Mini-
mum Income Question (miq): “We would like to know which net family income would, in 
your circumstances, be the absolute minimum for you. That is to say, that you would not 
be able to make ends meet if you earned less”. Based on this question, there are several 
ways of arriving at a poverty line. The simplest is purely subjective, by simply comparing 
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the actual income of a survey respondent with the minimum income they consider neces-
sary (see e.g. Vrooman & Hoff, 2004: 27-28; Thijssen & Wildeboer Schut, 2005: 46-48). This 
is also known as the ‘individual method’. An alternative is to take the average amounts 
given in response to the miq for different types of households. These amounts can then 
be regarded as the group-specific poverty lines, hence the term ‘group method’ that is 
sometimes used here.
The subjective poverty line (spl) developed by Dutch researchers goes a step fur-
ther. Here, the thresholds are estimated on the basis of a regression analysis, in which 
the amounts given in response to the miq are related to actual income and household 
composition. Including this latter characteristic means the model automatically delivers 
threshold amounts for different types of household49 (see Goedhart et al., 1977; Kapteyn 
et al., 1985, 1988).
An alternative approach developed at Leyden University uses the Income Evaluation 
Question (ieq) (Van Praag, 1971; Van Praag & Kapteyn, 1973; Goedhart et al., 1977). Here, 
respondents are asked to indicate which income levels they regard as ‘very bad’, ‘bad’ 
‘insufficient’, ‘sufficient’, ‘good’ and ‘very good’. It is then possible to calculate a welfare 
function of income (wfi) for each respondent, which shows the relationship between 
the verbal qualifications and the income amounts cited. Here again, the norm amounts 
for various household types can be derived through a regression analysis50; the resultant 
equivalence scale (see §6.7.2) is however usually much less steep than with the objective 
methods.
A third variant uses the Income Satisfaction Question (isq), in which respondents are 
asked to indicate how they assess their own current income51.
Another absolute means-based method does not use survey questions, but aims to 
develop consensual budget standards (Walker, 1987: 220-225; Middleton, 2000; Bradshaw et 
al., 2008). This involves the ascertainment of a detailed minimum standard budget for 
various household types. Unlike the objective expert method (see below), it is the opin-
ions of citizens that are decisive (Walker, 1987: 222):
What is suggested is a ‘democratisation’ of the budget standard approach …; or, more accu-
rately, a method for developing a budget standard through a process of public participation.
A citizen’s panel first discusses what they consider to be a correct definition of poverty. 
Once consensus has been reached on this, the panel explores which life style various 
types of households should be able to obtain in order not to be classed as poor. If this has 
been agreed upon, the panel members discuss the specific goods and services different 
households should be able to afford at the minimum level. The individual items are then 
priced by the researchers, based on amounts charged in the shops and by the suppliers 
recommended by the panel. This produces a draft minimum budget standard. The panel 
members discuss this and are allowed to make changes. As a final test, they are asked 
to assume that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has examined the list and believes the 
nation cannot afford all these things. The panel are then asked to reconsider the budget 
once more; they may make further changes, but are not required to do so. The final budget 
they decide upon can serve as a poverty line.
Rules of Relief_14.indd   376 21-9-2009   15:09:25
377p o v e r t y
   6
The consensual budget method has to date been used to only a limited extent, in 
research on the island of Jersey, in New Zealand and in Canada. Fisher (2001, 2007) pro-
vides a discussion of the method. In these studies the approach produced fairly spartan 
budgets which could certainly not be described as ‘wish lists’, but which in the eyes of the 
panel members referred to a minimum without any luxuries:
Parents felt that their lists represented an absolute basic minimum, and would have been dev-
astated if this was all their own children had.
In the subjective approach to poverty, too, it is possible, rather than asking about the 
required means, to take the minimum necessary consumption (cell h in table 6.1) as a starting 
point. In American research a simple Minimum Spending Question (msq) sometimes is 
used for this purpose. If people’s actual expenditure is below the level that is considered 
the minimum necessary, they are classed as poor52.
An alternative focuses on consensual necessities, a method developed by Mack & Lansley 
(1985: 42). They attempted
[...] to identify a minimum acceptable way of life not by reference to the views of ‘experts’, nor 
by reference to observed patterns of expenditure or observed living standards, but by refer-
ence to the views of society as a whole.
The consensual standard of living was established by asking respondents in a survey 
how essential they considered about 30 goods and services. In Mack & Lansley’s study, 
items such as having sufficient heating, an indoor toilet, a home that was free from damp 
and three meals per day for children were regarded as a necessity by more than 80% of 
respondents. Things such as having an evening out, having a car and being able to buy 
a pack of cigarettes every other day scored much lower. People were subsequently asked 
whether they themselves had the necessities, and if not whether they had to do without 
them for financial reasons. In the latter case, Mack & Lansley diagnosed an ‘enforced lack 
of socially perceived necessities’, their definition of poverty. Households which had to 
do without three or more of the necessities for financial reasons were regarded by these 
authors as poor – almost 14% of their British sample from 1983. The threshold value was 
underpinned by an empirical argument: in the higher income classes there were virtually 
no households which lacked three or more necessities, and Mack & Lansley concluded 
from this that such a level had to be involuntary. Unlike in Townsend’s approach, this 
poverty line thus has pretensions of being absolute.
Relative subjective criteria are not commonly found in the literature53. There is thus no 
research tradition in which the poverty line is defined on the basis of preferred income 
differentials between social groups. Given the central place accorded in international 
comparative research to the poverty line based on 60% of median income, it is surprising 
that there is no subjective counterpart to this threshold. The income ruler method developed 
by Bunjes et al. (1977) and elaborated by Szirmai (1986) probably provides the best point of 
departure for such a poverty line54.
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Relative approaches are also thin on the ground when it comes to subjective poverty lines 
based on consumption. An example is a variant of the Mack & Lansley’s (1985) method 
discussed above. With the common consensual necessities index (cell d in table 6.1), poverty 
is established by counting the extent to which people for financial reasons do not pos-
sess or consume items that are regarded as essential in their community, and which a 
large majority of that community do have. Adding this latter requirement transforms the 
method into a relative consumption standard. In practice, however, such an approach 
often leads to virtually the same outcomes as the original method put forward by Mack 
& Lansley55.
Assessment of subjective poverty lines
If it is felt that “all ‘objective’ definitions lack credibility, because poverty is a feeling” (Van 
Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004: 316), then subjective poverty lines are the only way of 
measuring poverty in a valid manner. That is not the theoretical starting point here, how-
ever. Following the earlier definition, a person who consistently does not have the means 
to acquire the minimal communal necessities is poor, regardless of whether they con-
sider themselves to be so. Even so, subjective perceptions could perhaps provide good 
approximations of such a state. Unlike the objective relative measures discussed earlier, 
therefore, not all subjective poverty lines are automatically invalid from a theoretical 
perspective. The two ‘exotic’ subjective criteria (the relative minimum on the income 
ruler and the common consensual necessities index) are however rejected because of 
their relative character. The Minimum Spending Question56 and Mack & Lansley’s con-
sensual necessities index57 are also regarded as invalid here on theoretical grounds; they 
are based on consumption and possessions, while it was argued earlier that such criteria 
are less suitable as primary poverty lines (though they can sometimes offer interesting 
supplementary information).
From a theoretical perspective, subjective poverty lines with an absolute, means-
based character (cell f in table 6.1) are in principle the most appropriate. Of these, the 
consensual budget standard method is still rather experimental; only a preliminary eval-
uation can be made58. We will therefore restrict the evaluation here to the ‘mainstream’ 
subjective approaches: the Minimum Income Question/spl, the Income Evaluation 
Question/lpl and the Income Satisfaction Question. In principle, these are all valid rep-
resentations of the definition of poverty postulated here. Whether they can be adopted 
as operational poverty lines depends chiefly on their reliability, ease of application and 
relevance for the socio-political debate.
One advantage of these methods is that they are fairly simple to use, although the ques-
tions do have to be included in surveys – unlike the objective income assessments, they are 
not standard items in all manner of data sets. A further strong point is that in the advanced 
variants (spl and lpl), the equivalence scales do not require arbitrary assumptions by the 
researcher, but can be derived directly from the answers given by respondents.
The reliability of the subjective income approaches is however limited, as the detailed 
overview study by Van den Bosch (2001) reveals. His opinion of the income satisfaction 
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method is particularly negative. He notes that income satisfaction correlates much less 
strongly with actual income than would be expected: even the highest income brackets 
contain a substantial group of people who are dissatisfied. This suggests that satisfac-
tion also depends on the consumption pattern to which people aspire, the financial self-
reliance, and personal circumstances (fixed costs, debts, alimony allowances, etc.). Also 
striking is the asymmetry in the influence of income mutations. Any noticeable increase 
in income satisfaction requires a considerable improvement in real income; but even a 
slight income deterioration results in a sharp reduction in income satisfaction. In addi-
tion, the responses to the isq tend to be much less stable over time than the answers to 
the miq and the ieq. Van den Bosch (2001: 376) concludes from this that this instrument 
is not an adequate criterion for measuring poverty:
In the context of poverty measurement, the income satisfaction method is … clearly unsuit-
able for the determination of income thresholds.
The reliability of the other subjective income methods is equally unconvincing. With the 
Minimum Income Question and the Income Evaluation Question the assumption is that people 
mean the same thing when they say that a certain income is the ‘absolute minimum’, 
‘bad’, ‘sufficient’, etc.; however, this assumption is probably not justified. Research in 
cognitive psychology has shown that people can attach very different meanings to ver-
bal qualifications of income (Stinson, 1997, 1998; Garner et al., 1998). This is particularly 
relevant for the miq and the derived spl. If people are asked at which level of income 
they would not be able to make ends meet, it makes a considerable difference whether 
respondents think of bare survival or the ability to continue their present lifestyle. In 
practice, some people are found to apply the first meaning, others the second. Several 
researchers argue that the ieq and the lpl based on it are more precise than the miq/spl, 
because these take into account more income levels. However, this method can also give 
rise to problems of reliability, as respondents may interpret the contrasting twin con-
cepts in the question differently59.
A second measurement problem is that by no means all respondents are able to 
estimate the required income. Those who run the household finances often have a more 
realistic picture of income and expenditure than the other household members. This 
means that variable measurement errors can arise, depending on who completed the 
questionnaire60.
The results of these methods are moreover anything but stable. In the available time 
series, these subjective thresholds tend to fluctuate considerably from year to year, in 
a way which is not in line with the trend in economic growth, the average income and 
other socioeconomic indicators. As a result, poverty rates may also show large mutations 
over time, often in an apparently capricious way. The measurement problems associ-
ated with these methods only increase in international comparative research61 (Van den 
Bosch, 2001: 98-110, 297).
It may be felt that the credibility of these subjective methods is high because the input is 
not provided by experts. However, this needs to be qualified with the comment that the 
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threshold is ultimately still established by the researcher; unlike the consensual budget 
standard, there is no interaction between the respondents, in which the poverty lines 
are tested intersubjectively. Walker (1987) therefore argues that the best these methods 
have to offer is a ‘consensus by coincidence’; but in truth there is no way of knowing 
whether the participants in the survey agree with the threshold amounts established by 
the researchers.
A more important credibility problem is that these methods can sometimes lead to 
very high poverty rates in fairly prosperous countries, as was the case with the relative 
deprivation index. The literature survey compiled by Van den Bosch (2001: 157-158) for the 
period 1975-1992 shows that poverty rates in countries such as France, Greece, Ireland 
and the United States according to these criteria62 can rise above 40%. Strengmann-Kuhn 
(2004: 23) found that applying the spl method to the 2001 wave of the echp generated 
poverty incidences of around 18% for the Netherlands and Belgium, 30% for France, 47% 
for Spain and 75% or more for Italy, Greece and Portugal. Not surprisingly, such high per-
centages are not regarded as credible by the public and policymakers in these countries.
6.4.5 Objective absolute poverty lines
Objective absolute thresholds have a long tradition. The first studies of poverty which 
were carried out in England in around 1900 took basic human needs as their starting 
point. These were generally limited to the purely physical necessities, such as food, cloth-
ing and shelter63 (Seebohm Rowntree, 1901; Booth, 1902 [1889]). In this tradition, house-
holds are regarded as poor if their income is insufficient to cover the minimal necessary 
expenditure for those needs. In the case of food, for example, the cheapest possible food 
basket is put together which provides the required number of calories.
Theoretically, a broader definition of needs or necessities can be used (cf. Doyal & 
Gough, 1991)64. Gradations are therefore sometimes used with these kinds of poverty 
line; see e.g. Sarlo (2001)65. Modern empirical research often uses detailed expert budget 
standards (cell e in table 6.1), which have been developed for many countries over the last 
decades (cf. Fisher, 2007). The British study edited by Bradshaw (1993) has been a particular 
source of inspiration here. In this approach, the researcher first draws up a detailed list 
of the goods and services he regards as the minimum necessary66. This list includes what 
different types of households need to eat and to heat the home, and what level of rent 
they have to pay for an acceptable home, but also includes things like how many winter 
coats and how much underwear people need, what constitutes an acceptable inventory 
for the home (furniture, carpets and curtains, linen, kitchen equipment), how often peo-
ple have to wash clothing, how many insurance premiums and local taxes people have to 
pay from their income, what they have to spend on memberships, subscriptions, trans-
port and recreation, etc. A realistic price is then assigned to each of these items, and an 
estimate is made of the quantity a person needs in normal usage. If it is relevant, allow-
ance is also made for the expected life of the item: if a winter coat normally lasts two 
years, half the purchase price is included each year. By adding up the annual monetary 
value of all items, standard budgets are constructed for different types of households. If 
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the net disposable income is lower than this standard budget, the household is classed 
as poor. It makes no difference here whether households actually consume the different 
budget elements in this way: in the expert budget method, the measurement of poverty 
usually is means-based.
Less common are objective absolute thresholds which are based on consumption and 
possession (cell g in table 6.1). A first option is to look at the proportion of total house-
hold income which is spent on food. Such a food ratio poverty threshold starts from the 
observation that the higher the income, the smaller the share of food in total household 
expenditure (‘Engel’s Law’). If a high proportion of income is spent on food – 30-35% 
is a common norm – this therefore can be regarded as indicative for poverty. Another 
option is to look at the share of household income taken by fixed costs; these are regular 
expenses that cannot be avoided, because they ensue from contractual obligations (e.g. 
rent, water and energy) or government regulations (e.g. co-payments for care provisions, 
local taxes). A high proportion of fixed costs leaves little room for other expenditure 
(food, replacement of furniture), and reduces the ability to cope with financial setbacks. 
Finally, in the total expenditure approach, a person is considered poor if they spend more 
than they receive, or in other words if they have to get into debt or use up their savings in 
order to make ends meet.
Assessment of objective absolute poverty lines
Here again, poverty lines based on actual consumption and possession can be regarded 
as an invalid translation of the theoretical definition of poverty discussed earlier. The 
approaches based on food ratios, fixed costs and total expenditure moreover suffer from 
a number of reliability problems67.
The expert budget standards method does however adequately meet the theoretical defi-
nition of poverty. It makes explicit what the minimal communal necessities are and is 
therefore not fetishistic. This also makes it possible to apply gradations to the poverty 
criterion, for example a subsistence level for the homeless, a basic minimum amount 
that is needed in order to run an independent household, or a threshold which makes 
possible social participation and recreation on a wide scale. Moreover, taking the avail-
able resources as a basis implies the focus is on the spending possibilities, rather than the 
actual consumption and possession of goods and services. This largely circumvents the 
issue of preferences, which is often difficult to resolve with consumption-based poverty 
lines. Within the theoretical framework adopted here, therefore, this method is valid.
The social and policy relevance of these types of threshold will also be fairly high. 
They are in line with the notions on poverty among the public as discussed earlier, and the 
detailed nature of the individual budget items lends them a high degree of credibility.
But is the method reliable? One objection that is often levelled at the expert budget stand-
ards approach is that the researcher by definition determines the standard. Scientific 
standards exist for only for a few of the budget components (mainly food and housing) 
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– e.g. minimum standards for a healthy diet – and even those often are debatable. As a 
result, this ‘objective’ method can still be normatively tainted: arbitrary perceptions and 
preferences of the experts involved may influence the number of poor people detected 
using this method.
This can happen because the researcher is highly educated and has a relatively high 
income (so may take their own needs as an implicit criterion), because of the researcher’s 
possible ideological bias (wanting to help the poor or to fight injustice), or because of 
the researcher’s own interests (scientific status, wanting to secure research funding). In 
practice, however, the detailed nature and transparency of the method constrain this 
discretionary scope somewhat. Unlike the relative deprivation index or the consensual 
necessities index, for example, this method involves a complete consumption basket, not 
a limited selection of goods and possessions the absence of which is considered by the 
researcher to be indicative of poverty. For each item, the researcher should argue why it 
has to be included in the budget standard in a specific way. If he is conscientious, he will 
use verifiable decision rules, information on the actual spending patterns of households 
and the opinions of other budget experts (fellow scientists, social services employees, 
debt counsellors). It is also possible to have the expert budgets tested by the public, via 
surveys or by the development of consensual budget standards. This can help keep the 
influence of researcher bias within bounds.
Adaptivity of the standard is a bigger risk. In practice, budget standards may tend 
to correlate with the applicable minimum benefits amounts. If benefit levels in a given 
country are greatly reduced or increased, people at the bottom of the distribution will 
adapt their spending pattern accordingly, and this can eventually work through into the 
standard. It is therefore possible that using this method ultimately produces low and 
fairly stable poverty rates. Sarlo (2001: 35), for example, discusses the results obtained by 
a ‘basic needs’ budget approach, and concludes that
[Poverty in Canada] has not fallen for about the past 20 years. Despite a huge increase in social 
spending since the 1980s, the poverty rate […] has apparently settled on a plateau.
It is however not certain that the adaptivity problem will by definition occur.
In terms of applicability, the expert budget method has a number of advantages. The pov-
erty lines for different types of household (compare the discussion of equivalence scales 
in §6.7.2) are not determined on theoretical grounds, but emerge automatically from 
the ratios between the established budgets. The method is transparent and flexible: the 
items in the standard are clearly described, and product innovations, price and volume 
changes, and increases in national prosperity can in principle be easily incorporated. For 
example, if rents go up because of housing shortages, the threshold moves to a higher 
level and the proportion of rent in the budget increases. The same thing happens if qual-
ity improvements that are generally regarded as necessary (separate bedrooms for the 
children, a bath instead of a shower) push up the rent. If incomes do not keep pace with 
rent increases (after allowing for housing benefit), this will lead to higher poverty rates. 
In such cases, the underlying causes of the poverty trend can thus be easily identified.
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Yet there are also major problems of applicability. Since the available goods and 
services, prices and spending patterns are constantly changing, the budget standards are 
never finished. This implies that the poverty line is continually moving, in a sometimes 
erratic way, which may complicate the analysis of time series; in addition, keeping the 
standards up to date requires a good deal of work. As a result of their labour-intensive 
nature, detailed budget standards are generally drawn up for only a limited number of 
household types, with little differentiation by age, income group, health impairments, 
region and ethnic origin. If a reference budget is not available for every household, it 
becomes difficult to establish generic poverty thresholds. Application of the method in 
international comparisons is even more complicated. Not all countries have developed 
detailed budget standards, and where they are available, methodological differences 
often imply that they cannot be used directly for comparative analyses68.
6.5 A generalised budget approach
No single poverty line emerges from the overview of operational poverty lines which can 
be regarded as suitable on the grounds of the criteria formulated earlier. Relative poverty 
lines are not valid within the theoretical framework employed here. Even if one were pre-
pared to ignore this, there are serious complications with the two most commonly used 
methods, namely 60% of median income and the relative deprivation index, as regards 
their reliability and normative credibility. Subjective poverty lines may be valid, but also 
suffer from measurement problems and regularly generate implausibly high or unstable 
poverty rates. Although the subjective evaluation of income and spending capacity may 
generate interesting supplementary information (cf. Vrooman & Hoff, 2004), it provides 
too weak a foundation to serve as a primary poverty threshold.
Expert-budget standards fit in well with the theoretical definition of poverty pro-
posed here. They are moreover recognisable for the public and policymakers and, if prop-
erly implemented, fairly reliable. They are however also very labour-intensive, often lead-
ing to a limited differentiation of household types. This makes this method less suitable 
for use in practical research, especially in country comparative analyses of poverty.
This creates a need to search for a poverty line which retains the theoretical and practi-
cal advantages of the expert budget method but which is easier to apply. The ‘general-
ised budget approach’ developed by The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp 
(Vrooman & Snel, 1999; Vrooman, 2000; Soede, 2006; Soede & Vrooman, 2007, 2008b) is 
an example of such a criterion. Here, two detailed minimum budgets are first determined 
for a single reference household in a given starting year. Using an empirical equivalence 
scale, this is then generalised to an initial poverty line for all household types. A histori-
cal series of threshold amounts is subsequently obtained by applying a dedicated index 
to the initial norms.
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6.5.1 Reference budgets for a single person
The initial level of the poverty line was determined by The Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research | scp on the basis of the budgets drawn up by the Dutch National Institute for 
Budgetary Information (Nibud). Each year, Nibud publishes highly detailed budgets for 
a number of household types, in which minimum norm amounts are set for all kinds 
of expenditure items. These norms are based on the opinions of experts (e.g. on the 
required quantity and quality of food), the availability of goods and services, and actual 
consumption patterns at the bottom end of the income distribution. The method used by 
Nibud rests on years of experience and detailed knowledge of the actual expenses faced 
by households. The Nibud budgets are also used by municipal social services, lenders, 
debt support organisations, etc.
Based on the detailed budgetary data provided by Nibud, two reference budgets were 
compiled for a Dutch person living alone69 (table 6.2). The first variant, the basic needs cri-
terion, was based on the expenses that can be regarded as the minimum necessary in the 
Netherlands. These include costs that are difficult to avoid for things such as food, cloth-
ing, housing (including rent, insurance, energy, water, telephone, furnishings, home 
maintenance and local taxes) and a number of other expenses (transport, extra medical 
expenses, personal care, washing detergents, etc.). For food, the diets published by The 
Netherlands Nutrition Centre (Voedingscentrum) were used; for clothing purchases, the 
minimum norm was drawn from the ‘NtexB study’ of clothing purchases. The calculation 
of housing costs was based on the minimum costs for a rented two-bedroom flat. It was 
assumed that a household is privately insured for medical expenses through a shared con-
tract (e.g. through one’s employer), and that the premium has been deducted from dispos-
able income. As a result, only out-of-pocket medical expenses not covered by the insurance 
were included in the budget. Fire and theft insurance and funeral insurance were deemed 
to be necessary, and the contributions due have therefore also been incorporated. The 
amount for transport costs is based on one national multi-journey bus and tram ticket 
(strippenkaart) per month, plus the maintenance and depreciation costs of a bicycle.
The total threshold amount obtained on the basis of these norms covers a minimal, 
but complete package of expenditure items. As long as no exceptional costs occur which 
are not reimbursed by the government or insurance companies, the budget is in principle 
sufficient to run an independent household without incurring debts or becoming depend-
ent on charity (e.g. church social welfare, Food Banks). In order to attain this standard of 
living, a single person in 2000 needed a total of eur 667 per month, as table 6.2 shows. If 
their disposable income is lower than this, they will very probably have too little money 
in the Dutch context to make ends meet. They can accordingly be described as poor.
The basic needs criterion includes the most necessary expenditure items, but no extras, 
such as the costs of social participation. The second variant does allow some scope for 
this. Modest amounts have been earmarked for recreation, membership of a library, 
sports or hobby club, subscription to a newspaper and magazine, and a pet. The selected 
items correspond almost exactly with one of the ‘residual packages’ used in the model 
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Table 6.2 
Reference budgets and poverty lines by family type (monthly amounts in euros, 2000)
   
   Single  Single parent Couple  Couple with children
  Number of adults 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
  Number of children  0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4
  Budget items         
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 142        
Clothing, shoes    32        
Rent    216        
Gas/fuel   30        
Electricity   22        
Water    7        
Local taxes   24        
Telephone    21        
Various insurances (excluding health care) 23        
Furniture, maintenance house 69        
Transport    9        
Uncovered medical expenses  11        
Other    61        
Total = basic needs reference budget 667        
Recreation       37        
Public library    2        
Newspaper and magazine  23        
Sport/hobby club    9        
Pet     20        
Total = modest but adequate reference budget 758        
  Basic needs poverty line         
- with Dutch equivalence scale 667 888 1008 1175 914 1115 1255 1375 1522
  (Statistics Netherlands)
- with alternative equivalence scale a 667 934 1157 1354 1012 1225 1415 1590 1753
  Modest but adequate poverty line         
- with Dutch equivalence scale  758 1007 1144 1333 1038 1265 1424 1560 1727
  (Statistics Netherlands) 
- with alternative equivalence scale a 758 1060 1313 1536 1148 1390 1606 1805 1990
a.  Cf. §6.7.2. 
Sources: Soede (2006); Soede & Vrooman (2007, 2008b)
minimum budgets drawn up by Nibud (2006: 50). This modest but adequate reference budget 
includes expenses which strictly speaking exceed that which is unavoidable, but there 
is no question of luxury, such as a car or foreign holidays. For a single person, the total 
amount needed to maintain such a lifestyle in 2000 was eur 758 per month.
6.5.2 Initial poverty lines
The initial poverty lines were subsequently determined by applying equivalence factors 
to non-single households; these indicate how much more on average, say, a couple with 
two children of a certain age spend than a single person. The additional expenditure 
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items include extra food and housing costs, but also non-reimbursed school and study 
fees for children living at home, etc. The equivalence scale for various household types 
was established empirically by Statistics Netherlands (cbs) by applying the ‘budget dis-
tribution method’ to data from the Dutch Household Budget Survey. With this method, 
it is first determined what proportion of each expenditure item can be attributed to the 
individual family members. The additional costs of extra adults and children are then 
determined using regression analysis; and from this for each type of household ratios to 
a single person are derived which represent comparable levels of welfare (Siermann et al., 
2004). Table 6.2 shows the norm amounts thus obtained for a number of typical house-
hold types. It also includes the amounts resulting from an alternative equivalence scale; 
this is somewhat steeper and will be discussed below.
6.5.3 The indexation method
For comparisons over time, it would be possible to use the updated norm amounts pub-
lished by Nibud on an annual basis. However, this method can lead to complications if the 
expert judgment on what is minimally necessary changes markedly over the years, and if 
the norm amounts consequently have to be adapted. For example, if Nibud in a given year 
includes a mobile telephone or Internet connection in the minimum household budget, 
making the basic basket of goods and services more expensive in real terms, this may have 
saltatorial effects on measured poverty. In order to avoid this, it is preferable to determine 
the year-on-year evolution of the threshold amounts using a theoretically substantiated 
indexation of the initial levels. The precise content of the basket of goods and services can 
then be reviewed at greater time intervals (for example every five or ten years).
In order to be able to map out the development of poverty in the Netherlands 
over time, the norm amounts from 2000 were indexed using a method recommended 
by the National Academy of Sciences (nas) in a report to the us government (Citro & 
Michael, 1995)70. The Academy suggested that the poverty line be linked to changes in 
median expenditure on the basic items food and drink (excluding alcohol), clothing and 
housing. It was anticipated that this would cause the threshold amounts to rise faster 
than inflation, but more slowly than a completely relative threshold; the indexation 
was supposed to be ‘quasi-relative’. This is because, with rising incomes and unchanged 
 preferences, people generally spend a declining share of their income on food, clothing 
and housing. The threshold thus reflects growing prosperity, though not completely.
In line with the nas recommendations, the indexation was based on the three-year 
moving average in median expenditure on the basic items. The mutation in the index for 
2000 thus reflects the development of real median expenditure in the period 1998-2000. 
One advantage of this is that the threshold amounts are less sensitive to sample fluctua-
tions and the economic cycle. In addition, the poverty line adapts with a certain time lag 
to changes in actual spending patterns – just as the social perception of the minimum 
necessary generally typically reacts with some delay to socioeconomic developments. 
The index was calculated on the basis of the median expenditure on housing, clothing 
and food (excluding alcohol) from the Dutch Household Budget Survey. In the period 
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1990-2000, that expenditure rose by 10% in constant prices, exactly equal to the real 
increase in the model minimum budgets published by Nibud for those years (cf. Soede, 
2006: 53). The changes experts perceive in the budget standard are thus well replicated via 
the indexation mechanism.
This combination of:
– meaningful initial levels for the reference household in an initial year,
– the derivation of the norm amounts for other household types via equivalence fac-
tors,
– and a quasi-relative, delayed indexation based on actual expenditure trends on the 
basic items
could be described as a ‘generalised budget approach’. This retains the conceptual advan-
tages of the expert budget method. The poverty line is not fetishistic and reflects the 
absolute character of poverty; the current necessities have been specified in the reference 
budget, and whether or not people are poor does not depend directly on the circum-
stances of others. As with poverty lines based on the expert budget method, it focuses 
on people’s consumption possibilities rather than their actual consumption. For these 
reasons, this method can be regarded as a valid operational translation of the theoretical 
poverty definition.
However, this method is much less labour-intensive than the traditional expert 
budget method, and can therefore be applied more easily in the practice of research. The 
norms are fairly simple to calculate for each year and each household type. The threshold 
amounts do not depend on the verbal qualifications assigned to income by respondents 
in a survey, so that the method does not suffer from the reliability problems of the subjec-
tive poverty lines.
The threshold is probably also normatively credible and transparent for policymak-
ers and the general public. The two variants appear to fit in with the poverty notions 
of the Dutch population as outlined earlier. The ‘basic needs’ variant can be seen as a 
good elaboration of the most common subjective definition of poverty. The ‘modest but 
adequate’ variant turns out slightly higher. Together, the two criteria probably provide a 
plausible bandwidth for the degree to which the theoretical notion of poverty applies to 
the actual living conditions of the population.
6.5.4 Outcomes of the generalised budget approach in the Netherlands
Figure 6.2 provides some insight into the results obtained using this method. It shows 
the trend in the norm amounts and poverty rates over the period 1985-2005. The degree 
of poverty has been assessed via the Dutch Income Panel Study (ipo), a large database 
(approx. 245,000 individuals in 85,000 households) built from administrative data held 
by the Dutch tax authorities, the population register and various benefits agencies. For 
comparison, the trends based on the relative 60%-median criterion and the Dutch low-
income threshold (cf. Vrooman & Hoff, 2004) are also shown. The latter is based on the 
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minimum social assistance level for a single person in 1979, adjusted for price inflation; 
norm amounts for the other households have been derived by applying cbs equivalence 
factors.
Because all poverty lines in the graph are in constant prices, and the low-income thresh-
old is indexed to price inflation, the norm amount for this criterion remains constant 
and appears as a horizontal line. Median income in the Netherlands rose between 1985 
and 2005 by roughly a third in real terms, and the relative income threshold level there-
fore shows the same increase. The norm for the two variants of the generalised budget 
approach rises in line with collective prosperity, but does not fully keep pace. Over the 
period as a whole, this amount rises by around a sixth (+17%) in real terms; a quasi-rela-
tive development, as expected.
According to the low-income threshold, the poverty rates trend downwards over the 
period; in 1985, one in five people were poor, while by 2005 this has reduced to 9%. This is 
mainly because his threshold is indexed only to price inflation, whereas the level of pros-
perity rose more strongly in the period concerned. Measured against the relative poverty 
line, the poverty incidence rises sharply in the period 1985 of 1990, from just over 4% to 
9%. It then remains rather stable at 10%, with minor fluctuations. This is in line with the 
evolution of income inequality in the same period: the Gini coefficient rose in the Neth-
erlands between 1985 and 1991, after which it remained fairly constant (Pommer et al., 
2003: 48; Vrooman et al., 2007b: 129).
The poverty rate measured using the ‘basic needs’ and the ‘modest but adequate’ var-
iant is lower in virtually all years than that measured using the other two poverty lines. In 
1985 the gap compared with low incomes is very wide (14-17 percentage points), but this 
difference reduces steadily over time. Since the poverty line partially follows the welfare 
trend, the poverty rate does not show a structurally downward trend. Apart from this, 
the mutations often move in the same direction as with the low-income threshold, with 
peaks around the economically weak years 1994 and 2003/2004. The incidences according 
to the relative poverty line, on the other hand, are not sensitive to the fluctuations in the 
economic cycle.
Evidently, the poverty rates generated by the basic needs criterion are consistently 
lower than according to the modest but adequate variant. The trends are broadly similar, 
with the exception of the period 1995-2000, when the poverty rate based on the basic needs 
criterion was virtually stable, while according to the modest but adequate variant it fell.
This suggests that those on the very lowest incomes benefited less during that period 
from the economic upturn than those with a slightly higher income. In addition, it turns 
out that the composition of the poor population can be readily interpreted in all years, 
though it is striking that the weight of the working poor in the total increases over time 
(cf. Soede, 2006; Vrooman et al., 2007b).
All in all, the generalised budget approach seems to offer a plausible picture of the actual 
evolution of poverty in the Netherlands. In this way, a good insight is obtained into the 
size and composition of the group whose income is almost certainly inadequate accord-
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ing to current Dutch standards. The trend found is more plausible than the structurally 
falling poverty rates based on the low-income threshold, or the very even picture sug-
gested by the relative approach. The levels are low, but this is not unexpected in a fairly 
prosperous country with a rather equal income distribution. It is however not the case 
that this method defines the poverty problem out of existence: according to the lowest 
variant, the basic needs criterion, 560,000 people were qualified as poor in 2005; that is 
one in 25 Dutch citizens, and more than 30 times as high as the client base of the Dutch 
food banks (approx. 8,000 households in February 2006). Based on the higher ‘modest 
but adequate’ variant, still one in 16 inhabitants of the Netherlands qualified as poor.
In the remaining part of this chapter, these two thresholds will be used to test a number 
of hypotheses concerning the impact of regime types on poverty rates. In principle, the 
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method can also be applied in other countries and in international comparative research. 
The royal road would be to determine the initial threshold amounts for the reference 
household in other countries, too, in accordance with the Nibud methodology; and then 
to apply suitable national equivalence scales and a similar country-specific indexation 
mechanism to these. A simple approximation of this can be obtained by translating the 
Dutch norm amounts to other countries using purchasing power parities, and by apply-
ing the same equivalence scale in all countries.  For country comparisons over time, the 
indexation perhaps could be based on expenditure data from the National Accounts. A 
single-year example of such an approach will be given later in this chapter. First, how-
ever, it is important to specify the research questions for this empirical cross-compara-
tive analysis.
6.6 The theoretical relationship between regime types and poverty
The introduction to this chapter gave a brief outline of the different strategies followed in 
the social-democratic, liberal and corporatist social security regimes to combat poverty. 
In the first regime type the emphasis is on de-commodification. According to the social-
democratic approach, the best way of tackling poverty is to give all residents an entitlement 
to a guaranteed minimum living standard, regardless of their present or former position 
on the labour market. In order to finance this, it is desirable that as many people as possible 
should be active on the labour market: this increases the tax proceeds and the revenue 
from social insurance contributions, and reduces the costs of benefit  dependency.
The liberal strategy is based on the idea of individual responsibility within a market 
setting. People are expected as far as possible to generate their own present income and 
their desired future income security (e.g. on retirement) via private arrangements. There 
is only a limited collective safety net, in the form of a sparse social assistance scheme 
which is subject to strict conditions and may be limited in duration. Since the govern-
ment extracts less money from private households and businesses, more remains for 
consumption and investments. This is supposed to increase the national wealth and jobs 
growth; and such collective gains will ultimately trickle down to people at the bottom of 
the income distribution, thus reducing the level of poverty.
The corporatist regime type emphasises the income continuity of the traditional 
wage earner. Provided people have an adequate employment history, their loss of income 
in the event of unemployment, retirement or sickness is limited. When these eventu-
alities occur, these insiders can claim high wage-related social insurance benefits. The 
poverty risk mainly affects outsiders: people who are not or insufficiently covered by the 
elaborate social insurance schemes. This concerns especially those who have never held 
a job, who perform low-paid work or who have a short or interrupted employment career 
(and their dependent relatives). As long as the number of outsiders remains limited, the 
strategy of the corporatist regime can theoretically also offer a successful means of com-
bating poverty.
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Based on these model strategies, it is not possible to say in advance which regime type 
will in theory generate the least poverty. The wide protection that is the aim of the social-
democratic and corporatist strategies may at first sight offer the best recipe for combat-
ing poverty, but there is no logically compelling reason for this assumption. It is also con-
ceivable that such comprehensive systems will lead to adverse and unintended economic 
effects, so that they ultimately produce more poverty (less collective prosperity, destruc-
tion of jobs, lower disposable incomes, poverty traps). This is the familiar essence of the 
neoclassical thesis of the negative impact of the welfare state on the economic process 
(see chapter 3.6.3). In fact, the strategy of each regime type can for various reasons lay a 
theoretical claim to the lowest ‘poverty production’.
The actual institutional structure in the countries concerned may offer more clues for 
hypothesising about the relationship between regime type and poverty than the model 
strategies. On the basis of the scaling procedure it was concluded in chapter 4 that, based 
on the actual institutional differences, the three regime types can be interpreted in terms 
of two dimensions (figure 4.1): the scope of social security (residual/ extensive) and the 
degree of particularism or universalism. The liberal regime type is residual; the corpo-
ratist type is extensive and particularistic; and the social-democratic system is extensive 
and universalistic. In Hempel’s (1966) terms, these dimensions can be regarded as an 
interpreted variant of the theoretical regime construct. The country scores on the two 
dimensions (figure 4.2) can then be understood as the observed manifestations of the 
theoretical regime concept, interpreted in terms of divergent formal institutions. Does 
this ‘operational classification’ of countries provide any leads about the empirical rela-
tionship of regime types and poverty that is to be expected?
In contrast to their postulated influence on benefit production (cf. §5.1), it may be 
assumed that the two underlying dimensions of the social security regimes theoreti-
cally reinforce each other in their impact on poverty. A wide scope on the first dimension 
means among other things relatively high benefits, of longer duration and with relatively 
little means-testing. On the second dimension, a universalistic regime implies wide cov-
erage, entitlements that are not linked to the employment history, a social assistance 
scheme which serves as a fully fledged safety net, and many incentives to work, thus fos-
tering the economic independence of all citizens. These factors may all be assumed to 
reduce the risk of poverty.
The risk of poverty is therefore likely to be lowest in the social-democratic regime 
type, as the countries in this cluster combine wide scope with a universalistic structure 
(see figure 4.2). The Netherlands would be expected to follow at a short distance, because 
this hybrid regime is slightly less extensive and universalistic. However, the positioning of 
the representatives of the corporatist and liberal regimes is less clear. The expected pov-
erty risk associated with these regime types depends on the relative weight one assigns to 
the two dimensions. If they weigh equally heavily, the ‘institutionally determined’ pov-
erty risk of the corporatist and liberal countries is more or less comparable. The repre-
sentatives of the corporatist systems are then likely to generate less poverty because of 
their broader scope, but this is cancelled out by their less universal design. By contrast, if 
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the first dimension weighs more heavily than the second, the poverty risk would in theory 
be smaller in the corporatist countries than the liberal states71. It is therefore not possible 
to derive an unambiguous theoretical expectation from the scores on the two dimensions 
concerning the ranking of the ‘institutional’ poverty risk in all countries studied here.
There are a number of other reasons why the country scores on the two dimensions are 
less suitable as a basis for deriving theoretical expectations about the extent of poverty 
in the different regime types. A first problem is that the individual regime characteristics 
in the earlier categorical principle component analysis (CatPCA) were not scaled by their 
theoretical significance for the extent of poverty, but purely on the grounds of empirical 
correlations. Theoretically, it may for example appear plausible that the risk of poverty 
for people who are not able to work reduces if their benefits are higher and the admission 
criteria for receiving benefit less stringent. Yet figure 4.1 makes clear that such poverty-
reducing regime characteristics can in practice sometimes show a negative correlation. 
Thus, countries with generous benefits for occupational disability (risque professionnel) often 
put up high barriers for actual take-up, for instance in the form of a minimally required 
degree of incapacity. From the perspective of the institutional poverty risk as theoretically 
intended, the scores on the empirical dimensions are thus not by definition optimal.
Another issue is that the relative importance of social security arrangements for the 
risk of poverty was not made explicit in the earlier analysis. It is for example logical that 
differences in retirement pension are more important for the poverty risk generated by 
the different regime types than the various arrangements for parental leave for employ-
ees; the potential target group for retirement pensions is bigger, pension benefits are 
generally utilised for a longer period, and they account for a larger proportion of the total 
income of the households concerned. However, figure 4.1 shows that the level of mater-
nity benefit, for example, weighs of more heavily on the first dimension of the CatPCA (it 
has a higher component loading) than the minimum level of collective retirement pen-
sions for non-employees and the gross replacement rates for earnings-related occupa-
tional pensions. This does not appear to reflect the theoretical weight of these provisions 
for combating of poverty adequately.
A final point is more practical in nature. The regime typology in chapter 4 represents 
the situation in around 1990, whereas here poverty will be analysed for the same coun-
tries in around the year 2000. It is desirable to base the theoretical expectation on the 
relationship between regime types and poverty rates on more recent traits of the formal 
social security institutions in the 11 countries concerned.
For this reason, an ‘institutional poverty risk index’ (ipri) was developed which seeks to 
accommodate these objections, by analogy with the ‘benefit dependency boost index’ 
from the previous chapter. The index is based on around 50 characteristics of social 
assistance, old age pensions and benefit schemes for the unemployed, disabled, sur-
viving dependants and the costs of children. The underlying data relate to the same 11 
countries as in chapter 4, but this time for the situation in around the year 2000. This is 
explicitly an institutional index: it seeks to give an indication of the theoretical poverty 
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risks that may be expected on the basis of the formal social security institutions, assum-
ing that the other circumstances (national prosperity72, demographic conditions, and so 
on) remain the same. The details of the construction of the ipri are given in Annex 1. 
Figure 6.3 shows the index scores for the countries studied according to the regime type 
to which they belong. Generally speaking, these are negatively related to the scores on 
the benefit dependency boost index depicted in figure 5.1 (a high poverty risk tends to 
be associated with a limited boosting of benefit dependency, and vice versa), though the 
statistical correlation is not perfect (r = -0.81, excluding Norway).
The index values suggest that the poverty risk based on institutional characteristics 
is theoretically greatest in the liberal regimes, with an average score of 0.77. There is 
however some dispersion within this regime type. The institutional poverty risk index 
is far and away the highest in the usa; the social security arrangements in this country 
generate the highest poverty risks with respect to pensions, social assistance, disability 
benefits and family benefits. The usa comes in second place for unemployment benefits, 
and achieves a lower (and therefore more favourable) score only on survivor’s benefits. 
In Australia the poverty risk is a bit less, mainly because collective pensions and family 
benefits are wider in scope than in the us, even though they are means-tested. The United 
Kingdom has a substantially lower index value. This country scores second for pensions 
and disability benefits, but this is offset by lower contributions to the poverty risk from 
social assistance, survivor’s benefits and family benefits. Based on the formal institu-
tions, Canada theoretically generates the lowest poverty risk of the liberal countries. It 
achieves a fairly reasonable score (from 6th to 9th place) for disability benefit, survivor’s 
benefits and social assistance, but does worse (second and third places) on unemploy-
ment and family benefits.
The countries with a corporatist regime occupy a middle position; their average 
ipri-score (-0.05) is slightly below the general average (zero). The differentiation within 
this regime type is low: theoretically the poverty risk in Belgium and Germany is slightly 
lower than in France. The latter country has the best pension provisions of the corpo-
ratist group; it attains the 8th place in the ranking. This is due to the fairly high replace-
ment rates for the lower incomes in old age, wage indexation of first pillar pensions and a 
relatively short build-up period; these are mitigated by the absence of separate collective 
pension entitlements for people without an employment history. Nonetheless, France 
ends up higher on the ipri then the other two corporatist countries because of the higher 
poverty risk generated by social assistance and survivor’s benefits.
Belgium has the poorest pension provision within the corporatist group (the second 
highest poverty risk of all countries). This is mainly due to the poor provisions for people 
who never held a job, the limited indexation mechanism (price inflation only), and the 
long period required to build up a full standard pension (42 years). On the other hand, 
Belgium compensates for this with fairly good scores on unemployment benefits, social 
assistance, family benefits and survivor’s benefits. In Germany the protection via pen-
sions is moderate, mainly because of the low net replacement rates at minimum level 
and the lack of collective entitlements for people who never worked. The country also 
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achieves a low score for disability benefit, due to the limited coverage of the risque social. 
This is offset to some extent by reasonable scores for social assistance and by the fact that 
family benefits in Germany carry the lowest poverty risk of all countries studied.
The poverty risk theoretically generated by the formal rules is lowest in Denmark 
(-1.01) and the Netherlands (-0.99). Sweden and Norway score slightly higher on the 
index, but are still well below the general average. Across all social-democratic countries 
together the poverty risk score (-0.59) is considerably lower than in the corporatist group. 
 Denmark achieves a low score on all constituent indices (ranging from 8th to 11th place), 
with the exception of survivor’s benefits, for which the country has no separate scheme. 
Sweden also scores high on the latter aspect; it ends up above Denmark on the total index 
because of the moderate poverty risk generated by old age pensions, family benefits and 
social assistance. The theoretical poverty risk for unemployment and disability benefits 
is by contrast very low in Sweden (10th and 11th place, respectively). Norway offers good 
protection against poverty via pensions (10th place on the risk index) and also achieves a 
reasonable score for disability benefits (7th place), but generates a higher poverty risk on 
the other arrangements (3rd to 5th place).
The low poverty risk generated by the hybrid Dutch social security regime is due 
mainly to the low score on old age pensions (11th place), which weigh heaviest in the total 
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index. Compared to Denmark, the Dutch pension schemes offers higher replacement 
rates, has slightly broader coverage for people without an employment history, and both 
first and second pillar pensions are indexed by the evolution of wages. Unlike Sweden 
and Denmark, the Netherlands moreover has an extensive collective survivor’s insurance 
system by international standards. The other schemes also theoretically generate little 
poverty in the Netherlands (8th to 9th place), with the exception of family benefits (5th 
place), which are much lower than in the neighbouring corporatist countries.
Set against the typology presented in chapter 4, the ranking on the institutional pov-
erty risk index (ipri) corresponds quite closely with the ranking on the scope dimension. 
Apart from the difference in sign (a country with a wide scope generally has a low poverty 
risk and vice versa), however, there are also a number of salient differences:
– the corporatist regime type is a more average category according to the ipri. Whereas 
these countries are fairly extensive on the scope dimension (and consequently tend 
towards the social-democratic group), on the index they fall almost precisely between 
the social-democratic and liberal groups, at around the origin. Furthermore, in the 
corporatist group, the differences on the ipri (maximum 0.16) are much smaller than 
on the scope dimension (0.38). The ranking is also slightly different: Germany has the 
widest scope, but Belgium has the lowest institutionally determined poverty risk;
– within the social-democratic group the country with the broadest scope overall, Swe-
den, occupies a much more central position on the ipri (third from bottom). Norway 
also moves to a more central position. Denmark achieves roughly the same score on 
both indicators and theoretically has the lowest institutional poverty risk, closely fol-
lowed by the Netherlands, which occupies a much more peripheral position on the 
ipri (second from bottom) than on the scope dimension;
– in the liberal group, the usa has a similar ranking overall, but it occupies a less periph-
eral position on the ipri than on the scope dimension. As a result, the gap relative to 
Australia and Great Britain becomes smaller, but the distance compared with Canada 
increases. In terms of the poverty risk that its institutions theoretically generate, the 
latter country is far more central than on the scope dimension.
Based on the average scores on the ipri, three simple hypotheses on the relationship 
between regime types and the extent of poverty can now be formulated:
(1) In countries with a liberal social security regime, poverty is higher than in countries with a 
regime of the corporatist type;
(2)  In countries with a corporatist social security regime, poverty is higher than in countries 
with a regime of the social-democratic type;
(3)  In countries with a social-democratic social security regime, poverty is higher than in the 
hybrid Dutch regime.
In formal terms, these poverty hypotheses can be expressed as follows:
All other things being equal, plib > pcrp > psd > phyb




p = degree of poverty
lib  = representatives of the liberal social security regime type (us, au, ca, uk)
sd = representatives of the social-democratic social security regime type (se, dk, no)
crp = representatives of the corporatist social security regime type (be, de, fr)
hyb = hybrid social security regime (nl)
The next section explores how far these hypotheses are supported by the empirical data. 
One qualifying comment needs to be made at this point, though. Arts & Gelissen (2002: 
155) state that much research in this field
…has a bearing on the distributive effects of welfare regimes. Because they are often described 
in terms of their intended social stratification, a tautological element easily sneaks into the 
explanations.
As such, this observation is quite correct. However, it should be noted that in the current 
analysis the social security regimes have not been defined a priori in relation to the desired 
stratification effects. Rather, the actual institutional characteristics of the countries con-
cerned are taken as a starting point here, regardless of the effects they are intended to 
bring about. Based on the poverty risk theoretically generated by the various sets of for-
mal rules (viz., the average ipri scores of country groups), hypotheses have been formu-
lated with respect to the effects of different social security regime types on the extent of 
poverty. This is a postulated relationship which must be empirically investigated, rather 
than a tautological explanation.
6.7 Empirical results
The correlation between regime types and poverty has been the subject of earlier empiri-
cal studies. Korpi & Palme (1998), for example, drew up their own classification of four 
welfare state types, and subsequently analysed how these correlated with a number of 
distributive indicators. Their ‘encompassing’ type comprises the social-democratic coun-
tries (minus Denmark), while the ‘corporatist’ type consists of the continental countries 
of Western Europe, plus Italy and Japan. Korpi & Palme assign most of the countries that 
are regarded here as liberal to the ‘basic security’ category, but also include Denmark 
and the Netherlands in this group. These authors place Australia in a separate ‘targeted’ 
 category. Their classification is contestable, because it is not based on an analysis of the 
connection between regime characteristics such as that carried out in chapter 4. This 
applies in particular for the separate targeted type: the institutional characteristics of 
Australia are not so unique that the country could not have been included in the lib-
eral cluster; and if one wished to identify a separate ‘Antipodean’ cluster, New Zealand 
would probably also have to be included in it, but according to Korpi & Palme this country 
belongs to the basic security group. Placing Denmark and the Netherlands in the same 
cluster as the usa is also striking. While it is true that the social security systems of these 
two countries have some universalistic elements, as figure 4.2 showed, the level of social 
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protection they offer is so much higher than the residual American system that it is dif-
ficult to justify placing them in the same group.
Notwithstanding these reservations, Korpi & Palme do find some correlation between 
their institutional types and a number of indicators for poverty and inequality (the 50% 
median threshold and the Gini coefficient). Using data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
in around 1985, they concluded that there is an opposition between systems with generous 
wage-related benefits for all inhabitants (the encompassing model) with little poverty or 
inequality, and those countries which offered only basic security or which were highly tar-
geted (high levels of poverty and inequality). The corporatist countries fell between these 
two groups. Korpi & Palme (1998: 675) therefore concluded that institutional arrangements 
determine the income distribution and the concentrations at its lower end:
These results give considerable support for our hypothesis about the overall role of welfare 
state institutions in the distributive processes of the Western countries.
The fit is however by no means perfect. The Netherlands, placed by these authors in 
the basic security group, has just as little poverty and inequality as the countries with 
an encompassing system, while the Australian type which they consider to be unique 
achieves the same levels of poverty and inequality as the usa, Canada and the United 
Kingdom.
Vogel (2003) also finds indications for a relationship between regime types and the dis-
tributive outcomes, based on data from the European Community Household Panel Sur-
vey from 1994. He draws attention to the contrasts between the Nordic countries (little 
poverty or inequality), a Central European cluster (an intermediate position) and a Medi-
terranean group (high rates of poverty and inequality). Analyses based on later waves of 
the echp, and using different versions of the relative poverty line (the 60%-threshold), 
lead to comparable conclusions (see e.g. Ras et al., 2002; cpb/scp, 2003; Eurostat, 2004b). 
Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001) also included a number of non-European countries in their 
analysis and, like Korpi & Palme, found a dichotomy. In their case, however, the divid-
ing line was not positioned between the ‘encompassing’ countries of Scandinavia and 
the rest, but between the liberal countries on the one hand (high relative poverty rates 
with the exception of Canada) and the corporatist and social-democratic regimes on the 
other (low poverty rates, with the exception of France). Wildeboer Schut et al. concluded 
that Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds of welfare’ can be clearly separated from each other 
empirically in terms of the institutional arrangements, but that they are not entirely 
reflected in the distributive results.
The contours of the typology can also be clearly observed in figure 6.1, in which the 
poverty rate according to the 60%-threshold is included for various countries and two 
decades. Viewed over the whole period, the liberal countries generally attain the high-
est poverty rates. The social-democratic group and the Netherlands achieve the lowest 
rates, with the lis observations for Denmark in the mid-1980s and early 1990s as outliers. 
Countries with a corporatist regime have lower poverty rates than liberal countries, but 
on average slightly higher rates than the social-democratic regime types73.
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These results appear to confirm the hypotheses to some extent. Given this, is further 
research into the relationship between regime types and poverty necessary at all? The 
answer to this question is ‘yes’, and for a number of reasons. The most important are 
the limitations already highlighted of the poverty line used in these studies: the relative 
poverty threshold at the level of 50% or 60% of median income. This threshold was con-
sidered invalid earlier, and also failed to meet the requirements of reliability and socio-
political credibility. The correlations found in the research carried out thus far chiefly 
reflect the fact that the regimes differ in the degree of inequality they produce. The latter 
is in line with Esping-Andersen’s original theory; he posited that the ‘three worlds of 
welfare’ differ in their intended stratification (see chapter 4 and the qualification made 
in the previous section). In terms of poverty as theoretically demarcated here, however, 
these outcomes provide little information.
Another point of criticism that can be levelled against many of the earlier interna-
tional comparative studies is that the relationship between regime type and poverty is 
often analysed as an isolated bivariate correlation. No allowance is generally made for 
the influence of other characteristics which can affect national poverty rates, such as the 
demographic profile. If retired people and young people are generally more often poor, 
for example, a country with a relatively elderly or very young population will – all other 
things being equal – produce more poverty than a country with a more balanced demo-
graphic composition. Allowing for this requires a multivariate analysis which establishes 
the effect of regime type on the poverty rate after controlling for the influence of alterna-
tive explanatory factors.
A third objection is more technical in nature. In most poverty research, and thus also 
in comparative studies focusing on the relationship between regime types and poverty, 
the emphasis tends to be on the headcount ratio or poverty incidence, i.e. the percentage 
of people living below a given poverty line. This is understandable: it is in principle an 
easily understood criterion, which leads to an unambiguous ranking of empirical obser-
vations. It is however questionable whether it provides an accurate reflection of the true 
level of poverty. With one and the same poverty rate, the depth of poverty (the average 
amount by which poor people fall short) and the poverty inequality (the distribution of 
shortfalls within the poor group) can be very different. These aspects really ought to be 
taken into account, but in research practice this does not happen very often, even though 
it is possible to capture them in composite poverty measures (see e.g. the overviews in 
Zheng, 1997 and Jäntti & Danziger, 2000; and for a practical international comparative 
application Ras et al., 2002).
All in all, therefore, there is sufficient reason to examine the relationship between 
regime types and poverty again. This is done here using data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study that are available for the 11 countries studied for around the year 2000. 
The lis is a harmonised database containing detailed micro-income data from a large 
number of countries (see also figure 6.1). The equivalised disposable household income 
of persons in the database is used to establish whether people fall below the two variants 
of the poverty line according to the generalised budget approach74.
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The lis data used here (‘wave 5’) shows a number of improvements compared with 
earlier editions. The household definition is more consistent across the different coun-
tries – in earlier waves, for example, tax units, which could belong to the same house-
hold type, were taken as a basis in Sweden – and the quality of the income information 
has been improved in some countries (among other things by adding income data drawn 
from administrative sources). One drawback of the lis data is that they are only avail-
able via remote access, which imposes constraints on the statistical analyses that can be 
performed. Another limitation is that only one measurement point is considered here; 
detailed time series with annual measurements as discussed in the previous chapter are 
not available via the lis. Although data are available for several other years on most of the 
countries discussed here, in some cases comparability over time is not optimum (e.g. due 
to changes in survey design).
A final limitation is that poverty is established here on the basis of the adequacy of 
the available annual income. Whilst a year in poverty is by no means a short period, for 
some groups (e.g. the self-employed) it could perhaps be desirable to consider a longer 
time span, as their incomes can fluctuate widely from one year to the next. That said, 
empirical analyses of Dutch multiple-year income data have shown that there is no clear 
‘breaking point’, whereby the problems associated with poverty rises sharply after a par-
ticular period. The financial assets of poor households, and the extent to which they are 
able to make ends meet, are substantially less after four years than after one year; but in 
the Netherlands at least this is a fairly gradual process (cbs/scp, 1999: 24).
6.7.1 Country-specific norm amounts for a single person
It was concluded earlier that the poverty line developed by The Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research | scp is a good operational criterion for covering the theoretical denota-
tion of poverty. The two variants of this criterion will therefore be used here to test the 
hypotheses. For the country comparative analysis the Dutch amounts from the two vari-
ants of the scp threshold for a single person in 2000 (see table 6.2) have been converted 
to local currency using purchasing power parities75. It would of course be desirable to 
assess the threshold amounts for the individual countries using the same method as that 
applied for the Netherlands and taking into account national differences in prices, taxa-
tion and consumption patterns. However, the reference budgets and the data that would 
be needed for this are not available.
Table 6.3 shows the norm amounts for a single person according to the ‘basic needs’ and 
‘modest but adequate’ variants of the poverty threshold. In the empirical analyses all 
amounts are in national currencies, as derived by the application of purchasing power 
parities (the first two columns of amounts in the table). To gain an impression of the 
relative level of the poverty lines, they have also been converted into euros (based on the 
official conversion rates for Eurozone countries and exchange rates elsewhere).
In five countries, the deviations from the Dutch norm amounts are found to be lim-
ited: Australia comes out 4% lower, France, Canada, Belgium and Germany between 1% 
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and 7% higher. The uk norm amounts for a single person are 15% higher; but Sweden, the 
United States, Denmark and Norway are the most expensive countries (between 22% and 
29% higher than in the Netherlands).
On an annual basis the ‘basic needs’ criterion for a single person ranges from 7,600 
to 10,400 euros, while the ‘modest but adequate’ criterion is between 8,600 and 11,800 
euros. In most countries, both threshold amounts for a single person are below the rela-
tive poverty line (60% of median income) in 2000 as published by the oecd (Förster & Mira 
d’Ercole, 2005). In Australia, France and Germany, however, the amount for the ‘modest 
but adequate’ variant is 4-7% above the national relative poverty line.
The amounts in table 6.3 apply for disposable income; after compulsory government 
taxes, social insurance contributions, etc. have been deducted from the received salary, 
benefits, profits etc., the remainder must be adequate to cover the other unavoidable or 
highly desirable expenditure items.
6.7.2 Sensitivity analysis of equivalence scales
The norm amounts for a single person cannot be applied directly to other types of house-
hold. A family with four children will find it more difficult to make ends meet from 10,000 
euros than a single person: there are more mouths to feed, more furniture and beds are 
needed, the energy costs will be higher, expenses will be incurred for school and child-
care, insurance is more expensive, and so on. To allow for this, an equivalence scale is 
often used. This comprises a set of ratios which indicate how much extra income house-
Table 6.3 
Poverty thresholds for a single person, 2000 (annual amounts) 
In national currencies a  In euros  b
 basic  modest but basic modest but
  needs adequate needs adequate
 AU AUD        12,017         13,637         7,562         8,581 
 NL NLG        17,652         20,032         8,010         9,090 
 FR FRF        53,306         60,494         8,127         9,222 
 CA CAD        11,178         12,685         8,169         9,271 
 BE BEF       334,118        379,167         8,283         9,399 
 DE DEM        16,773         19,034         8,576         9,732 
 UK GBP          5,602           6,357         9,200        10,440 
 SE SEK        82,658         93,803         9,792        11,112 
 US USD          9,227         10,471        10,015        11,365 
 DK DKK        75,187         85,324        10,096        11,457 
 NO NOK        84,066         95,401        10,367        11,764
a. SCP poverty thresholds for the Netherlands transformed to national currencies by 
  applying OECD purchasing power parities for actual individual consumption.
b. Poverty thresholds in national currencies recalculated by means of exchange rates 2000
    (offi cial conversion rates for euro countries).
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holds need in order to derive the same utility or level of welfare as a reference household. 
The ratios (or equivalence factors) then express, for example, how many ‘equivalent sin-
gle adults’ there are in households with a certain composition.
Equivalence scales usually take account in some way of economies of scale. As a result, 
they generally do not increase directly proportional to the size of the household. A couple 
with four children will need a larger house than a single person in order to achieve the 
same level of welfare, and will therefore incur greater housing costs; on the other hand, 
they do not need to occupy six homes that are suitable for a single person.
Whether or not households are poor can then be determined by examining whether 
the equivalised income (the nominal income divided by the equivalence factors) lies 
below the norm amount for the reference household. Logically, the same result will be 
obtained if this latter amount is multiplied by the equivalence factors and the resultant 
household-specific poverty lines are compared with the original (nominal) incomes.
Naturally, the question that arises here is which equivalence scale is the best to use. This 
is not a trivial issue, because the equivalence scale chosen can influence the poverty that 
is detected. For example, the more steeply the equivalence scale rises with the size of the 
household, the greater the number of large families that are classed as poor (given a con-
stant threshold amount for the reference household). With steeper equivalence scales, 
the factor by which the nominal income is divided becomes higher, so that more large 
families end up below the threshold amount. This implies that both the number of poor 
and the share of large families in the poor group will increase.
As stated, the Dutch version of the scp poverty line uses equivalence factors calcu-
lated by Statistics Netherlands (cbs) (Siermann et al., 2004). This equivalence scale is fairly 
well approximated if each adult is counted as 1 and each child as 0.8, and the square root 
of the sum of all individual weights is then extracted. It then resembles the scales pro-
posed in the report mentioned earlier by the National Academy of Sciences for the United 
States. The latter are however steeper: the nas proposes giving all adults a weight of 1 and 
each child a weight of 0.7; the sum of all weights is then raised to the power of 0.65 to 
0.75 (Citro & Michael, 1995). It can however not be taken for granted that the equivalence 
scales suggested by Statistics Netherlands or the nas are suitable for other countries, as 
empirically the situation may be different there (e.g. less housing costs in more sparsely 
populated countries, fewer energy costs in milder climates).
By convention three variants are often used in international comparative research:
– the (old) oecd equivalence scale, also known as the ‘Oxford scale’. This scale assigns a value 
of 1 to the first adult household member, 0.7 to each additional adult and 0.5 for each 
child. The household income is then divided by the sum of the values of the household 
members in order to obtain equivalent incomes. The oecd (1982) introduced this scale 
for use in “countries which have not established their own equivalence scale”.
– the modified oecd equivalence scale, proposed by Hagenaars et al. (1994). This rises less 
steeply as the number of household members increases. The first adult household 
member is given a weight of 1; each additional adult counts for 0.5, and each child for 
Table 6.3 
Poverty thresholds for a single person, 2000 (annual amounts) 
In national currencies a  In euros  b
 basic  modest but basic modest but
  needs adequate needs adequate
 AU AUD        12,017         13,637         7,562         8,581 
 NL NLG        17,652         20,032         8,010         9,090 
 FR FRF        53,306         60,494         8,127         9,222 
 CA CAD        11,178         12,685         8,169         9,271 
 BE BEF       334,118        379,167         8,283         9,399 
 DE DEM        16,773         19,034         8,576         9,732 
 UK GBP          5,602           6,357         9,200        10,440 
 SE SEK        82,658         93,803         9,792        11,112 
 US USD          9,227         10,471        10,015        11,365 
 DK DKK        75,187         85,324        10,096        11,457 
 NO NOK        84,066         95,401        10,367        11,764
a. SCP poverty thresholds for the Netherlands transformed to national currencies by 
  applying OECD purchasing power parities for actual individual consumption.
b. Poverty thresholds in national currencies recalculated by means of exchange rates 2000
    (offi cial conversion rates for euro countries).
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0.3. The European Union uses this scale to determine the level of relative poverty in 
the member states (see e.g. ec, 2007).
– the square root equivalence scale. Here, household income is divided by the square root 
of the total number of persons in the household. A family of four is thus considered 
to need twice as much income as a single person in order to achieve the same level of 
welfare. This equivalence scale (and not the one which bears its name) has often been 
applied by the oecd in recent years in international comparisons (see e.g. Förster & 
Mira d’Ercole, 2005).
Their conventional nature is at once the main objection to these equivalence scales. 
There are no compelling reasons to assume that they adequately reflect the actual welfare 
differences between various types of household; and no grounds at all to suppose that 
the equivalences must be the same in all countries and periods. Furthermore, the con-
ventional scales are based on relatively few household characteristics. They differentiate 
according to household size and partially to age (the square root scale does not distin-
guish between adults and children). It is rather plausible that finer age distinctions (e.g. 
young adults, over-65s), gender, health status and present income level are also impor-
tant in determining the experienced level of welfare.
To get round this problem, empirical equivalence scales are often used, especially in national 
research into poverty and inequality; at first sight, these are less problematic. The best 
known are the scales based on consumer demand models (see e.g. Lewbel, 1997). These 
models use a system of regression equations to estimate how consumptive units (house-
holds) with divergent characteristics distribute their total income, given specific prices, 
across consumer goods and services. Equivalence factors can then be derived from the 
ratios of the estimated expenditure of different types of households relative to a refer-
ence household.
The estimation of equivalence factors based on consumer demand models is intended 
to provide a ‘technical’ solution to the arbitrariness of the conventional scales. In prac-
tice, however, normative elements still creep in (Cowell & Mercader-Prats, 1999: 410-412; 
for an overview see Jäntti & Danziger, 2000: 316-322). An equivalence scale can be regarded 
as the rate of exchange between nominal and equivalised incomes. For households with 
specific traits it gives the function by which nominal income is transformed in such a way 
that the welfare or utility level of the reference household is attained. The equivalence 
scale can thus also be interpreted as a ‘cost of characteristics’ index:
eh= 
 C (u0 , p , zh)
 C (u0 , p , zo)
where
eh = equivalence for household with characteristics zh;
c = cost/expenditure function;
u0 = utility level of reference household;
p = vector of prices (assumed constant across households);
zh = vector of characteristics of household;
z0 = vector of characteristics of reference household
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The formula makes clear that the equivalence factor is determined not only by the differ-
ences in the characteristics of the household (such as size, composition, age), but also by 
prices and by the adopted points of reference. The price vector is not necessarily the same 
for all household types (farmers spend less on food and milk than town-dwellers), even 
though this is generally assumed to be the case; and if a different reference level of utility 
is chosen, the ratios on the cost of characteristics index can turn out differently. Equiva-
lence scales based on consumer demand models tend to make normative choices here.
More fundamental is the assumption that the utility levels of households with dif-
ferent characteristics can be compared accurately76 (see e.g. Pollak & Wales, 1979). This 
is not however self-evident. Suppose a person has a motor disability, so that they spend 
more on transport (e.g. a wheelchair, taxis) than a healthy person and less on other items. 
In principle, the ‘pure’ additional costs of the disability (controlling for age, household 
size and composition, etc.) can be established reasonably well using consumer demand 
models, and from this the conditional equivalence factor relative to the reference house-
hold can be derived. However, the extra transport costs for people with a motor disability 
do not by definition imply that they achieve the same level of welfare as people without 
disabilities. If someone becomes disabled, their needs may change; transport becomes 
more important to them, and in order to achieve the same utility as before they may have 
to spend more than their income allows; or the extra transport costs may force them to 
economise on other items, which is also tantamount to a loss of welfare.
When determining the level of poverty and income inequality the researcher is inter-
ested in unconditional equivalence factors: “index numbers which reflect the ratio of 
expenditures required to attain a particular indifference curve under alternative demo-
graphic profiles” (Pollak & Wales, 1979: 217). Since budget data generally contain no infor-
mation enabling the estimation of indifference curves, Cowell & Mercader-Prats (1999: 
409) conclude that
[...] econometric equivalence scales cannot in general be identified from observed micro-data; 
in practice, they are identified by making assumptions that are not ethically neutral, and that 
may be criticized as arbitrary and controversial. [Thus] there can be no one ‘correct’ equiva-
lence scale.
In empirical comparative research it has been found repeatedly that, while the equiva-
lence scale chosen influences the poverty rate and the composition of the poor popula-
tion, the ranking of countries and the trends observed are however often comparable 
(Burniaux et al., 1998; Jäntti & Danziger, 2000). For this reason, a pragmatic approach is 
followed here. It involves an assessment of the degree to which the measured poverty 
rate varies if a large number of equivalence scales are applied to the norm amounts for a 
single person outlined earlier. These equivalence scales are captured by the formula
e (1 + aN + bK)c
where
e = equivalence scale;
N = number of additional adults;
K = number of children below 18 years of age;
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a = multiplier for additional adults;
b = multiplier for children;
c = exponent of sum score
The conventional equivalence scales discussed earlier, the equivalence scale developed 
by Statistics Netherlands (cbs) and the scales proposed by the nas all are variants of this 
formula. Comparing the poverty rates and ranking of countries using a range of differ-
ent scales provides some evidence on the impact of the chosen equivalence scale on the 
empirical results. Two comments need to be made about this sensitivity analysis, how-
ever. First, the number of characteristics on which the equivalence scale is based is again 
limited in this analysis: household size and a fairly rough division by age of the family 
members (older/younger than 18 years77). In addition, the most extreme variants of the 
equivalence formula probably will not be perceived as reasonable by many people. At one 
extreme is the nominal income, where the welfare differences between households with 
a different composition are ignored. Here, the poverty line for the reference household 
serves as the norm for all households, and it is therefore assumed the larger families do 
not need to spend more in order to achieve the same level of welfare. The variant at the 
other extreme assumes that welfare differences show a linear increase with the number 
of family members. This approach in terms of the per capita income ignores economies 
of scale, which for instance implies that the family with four children mentioned above 
would indeed need six single-person dwellings in which to live. Although the extreme 
variants have little credibility, therefore, they do provide an indication of the maximum 
bandwidth in the poverty rate using different equivalence scales.
Table 6.4 shows results of this sensitivity analysis in the 11 countries in terms of the head-
count ratios. In variant 1 (nominal income) the poverty rate in the 11 countries lies between 
2% and 7%. Variant 18 (Y per capita) delivers much higher figures: between 27% and 54% of 
the population are characterised as poor based on this equivalence scale. Between these 
two extremes the poverty rate in all countries rises steadily78 if higher parameter values 
are chosen, with large jumps in variants 17 and 18. The increase between variant 1 and 
variant 18 is smallest in Denmark and Norway (approx. +10 percentage points), and great-
est in France and Australia (between +40 and +47 percentage points).
The ranking of countries is fairly stable for divergent parameter values79. Regardless 
of the equivalence factor used, Australia always comes in first place, with the highest pov-
erty rate. Similarly, Norway and Denmark record the lowest relative number of poor peo-
ple for each equivalence scale. Belgium, the uk and Canada also occupy fairly stable posi-
tions in the poverty ranking. In a few countries this is not the case, however. With higher 
parameter values, France climbs higher up the ranking of poor countries (comparatively 
more poverty), while Germany falls (comparatively less poverty). The Netherlands has the 
fewest poor people for the two least steep variants, and thereafter remains for a long time 
in third place. With the ‘steepest’ variants (17 and 18), the poverty rate in the Netherlands 
rises rather sharply, pushing the country into a middle position. The reverse applies for 
the usa: in most variants this country has one of the higher poverty rates. For the final 
Table 6.4
Sensitivity analysis: poverty rates according to a class of equivalence s cales (around 2000)
 
       Equivalence scale*    e=(1 + aN + bK)c    % of population below basic needs poverty criterion
No. Name a b c NL NO DK SE DE BE FR  CA US UK AU
1 Nominal income 0 0 0 1.9 1.4 1.7 4.2 4.0 2.8 2.5 2.7 3.7 3.6 5.5
2 - 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.9 1.5 1.8 4.2 4.2 2.9 2.6 2.9 4.0 3.8 5.8
3 - 0.5 0.5 0.25 2.2 1.6 1.8 4.4 4.5 3.5 3.1 3.4 4.5 4.3 6.5
4 - 1 0.5 0.25 2.4 1.6 1.8 4.5 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.7 4.8 4.6 6.9
5 - 1 0.5 0.35 2.8 1.7 2.0 4.7 5.4 4.6 4.4 4.2 5.6 5.3 7.7
6 - 1 0.5 0.5 3.7 1.8 2.2 5.3 6.5 5.9 6.5 5.6 7.2 7.1 11.4
7 - 1 0.7 0.5 3.9 1.9 2.3 5.8 6.9 6.4 7.3 6.2 7.9 8.1 12.8
8 Statistics Netherlands 1 0.8 0.5 4.3 2.0 2.3 6.0 7.1 6.7 7.9 6.5 8.2 8.8 13.5
9 Square root scale 1 1 0.5 4.7 2.1 2.4 6.4 7.4 7.0 8.8 7.2 8.9 10.3 15.1
10 OECD modifi ed scale 0.5 0.3 1 5.3 2.2 2.7 7.0 7.9 8.9 11.2 8.5 10.3 11.9 17.0
11 Alternative scale: (SN+NAS)/2 1 0.75 0.6 5.5 2.2 2.7 7.1 8.1 9.5 10.9 8.4 10.1 12.4 17.5
12 US NAS (low) 1 0.7 0.65 6.4 2.4 3.0 7.9 8.6 10.1 12.6 9.4 11.2 13.8 19.1
13 - 1 0.5 0.75 7.0 2.6 4.0 8.6 9.8 12.1 14.4 10.5 12.3 15.3 21.3
14 US NAS (high) 1 0.7 0.75 8.6 3.1 4.8 10.2 11.2 12.9 17.5 12.5 14.1 18.5 24.6
15 Oxford (old OECD) scale 0.7 0.5 1 11.2 3.9 6.0 12.0 13.2 14.6 21.1 14.8 16.1 21.4 28.1
16 - 1 1 0.75 11.7 4.3 6.8 13.7 14.0 15.8 21.9 15.3 16.6 22.2 28.8
17 - 1 1 0.9 24.7 9.9 13.2 25.0 22.6 24.3 33.6 23.3 23.4 30.3 39.1
18 Per capita income 1 1 1 33.2 17.2 20.3 33.8 30.4 32.1 41.6 30.3 28.6 36.4 46.3
 Equivalence scale*    e=(1 + aN + bK)c  % of population below modest but adequate poverty criterion
No. Name a b c NL NO DK SE DE BE FR CA US UK AU
1 Nominal income 0 0 0 2.4 3.0 3.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 3.8 3.8 4.8 5.1 6.9
2 - 0.5 0.5 0.1 2.6 3.1 3.2 6.8 5.9 5.0 4.2 4.2 5.2 5.4 7.3
3 - 0.5 0.5 0.25 3.2 3.1 3.3 7.0 6.4 5.8 5.1 4.8 5.9 6.2 8.3
4 - 1 0.5 0.25 3.3 3.2 3.4 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.7 5.2 6.3 6.8 9.5
5 - 1 0.5 0.35 4.0 3.3 3.6 7.7 7.7 8.0 7.1 6.1 7.4 8.1 12.1
6 - 1 0.5 0.5 5.3 3.6 4.3 9.1 9.1 10.3 10.5 8.1 9.7 11.7 17.1
7 - 1 0.7 0.5 6.0 3.8 4.5 9.7 9.5 10.9 11.9 9.1 10.6 13.7 18.9
8 Statistics Netherlands 1 0.8 0.5 6.4 3.9 4.6 10.1 9.8 11.3 12.6 9.5 11.1 14.7 19.5
9 Square root scale 1 1 0.5 7.3 4.1 4.8 10.9 10.2 12.3 13.8 10.5 12.0 16.3 20.4
10 OECD modifi ed scale 0.5 0.3 1 8.5 4.3 5.9 11.9 11.6 14.2 17.0 12.2 13.9 18.3 24.1
11 Alternative scale: (SN+NAS)/2 1 0.75 0.6 8.6 4.5 6.0 12.2 11.6 13.9 16.8 12.2 13.7 18.7 23.9
12 US NAS (low) 1 0.7 0.65 9.6 4.8 6.9 13.2 12.9 14.8 19.1 13.5 14.8 20.4 26.0
13 - 1 0.5 0.75 11.5 5.3 8.1 14.7 14.8 17.1 21.9 15.3 16.0 22.2 28.3
14 US NAS (high) 1 0.7 0.75 13.8 6.2 9.7 17.4 17.1 19.5 25.4 17.6 18.2 25.3 31.7
15 Oxford (old OECD) scale 0.7 0.5 1 17.9 7.8 11.6 21.1 20.1 22.3 29.9 20.4 20.8 28.0 35.5
16 - 1 1 0.75 19.5 8.7 12.6 23.4 20.8 22.5 31.1 21.1 21.4 29.0 36.6
17 - 1 1 0.9 33.8 18.4 21.9 36.8 31.9 33.4 43.3 31.1 29.1 37.9 47.1
18 Per capita income 1 1 1 43.7 26.9 30.8 45.7 39.8 43.9 51.3 38.4 34.5 44.1 54.1
* In formula, with
    e = equivalence scale
    N = number of additional adults      
    K = number of children below 18 years of age
    a = multiplier for additional adults
    b = multiplier for children
    c = exponent of sum score
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (1999-2001)
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Table 6.4
Sensitivity analysis: poverty rates according to a class of equivalence s cales (around 2000)
 
       Equivalence scale*    e=(1 + aN + bK)c    % of population below basic needs poverty criterion
No. Name a b c NL NO DK SE DE BE FR  CA US UK AU
1 Nominal income 0 0 0 1.9 1.4 1.7 4.2 4.0 2.8 2.5 2.7 3.7 3.6 5.5
2 - 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.9 1.5 1.8 4.2 4.2 2.9 2.6 2.9 4.0 3.8 5.8
3 - 0.5 0.5 0.25 2.2 1.6 1.8 4.4 4.5 3.5 3.1 3.4 4.5 4.3 6.5
4 - 1 0.5 0.25 2.4 1.6 1.8 4.5 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.7 4.8 4.6 6.9
5 - 1 0.5 0.35 2.8 1.7 2.0 4.7 5.4 4.6 4.4 4.2 5.6 5.3 7.7
6 - 1 0.5 0.5 3.7 1.8 2.2 5.3 6.5 5.9 6.5 5.6 7.2 7.1 11.4
7 - 1 0.7 0.5 3.9 1.9 2.3 5.8 6.9 6.4 7.3 6.2 7.9 8.1 12.8
8 Statistics Netherlands 1 0.8 0.5 4.3 2.0 2.3 6.0 7.1 6.7 7.9 6.5 8.2 8.8 13.5
9 Square root scale 1 1 0.5 4.7 2.1 2.4 6.4 7.4 7.0 8.8 7.2 8.9 10.3 15.1
10 OECD modifi ed scale 0.5 0.3 1 5.3 2.2 2.7 7.0 7.9 8.9 11.2 8.5 10.3 11.9 17.0
11 Alternative scale: (SN+NAS)/2 1 0.75 0.6 5.5 2.2 2.7 7.1 8.1 9.5 10.9 8.4 10.1 12.4 17.5
12 US NAS (low) 1 0.7 0.65 6.4 2.4 3.0 7.9 8.6 10.1 12.6 9.4 11.2 13.8 19.1
13 - 1 0.5 0.75 7.0 2.6 4.0 8.6 9.8 12.1 14.4 10.5 12.3 15.3 21.3
14 US NAS (high) 1 0.7 0.75 8.6 3.1 4.8 10.2 11.2 12.9 17.5 12.5 14.1 18.5 24.6
15 Oxford (old OECD) scale 0.7 0.5 1 11.2 3.9 6.0 12.0 13.2 14.6 21.1 14.8 16.1 21.4 28.1
16 - 1 1 0.75 11.7 4.3 6.8 13.7 14.0 15.8 21.9 15.3 16.6 22.2 28.8
17 - 1 1 0.9 24.7 9.9 13.2 25.0 22.6 24.3 33.6 23.3 23.4 30.3 39.1
18 Per capita income 1 1 1 33.2 17.2 20.3 33.8 30.4 32.1 41.6 30.3 28.6 36.4 46.3
 Equivalence scale*    e=(1 + aN + bK)c  % of population below modest but adequate poverty criterion
No. Name a b c NL NO DK SE DE BE FR CA US UK AU
1 Nominal income 0 0 0 2.4 3.0 3.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 3.8 3.8 4.8 5.1 6.9
2 - 0.5 0.5 0.1 2.6 3.1 3.2 6.8 5.9 5.0 4.2 4.2 5.2 5.4 7.3
3 - 0.5 0.5 0.25 3.2 3.1 3.3 7.0 6.4 5.8 5.1 4.8 5.9 6.2 8.3
4 - 1 0.5 0.25 3.3 3.2 3.4 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.7 5.2 6.3 6.8 9.5
5 - 1 0.5 0.35 4.0 3.3 3.6 7.7 7.7 8.0 7.1 6.1 7.4 8.1 12.1
6 - 1 0.5 0.5 5.3 3.6 4.3 9.1 9.1 10.3 10.5 8.1 9.7 11.7 17.1
7 - 1 0.7 0.5 6.0 3.8 4.5 9.7 9.5 10.9 11.9 9.1 10.6 13.7 18.9
8 Statistics Netherlands 1 0.8 0.5 6.4 3.9 4.6 10.1 9.8 11.3 12.6 9.5 11.1 14.7 19.5
9 Square root scale 1 1 0.5 7.3 4.1 4.8 10.9 10.2 12.3 13.8 10.5 12.0 16.3 20.4
10 OECD modifi ed scale 0.5 0.3 1 8.5 4.3 5.9 11.9 11.6 14.2 17.0 12.2 13.9 18.3 24.1
11 Alternative scale: (SN+NAS)/2 1 0.75 0.6 8.6 4.5 6.0 12.2 11.6 13.9 16.8 12.2 13.7 18.7 23.9
12 US NAS (low) 1 0.7 0.65 9.6 4.8 6.9 13.2 12.9 14.8 19.1 13.5 14.8 20.4 26.0
13 - 1 0.5 0.75 11.5 5.3 8.1 14.7 14.8 17.1 21.9 15.3 16.0 22.2 28.3
14 US NAS (high) 1 0.7 0.75 13.8 6.2 9.7 17.4 17.1 19.5 25.4 17.6 18.2 25.3 31.7
15 Oxford (old OECD) scale 0.7 0.5 1 17.9 7.8 11.6 21.1 20.1 22.3 29.9 20.4 20.8 28.0 35.5
16 - 1 1 0.75 19.5 8.7 12.6 23.4 20.8 22.5 31.1 21.1 21.4 29.0 36.6
17 - 1 1 0.9 33.8 18.4 21.9 36.8 31.9 33.4 43.3 31.1 29.1 37.9 47.1
18 Per capita income 1 1 1 43.7 26.9 30.8 45.7 39.8 43.9 51.3 38.4 34.5 44.1 54.1
* In formula, with
    e = equivalence scale
    N = number of additional adults      
    K = number of children below 18 years of age
    a = multiplier for additional adults
    b = multiplier for children
    c = exponent of sum score
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (1999-2001)
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two variants, however, the poverty rate rises less than elsewhere, moving the country to 
the middle segment. Sweden initially falls down the ladder, but according to the last two 
to four variants the poverty rate rises comparatively strongly.
For most countries, it makes no difference for their position in the ranking whether 
the basic needs or the modest but adequate variant of the poverty line is used. Accord-
ing to the latter criterion, Belgium and Sweden are one place higher up the ranking than 
on the basis of the basic needs criterion; applying the higher threshold thus leads to a 
comparatively large increase in these countries. The usa comes in most cases almost two 
places lower when the modest but adequate criterion is used; the growth in poverty is 
comparatively small if the higher threshold amount is used.
If only the familiar equivalence scales are considered, the picture is even more stable. 
If the headcount ratios are compared according to the two variants which are furthest 
apart from each other in the table (‘Statistics Netherlands’ and ‘Oxford’), the changes in 
the rankings are very limited. If the basic needs poverty line is taken as a basis, there are 
seven countries in exactly the same place in variants 8 and 15. The other four move up or 
down the ranking by at most two positions. Based on the modest but adequate criterion, 
five countries share an identical position according to both the ‘Statistics Netherlands’ 
and ‘Oxford’ scales; with the other seven, the difference is no more than one position.
What then constitutes a reasonable equivalence scale? If the conventional methods are 
examined more closely, the objection may be levelled at the square root scale that it does 
not distinguish between adults and children. If a married couple has the same household 
income as a single-parent with a newborn child, they are therefore assumed to attain the 
same level of welfare. The oecd-modified scale does draw a crude distinction by age. Here, 
however, one may question the linear increase in the equivalence scale: each  additional 
adult or child carries the same weight as the previous one; there are no economies of 
scale. The same applies for the Oxford scale, which seems moreover fairly steep, resulting 
in rather high poverty rates (8-36%) for prosperous countries.
The strength of the equivalence scales put forward by Statistics Netherlands (cbs) and 
the us National Academy of Sciences (nas) is that they distinguish between adults and 
children and allow for economies of scale. Compared with the two conventional scales 
most commonly used in international comparative research (Square root and oecd-mod-
ified), however, the Dutch scale is fairly flat (leading to low poverty rates), while the two 
American variants are actually steeper than usual (resulting in fairly high poverty rates).
For practical reasons, it was therefore decided to base the further analysis on a hybrid 
form: an equivalence scale which follows a middle path between the cbs equivalence 
scale and the average of the two scales propagated by the nas. In the chosen equiva-
lence scale (variant 11), each adult carries a weight of 1, each child 0.75, and with a rising 
number of household members the equivalence factor exhibits a slightly stronger non-
linear increase than with the square root scale (c=0.60). In table 6.2 the norm amounts 
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for this alternative equivalence scale in the Netherlands were already presented for a 
number of household types.
Given the earlier discussion of the merits of different equivalence scales, this is inevi-
tably a normative choice. It does however seem reasonable in view of the highlighted 
limitations of the existing conventional scales and the somewhat extreme nature of the 
Dutch and American approaches. The poverty rates produced by the adopted equivalence 
scale are virtually the same as those based on the oecd-modified scale, with a maximum 
deviation of +0.6 percentage points (uk, basic needs variant). The difference compared 
with the square root scale is greater, rising to +3.5 percentage points for Australia using 
the modest but adequate criterion.
Applying this equivalence scale, the correlation between the poverty rates and 
income inequality is much smaller than when the 60% of median income criterion is 
taken as the poverty threshold (cf. figure 6.1). For the 11 countries studied here in around 
the year 2000, the correlation between the Gini coefficient and the relative poverty is 
0.95, i.e. almost perfect. The basic needs and modest but adequate criteria also correlate 
with this inequality measure, but less strongly (0.70 and 0.65, respectively).
6.7.3 The ‘three I’s of poverty’ and the regime types
It was noted earlier that much international comparative research focuses exclusively on 
the poverty rate, ignoring two other potentially important aspects of poverty, namely 
the income deficits of the poor and the distribution of those deficits among the poor. 
This is sometimes described as the ‘three I’s of poverty’: the incidence, income deficit and 
inequality of poverty (see e.g. Jenkins & Lambert, 1997). The incidence (also referred to as 
the poverty rate or headcount ratio) is an intuitively clear indicator: the proportion of 
the population with an income below the poverty line is an obvious key indicator both 
for policymakers and in the public debate. If the poverty line amount is regarded as a 
fundamental right, it also has legal significance: the incidence of poverty then indicates 
how many people’s basic entitlements are being infringed. Yet the indicator also has 
some drawbacks. It implies that households are either poor or not poor, and this simple 
dichotomy may not fully reflect the actual situation as experienced by people. Is someone 
really not poor any more if he has an income that is one euro below the poverty line and 
receives an additional two euros? And does his condition improve just as much as in the 
case of someone who has a deficit of 1000 euros and receives an additional 1001 euros? 
Moreover, there is a possible objection from a policy perspective: based on this indicator 
measures aimed at those just below the poverty line will be found to be the most efficient, 
as these reduce the poverty rate at the lowest cost.
There is thus some justification for looking at the income deficit as well. Based on 
this indicator, there is also a reduction in poverty if the incidence remains constant but 
the average or median deficit of the poor reduces. The depth of poverty thus helps deter-
mine the judgment as to the severity of the problem: if 5% of the population are below 
the poverty line, it is less serious if they fall short by an average of 10 euros per year than 
if their income deficit is 1000 euros. The income deficit provides an indication of the dif-
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ficulty and costs that will be involved in lifting this group out of poverty, and is therefore 
also relevant from a policy perspective. One comment that needs to be made here is that 
the indicator becomes less relevant if the poverty line is set at a very spartan level or has 
little discretionary scope. In that case, poor people cannot keep their heads above water 
anyway, and just like drowning people who cannot swim, it makes no difference how far 
below the water surface they are – they will still drown.
As regards the third aspect, the income inequality within the poor population, 
the assumption is that there is more poverty if the dispersion of the deficits is greater. 
Income redistribution among the poor will therefore also alter the structure of poverty: 
if money is transferred from a ‘wealthy’ poor person (just below the poverty line) to a 
poorer person (a long way below the threshold) poverty will reduce, even if the incidence 
and median income deficit do not change. From a policy perspective, the inequality cri-
terion quickly leads to the conclusion that it is efficient to redistribute income in order to 
decrease the deficit of the poorest. This can be justified if one supposes that the marginal 
utility of income decreases. For the very poorest people, the extra amount can mean that 
they will not die of hunger, while for the ‘wealthier’ poor person the lost income may 
mean that they can no longer pay their telephone bill. The former could be allowed to 
weigh more heavily than the latter. At first sight this is a defensible standpoint, but here 
again another line of reasoning can be followed. To use the analogy of the drowning per-
son once more: if a few people are swimming slightly below the water surface, they may 
have a chance of escaping; that may be preferable to a situation where all swim at greater 
depth but drown.
Since these are all relevant aspects of income poverty, however, it is still useful – despite 
the objections that can be levelled at each – to analyse all three indicators here, and to 
explore to what extent empirical results are in line with theoretical expectations. Table 6.5 
shows the poverty rates, the median percentage income deficits and the inequality of the 
deficits (measured using the Gini coefficient) for both variants of the poverty line and the 
equivalence scale selected earlier.
Three composite measures are also reported; these summarise the differences on 
some of these aspects simultaneously. The intensity index is simply the product of the 
incidence and the median income deficit. The Sen index and the Shorrocks index also 
take the inequality among the poor into account. If a few familiar axioms are accepted, 
the Shorrocks measure is the most attractive from a theoretical point of view80.
With both poverty lines, the differences between the countries are greatest with regard 
to the incidence. In the country with the most poor people, the incidence with the basic 
needs poverty criterion is eight times as high as in the country with the fewest poor; 
based on the modest but adequate poverty threshold, the figure is five times as high.
The spread in the income deficits is less marked (the maximum is roughly twice as 
high as the minimum), and the inequality among the poor varies even less (a ratio of 
between 1.2 and 1.4). This implies that for the composite measures the differences will be 
mainly due to the divergent poverty rates, and to a lesser extent to the median income 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   408 21-9-2009   15:09:31
409p o v e r t y
   6
deficits and the inequality in them. It may thus be expected that the three indices will 
lead to roughly the same conclusions as the incidence.
Basic needs criterion
According to the basic needs poverty criterion, the incidence is lowest in Norway and Den-
mark (2-3%). The Netherlands follows at some distance (just over 5% poverty) and Sweden 
comes in fourth place (7%). The three corporatist countries all score higher (8-11%), as do 
the four liberal countries (8-17%). Hypothesis 1 (Plib>Pcrp) is thus supported by the data: the 
poverty rate is higher on average in the liberal group than in the corporatist cluster (+2.6 
percentage points). This is however attributable largely to the high incidence of  poverty in 
Australia; if this country is left out of consideration, the differences are less obvious, with 
only the United Kingdom scoring clearly higher than the corporatist countries.
The picture is even clearer when it comes to hypothesis 2 (Pcrp>Psd). All corporatist 
countries have higher poverty rates than the social-democratic countries, and as a result the 
averages in these regime types diverge in the expected direction (+5.5 percentage points).
Hypothesis 3 (Psd>Phyb) is however not supported as regards the incidence of pov-
erty. Norway and Denmark have significantly fewer poor people than the hybrid Neth-
erlands; only Sweden scores somewhat higher. The average poverty rate in the three 
social-democratic countries is lower than in the Netherlands, contrary to expectations 
(-1.5  percentage point). The hybrid regime type does however score below the average 
rates in the corporatist and liberal regime types.
Linking the income deficits to the regime types is a less straightforward matter. The defi-
cits are greatest in the Netherlands, Norway and the usa (a median value of around 25%), 
followed by Germany and Canada (approx. 20%) and the other countries (approx. 15%). 
Due to the scores of the usa and Canada, the liberal countries on average have a higher 
median income deficit than the corporatist group. This is in line with hypothesis 1, but 
the difference is not great. The social-democratic countries come out roughly on a par 
with the corporatist group, so that hypothesis 2 is not supported. The score of the Neth-
erlands is actually completely opposite to the theoretical assumption in hypothesis 3: the 
country does not have the smallest median income deficit, but the largest.
The differences between countries in terms of inequality of deficits also run contrary 
to expectations. The limited differences reveal a divide between the social-democratic 
countries plus the Netherlands on the one hand (slightly higher Gini coefficient of income 
deficits than elsewhere, with the exception of Denmark) and the corporatist and liberal 
countries on the other (lower Gini coefficients, except in the usa).
The three indices show the same pattern as the poverty incidence, but the differences are 
less marked because they are dampened by the other two I’s. Denmark and Norway have 
the lowest scores, with the high income deficit of the Norwegian poor putting this coun-
try into second place. Sweden and the Netherlands come next; the hybrid regime ends up 
somewhat lower in the rankings due to the high median income deficit. The Netherlands 




Poverty indicators according to basic needs and modest but adequate criteria a
Basic needs poverty criterion 
Incidence Income Inequality Intensity Sen Shorrocks
 (% poor) defi cit of defi cits index index index
  (median %)  (Gini) 
 
   NL 5.5 25.2 0.256 1.4 2.5 2.8 
   SE 7.1 15.6 0.256 1.1 2.6 2.2 
   DK 2.7 13.1 0.231 0.4 0.9 0.7 
   NO 2.2 24.6 0.285 0.6 1.0 1.1 
   DE 8.1 20.7 0.234 1.7 3.2 3.3 
   BE 9.5 14.6 0.224 1.4 3.2 2.8 
   FR 10.9 16.3 0.216 1.8 3.8 3.6 
   UK 12.4 14.3 0.227 1.8 4.5 4.5 
   CA 8.4 21.8 0.239 1.8 3.1 3.0 
   AU 17.5 15.2 0.204 2.7 6.5 7.2 
   US 10.1 24.2 0.263 2.5 4.2 4.2 
  Regime type average         
   Hybrid (NL)=ref. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
   Social-democratic 0.72 0.71 1.00 0.48 0.62 0.49 
   Corporatist 1.72 0.68 0.88 1.16 1.38 1.17  
   Liberal 2.19 0.88 0.91 1.56 1.88 1.71 
a.  Assessed against equivalised disposable household income of persons, around 2000
(Table 6.5)
Modest but adequate poverty criterion 
Incidence Income Inequality Intensity Sen Shorrocks
(% poor) defi cit of defi cits index index index
 (median %)  (Gini) 
8.6 19.0 0.238 1.6 3.3 3.3 NL
12.2 15.2 0.246 1.9 4.4 3.8 SE
6.0 10.5 0.223 0.6 1.8 1.3 DK
4.5 12.4 0.252 0.6 1.5 1.1 NO
11.6 21.4 0.241 2.5 4.7 4.9 DE
13.9 16.5 0.213 2.3 4.8 4.6 BE
16.8 17.9 0.213 3.0 5.9 6.0 FR
18.7 17.6 0.219 3.3 6.7 6.6 UK
12.2 21.1 0.240 2.6 4.9 5.1 CA
23.9 20.9 0.211 5.0 9.0 9.7 AU
13.7 25.1 0.263 3.4 6.1 6.7 US
      Regime type average 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Hybrid (NL)=ref.
0.88 0.67 1.01 0.62 0.79 0.63 Social-democratic
1.64 0.98 0.94 1.59 1.56 1.59 Corporatist
1.99 1.12 0.98 2.19 2.02 2.16 Liberal
                          Source: Luxembourg Income Study (1999-2001)
is below all the social-democratic countries on the intensity index and the Shorrocks 
index. On the Sen index, the Netherlands comes in roughly the same place as Sweden, 
even though the poverty rate is substantially lower.
The corporatist countries still form a homogenous middle group, and the liberal coun-
tries have the highest scores. Australia is again that the poorest country according to the 
three indices. Its distance from the other countries however, is less than in the case of 
the incidence because of the low median income deficit and inequality. The United States 
climbs up the rankings somewhat: the poverty rate is not exceptionally high, but the 
income deficit and inequality are.
Based on these composite measures, the conclusion for the degree of poverty of the 
regime types is the same as for the incidence. Hypothesis 1 is sustained, with the differ-
ence between the liberal and corporatist group now being due not only to the high score 
of Australia, but also to that of the usa. In line with hypothesis 2, the corporatist coun-
tries score higher than the social-democratic cluster across the board on the composite 
measures. Once again, however, hypothesis 3 has to be rejected: the Netherlands does 
not attain lower, but higher scores than the social-democratic group on the composite 
poverty measures.
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Table 6.5 
Poverty indicators according to basic needs and modest but adequate criteria a
Basic needs poverty criterion 
Incidence Income Inequality Intensity Sen Shorrocks
 (% poor) defi cit of defi cits index index index
  (median %)  (Gini) 
 
   NL 5.5 25.2 0.256 1.4 2.5 2.8 
   SE 7.1 15.6 0.256 1.1 2.6 2.2 
   DK 2.7 13.1 0.231 0.4 0.9 0.7 
   NO 2.2 24.6 0.285 0.6 1.0 1.1 
   DE 8.1 20.7 0.234 1.7 3.2 3.3 
   BE 9.5 14.6 0.224 1.4 3.2 2.8 
   FR 10.9 16.3 0.216 1.8 3.8 3.6 
   UK 12.4 14.3 0.227 1.8 4.5 4.5 
   CA 8.4 21.8 0.239 1.8 3.1 3.0 
   AU 17.5 15.2 0.204 2.7 6.5 7.2 
   US 10.1 24.2 0.263 2.5 4.2 4.2 
  Regime type average         
   Hybrid (NL)=ref. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
   Social-democratic 0.72 0.71 1.00 0.48 0.62 0.49 
   Corporatist 1.72 0.68 0.88 1.16 1.38 1.17  
   Liberal 2.19 0.88 0.91 1.56 1.88 1.71 
a.  Assessed against equivalised disposable household income of persons, around 2000
(Table 6.5)
Modest but adequate poverty criterion 
Incidence Income Inequality Intensity Sen Shorrocks
(% poor) defi cit of defi cits index index index
 (median %)  (Gini) 
8.6 19.0 0.238 1.6 3.3 3.3 NL
12.2 15.2 0.246 1.9 4.4 3.8 SE
6.0 10.5 0.223 0.6 1.8 1.3 DK
4.5 12.4 0.252 0.6 1.5 1.1 NO
11.6 21.4 0.241 2.5 4.7 4.9 DE
13.9 16.5 0.213 2.3 4.8 4.6 BE
16.8 17.9 0.213 3.0 5.9 6.0 FR
18.7 17.6 0.219 3.3 6.7 6.6 UK
12.2 21.1 0.240 2.6 4.9 5.1 CA
23.9 20.9 0.211 5.0 9.0 9.7 AU
13.7 25.1 0.263 3.4 6.1 6.7 US
      Regime type average 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Hybrid (NL)=ref.
0.88 0.67 1.01 0.62 0.79 0.63 Social-democratic
1.64 0.98 0.94 1.59 1.56 1.59 Corporatist
1.99 1.12 0.98 2.19 2.02 2.16 Liberal
                          Source: Luxembourg Income Study (1999-2001)
Modest but adequate criterion
Applying the more generous modest but adequate criterion leads to similar conclusions. 
The ranking for incidence is virtually identical, being lowest in Norway and Denmark 
(5-6%), followed by the Netherlands (9%). Germany overtakes Sweden in the rankings on 
this measure, but the difference is not great: when rounded off, both countries score 12%. 
Canada has the same poverty rate as Sweden; Belgium and the usa score slightly higher 
(just under 14%). As with the lower threshold amount, the incidence of poverty is highest 
in France (16%), the United Kingdom (17%) and Australia (24%).
The differences are somewhat larger when it comes to income deficits. These are 
no longer highest in Norway and the Netherlands, but in the United States. Australia 
undergoes a relatively sharp increase on this indicator. The country differences in the 
inequality of deficits are even smaller than with the basic needs criterion. On the three 
composite measures, Norway now scores lowest across the board, while the Netherlands 
consistently comes below Sweden. Australia again records by far the highest score on the 
three indices.
Hypothesis 1 receives most support with the three composite measures, with three of the 
four liberal countries (with Canada as the exception) coming consistently higher than 
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Germany, Belgium and France. The average incidence in the liberal group is also higher 
than in the corporatist regime types (+3.0 percentage points), but as with the basic needs 
criterion this is due mainly to the high scores of Australia and the United Kingdom. The 
income deficits and the inequality in them reveal no systematic difference between the 
liberal and corporatist regime types.
Hypothesis 2 also receives the most support based on the indices, with all social-
democratic countries coming below all corporatist countries (though on the Sen index 
the difference between Sweden on the one hand and Germany and Belgium on the other 
is not very large). When it comes to the incidence, the differences between the groups 
are mostly in line with expectations as well (except for the positions of Sweden and 
Germany). On average the between cluster difference equals 6.5 percentage points. The 
median income deficits in the social-democratic countries are somewhat smaller than 
in the corporatist group, as expected; but this does not apply for the inequality of the 
deficits.
Hypothesis 3 is not supported on the basis of the incidence and the three composite 
measures: the Netherlands comes substantially higher than Norway and Denmark in all 
cases. On average, the incidence in the social-democratic group is 1 percentage point less 
than in the hybrid regime. The median income deficit in the Netherlands also runs con-
trary to expectations, being greater than in the three social-democratic countries. The 
differences in inequality of deficits are negligible.
In sum, regardless of the level of the poverty line chosen, support is found for hypotheses 
1 and 2 based on the incidence and the three indices, and also partially on the grounds of 
income deficits. By contrast, hypothesis 3 is not supported by any indicator.
It is however questionable whether this straightforward, bivariate comparison of the 
poverty indicators is empirically sound; the countries studied here may differ from each 
other in more respects than the regime type. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the 
impact of the regime types on poverty, a model-based approach is required.
6.7.4 Explaining the poverty incidence: multi-level models
The regime types are theoretically not the only determinants of the differences in 
poverty; other macro-characteristics, such as differences in national prosperity, can have 
an influence as well. It is also possible that characteristics at lower scale levels explain 
part of the differences in the national poverty figures: characteristics of individuals and 
households at micro-level, labour relations and administrative processes at meso-level, 
and so on. Multi-level analysis is the most appropriate technique for establishing the 
influence of such hierarchically ordered causal factors (see e.g. Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
This technique starts from the premise that the spread in the dependent variable stems 
from a number of nested sources: pupils in schools in neighbourhoods, employees in 
companies in countries, patients in hospitals in regions, and so on. The total variance in 
the dependent variable is decomposed across the different levels. At each level it is then 
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possible to assess to what extent independent characteristics (age of the patient, size of 
the hospital, population density of the region, etc.) are able to predict the specific part 
of the variance. Unlike in the previous chapter, multi-level analysis can be applied here, 
because data on poverty and its potential determinants are available for persons living in 
households in the various countries. By contrast, the figures on benefit dependency were 
only available at aggregated country level.
In order to determine the pure influence of the regime types, a number of multi-level 
models were developed. In each case, being poor or not being poor (the incidence) is the 
dependent variable. The income deficits of the poor and the inequality therein are left 
out of consideration here. In many countries the number of observations for multi-level 
analyses with these variables as dependent is too small, due to the fact that the non-poor 
are by definition ignored with these criteria81. Moreover, as stated the between country 
variance is much more limited as regards the income deficits and the inequality than for 
the incidence of poverty.
When dealing with a dichotomous dependent variable (such as poor/not poor), 
multi-level logistical regression is the most appropriate technique to use. If an ordinary 
regression analysis were to be performed on such a variable, the probabilities predicted 
by the model may become smaller than 0 or greater than 1. In the logistical approach 
this is avoided by taking the logarithm of the odds ratios (in this case: the probability 
that someone is poor, divided by the probability that they are not) as a starting point. 
A predicted value of 0 in such a model indicates that the independent variable has no 
effect. In that case the probability that someone is poor is the same as the probabil-
ity that they are not (p=0.50); the odds ratio is therefore equal to 1, and its logarithm 
is 0. In logistic regression models, a negative coefficient implies a low probability of 
the dependent trait to occur; a positive coefficient points to an increased risk (e.g. -4.6 
 corresponds with an estimated probability of being poor of 0.01, while +4.6 equals a 
probability of 0.99).
For technical reasons, only two levels are distinguished in the models: persons in 
countries. This is because the lis data could only be analysed via remote access using 
standard software, and the available version of the Stata software package did not allow 
more than two levels of analysis82. Two problems arose here: the program is not good 
at dealing with weighted data, and a correction had to be applied for the fact that some 
people were members of the same household. This was resolved by drawing physical 
subsamples of equal size (approx. 1,225 persons in each country, making a total of over 
13,000 observations), in proportion to the household weight and minimising the number 
of persons originating from the same household83.
At level 1 (persons), the models incorporate five explanatory characteristics. One of 
these is a pure person variable, namely age. Dummy variables were used here for three 
age categories, with 30-59 year-olds as the reference group. The other variables were 
household characteristics that are attributed to the person: number of earners, number 
of children, (not) living in a single-parent family, and (not) belonging to a poorly edu-
cated household. The latter is the case where the head and – if present – partner have 
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completed an education no higher than level 2 of the unesco International Standard 
Classification of Education (isced 97), i.e. no higher than lower secondary education or 
initial vocational training84.
The number of explanatory characteristics at level 2 had to be restricted because the 
number of countries is fairly small. National prosperity was measured on the basis of gdp 
per head of the population (which in this analysis is not regarded as an endogenous char-
acteristic of the regime types)85. A number of variants for the regime classification were 
tested in separate models: the country scores on the two dimensions in figure 4.2 (scope 
and universalism), the scores on the institutional poverty risk index (ipri), and dummy 
variables for the three regime types and the hybrid Dutch system. Based on the analysis in 
§6.6, it would be expected that the scores on the ipri would provide the best explanation 
for the poverty incidences. The dummy variables make it possible to test the hypotheses 
formulated there, but would be expected to have less explanatory power than the ipri.
Table 6.6 presents the outcomes of seven multi-level logistical regression models for the 
risk of poverty based on the modest but adequate criterion86. In the unconditional hierarchi-
cal model (model 1) no explanatory factors are incorporated; this ‘empty’ model serves as 
a reference point. It can be deduced from this that most of the unexplained variance87 in 
the dependent variable is at the lowest level, that of the persons; only 7.5% of the variance 
is related to country level.
In model 2 the person variables discussed earlier (level 1) and per capita gdp (level 2) are 
added. The proportion of explained variance is 0.38. Most of this is attributable to person 
variables88; but at level 2 the proportion of unexplained variance (0.029) is much lower 
than in the empty model. All coefficients are statistically significant, with the exception 
of the effect of gender (and the constant).
At level 2 the expected relationship is found: the more prosperous a country is, the 
lower the risk of poverty. At person level the effects also operate in the expected direc-
tion. The poverty risk rises as the number of earners reduces, the number of children 
increases, and if people belong to single-parent families or households whose head and 
partner (where present) have a low education level. Measured by age, the poverty inci-
dence relative to 30-59 year-olds is high among children younger than 18 and young peo-
ple aged 18-30 years. The latter group excludes students living outside the home; the effect 
thus mainly reflects the lower earnings of working young people and their higher risk of 
unemployment, often coupled with low benefits. The over-60s are poor significantly less 
often than 30-59 year-olds, mainly because of the correction for the number of earners, 
which is smaller on average in this group. After controlling for the effect of the charac-
teristics cited, the influence of gender is negligible. Based on the z-values (not shown in 
table), the number of earners is the most important variable at level 1. The number of 
children, a low-educated household and the 18-30 years age group roughly exert the same 
influence on poverty and rank second. The pure effects of single-parent families and 0-17 
year-olds are the least important, though unlike the effects of the gender variable they 
are statistically significant.
Table 6.6 
Multi-level logistic regression models  a
                                            Model b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 uncondi-  level 1 level 1 level 1 level 1 level 1 level 1
 tional hier- + gdp/cap + gdp/cap + gdp/cap + gdp/cap + gdp/cap - gdp/cap
 archical  + regime + institutio- + regime + regime + regime
   model     dimen- nal poverty    type    type    type
      sions risk index (ref.=LIB) (ref.=SD) (ref. =SD)
  Level 2 variables       
GDP per capita (* 1000 US $)  -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Scope (regime dimension 1)   -0.31    
Universalism (regime dimension 2)   0.01    
Institutional poverty risk index    0.52   
Hybrid regime type c     -1.02 -0.40 -0.14
Social-democratic regime type c     -0.63 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00
Corporatist regime type c     -0.54 0.09 0.48
Liberal regime type c     ref.= 0.00 0.63 0.89
  Level 1 variables       
Age < 18 years c  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Age 18-30 years c  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Age 30-59 years  ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00
Age > 60 years c  -0.59 -0.58 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59
Number of earners  -1.57 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57
Number of children  0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Single parent  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27
Gender  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Low level of education  0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Constant -2.00 0.69  0.55 0.75 0.97 0.34 -1.01
  Fit indicators       
Prop. explained variance (level 1+2) 0.000 0.384 0.401 0.408 0.401 0.401 0.395
Prop. unexplained variance (level 1) 0.925 0.587 0.588 0.587 0.591 0.591 0.592
Prop. unexplained variance (level 2) 0.075 0.029 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.014
Residual intraclass correlation (rho) 0.075 0.047 0.018 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.023
       
Log Likelihood -5038.4 -3994.5 -3989.5 -3986.5 -3988.4 -3988.4 -3990.7
∆ –2 Log Likelihood (∆ df); 
   ref.=model 2 . . 10.0 (2) 16.0 (1) 12.2 (3) 12.2 (3) .
Probability . . 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 .
       
Wald χ  2 . 1431.9 1450.4 1468.7 1457.3 1457.3 1448.7
Probability  . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆ Wald χ 2 (∆ df); ref.=model 2 . . 18.5 (2) 36.9 (1) 25.4 (3) 25.4 (3) .
Probability . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
number of persons
   (level 1 observations) 13483 13483 13483 13483 13483 13483 13483
number of countries 
   (level 2 observations) 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
number of persons in countries 
   (range)  1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232
a.  Dependent variable: non-poor/poor according to modest but adequate poverty line.
b.  Changes in comparison with previous model are printed in bold.
c.  Dummy variable.
Coeffi cients printed in italics are not signifi cant at p<.05
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (1999-2001)
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Table 6.6 
Multi-level logistic regression models  a
                                            Model b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 uncondi-  level 1 level 1 level 1 level 1 level 1 level 1
 tional hier- + gdp/cap + gdp/cap + gdp/cap + gdp/cap + gdp/cap - gdp/cap
 archical  + regime + institutio- + regime + regime + regime
   model     dimen- nal poverty    type    type    type
      sions risk index (ref.=LIB) (ref.=SD) (ref. =SD)
  Level 2 variables       
GDP per capita (* 1000 US $)  -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Scope (regime dimension 1)   -0.31    
Universalism (regime dimension 2)   0.01    
Institutional poverty risk index    0.52   
Hybrid regime type c     -1.02 -0.40 -0.14
Social-democratic regime type c     -0.63 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00
Corporatist regime type c     -0.54 0.09 0.48
Liberal regime type c     ref.= 0.00 0.63 0.89
  Level 1 variables       
Age < 18 years c  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Age 18-30 years c  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Age 30-59 years  ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00 ref.= 0.00
Age > 60 years c  -0.59 -0.58 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59
Number of earners  -1.57 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57 -1.57
Number of children  0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Single parent  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27
Gender  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Low level of education  0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Constant -2.00 0.69  0.55 0.75 0.97 0.34 -1.01
  Fit indicators       
Prop. explained variance (level 1+2) 0.000 0.384 0.401 0.408 0.401 0.401 0.395
Prop. unexplained variance (level 1) 0.925 0.587 0.588 0.587 0.591 0.591 0.592
Prop. unexplained variance (level 2) 0.075 0.029 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.014
Residual intraclass correlation (rho) 0.075 0.047 0.018 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.023
       
Log Likelihood -5038.4 -3994.5 -3989.5 -3986.5 -3988.4 -3988.4 -3990.7
∆ –2 Log Likelihood (∆ df); 
   ref.=model 2 . . 10.0 (2) 16.0 (1) 12.2 (3) 12.2 (3) .
Probability . . 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 .
       
Wald χ  2 . 1431.9 1450.4 1468.7 1457.3 1457.3 1448.7
Probability  . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆ Wald χ 2 (∆ df); ref.=model 2 . . 18.5 (2) 36.9 (1) 25.4 (3) 25.4 (3) .
Probability . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
number of persons
   (level 1 observations) 13483 13483 13483 13483 13483 13483 13483
number of countries 
   (level 2 observations) 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
number of persons in countries 
   (range)  1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232 1224-1232
a.  Dependent variable: non-poor/poor according to modest but adequate poverty line.
b.  Changes in comparison with previous model are printed in bold.
c.  Dummy variable.
Coeffi cients printed in italics are not signifi cant at p<.05
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (1999-2001)
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In models 3, 4, 5 and 6 a number of variants of the regime typology were then introduced 
at the second level. Since the group of countries studied here does not exhibit very strong 
correlations between national wealth and regime type, these additions to the model do 
not lead to multicollinearity problems. The explained variance is higher in all cases than 
in the model incorporating only per capita gdp. The other indicators also suggest a better 
fit: the log likelihood is lower and the Wald χ 2 higher than in model 2, and the differences 
compared with that model are statistically significant89 in all cases.
 In model 3 the country scores on the two separate regime dimensions in figure 4.2 – 
scope and universalism – are added as explanatory characteristics at the second level. The 
proportion of unexplained variance at level 2 now falls to 0.010. Only the first dimension 
is found to have a statistically significant effect: a more extensive system reduces the risk 
of poverty, even after controlling for the level of wealth. The degree of universality (the 
second dimension) has no influence, however: this effect is negligible and not statisti-
cally significant.
In model 4 the score on the institutional poverty risk index is included as a determinant. 
Here again, the effect operates in the expected direction: the higher the score on the 
index, the greater the extent of poverty. However, the fit is better than in the previous 
model, as borne out by the lower proportion of unexplained variance at level 2 (0.005), 
the lower log likelihood and the higher Wald χ 2. As expected, therefore, the institutional 
poverty risk index explains the empirical differences in poverty incidence in the coun-
tries somewhat better than the scope and degree of universalism of the regime.
Models 5 and 6 contain separate dummy variables for the regime types at level 2, with 
the liberal and social-democratic type, respectively, as reference group. This enables 
the hypotheses formulated earlier to be tested in a targeted way. As expected, these 
models fare slightly less well with the empirical data than model 4. The proportion of 
unexplained variance at the second level is 0.008, and the log likelihood and Wald χ 2 are 
between those of model 3 and 4. The model with the institutional poverty risk index thus 
has the greatest explanatory power, as predicted. What is however striking is that the fit 
of the models with dummy variables is slightly better than the model with the dimen-
sions of the original regime typology. These dimensions thus do not have exceptional 
explanatory power; in section 6.5 it was argued that they are also theoretically less suit-
able for testing the relationship between regime type and poverty.
Based on model 5, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. As expected, after correction for 
per capita gdp, the poverty incidence in the corporatist regime type is significantly lower 
than in the liberal countries. Remarkably enough, the difference between the two country 
groups is greater after correction for national wealth than before. This can be deduced 
from the coefficients in model 7, in which per capita gdp is omitted. Here, the low poverty 
rates in Canada and the usa push down the average poverty rate in the liberal cluster, while 
the higher poverty rate in Australia pushes it up. The outcomes in model 5 suggest that this 
is partially due to differences in prosperity. The North American countries are richer than 
Rules of Relief_14.indd   416 21-9-2009   15:09:33
417p o v e r t y
   6
the corporatist countries, while Australia is poorer; and if this is taken into account, the 
average gap in poverty rates between the two regime types widens somewhat.
Model 5 also shows that poverty in the social-democratic cluster is lower than in the 
corporatist group, and that the hybrid Dutch regime type scores lowest. This ranking is 
in line with expectations, but it emerges from model 6 that the differences vis-à-vis the 
social-democratic group are not statistically significant. For hypothesis 2, it is interesting 
to compare the outcomes with those of model 7, which does not contain per capita gdp. 
In that case the poverty incidence in the corporatist countries is significantly higher than 
in the social-democratic group, and hypothesis 2 can thus not be rejected. In model 6, 
however, the hypothesis received no support: after correction for differences in national 
wealth, the difference still operates in the expected direction, but is no longer statisti-
cally significant. Substantively, the multi-level analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
corporatist group does indeed have a higher poverty incidence than the social-demo-
cratic regime type, as expected, but that this is to some extent due to differences in pros-
perity. In Norway, in particular, but also in Denmark, per capita gdp was significantly 
higher than in Germany, France and Belgium. Although the pure difference between 
these regime types operates in the expected direction, it is modest and insignificant in 
statistical terms.
It is also useful to compare the outcomes of model 6 and model 7 with regard to 
hypothesis 3. If no allowance is made for variations in national wealth (model 7), the 
Netherlands has a slightly lower poverty rate than the social-democratic group of coun-
tries, but the effect is not significant. However, it turns out that this difference is miti-
gated because per capita gdp in the social-democratic group is higher on average than 
in the Netherlands. Correcting for this (model 6) produces a greater gap between the 
hybrid regime and the social-democratic cluster, though yet again this is not statistically 
significant.
Taking the analyses as a whole, it is apparent that there is little variance in the incidence 
of poverty at the level of the countries. The combination of regime characteristics and 
per capita gdp does however explain a large part of the limited level 2 variance (models 
3-6) and leads to a better fit than the models in which the two macro-variables are incor-
porated separately (2 and 7).
Substantively, only hypothesis 1 is not rejected in these analyses: the liberal regime 
generates more poverty than the corporatist (and substantially more than the social-dem-
ocratic and hybrid regimes). Hypotheses 2 and 3 receive insufficient support in the multi-
level analyses and must therefore be rejected. The differences operate in the expected 
direction, but the pure regime effects are not statistically significant. It should be noted 
here that on the theoretical institutional poverty risk index the differences between the 
liberal and corporatist countries are greatest as well (there is a gap of 0.82 between the 
average scores on the index). The distances between the social-democratic and corporat-
ist countries, and between the social-democratic cluster and the hybrid Dutch regime, 
are smaller on the index (respectively 0.54 and 0.40). The fact that it is precisely hypoth-
eses 2 and 3 that have to be rejected is therefore somewhat understandable: the theo-
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retical differences between the regime types are smaller according to the ipri than in 
hypothesis 1, and this may explain why the differences in the poverty incidence are not 
large enough (after controlling for the divergent levels of national wealth) to be statisti-
cally significant.
6.8 Conclusions
This chapter explored whether the social security regime types identified in chapter 4 
differ in the degree of poverty they produce. Since the definition of poverty in the theo-
retical and empirical literature has an ambiguous status, the chapter first explored what 
should be understood by the term theoretically.
The construct of poverty
Several choices arise in a theoretical construct of poverty. Should deficits be seen in terms 
of welfare, capabilities or resources? Are they relative or absolute, i.e. should the deficits 
be measured in relation to a certain reference group or not? And where should the line 
be drawn between the poor and the non-poor? A choice was made for a number of simple 
theoretical principles:
– Poverty is about the minimum necessities within a community. This may include both 
simple ‘basic needs’ (food, clothing, housing) and things which can be seen rather 
as capabilities (e.g. the possibility of taking part in social life) – with the qualifying 
comments that the definition of poverty must constantly refer to the prevailing socio-
historical minimum in the community, and that overly broad definitions are not cred-
ible. Three elements are included in the minimum necessities: things which are indis-
pensable for the physical survival of the actor within the socio-historical community; 
the economic duties that are established in the formal institutions (e.g. taxation); 
and material obligations which ensue from the informal institutions within the com-
munity, if infringement attracts heavy sanctions (e.g. not being allowed into school 
because one cannot afford the uniform).
 – Poverty makes it impossible for a person to achieve the minimal necessities with the 
available resources. The presence or absence of resources (income, financial assets, 
education level) should not form part of the definition of poverty; but such resources 
are important in assessing whether or not poverty exists, as they offer an indication of 
the ability to achieve the indispensable communal minimum.
– Poverty relates to absolute deficits. If someone is unable to achieve the minimum 
necessities within their community they are poor, regardless of what others have or do 
not have. The absolute standard is flexible, though. It refers to what is the minimum 
necessary within a certain community at a certain point in time, and this implies that 
the standard may change, for example due to technological developments (new prod-
ucts), different supply and demand (e.g. growing scarcity) or alterations in the formal 
and informal institutions (e.g. taxation, social norms).
– A threshold value for the absolute standard can be determined if the minimum neces-
sities can be valorised in terms of the available resources. This can be done, for exam-
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ple, by converting the monetary value of a certain minimum basket of goods into the 
required disposable income. If the necessities cannot be valorised, it is not possible to 
determine a threshold.
Based on these principles, a theoretical definition of poverty was suggested: An individual 
actor is poor if he consistently lacks the means to obtain the minimum necessities of his community. This 
implies among other things that collective actors (e.g. businesses, governments) cannot 
be poor, and that the lack of means has to relate to a minimum period of time (e.g., a 
calendar year).
With regard to three other elements from the theoretical poverty debate – should the 
deficits of the poor be compensated; is the government responsible for this; and which 
conditions should be attached to compensation? – it was observed that no satisfactory 
general statements can be made from a sociological perspective. Following Coleman 
(1990), there is no ‘right division of rights’; rights, and the associated obligations, condi-
tions and sanctions, are always constructed within a certain historical community. The 
course of this institutionalisation process theoretically depends on changes in relative 
prices, power relations, conflicts of interest and ideals within that community. From this 
institutional perspective, poverty cannot be seen in isolation from the community in 
question; it is an endogenous issue, which cannot be resolved by adopting an exogenous 
standpoint, such as the abstract rational actor operating behind Rawls’ (1999 [1971]) ‘veil 
of ignorance’ or in Dworkin’s (2000) ‘hypothetical insurance market’. Rather than rack-
ing one’s brains about the true nature of poverty and the universally fairest way of tack-
ling the poverty problem, it is important to investigate how combating poverty is actually 
institutionalised in various contexts, and what effects this has.
Operational poverty lines
The chapter then investigated whether, given the theoretical demarcation, it was possible 
to find a suitable operational criterion for measuring poverty. The existing poverty lines 
used in empirical research were classified on the basis of three criteria: is the poverty 
line absolute or relative? Is it based on available resources or actual consumption and 
possession? And is poverty determined by ‘outsiders’ (objective: experts, policymakers) 
or by those involved (subjective: citizens, the poor)? Combining the dichotomies creates 
a typology of eight types of poverty line. The most commonly occurring were assessed 
on the basis of four criteria: validity, reliability, ease of application and socio-political 
relevance (or normative credibility). With regard to the latter, it is important to note that 
Australian and Dutch opinion research suggests that most people see poverty as an abso-
lute shortage of necessities, not as a relative disadvantage compared with an average citi-
zen. The absolute deficits are delineated rather strictly: for most people, poverty is about 
shortages at a fairly basic level, according to the standard that applies in their own soci-
ety. Higher needs and capabilities are not rated as such, and therefore tend to be excluded 
from the public notion of poverty.
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The analysis based on the above assessment criteria led among other things to the con-
clusion that relative poverty lines are not valid given the theoretical definition advocated 
here. The most commonly used variants of this type, namely the poverty line that equates 
to 60% of median income and the relative deprivation index, are moreover not satisfac-
tory in terms of reliability and normative persuasiveness. Subjective income thresholds 
– particularly the methods which rely on the Minimum Income Question and the Income 
Evaluation Question – sometimes fit better with the theoretical conceptualisation; how-
ever, they suffer from major reliability problems which lead to unstable or unrealistically 
high poverty rates in empirical research. The objective expert budget method, finally, 
is valid, fairly reliable and credible. However, it is not simple to apply due to its labour-
intensive nature; and the often limited differentiation of budget standards by household 
types makes it hard to derive poverty thresholds covering the entire population. Moreo-
ver, at present the approach is not suitable for comparative analyses of poverty, as inter-
national budget standards based on a common methodology are not yet available.
The generalised budget approach to poverty
An alternative poverty line was subsequently introduced; it can be described as a gen-
eralised budget approach, and was originally developed for the Netherlands (cf. Soede, 
2006; Soede & Vrooman, 2007, 2008b). Based on the detailed budget inventories pub-
lished by the Dutch National Institute for Budgetary Information, two reference budgets 
for a single person were first constructed. The ‘basic needs’ level incorporates costs that 
are virtually unavoidable for food, clothing, housing (e.g. rent, insurance, energy, water, 
telephone, furnishings, home maintenance and local taxes) and a few other expenditure 
items (such as transport, extra medical expenses, personal care and washing agents). This 
resulted in a sparse but complete budget which in principle makes it possible to run a 
household independently. The second reference budget, the ‘modest but adequate’ vari-
ant, allows scope for a few expenditure items which go beyond what is strictly unavoid-
able (recreation, memberships and subscriptions, a pet), but without any luxury (such as 
a car or foreign holiday).
The reference budgets were then generalised using equivalence factors to create two 
variants of the initial poverty line for the Netherlands. Following the recommendations 
of the us National Academy of Sciences, the threshold amounts over time have been 
determined by indexing the initial norms to the three-year moving average in median 
expenditure on the basic items food, drink (excluding alcohol), clothing and housing. 
This leads to an increase in the threshold amounts which exceeds price inflation, but lags 
behind the growth in national wealth and median income.
Like the expert budget method, this threshold reflects the absolute nature of pov-
erty, and establishes a clear link with what is necessary at a given time and place. The 
threshold amounts refer to people’s consumption possibilities, not to their actual con-
sumption; and the limits have a meaningful interpretation, they are not ‘fetishistic’. As 
a result, the threshold provides valid coverage of the theoretical definition of poverty 
applied here. This poverty line is probably also relevant for policymakers and citizens, 
since the two variants fit in well with the subjective perceptions of poverty among the 
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population. In contrast to the traditional expert budget method, the new threshold is not 
especially labour-intensive, which means it lends itself well for use in practical research.
For the Netherlands, this approach led to a plausible and readily interpretable trend in 
poverty rates in the period 1985-2005. Subsequently, the threshold amounts in around 
2000 were converted into similar norms for the ten other countries using purchasing 
power parities. Based on a sensitivity analysis, a slightly different equivalence scale was 
chosen for the comparative norms than in the original Dutch poverty line. The ranking of 
the countries in terms of poverty rates proved to be fairly stable when applying a variety 
of equivalence scales.
Postulated relationships between regime types and poverty
This translation of the Dutch threshold amounts to the other countries made it possi-
ble to test a number of hypotheses concerning the relationship between social security 
regime types and poverty according to the generalised budget approach. The hypotheses 
were constructed on the basis of the country scores on a theoretical institutional pov-
erty risk index (ipri; cf. figure 6.3); this index indicates to what extent the  formal social 
security institutions of different countries are conducive to the risk of poverty, all other 
circumstances (wealth, demographic composition, etc.) being equal. The expectations 
were that
(1) In countries with a liberal social security regime (Australia, Canada, uk and usa), pov-
erty is higher than in countries with a regime of the corporatist type (Belgium, France 
and Germany);
(2) In countries with a corporatist social security regime, poverty is higher than in coun-
tries with a regime of the social-democratic type (Denmark, Norway and Sweden);
(3) In countries with a social-democratic social security regime, poverty is higher than in 
the hybrid Dutch regime.
Empirical results
Based on adapted data from the Luxembourg Income Study, a bivariate analysis was first 
performed on the ‘three I’s of poverty’: the incidence, income deficit and inequality of 
poverty. The scores on a number of composite measures, in which all three aspects of 
poverty are expressed, were also calculated. Hypotheses 1 and 2 received support on the 
basis of the poverty incidence and the indices, and to some extent were also sustained on 
the grounds of the income deficits. Hypothesis 3, by contrast, received no support in any 
of the bivariate analyses.
A multi-level logistical regression analysis was then performed, with the poverty 
incidence on the basis of the ‘modest but adequate’ criterion as the dependent variable. 
This enabled the pure effects of the regime types to be determined whilst controlling 
for other characteristics in which the countries differ, and also to test whether the dif-
ferences between the regime types were statistically significant. It emerged from this 
that only a small proportion of the variance in the poverty incidence is related to dif-
ferences at the country level (7.5%); the rest consists of differences between individual 
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persons. The limited variance at the country level could however be largely explained 
by the model variables, whereby the differences between the countries in the scores on 
the institutional poverty risk index and national wealth (measured by per capita gdp) 
both made an independent contribution. After correcting for the impact of differences 
in national prosperity, the effects of the regime types on the poverty rate all operated in 
the theoretically postulated direction. The difference between the liberal and corporatist 
groups was found to be statistically significant, so that hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 received insufficient support in this analysis, however; although the 
differences found were in line with expectations, the pure regime effects were statisti-
cally too weak.
As in chapter 5, therefore, it appears that divergent sets of coherent formal institutions in 
similar circumstances generate different outcomes. The abstract classification of coun-
tries in terms of social security regime types has the postulated impact on the ‘produc-
tion of poverty’; however, the effects are modest and sometimes negligible in statisti-
cal terms. This calls for a reconsideration of the central theme of this study in the final 
chapter.
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Annex 1
Construction of the institutional poverty risk index
The same procedure was used for the construction of the institutional poverty risk index 
(ipri) as for the ‘benefit dependency boost index’ in the previous chapter. The criterion 
is related to some degree to the inverse of the de-commodification score calculated by 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 47-54). The underlying theoretical notions are however different. 
Corporatist systems are for example relatively highly ‘commodified’, because a person’s 
position on the labour market and their employment history play an important role in the 
allocation of benefit rights. This does not however mean by definition that such systems 
will in theory generate more poverty. If elderly people and widows in a corporatist system 
are assured of a generous pension, their poverty risk can in principle be lower than in a 
‘de-commodified’ system with a universal but low basic income for every citizen. In addi-
tion, there are a number of practical differences between the ipri and Esping-Andersen’s 
de-commodification score: the data used are more recent, they cover more aspects of 
social security, and the components of the index are added together in a different way90.
The analysis performed here incorporates 49 characteristics of collective old age 
pensions; statutory social insurance benefits and provisions for the unemployed, the dis-
abled, and surviving dependants; social assistance; and family benefits (excluding child-
care; see oecd, 2002: 13-17). For each of these arrangements, the extent to which rights 
are allocated that are theoretically important for the degree of poverty was assessed in 
the 11 countries concerned: the intended target group, the level of benefits (especially at 
the lower end of the scale), the method of indexation, any conditions attaching to the 
rights (job search requirements, means testing, residency, employment history) and the 
maximum duration of benefit. The formal institutions studied were as follows:
Old age pension (9 variables):
a) coverage: entitlement of persons with/without labour experience;
b) levels: net replacement rates at three lower income levels (50%-100% average produc-
tion worker); mode of indexation of first, second pillar pension; target full mandatory 
pension for a single person;
c) conditions: number of labour years required for a full pension in the second tier public 
scheme.
Unemployment (7 variables):
a) coverage: covered unemployed persons (inhabitants, employees, certain employees 
only); percentage of unemployed receiving benefits;
b) levels: statutory benefit rate of unemployment insurance; net replacement rate for a 
single person in the first month of unemployment (two lower income levels);
c) conditions: minimum qualifying period (contributions, work history) for entitlement;
d) duration: maximum duration in months.
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Social assistance (14 variables):
a) coverage: restrictions based on nationality, residency, or period of residence;
b) levels: net replacement rates after five years without gainful employment (three family 
types); maximum statutory benefit amounts (three family types); indexation of ben-
efits (prices, wages, mix);
c) conditions: strictness of work test; income test; assets test; inclusion of private home 
in assets test; minimum age to qualify for a full benefit;
d) duration: maximum duration in months.
Disability (9 variables):
a) coverage: group eligible for sickness leave, work-related and social disability benefits;
b) levels: benefit level in case of work-related and social disability; indexation of work-
related benefits;
c) conditions: minimum threshold work-related and social disability; minimum period 
of affiliation in case of social disability.
Survivor’s benefits (7 variables):
a) coverage: scope of widow’s pension; separate orphan’s pension;
b) levels: benefit level of widows of residents, employees (long term benefits);
c) conditions: means testing; exclusion in case of remarriage/cohabitation with new 
partner;
d) duration: maximum benefit period for dependent spouse, below age 65.
Family benefits (3 variables):
a) coverage: benefits for dependent children of residents, employees, or none;
b) levels: benefit amount 1st child;
c) conditions: means testing.
Categorical principal component analysis (CatPCA, see chapter 4) was applied to each 
arrangement to examine whether the items correlated in such a way that they could be 
reduced to one or more underlying dimensions. Variables which produced scale scores 
on these dimensions that were not in line with their theoretical impact on poverty have 
been treated separately. For example, the indicators for social assistance were split up 
into a ‘performance’ scale (levels + duration, 8 items, Cronbach’s alpha= 0.95), a scale 
with a number of conditions (3 items, Cronbach’s alpha= 0.67) and three individual indi-
cators (the coverage, the income test, and the minimum age to qualify for full benefit). 
A total score was calculated for each set of indicators, taking into account the number of 
characteristics included. The constituent indices thus obtained were then standardised 
and added together to produce a total score.
In calculating the total score, weighting factors were applied to reflect the average 
importance of the scheme types across all countries. These factors were determined on 
the grounds of:
a) the average take-up of each type of scheme in the period 1995-1999 among the popula-
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tion aged 15 years and older, as this emerged from the volume figures in the previous 
chapter and (for family benefits, assuming full take-up) the proportion of households 
with children;
b) the share of potential users of the arrangement among people at the bottom end of the 
income distribution (the lowest three deciles);
c) the share of the income source (pension, unemployment benefit, etc.) in the total 
income.
Pension arrangements carry the most weight in the total index (34%), followed by social 
assistance (29%). Unemployment benefits have roughly half the weight of pension 
arrangements (18%), disability benefits are about three times as low (11%). Family benefits 
(5%) and survivor’s benefits (4%) are of relatively subordinate importance91.
The institutional poverty risk index probably gives a good picture of the theoretical likeli-
hood of poverty in the regime types and the individual countries, because it includes the 
elements of the formal rules that are particularly relevant for poverty of all major social 
security schemes. Naturally, a different approach is also possible. It could for example be 
argued that fewer arrangements should be taken into account because the degree of pro-
tection against poverty in a given country is determined mainly by the provisions which 
establish the collective ‘bottom line’, such as old-age pensions for people who have never 
worked, social assistance benefit and family benefits. This is in line with the de-com-
modification interpretation of Esping-Andersen, who considered it important how well 
people are protected regardless of their relationship with the labour market. However, 
such an approach ignores the fact that in some countries the protection against poverty 
is achieved largely via social insurance arrangements for the unemployed, the disabled 
and survivors. If the social assistance benefits are rather spartan, this is then less prob-
lematic from the perspective of poverty, because not many people are dependent on this 
provision. In addition, it should be noted that in fact old-age pensions, social assistance 
and family benefits do weigh heavily in the total index (two-thirds of the total weight).
Alternatively, one could posit that more social security arrangements should have 
been included in the analysis, for example by adding employee benefits (leave arrange-
ments, maternity/paternity leave, childcare facilities). It was decided not to do that here, 
however, because these arrangements are often temporary or supplementary in nature 
and are taken up mainly by a group with a low risk of poverty.
Consideration could also be given to including characteristics of the institutionali-
sation of the labour market, such as the degree of legal protection against dismissal. 
The theoretical impact of such arrangements on poverty is however difficult to indicate 
in advance. An extensive system of employment protection may guard working people 
against a severe loss of income, and can thus prevent poverty. At the same time, however, 
it could lead to an increasing poverty risk among the unemployed; employers may be 
less inclined to hire them permanently, out of fear of not being able to fire them when 
things go wrong. From a theoretical point of view, the net effect on the poverty rate is 
hard to determine in advance. Something similar applies for a labour market policy of 
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active integration. If a country spends a good deal on such an activating policy, it is not 
certain that this will lead to a reduction in poverty; that will depend on the effectiveness 
of the measures and the income gains that are achieved. If, for example, an active labour 
market policy induces people systematically to perform subsidised work for a wage that 
is barely above the level of their previous benefit, they have become more active, and 
benefit dependency will fall; but this has no discernible influence on the poverty figures 
if many people merely experience a transition from being non-working poor to working 
poor.
It would on the other hand be desirable to add certain supplementary benefits to the 
index, such as housing benefits and one-off social assistance to cover special expenses, 
but it was decided not to do this for practical reasons (limited availability of compara-
tive data). In any event, their supplementary nature would obviously imply that these 
arrangements would have had only a limited weight in the total index, so that the picture 
presented here would probably not change radically if they were to be included.
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7  The collective significance of social security institutions
One of the central ideas of the ‘new institutional economics’ is that the rules created 
within a society matter for the outcomes brought about at the communal level. Although 
mechanisms of supply and demand are of great importance in transacting, markets are 
not self-regulating in the sense that they automatically lead to economically optimal 
outcomes. On the contrary, if the desired collective results are to be achieved, even the 
most liberal society is bound to impose some kind of regulation, in the form of legally 
enforceable contracts, a system of mutual trust between traders and customers, or other 
institutions. Stiglitz (2006: xiv, 189-190) phrases it like this:
The eminent eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith has often been misunderstood. He 
argued that individuals, in pursuing their self-interest, would advance the broader interests 
of society: that incentives to outcompete rivals would lead to lower costs and to the produc-
tion of goods consumers wanted, and that consumers, and society more generally, would 
benefit from both. [… Thus] markets and the pursuit of self-interest would lead, as if by an 
invisible hand, to economic efficiency. […] However, even Smith realized that in an unfettered 
market economy private incentives are often not aligned with social costs and benefits – and 
when that happens, the pursuit of self-interest will not result in the well-being of society. […] 
Research on the economics of information showed that whenever information is imperfect, 
in particular when there are information asymmetries – where some individuals know some-
thing that others do not (in other words, always) – the reason that the invisible hand seems 
invisible is that it is not there. […] Market failures arise whenever there are externalities, con-
sequences of an individual’s or a firm’s actions for which they do not pay the cost or receive the 
benefit. Markets, by themselves, lead to too little of some things, like research, and too much 
of others, like pollution. […] Without appropriate government regulation and intervention, 
markets do not lead to economic efficiency.
The premise that ‘institutions matter’ has been fleshed out and investigated in this study 
for the ‘rules of relief’; the principal motif is the collective significance of social security 
institutions. On the basis of a literature survey, the theoretical sections began by explor-
ing the nature of institutions, and how they are embedded in society (chapter 2). An insti-
tutional demarcation of social security was then built from this (chapter 3). The empiri-
cal sections first ascertained whether the actual configurations of official social security 
rules in 11 countries diverge in such a way that there is justification for reducing them to 
a limited number of regimes (chapter 4). This was followed by an examination of whether 
the countries representing the various types of social security regime differ in the degree 
of benefit dependency and poverty they produce (chapters 5 and 6).
The outcomes of the theoretical and empirical analyses are presented here in broad out-
line1. Following on from this overview, an attempt is made to interpret in more detail the 
relationships found between regime types on the one hand, and benefit dependency and 
poverty on the other. The chapter concludes with a brief look at some of the implications 
of this study for further scientific research and for socioeconomic policy in developed 
countries.
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7.1 Institutions and social security
This section elucidates the two concepts that lie at the heart of the theoretical analy-
ses. It also indicates how the outcomes of the general examination of institutions can be 
applied to social security.
Institutions as social rules
Institutions are often equated with certain forms of social organisation, especially the 
more permanent ones which give direction to society (the Church, the family, education) 
or which serve higher social ends (voluntary associations, cultural organisations). That 
is not the meaning that is assigned to institutions in this study, however. In line with 
the view put forward by Durkheim (1901) – who regarded sociology as “the science of 
institutions” – the term here refers simply to the rules that a community applies in order 
to steer the behaviour of its members in a desired direction. This interpretation is also 
employed in the ‘new institutionalism’ in the social sciences, three variants of which can 
be distinguished: the sociological approach, the rational choice view and the historical 
perspective. Proponents of sociological institutionalism argue among other things that 
collective rules not only guide behaviour through the explicit prescriptions that are con-
tained within them, but also because of the way in which they allow actors to see their 
world (via ‘cognitive framing’ and ‘moral templates’); or, to put it differently, institutions 
not only indicate what people ought to do in certain circumstances, but also determine 
the behavioural alternatives they are able to imagine. This approach also stresses that the 
relationship between the rules of the community and its members is a dialectic one. On 
the one hand, social rules steer actors’ behaviour; on the other hand, institutions are not 
a natural given, but are always a product of the rule-defining acts of people.
The rational choice perspective has been widely used in research into social dilem-
mas: situations where behaviour that is advantageous and sensible for individual actors 
generates major disadvantages at the level of the community as a whole, and can there-
fore not be described as optimal from that collective point of view (e.g. overgrazing, 
polluting the environment, tax evasion). According to this approach institutions make 
economic and social interactions predictable; they foster collectively desirable behav-
iour by indicating what is allowed and intolerable, making rule compliance profitable 
and punishing defection.
Historical institutionalism posits that although actors make the rules, they are not 
free in doing so: the development of institutions is characterised by a high degree of path 
dependence. The routines and the investments encapsulated in the rules imply that insti-
tutional change may involve high economic or social costs; as a result, they tend to be dif-
ficult to change, and often build on the existing structures. Proponents of this perspec-
tive also point out that the same institutions do not lead to similar results everywhere, 
but that those results depend on the historical context in which the rules are applied.
The economist North (1990, 1998) integrated some of these notions. In his view, 
institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Accord-
ing to North, such ‘rules of the game’ must be separated from the ‘players’: the actors 
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who make and apply the rules. He argues that institutions play an important role in eco-
nomic transactions because they establish and protect property rights (for example via 
contracts, laws, etc.) and also contain stipulations on monitoring and enforcing compli-
ance with the rules. In this way they coordinate economic exchange, and they may do this 
more or less efficiently, with higher or lower transaction costs. North draws a distinction 
between formal institutions (such as government laws) and informal institutions which 
apply between private actors (such as conventions in business). If the exchange takes 
place over a long period, between actors who know each other well and are dependent 
on each other (for example in tribal societies), unwritten informal rules may be efficient: 
the likelihood that actors will not meet their mutual agreements is small because the 
cost of this (disgrace, expulsion) is high. In modern societies, however, exchanges tend 
to be more impersonal and are repeated less often. In these cases there is a high chance 
of defection and it may be useful to have the government, as an independent third party, 
draw up formal rules. Although this is more expensive (because a police and judicial 
apparatus is needed to ensure compliance and to impose sanctions in case of defection), 
it may nonetheless be efficient for the economic interaction in society as a whole, as it 
increases the likelihood that actors will behave in a predictable and reliable way.
A number of these lines of thought come together in the figural model (see §2.3). Here, 
institutions are interpreted as socially constructed rules that delineate the rights and 
obligations of actors. They also indicate the conditions attaching to the granting of those 
entitlements and the imposition of those duties, and what positive and negative sanc-
tions are possible.
The fact that institutions are social constructs implies among other things that they 
never simply appear of their own accord, or that they follow inevitably from certain reli-
gious, ethical or philosophical principles (the Rule of St. Benedict, Kantian ethics, utility 
maximisation, etc.). Sociologically, the rights, obligations, conditions and sanctions 
that apply in a community can only be described, and explanations can be sought for the 
existence of certain configurations. There are however no universal imperatives: institu-
tions are always endogenous, their justification lies exclusively within the community 
in which they are applied. The rationale may be derived from higher principles, but that 
is not necessarily the case; from a sociological perspective, there is no “right division of 
rights” (Coleman, 1990).
A right means that someone is permitted to do something, to possess something or to 
acquire something; and that others may not hinder this. Rights generally imply that other 
actors have obligations towards those who are entitled: “rights are grounds of duty in 
others” (Raz, 1986). Entitlements and duties both reflect the interests of the actors con-
cerned, the support for ideals, the power relations within their community, and the rela-
tive costs and benefits of different forms of regulation (including expenditure on vesting 
the rules, monitoring and sanctioning). Ultimately, both the rights and the obligations 
are based on a social consensus; if they are no longer supported by the actors in the com-
munity, the basis for assigning rights and imposing duties disappears.
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Conditions may be attached to rights in the form of certain events (such as being 
needy), qualifying characteristics on the part of stakeholders (having a certain age, fam-
ily composition, education level, etc.), or particular types of behaviour (e.g. showing a 
willingness to work).
Sanctions are rewards granted when the rules are observed and punishments 
imposed in the event of defection. They are not by definition ‘heroic’, in other words it is 
not necessary for there to be one actor who hands out non-recurring punishments and 
rewards; sanctions can also be imposed collectively and incrementally. Sanctions need 
not be applied by external agents either; individual actors may have internalised the rules 
of conduct, causing them to experience feelings of guilt, shame or superiority when they 
break or observe the rules, and thus to punish or reward themselves.
The traditional and institutional view of social security
Although the type of arrangements to which ‘social security’ refers has a long history 
(poor relief, Bismarck’s social insurances), until the introduction of the American New 
Deal in the 1930s it was a term that was used only sporadically. In the us Social Security Act 
(1935) it related to all rights that fell within the scheme, and simply meant that society 
offered a degree of economic security to its citizens. The more recent scientific literature 
contains both narrow and broad demarcations of the concept. In the narrow approach, 
social security has the objective of offering a certain level of income protection. The 
instruments deployed to achieve this consist of statutory social insurance (e.g. old-age 
pensions for employees) and national provisions such as social assistance or a national 
health insurance scheme. Under those arrangements, benefits may be provided in money 
or in kind when a limited number of clearly defined risks occur. The contingencies as laid 
down in 1952 in a convention of the International Labour Organisation (ilo) are often 
taken as a basis here: old age; death of the breadwinner; the maintenance of children; 
unemployment; short-term sickness of employees; permanent incapacity for work; high 
medical expenses; a loss of earnings due to pregnancy and confinement; and the costs 
and losses ensuing from occupational illnesses and accidents. The disadvantage of this 
approach to social security is that it is equated to formal income schemes which target 
specific and traditional risks; for example, it does not include help given by relatives or 
measures to counter the financial and social consequences of divorce.
In the broad definition, which is propagated among others by a number of Flemish 
theoreticians (see e.g. Viaene et al., 1976, 1990), social security is not only about income 
protection, but also extends to job security, health and social participation. The instru-
ments used to realise this are not restricted to statutory government schemes, or ‘social 
welfare’, but also include ‘invisible’ social security: tax reductions and allowances, 
employment-related provisions and insurance schemes, and household savings and 
insurances people arrange for themselves (‘fiscal’, ‘occupational’ and ‘private welfare’; cf. 
Titmuss, 1958; Berghman, 1986). The interventions are concerned not only with partially 
recompensing a falling or excessively low income; in principle, prevention and restora-
tion should be given priority. In the broad approach, moreover, social security focuses 
not just on the traditional risks from the ilo list, but on all forms of ‘human damage’, 
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thus including things such as ecological harm or losses which manifest themselves only 
after many years. A strong point of this broad approach is that it is not restricted to the 
legal protection against the risks contained in a fossilised list. On the other hand, it also 
means that the social security concept is in danger of becoming all-embracing: the entire 
welfare state falls within its scope, plus all the arrangements that are not enforced by 
formal legislation. Another objection is that it is a fairly a-sociological approach; there is 
little attention for the socio-historical context of the prevailing rules (such as the goals 
and interests involved) and for the collective consequences of social security.
In the light of these considerations, in this study social security has been defined from 
an institutional perspective. The concept refers to the collectively defined rights, duties, 
conditions and potential sanctions which aim to generate positive social outcomes by 
protecting individual actors against economic deficits. Social security is thus a collec-
tion of rules that have been constructed within the community, i.e. institutions. These 
relate to deficits faced by individuals to which an economic value can be assigned (too lit-
tle income, loss of employment, costs of medical provisions or social participation). The 
allocation of rights and duties is not only important for those concerned, but also serves 
a higher purpose, namely the expectation that the rules will generate net positive out-
comes for the community: more collective wealth or a fairer distribution of prosperity, a 
healthier population, fewer social tensions, combating poverty. The way in which social 
security rights are allocated and the manner in which duties, conditions and sanctions 
are imposed always depend on the socio-historical context. Every community determines 
for itself where the optimum lies; this is based on a certain consensus – there is no uni-
versally applicable ‘right division of social security rights’.
Theoretically, it is not essential for social security to focus on specific eventualities; 
for example, an unconditional basic income is not linked to any explicitly covered risk. 
The notion of risk is therefore not included in the definition used here. In practice, how-
ever, the allocation of rights will generally be connected with the reasons for the deficits; 
for example, a person who becomes fully incapacitated for work due to an occupational 
accident often will receive a higher and longer-lasting benefit than someone who is dis-
missed due to misconduct.
According to this institutional demarcation, social security encompasses more than 
the traditional social insurances and national provisions; yet it is not so comprehensive 
that it can no longer be analytically distinguished from the welfare state and its informal 
counterparts. Collective regulation of education, health care, the housing market, etc. is 
not regarded as social security, except for those elements concerned with the economic 
entitlements of people or households (e.g. student grants, health insurance, housing 
benefit).
Types of institution
In the figural model in §2.3 a distinction is drawn between formal and informal institu-
tions. The former are promulgated or ratified by the government. Formal institutions can 
be divided into four hierarchically arranged types. First there are the meta-rules (such as the 
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Constitution, election laws), which describe the rights and duties applying for the estab-
lishment of formal rules. Then there are rules governing the production of goods and 
services by the government; examples include laws on the police force, national defence, 
state education, etc. These rules also establish the rights and obligations of other actors 
in connection with this government production (paying taxes, military service, compulsory 
education etc.). A third category is recognition by the government, as an independent third 
party, of the rights and obligations of private legal persons (citizens, companies). Provi-
sions from the civil code (e.g. matrimonial law) or mercantile law (such as the statutory 
period within which companies must pay their bills) are examples of this. Finally, there 
are formal contracts between private parties: agreements that are embedded in legal stipula-
tions, such as ownership and inheritance rights that are implicitly established when peo-
ple marry, or the terms of delivery between suppliers and consumers which build on the 
general rules of the prevailing mercantile law.
Informal institutions are based entirely on social consensus in groups or communi-
ties, and can also be broken down into four categories. Values are collective guidelines 
for preferred behaviour, which do not indicate what people should or should not do in 
specific cases. By contrast, social norms are prescriptive; they are behavioural rules apply-
ing in specific circumstances and can often be regarded as an elaboration of the princi-
ples incorporated in values. Since it is possible to infringe against social norms (unlike 
values, towards which people may be more or less oriented), they also contain the pos-
sibility of imposing sanctions. Conventions resemble norms in many respects, but have no 
value component: they are arbitrary behavioural expectations which are fairly neutral in 
nature, and which are intended mainly to coordinate behaviour effectively and to affirm 
the membership of groups or communities (e.g. dress codes). Sometimes conventions 
may be codified, giving them a formal character (e.g. statutory traffic rules, the official 
spelling of a language). Informal contracts are promises and agreements on the rights and 
duties of actors which are not endorsed by the government, but are entirely based on 
what is customary within the community (e.g. an unofficial church marriage).
Every social security system contains informal elements: values such as solidarity and 
fairness, the norms which apply in a society for the minimum necessities of life, con-
ventions that apply in the relationship between benefit recipients and help and support 
agencies (e.g. making benefits available on a specific day). Social security systems can 
also be entirely informal, for example taking the form of support from family members 
or the Church.
Modern social security systems, however, tend to be highly formalised. They are 
often enshrined in laws and government decrees as part of the rules concerning govern-
ment production. In addition to this purely collective social security, the government 
may also endorse specific types of occupational social security, for example by legally 
ratifying an unemployment insurance scheme which is administered by companies or 
trade unions. Finally, there are private arrangements which are partly controlled by the 
government, such as commercial medical insurance contracts where the minimum cover 
and the maximum premium payable are established by law.
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The social security ‘regimes’ discussed later can be regarded as qualitatively differ-
ent, cohesive systems of formal institutions which are designed to achieve certain goals 
that are considered collectively desirable.
The relationship between institutional levels
While formal and informal institutions are often hierarchically arranged, it is not the 
case that the lower rules can be derived from the higher rules in only one way; there is no 
logically compelling entailment: the form in which high principles or meta-rules appear 
at a lower level is socio-historically determined. In social security, too, laws and regula-
tions, and the informal rules that support or elaborate the formal rules, can theoretically 
be arranged in an infinite number of ways. In reality, however, there is often a hierarchy 
in terms of the level of abstraction. Thus the government, driven by supranational rules 
imposed by the European Union or the United Nations, may for example guarantee a con-
stitutional right to support in the event of need. This may be elaborated in the form of a 
social assistance law, and fleshed out further in implementation decrees and the mutual 
informal behavioural expectations of the actors concerned. The links between these 
hierarchical levels invariably rest on consensual interpretations. The constitutional right 
to social assistance may remain unchanged for decades, while it may be interpreted more 
broadly or more strictly over time in the lower laws, depending on the changing percep-
tions and preferences of politicians, policy officials and citizens. In practice the rights 
and obligations at the bottom of the institutional ranking can play a bigger part in deter-
mining the behaviour of the actors concerned (applicants for and recipients of benefits, 
social security organisations, etc.) than the higher principles that are laid down in the 
Constitution.
The formal social security rules discussed earlier can exist alongside each other, in 
which case they are often referred to as the first, second and third pillars. The government 
is then for example responsible for providing social assistance to all citizens; employers 
are responsible for operating an unemployment insurance scheme for their own workers; 
and the individual is responsible for his or her own pension provision. The institutions 
can however also be built up in layers; for example, the government may guarantee a flat 
rate minimum retirement pension for everyone; employers or trade unions may then top 
this up for former employees to a certain percentage of their earlier wage; and in addition 
the individual may themselves take out a supplementary pension insurance or annuity.
Although this is not necessary, institutions may be strongly interrelated. This is often the 
case in closed communities (sects, monastic orders, a class-ridden society, etc.), where 
the values work through in an apparently inevitable way into precise behavioural pre-
scripts, with heavy and well-known sanctions for defection. In the main, however, such 
‘thick institutions’ are less typical of prosperous democratic societies.
For several reasons it is likely that formal and informal rules which relate to the same 
kind of behaviour will correspond with each other to some extent. Informal institu-
tions may be an elaboration of the formal rules; the latter can never cover all circum-
stances that might occur in practice and therefore by definition leave some room for 
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discretionary action. Conversely, formal rights and obligations can be a codification of 
informal institutions people were already subjected to within their community. Such a 
correspondence is not however necessarily present: the informal rules by which people 
live can also diverge considerably from what the law stipulates (for example in countries 
where tax evasion is the prevailing standard), or in specific communities may differ mark-
edly from the official rules (Jews in the Diaspora, Christians living under communism). 
Whether informal rules dominate the formal rules, or vice versa, is ultimately an empiri-
cal, socio-historical question; that applies just as much for social security institutions as 
for other rules.
Individual and corporate actors
The figural model incorporates two processes: rule application and rule generation 
(cf. graph 2.1). Both come about via actors, which may be individual persons or corporate 
actors (organisations which form an independently acting legal persona, such as compa-
nies or foundations). Social security actors vary depending on the nature of the scheme. 
In addition to entitled persons and duty-bound contributors, they may include various 
parts of the social security organisation, employers, judges, etc.
The rule-driven and rule-generating behaviour of actors is not determined directly by the 
existing institutions. People are not slavish followers of the prevailing rules, but filter 
them and thus play an active role. They base their behaviour on their own interpretation 
of the institutions, and that is shaped by their earlier experiences, their resources and 
a number of motivations. In theory, those motivations relate to the goals, ideals and 
interests of actors; their assessment of the costs and benefits of perceived behavioural 
alternatives; the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes; and (for natural persons) 
the emotional aspects of their possible courses of action. In the case of corporate actors 
there is a complication in that the aims, ideological bias, interests and the motivations of 
the individuals who represent them may not correspond with those of the organisation 
itself: the principal-agent problem.
The origin of social rules
Institutions always arise and change through the behaviour of actors. The figural model 
indicates that this rule generation process is theoretically determined by changes in rela-
tive prices, power relations, conflicts of interest and support for ideals. If the socially 
weighted sum of these elements alters, actors may be prompted to establish new institu-
tions or modify existing rules. The changes in these driving factors, and consequently in 
the actors’ incentive to regulate, theoretically ensue from the interaction of the existing 
institutional structure with the historical process a community is experiencing.
Actors do not react automatically to such impulses, but weigh up for themselves 
whether they make new rules desirable for them. Path dependence acts as a brake on 
change: people cannot always imagine new rules, and stakeholders may feel that rule 
changes do not produce sufficient returns or will be accompanied by high social or eco-
nomic costs. New actors – the coming young generation, counter-elites, new organisa-
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tions – and individual ‘normative entrepreneurs’ often play a key role in the process of 
rule transformation. They less readily accept the existing situation as self-evident, and 
for them the benefits of changes are more likely to exceed the costs.
This does not imply that widely desired rule changes can be achieved without a strug-
gle. In the case of formal institutions, the vesting or modifying of rules often requires 
complex forms of ‘rule interaction’: decisions on new legislation and regulations in parlia-
mentary democracies are a characteristic example of this. However, informal institutions 
can generally not be created in such a more or less rational interchange of arguments on a 
platform of rule interaction. It is not possible simply to promulgate new values, norms or 
conventions, because such rules are based purely on social consensus and consequently 
arise and change in a process that takes place within the community. The evolution of 
social norms on extramarital sexual relationships may illustrate this. The introduction of 
the contraceptive pill (a technological innovation) lowers the material and social costs of 
extramarital sex, because the risk of unwanted pregnancy declines. As a result the incen-
tive to regulate can change, and this may work through into actor perceptions: fewer peo-
ple may accept the norm ‘sex outside marriage is not permissible’ as self-evident. Defec-
tion may increase and be sanctioned to a lesser degree (more extramarital sex that is left 
unpunished occurs). However, if the behaviour is still considered to have negative col-
lective consequences (such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases) a new norm 
is likely to emerge (e.g. ‘sexual contact outside marriage is permissible as long as people 
practise safe sex’), provided it has the support of a critical mass within the community.
Generally speaking, with both formal and informal institutions it is easier to change 
the lower-level rules (e.g. implementation decrees, conventions) then higher guidelines 
(the Constitution, certain core values). This is largely because the costs of changing the 
more abstract institutions tend to be greater: if these are modified, that change often 
also affects the lower-level rules. Additionally, actors are more likely to have internalised 
the higher rules, and therefore may find it more difficult to envisage changing them.
The process of institutionalisation is clearly visible in the transition from informal to 
formal social security systems (predominantly statutory social insurance schemes) 
which took hold in many Western European countries between 1875 and 1930 (see also 
De Swaan, 1988). The low wages and greater risks which accompanied industrialisation 
(mass unemployment and indigence need on the part of workers, industrial accidents, 
etc.) implied a change in relative prices. The growing gulf between the economic classes 
led to sharper conflicts of interest. The power relations also changed, largely as a result of 
the emergence of a liberal bourgeoisie which partially took over the dominant position 
of the traditional, often aristocratic elite, and of the growth in a number of counter-elites 
(socialists, communists, anarchists, feminists, the petty bourgeoisie). The latter were 
inspired by different ideals, which attracted growing support among the population. The 
Enlightenment ideals of equality and emancipation took on a radical dimension in the 
reformist ideologies of the 19th century; and the traditional Christian ideals of charity, 
mutual care and striving for eternal salvation enjoyed a revival because they offered a 
means of countering the excesses that accompanied industrial production processes.
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In this way socio-historical developments had an impact on all the driving factors, 
thus changing the incentive to regulate. This does not however mean that it was decided 
overnight to establish formal social security schemes. Ultimately, three changes in the 
perceptions of the relevant actors proved decisive. There was a growing consensus that 
unemployment, neediness, incapacity for work, and so on were not purely the result of 
individual moral failure, but of the way in which industrial production was organised 
and embedded in society; and macro-problems such as these demanded a collective solu-
tion. The idea also gained hold that the existing informal social security arrangements 
offered an inadequate response to the emerging modern risks. The extensive migration 
to the large towns and cities caused many local communities to shrink and become more 
unstable, so that the traditional family and community solutions, based on social norms, 
no longer worked. In the urban setting, large sections of the working population could be 
affected by unemployment and neediness, which went beyond the ability of the network 
of blood relatives, churches and local authorities to mitigate. Occupational provisions 
failed to materialise: the surfeit of available labour meant that companies saw no need 
for this, with the exception of a minority of socially aware entrepreneurs.
Finally, both the elite and the counter-elites increasingly felt that there was some-
thing to be gained from establishing statutory social security schemes. For the bourgeoi-
sie it was a means of mitigating the disadvantages of industrial production. Expensive 
externalities (strikes and social unrest prompted by the mass poverty and poor working 
conditions, health risks that could affect all citizens) might be countered by social legis-
lation, and it was believed that a healthy, rested and properly trained population would 
be more productive. The establishment of formal social security was also often seen as a 
means of generating loyalty on the part of the working classes to a strong nation-state, 
which would be able to compete economically and politically with other countries. For 
the counter-elites, formalisation of social security was above all a means of emancipating 
their followers and assuring them of a more decent standard of living.
The ‘social question’ was ultimately decided in many countries in a lengthy process of 
rule interaction, often in connection with the decision-making on other policy domains 
and political questions (such as compulsory education, public housing). Introduction 
of universal suffrage was of great importance here: it was often the changing alliances 
of the bourgeoisie with the counter-elites – which were now also represented in Parlia-
ment – that effected the transition from informal to formal social security systems.
The acquisition of rules by individual actors
Since institutions are social constructs, new members of a society (children, immigrants) 
have to be familiarised with the rights and obligations that apply in their community. 
This rule acquisition by new actors can be seen as a specific form of rule-driven interac-
tion: the community has expectations regarding the kind of upbringing parents should 
give their children; teachers have to meet the standards of their profession and the statu-
tory requirements regarding the curriculum, etc. In many theories it is assumed that this 
is an inevitable, one-sided process of imprinting the rules of the host community. For 
example, the functionalist school stresses that the steady “barbarian invasion of new-
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born infants” (Parsons, 1951) poses a permanent threat to the social order, and argues 
that they must therefore be integrated via a process of socialisation. Initially, this takes 
place via the parents, who pass on to the ‘newcomers’ basic values, norms and skills. In 
complex societies, an extensive secondary socialisation process also takes place (mainly 
via education), which is based more on direct instruction and role models. In this way the 
new members of the community are prepared for the professional and social tasks they 
will fulfil in the future. Critical sociology broadly takes the same view of socialisation, 
but stresses that the process is often a differentiated one: girls and children from lower 
social classes or descending from ethnic minorities are taught different skills, rules of 
behaviour and cultural preferences than boys and children from the elite and the indige-
nous population. This differential socialisation reproduces the existing social inequality 
from generation to generation. In economic theories, too, socialisation has a mandatory 
nature; here, it is often stressed that all families have an interest in optimising the formal 
qualifications and the ‘human capital’ of their children. A rational parent will ensure that 
their child learns as many useful things as possible, since this increases the likelihood 
that their progeny will sustain and care for them in later life, and also prevents loss of 
reputation (in this case, being seen as a ‘bad parent’). According to this view the children, 
for their part, are driven to obtain the right qualifications, social contacts, etc., because 
this increases their subsequent chances of securing a well-paid job, high status and an 
attractive partner.
More recent theories stress that the view in which socialisation is interpreted as a 
unilateral, inevitable transfer of rules to the new members of the community fails to do 
justice to the complexity of rule acquisition. New actors are not passive, but often play 
an independent role in the socialisation process, in particular when they are older and/
or the rules more complex. The process is not always intentional, especially in its earli-
est phase: primary socialisation largely happens ‘incidentally’, in the everyday contact 
between parents and children. It is also not self-evident that socialisation will invariably 
be successful from a collective point of view; children may withdraw from the upbring-
ing attempts of their fathers, mothers and teachers, and the socialisers do not necessar-
ily act as agents of the community. Parents may not be aware of the dominant rules of 
the society, or may reject them, be unwilling to pass them on (for example because they 
expect little return from them) or be incapable of doing so due to a lack of resources (e.g. 
inability to pay school fees) or because of their limited parenting skills. The outcomes 
of the socialisation process, finally, are not uniform. This is because the socialisers dif-
fer in their interpretation of the rules to be imparted, and because the socialisees are 
not uniform in their potential for development and self-regulation. As a result, similar 
socialisation processes can be passed through differentially. This heterogeneity is rein-
forced by the fact that the content of the rules to be imparted can change over time, as 
can the dominant view on the most appropriate method of socialisation (the content 
of the school curriculum, teaching methods). The process in which new actors acquire 
rules also shows socio-historical variation as regards the phasing, the socialisers who are 
involved in it, and their relative strength.
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It is plausible that the institutions of social security are somewhat ‘undersocialised’: on 
the one hand because, owing to their complexity and ambiguity, the rules are difficult 
to learn; and on the other because people do not normally need in-depth knowledge of 
social security in order to be able to function in their everyday lives. In informal systems, 
the family or community members have a certain interest in imparting an elementary 
awareness of mutual support rights and obligations to children; in formal systems this 
interest is lacking, and the rules are usually transferred to only a limited extent through 
the education system. Just a small group of professionals (for example people working 
for the social security organisation or as legal specialists in this field) learn the rules 
thoroughly; and sometimes people who claim a given benefit for a long period can also 
acquire a great deal of specific knowledge about ‘their’ benefit. However, generally speak-
ing modern social security rules tend to be undersocialised; and this increases the likeli-
hood of defection.
The application of rules
The process of rule application can take different forms: economic exchange between 
people and organisations, social contacts, political selection processes, etc. For social 
security this is reflected in six theoretical models of rule-driven interaction. Three of 
these models relate to informal social security; the remainder to formal regulations.
Family-based social security regulations (cf. figure 3.1) are normally aimed at combating 
acute indigence through the provision of material assistance among blood relatives. The 
interaction is limited to contributing and receiving support in money or in kind, and 
only a few categories of actors are involved (parents, children, possibly grandparents and 
other family members). It is driven by the informal expectations that exist within the 
family and which are normally embedded in the institutions of the community. The rules 
are often fairly vague and only weakly internalised. This gives the actors considerable lat-
itude, so that rights and obligations are difficult to enforce and are not always observed. 
The risk of defection is particularly great if the mutual connectedness is low or if many 
family members are affected by the same risk simultaneously (e.g. widespread acute need 
in times of mass unemployment). Communal arrangements (figure 3.2) seek to alleviate 
indigence at the level of the local society, and are characterised by the existence of an 
intermediary social security organisation (such as a church charity council or a municipal 
poor house). In contrast to the family-based structure, a principal-agent problem readily 
arises in these schemes. The rules leave a great deal of freedom of interpretation for the 
board, the attendants and the collectors, which they sometimes abuse for their own gain; 
and the decisions they take about those in need may be considered arbitrary or unfair. 
Informal occupational social security (figure 3.3) is concerned with rights and obligations 
that are linked to an employment relationship, without being ratified by the government 
(for example benefits in the guild system, emergency funds for employees).
Of the formal interaction models, the demographic regulations (statutory or government-
ratified old age and survivor’s pensions, child benefit, etc.) are the simplest (cf. figure 
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3.4). In addition to the beneficiaries and contributors, there is often a large corporate 
actor: the social security organisation charged with awarding and paying benefits, col-
lecting contributions, and monitoring and sanctioning. There is also a supervisory board 
which oversees the administrative process and a social security court which rules on legal 
complaints. The principal-agent problem is greater here than in the informal schemes. 
The impersonal and indirect nature of the interaction (which is usually a written one) 
increases the risk of abuse by the beneficiaries. On the other hand, the main benefit con-
ditions (having a certain age, death of the breadwinner, presence of dependent children, 
etc.) can be verified relatively objectively and simply, thereby reducing the risk of non-
compliance.
In the interaction structure that characterises formal unemployment and social assistance 
arrangements (figure 3.5), the likelihood of defection is greater. There is an additional 
category of actors involved (employers who hire and dismiss people), there are more – 
and more complex – benefit conditions, and clients can themselves to some extent bring 
about or extend the rights, for example by not actively seeking work; the ‘moral hazard’ 
is greater than in the informal and the demographic schemes.
The most intricate structure of interaction theoretically occurs in formal arrange-
ments for sickness leave and disability (figure 3.6). Establishing the right to benefit is often 
complex and requires the judgement of medical experts (gp, specialist, medical examin-
ers appointed by the social security organisation or an independent assessment agency). 
This increases the principal-agent problem: the professional code of the medical asses-
sors may be at odds with the statutory provisions and the internal rules of the social 
security organisation.
The consequences of rule-driven interaction
Institutions are in principle established in order to achieve certain collective goals. In 
theory, the application of rules can influence various developments in the community: 
the degree of technological and scientific innovation, the economic process, the struc-
turing of society, the formation of ideals and demographic trends. However, the rela-
tionship between institutions and social developments is a dialectic one; the prevailing 
institutions are not only important for the collective output – and thus help determine 
the historical process – but the trends at macro-level also serve as a ‘context of rule appli-
cation’. This means that rules can have differing effects depending on whether they are 
applied when the economy is booming or in recession, in a population that is ageing or 
relatively young, etc.
The interactions driven by social security rules have consequences for the individual 
actors, for whom receiving a pension, for example, enables them to maintain a certain 
living standard. Of more decisive importance, however, are the consequences for the 
community, since this is the raison d’être for the institutions. Theoretically, the effects of 
social security regulations on social structuring and the economic process are the most 
important. By implementing these schemes new social categories may be created (e.g. 
oaps, single welfare mothers), and the position of various social groups on the prevail-
ing ladders of stratification may change. Social security usually implies some redistribu-
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tion from contributors to beneficiaries; the extent to which this reinforces or reduces 
the existing social hierarchy is not something that is fixed in advance, but is an empirical 
issue. Another structuring effect is the potential influence of social security issues and 
the votes of benefit recipients in political elections; views on the desirability of support-
ing weaker groups and the beneficiaries’ vote may be decisive for the selection of the 
political elite.
The impact on the economic process mainly relates to the level, growth and distribu-
tion of collective prosperity. Theoretically, positive wealth effects may be expected to the 
extent that social security contributes to economic efficiency (because it combats social 
unrest and maintains productive capacity in times of recession) and to avoiding a col-
lapse in demand. Examples of negative economic effects relate to the potential decline 
in the propensity to save or invest, and to the labour market disincentives social security 
may create (for example a low labour supply due to high benefits). Whether the economic 
functions or dysfunctions of social security dominate cannot be established on theoreti-
cal grounds, but is an empirical question whose outcome depends on the precise nature 
of the institutions, the context in which the rules are applied and the perceptions and 
preferences of the actors concerned. Thus, for instance, a pension system that initially 
contributed to sustaining consumer demand can become less efficient over time, for 
example if pronounced ageing of the population pushes up the costs and places a heavy 
burden on the shoulders of working contributors, or if it squeezes other collective invest-
ments that are deemed necessary (such as the budget available for education).
7.2 Regimes, benefit dependency and poverty
In the theoretical part of this study social security in general has been delineated from 
the institutional perspective. The empirical analyses focused on the collective effects of 
specific formal social security institutions. Since modern forms of social security are pre-
dominantly national in their structure, a country comparison is the obvious way to inves-
tigate their operation. It is in principle possible to map out the collective impact of indi-
vidual arrangements (different types of social assistance, unemployment insurance, child 
benefit, etc.) in various countries, but it was decided not to make such a ‘single scheme’ 
comparison, among other things because it could present too limited a picture of the 
influence of social security rules. If a country has a spartan social assistance scheme, for 
example, this may lead to widespread indigence among the population. However, such a 
causal connection need not occur by definition: if a large proportion of the population 
are entitled to generous social insurance benefits, it is possible that most people will 
be guaranteed an acceptable standard of living through these. The limited scope of the 
social assistance scheme may then be less problematic in terms of the results obtained.
It was therefore decided to perform empirical analyses of the collective effects that 
certain regimes of social security bring about, building on the influential work of Esping-
Andersen (1990). Eleven countries were selected which are supposed to represent different 
types of social security regimes, viz. the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France,  Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, the United States, Canada, Australia and the United  Kingdom.
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The study looked at whether countries belonging to the various regime types differ in 
the degree of benefit dependency and poverty they generate. At collective level these two 
phenomena are important in both the social structuring and the economic process. The 
degree of benefit dependency is theoretically linked to the differentiation in recognisable 
social groups and their position on stratification ladders, and to the growth and distri-
bution of the collective prosperity. Combating poverty is a traditional objective of social 
security; social security systems seek to protect people from want, but application of the 
rules can also create new, weak social groups, who may find it difficult to escape from their 
dependency on the collective provisions. Combating poverty via social security also guar-
antees a minimum level of consumption and the retention of productive capacities for 
those with an entitlement. At the same time, however, it may be that such arrangements 
provide too little incentive for people to look for work or save for a rainy day.
Three types of social security regimes, and one hybrid system
The term ‘regime’ refers to different types of coherent formal institutions at the national 
level, which are designed to achieve distinct collective goals. These regimes encapsulate 
divergent formal rules relating to government production in an abstract, systemic way. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) uses the term ‘welfare regimes’, which in principle embraces 
more than social security arrangements alone. He describes a number of regime types, 
which he refers to as the ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’.
Theoretically, the collective, statutory social security regulations in the liberal regime 
type are limited (or ‘residual’) in scope. Benefits are low and of short duration, and are 
heavily targeted at the most needy; there are no collective provisions for meeting the costs 
of raising children, etc. Yet there is a well-developed system of private insurance aimed 
mainly at the middle classes. The ‘de-commodification’ (the degree to which people are 
able to achieve an acceptable standard of living regardless of their market position) is low 
in this system. It sharpens the social stratification, increasing the likelihood of a three-
fold division between benefit recipients and the working poor; the middle classes; and 
the privileged. According to Esping-Andersen, the social security systems of the United 
States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom belong to this category.
The social-democratic regime type is by contrast very extensive in its scope. Benefits are 
not reserved for the disadvantaged and deprived, but are available for all citizens. They 
are generous and last for as long as the covered risk is present. To limit the costs and pro-
mote social integration, however, attempts are made to help beneficiaries back into work 
as quickly as possible via an elaborate activation programme. The funding base is broad-
ened by the high labour market participation rate of women, most of whom work in the 
non-commercial services sector (education, care). The large collective system means that 
taxes and social insurance contributions are high and private insurance is less important 
in this system. The social-democratic regime is characterised by a high degree of de-com-
modification and attempts to reduce the existing social differences. Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway provide examples of such a system.
The corporatist regime type is also theoretically extensive, but more selective. Rights 
are often linked to contributions paid and previous work experience. They are also not 
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the same for all social groups; for example, civil servants enjoy very generous arrange-
ments, matching their elevated status as agents of the highest authority in these socie-
ties. Rights are built up around the breadwinner model: there are good social insurance 
programmes for families with children, but the economic independence of both partners 
is not stimulated. The labour market participation rate of women is therefore low. The 
provisions for elderly and disabled workers are comprehensive, but these imply that these 
groups, too, tend to be excluded from employment. The degree of de-commodification is 
low, and corporatist regimes are largely designed to keep the existing hierarchy between 
different status groups intact. Belgium, Germany and France are regarded as specimens 
of this regime type.
According to Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), the regime in the Netherlands is a hybrid: 
a “Janus-headed welfare regime” which displays both social-democratic and corporatist 
traits. There are other countries, too, which are not entirely pure representatives of their 
type. For example, the United Kingdom initially had a generous social security system, 
which expressed the ideas of its founder Beveridge. In the 1980s, however, many schemes 
were transformed into a more liberal direction; Esping-Andersen regards this as an exam-
ple of “regime-shifting or, perhaps, of stalled social democratization”.
In his analysis Esping-Andersen stresses that the regime types arose in a specific 
socio-historical context. They reflect broader trends in society (e.g. wealth, demography), 
the power of political actors and the alliances they concluded when the welfare state was 
being developed after the Second World War. The hybrid Dutch system, for example, is the 
product of the Catholic-socialist government coalitions of the 1950s. Once established, 
regimes are relatively stable because the existing institutional structure determines fur-
ther development, in accordance with the notion of path dependence from historical 
institutionalism.
Esping-Andersen substantiated his classification by presenting empirical analyses, but 
these received a fair amount of criticism. One class of objection concerned issues such 
as the limited validity, reliability and accessibility of his data. Another objection related 
to Esping-Andersen’s use of unnecessarily ‘soft’ or less adequate statistical techniques 
(mainly tabular and regression analysis). Later authors tried to test his typology more 
stringently by generating new data and applying more advanced and robust methods. 
These new datasets and analyses also have limitations, however. They often relate to only 
part of the social security system (for example social assistance), and are generally based 
on relatively few institutional characteristics. The latter are moreover often analysed as 
continuous, linearly correlated variables, using statistical techniques that are less suit-
able for measuring the qualitative differences on which the typology is based.
In order to accommodate such objections this study performed a categorical princi-
pal component analysis (CatPCA) on 54 aspects of formal social security, as these existed 
in the selected eleven countries in around 1990. Institutional characteristics of all impor-
tant collective schemes were included in the analysis. The component loadings showed 
that the variables can be reduced to two underlying dimensions. The first indicates the 
scope of the social security rules (are they residual or extensive?); the second indicates the 
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degree to which schemes have a universalistic or particularistic design (figure 4.1). Accord-
ing to their scores on these dimensions, the countries fall into the expected clusters 
(figure 4.2). The United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom form a liberal 
group, which is represented most clearly by the first two countries. Denmark, Sweden 
and – slightly less clearly – Norway end up in a social-democratic cluster, while Belgium, 
Germany and France form a rather homogeneous corporatist group. The Netherlands 
is scaled between the exponents of the social-democratic and corporatist regimes and 
thus does indeed has a hybrid system. Cluster analyses of the country scores on the two 
dimensions result in the same classification.
A further CatPCA was carried out to investigate whether the countries also show system-
atic differences in their informal social security rules (such as public opinion on the pre-
ferred level of inequality and government interventions, the social status of civil serv-
ants, traditional gender roles, etc.; see figure 4.3). The same groups of countries emerged 
from this analysis, albeit with minor differences of emphasis. In Denmark and Australia 
the informal rules are less pure than the formal rules, while in Norway and Canada the 
reverse occurs (see figure 4.4). The correlation coefficient between the formal and infor-
mal institutions of countries is however high: 0.84 on the first dimension, 0.85 on the 
second. This correspondence came out less clearly in earlier research, probably because 
the indicators used did not always refer to informal rights and obligations, and because 
there was often a lack of informal counterparts for the second dimension of the regime 
classification (universalism/particularism). The latter may explain why much compara-
tive research on ‘welfare attitudes’ only detected the scope dimension, i.e. an opposition 
between the liberal and non-liberal countries.
The analysis thus leads to the conclusion that Esping-Andersen’s typology has a solid 
empirical basis as regards both the formal and informal social security institutions.
Benefit dependency and the regime types
Another comment on Esping-Andersen’s work that is regularly found in the literature is 
that the typology relates only to the institutionalisation that is characteristic for a spe-
cific moment in time. Esping-Andersen (1999) himself acknowledged that his classifica-
tion was a “snapshot of the worlds of welfare capitalism”. In order to test the robustness 
of the typology over time, it was therefore decided in chapter 4 to look at a different sam-
ple year (1990) from that in Esping-Andersen’s original work and its secondary analyses 
(1980). In addition, a project related to this study explored the situation in around 2000 
(Soede et al., 2004). This led to the conclusion that the classification into the three types 
of regime plus the hybrid Netherlands is empirically fairly stable for the last two decades 
of the 20th century.
Chapter 5 went a step further by creating not a snapshot, but a film of the results 
associated with the ‘three worlds’. The aim was to establish whether the regime types 
differed in their ‘benefit production’ in the period 1980-1999. First, the institutional 
characteristics of the national systems in around 1990 were analysed again from this per-
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spective and scored on a benefit dependency boost index. This led to the hypothesis that 
the hybrid Dutch regime incorporated the ‘worst of three worlds’ and would therefore 
generate the most benefits, both in terms of the relative volume (the number of benefits 
as a share of the population aged 15 years and older) and as regards the percentage growth 
in the number of benefits. The corporatist group was expected to generate more benefit 
dependency than the social-democratic cluster, which was in turn predicted to exceed 
the liberal countries.
Hypotheses were also formulated relating to the composition of the benefit volume 
in the population of working age. In the corporatist group it was expected that there 
would be a comparatively high volume of benefits for early retirement, unemployment 
insurance and survivor’s pensions; the social-democratic cluster was predicted to show 
a high volume in employee dependency (sickness benefits, leave arrangements, etc.) and 
disability insurance for non-employees (early disabled, self-employed, housewives, stu-
dents). In the liberal group the expectation was that there would be high dependency 
on social assistance benefits, while the hybrid Netherlands was supposed to score above 
average on all these types of benefit.
Whether the theoretical expectations match the facts was investigated using data 
on the take-up of the main benefits over two decades in ten countries (Norway is miss-
ing in the dataset). The analyses were based on administrative data on full benefit years, 
which were processed in such a way that they could be regarded as reasonably comparable 
across countries. Since all the information was available only at aggregate national level, 
it was not possible to determine the effects of characteristics of individual beneficiaries 
(gender, age, etc.) on the volume.
The bivariate relationship between the regime types and the relative volume was found to 
be fairly weak (cf. figures 5.2 and 5.3). On average, the share of benefits in the population 
was higher in the social-democratic countries than in the liberal group, as expected, but 
the other differences are less pronounced. While it is true that the relative volume in the 
population of working age was higher in the corporatist group than in the social-dem-
ocratic cluster from 1990 onwards, prior to this, and in the entire adult population (i.e. 
including old age pensioners), this assumed relation was absent. The Netherlands had a 
fairly high volume in the period 1980-1990, but fell down the rankings in the 1990s and 
did not occupy the expected top position in any of the years studied.
Similarly, the bivariate correspondence between the typology and the volume growth 
was fairly limited (figure 5.4). The corporatist countries did indeed undergo consistently 
higher volume growth between 1980 and 1999 than the social-democratic cluster, but the 
other hypotheses were not sustained. Unexpected were the high growth rates in France, 
Australia and Canada and the low percentage increases in the Netherlands.
The hypotheses concerning the volume composition did however find support in the data 
(compare figures 5.5 and 5.6). In all years considered here the corporatist countries, as 
expected, had a relatively high number of recipients of unemployment insurance and 
early exit benefits (though for the latter in 1980 the difference compared with the other 
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countries was less pronounced). Their top position was less clear for survivor’s pensions 
below the age of 65; this applies especially to France.
Generally speaking, the two Scandinavian countries do indeed score highest on 
sickness benefits, leave arrangements for employees and on disability benefits paid to 
non-employees. In other aspects, however, they deviate from the expected profile. For 
instance, Sweden had a high volume of survivor’s pensions in the early 1980s, while 
in Denmark the relative number of unemployment insurance and early exit benefits 
approaches that of the corporatist group of countries.
The countries in the liberal cluster generate the most social assistance benefits, as 
predicted. However, in the United States this bias reduces steadily over time, partly due 
to the restriction of access to the American social assistance schemes in the 1990s. As a 
result, at the end of the period studied here, the composition of the recipient population 
in the usa is plus libéral que les libérals: benefit volumes are low for all types of arrangement, 
even social assistance, a benefit which in other liberal countries often serves as a last 
refuge for people who are not entitled to employee insurance.
Since it is evident that the benefit volume is not solely determined by the structure of for-
mal rules, a multivariate approach was then adopted. A causal model was developed (see 
figure 6.5) in which the growth in the benefit volume was linked to a number of aspects 
of the context of rule application: demographic trends, economic developments, and 
changes in the institutional structure. The model was tested for eight countries simulta-
neously (Canada and Australia were left out of consideration because of data limitations) 
and was found to fit the empirical data well. In general, according to the model the volume 
was boosted substantially between 1980 and 1999 by the growth in the population (both 
below and above 65 years). In some countries the increase in the number of single-parent 
families was also an important factor, as was the falling labour market participation of 
men aged 50-64 years. System changes had an influence particularly in France (especially 
the introduction of new social assistance legislation at the end of the 1980s) and the usa 
(the curtailment of social assistance entitlements in the middle of the 1990s).
The model was then used to establish the impact of the regimes more accurately, 
by equalising the countries in a number of respects. In a first simulation all countries 
were assumed to have the same demographic structure and trends as the usa, so that the 
volumes were corrected for the effects of differences in the population profile. In addi-
tion, the influence of system changes and of the rising take-up of pensions was left out of 
consideration. Finally, a simulation was carried out which included structural unemploy-
ment figures, so that the benefit volumes were no longer distorted by the business cycle.
These simulations greatly reduced the dispersion in the ‘benefit production’ of the 
countries. If the less pure regime representatives in the causal analysis (the Netherlands 
and Great Britain)2 are left out of consideration, the expected differences between the 
regime types emerge, but these are not particularly large. Under equalised conditions the 
annual volume growth in the social-democratic countries is an average of 0.1 percentage 
point higher than in the usa and 0.4 percentage points lower than in the corporatist clus-
ter. Over the whole period studied, this is equivalent to differences of 3 and 7 percentage 
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points, respectively. These limited discrepancies can however be linked to differences in 
the formal institutions. The usa undergoes less marked growth than Sweden and Den-
mark mostly because unemployed people have less chance of receiving benefit (including 
social assistance) and because early retirement is less common. The social-democratic 
countries, for their part, score lower on average than Belgium, Germany and France 
because of the divergent arrangements for early exits3 and the higher benefit dependency 
of lone parents in the corporatist group.
Actual benefit volumes in the hybrid Dutch regime grew strongly in the 1980s, but in 
the 1990s the increase was the lowest of all countries. Under equalised conditions, how-
ever, the growth in the first decade turned out to be virtually no higher than in the cor-
poratist group. This suggests that in the 1980s the Netherlands was more a victim of its 
specific demographic context – a relatively young population which grew more strongly 
and aged more than elsewhere, a large number of single-parent families living on benefit 
– than of its ‘worst of three worlds’ institutions.
Poverty and the regime types
The first social security arrangements, such as England’s Elizabethan Poor Law (1601), were 
intended to combat poverty. That aim is no different in modern social security regimes, 
though a diversity of strategies are pursued. In the social-democratic model, the empha-
sis is on guaranteeing a fairly high living standard for all citizens, regardless of their 
present or past position on the labour market. In order to keep this system affordable, 
it is essential that as many people as possible work; this broadens the funding base and 
keeps benefit dependency within bounds.
The corporatist system attaches great importance to income continuity of the male 
breadwinner. Through a system of compulsory social insurance, breadwinners largely 
maintain their standard of living when they are affected by unemployment, illness, etc., 
assuming they have an adequate employment history. The poverty risk mainly concerns 
outsiders: people who have not worked or who have had many career interruptions, and 
those who are dependent on them. If this group is not too large, poverty can be effec-
tively combated by this system.
The liberal approach stresses individual responsibility and economic incentives. Col-
lective social security is kept to a minimum through low benefits of short duration. This 
encourages people to take responsibility for their own income and to become produc-
tive; and because the statutory social security system is relatively cheap, there is more 
money left over for consumption and investment. On balance, this leads to an increase in 
the collective wealth and demand for labour, which ultimately will trickle down to those 
with the fewest resources, so that poverty remains limited.
It is not possible to say in advance which strategy is the most effective in combating 
poverty. It may be that the more generous social-democratic and corporatist systems offer 
the greatest social protection, but it is equally plausible that these systems generate neg-
ative external effects (less prosperity and fewer jobs), so that people are ultimately best 
off under a liberal regime. An attempt was therefore made to establish to what extent the 
concrete formal institutions in the eleven countries theoretically reduce the risk of pov-
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erty. The main regulations were scored on an institutional poverty risk index, which led 
to the prediction that countries with a liberal social security regime (usa, Australia, Can-
ada and uk) would generate more poverty than the corporatist group (Belgium, France 
and Germany). It was also presumed that the latter would exceed the social-democratic 
countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), which in turn were expected to produce more 
poverty than the hybrid Dutch regime.
Poverty is a more complex theoretical concept than the degree of benefit dependency, 
and there are many possible ways of investigating the phenomenon empirically. For this 
reason, this study first explored what poverty means and how it can best be measured.
Based on a critical analysis of theoretical politico-philosophical literature, poverty 
was defined as follows: “an individual actor is poor if he consistently lacks the means to 
obtain the minimum necessities of his community”. This implies that poverty ultimately 
always describes a situation affecting individuals: a collective actor, a group or a com-
munity cannot be poor, but at most may not have the resources to protect all individual 
members against indigence. That situation must also have a certain permanence: some-
one who cannot make ends meet for a single month is not poor. Poverty is an absolute 
phenomenon, in the sense that in determining whether someone is poor it makes no 
difference how many people experience the same situation; the mere fact that during a 
famine or a period of mass unemployment “this person may not be, relatively speaking, 
any worse off than most others” (Sen, 1985) does not imply he cannot be regarded as poor. 
In another respect, however, poverty is ‘relative’: the standard concerning the minimum 
necessities can vary according to time and place; it depends on the community the actor 
currently belongs to. Finally, the definition expresses that poverty relates to the ability to 
achieve the prevailing minimum standard, not to the actual possession or consumption 
of what is minimally required. Someone who lacks the minimum necessities because 
they spend more on items that are generally not regarded as indispensable (a large wine 
collection, weekly visits to the opera, etc.) is not poor.
A community can compensate poor people for their deficits by giving them a con-
ditional right to a benefit or other forms of material support. In the literature calls are 
often found for a collective social minimum, arguing that this is beneficial for society, 
increases freedom or is fair. An example is the thought experiment that was proposed by 
Rawls (1999 [1971]). According to this author, a rational actor operating behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ (he does not know what resources he has and what they are worth in his cir-
cumstances) will inevitably reach the conclusion that differentials in income and wealth 
are only defensible if the highest positions are attainable by everyone, and if the poorest 
would have been worse off if those differentials did not exist. Since the hypothetical actor 
himself does not know whether he is one of the worst off, and as he should not wish upon 
others a life that he could not bear for himself, it is rational to maximise the minimum 
rights (maximin) and have these guaranteed by the government.
Sociologically, however, there is no need for communities to adopt such a philosoph-
ical line of reasoning. There is no “right division of rights”, and therefore no universally 
just method of tackling the problem of poverty. The allocation of rights in the case of 
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poverty cannot be seen in isolation from the socio-historical developments with which 
the community is confronted, and from the institutional path chosen earlier. These 
influence the way in which the actors concerned perceive the phenomenon of poverty 
and the merits assigned by them to the various solutions; and through this they impact 
on the course of the rule interaction, the outcome of which is not fixed in advance (cf. 
figure 2.1).
The operational poverty lines used in empirical research were then assessed on the basis 
of four criteria: their validity (does the measurement instrument correspond with the the-
oretical concept?), reliability (is an accurate measurement obtained of the degree of pov-
erty?), ease of application (can the poverty line be determined simply and be applied in a 
straightforward manner in the available databases?) and socio-political relevance (is the 
criterion normatively credible for the community in question and for  policymakers?).
This led to the conclusion that all existing instruments used to measure poverty 
have shortcomings. Relative poverty criteria, such as the eu threshold of 60% of median 
income and Townsend’s relative deprivation index, are not valid in terms of the theoreti-
cal concept used here, because the poverty rate depends on the position of the reference 
group. They are moreover not reliable or normatively convincing in all respects; e.g., 
even substantial improvements or deteriorations in the position of the least well-off will 
not be detected if the dispersion of income or consumption remains the same. Subjec-
tive income thresholds, such as the ‘Leyden poverty line’, often fit the theoretical concept 
better, but frequently run into measurement problems (differing interpretations of sur-
vey questions by respondents), thus denting their credibility (for example by producing 
unstable and very high poverty rates). Objective expert budget methods are valid, fairly 
reliable and normatively credible, but are very cumbersome for use in research practice, 
especially in international comparisons.
For this reason, it was decided to use the ‘generalised budget approach’ as developed 
by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp for the Dutch situation (Vrooman 
& Snel, 1999; Soede, 2006; Soede & Vrooman, 2007, 2008b). First, two reference budgets 
for a single person in the Netherlands were constructed, based on detailed data from the 
Dutch National Institute for Budgetary Information (Nibud). The ‘basic needs’ level is suf-
ficient for running an independent household, but is meagre; it includes those expenses 
which are almost unavoidable, for food, clothing, housing in a broad sense (rent, insur-
ance, energy, water, telephone, furnishings, home maintenance and local taxes) and 
a limited number of other items. The ‘modest but adequate’ variant adds a few other 
expenditure items which exceed that which is strictly necessary (recreation, member-
ships and subscriptions, a pet), but does not provide for any luxuries, such as a car or a 
holiday abroad.
Earlier Dutch studies obtained a historical series of norms by indexing the initial 
amounts using a three-year moving average in the actual median expenditure on food, 
non-alcoholic beverages, clothing and housing according to the national Household 
Budget Survey. This resulted in threshold amounts which over time rose more strongly 
than price inflation, but which lagged behind the increase in national wealth and median 
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income. For the Netherlands, using this method the observed evolution in the poverty 
rates for the period 1985-2005 was plausible and readily interpretable. The ‘generalised 
budget approach’ is valid in terms of the definition used here, appears sufficiently relia-
ble and is easy to apply. Public opinion research in the Netherlands and Australia suggests 
that such a poverty line is probably also credible for both citizens and policymakers.
Because the required detailed budget data were not available in the ten other countries, 
for those the ‘basic needs’ and ‘modest but adequate’ levels for a single person have been 
assessed by converting the Dutch norm amounts in around the year 2000 using purchas-
ing power parities. National norm amounts for other types of households were deter-
mined by applying uniform equivalence factors that were chosen on the basis of a sensi-
tivity analysis of different scales (cf. tables 6.2-6.4).
When imposing the two variants of the poverty threshold to the data on the eleven 
countries included in the 2000 wave of the Luxembourg Income Study, the bivariate results 
show some support for the hypotheses. This study looked at ‘the three I’s of poverty’: the 
incidence of poverty, the median income deficits of the poor and the inequality in the 
distribution of those deficits. According to both the ‘basic needs’ criterion and the ‘mod-
est but adequate’ threshold, the poverty rate in the liberal countries was greater on aver-
age than in the corporatist group (a difference of approximately +3 percentage points); 
this was caused mainly by the high incidence in Australia. As expected, the corporatist 
group in turn had a higher poverty rate than the social-democratic cluster (+6 percent-
age points). The Netherlands did not have the lowest incidence, however, but ended up 
amidst the three social-democratic countries, which scored slightly lower on average (-1 
percentage point). The difference between the regime types was much less clear when it 
came to the income deficits and the inequality in their distribution.
A number of multi-level logistic regression models were then developed, with the 
poverty incidence based on the ‘modest but adequate’ criterion as the variable to be 
explained. A large part of the variance was found to lie not at the level of the countries, 
but had to be attributed to differences between individual respondents and households. 
The limited macro-variance was however largely explained by the country characteris-
tics that were included as determinants in the model. A part of it could be ascribed to 
the wealth differentials between the countries (for example, the liberal group includes 
both the affluent usa and the poorer Australia). If allowance is made for this, all ‘pure’ 
differences among the regime types and the hybrid operate in the theoretically expected 
direction; but only the difference between the liberal and corporatist group turned out 
to be statistically significant.
7.3 The impact of social security regimes
Based on the empirical analyses, it may be asked why the differences between the three 
social security regimes are reflected to only a limited extent in the output indicators. In 
the area of benefit dependency, characteristic disparities were found in the composition 
of the take-up of different arrangements, but under equalised conditions the differences 
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in the volume growth between 1980 and 1999 were fairly small. The growth in the corpo-
ratist group was not much stronger than in the social-democratic cluster, which in turn 
ended up only slightly higher than the liberal group, and even then only in comparison 
with the usa as the purer representative of the latter cluster. The multi-level analyses of 
the poverty incidence in around 2000 also revealed only a rather limited influence by the 
regime type. Ceteris paribus, the sign of the effect on the incidence was as expected in all 
cases, but only one hypothesis (the liberal/corporatist distinction) withstood statistical 
testing.
A number of possible explanations for the rather small differences in the output of the 
regimes are obvious. For example, measurement errors in the dependent variables and 
the empirical typology may have distorted the outcomes. The findings in relation to 
benefit dependency might perhaps have been different if adequate data had been avail-
able on individual recipients, enabling multi-level analyses to be performed here, too. 
Similarly, the outcomes in relation to poverty incidence could have been more robust if 
they had been based on a reliable time series covering several decades. And the empirical 
typology of the regimes might gain in predictive power if it was extended to include more 
countries, thus increasing the variance and enabling more macro-characteristics to be 
included in the multi-level models. It is also possible that the effects of the typology have 
been partly cancelled out by ‘invisible’ forms of social security, which are not reflected 
in the empirical classification of formal social security regimes. The residual nature of 
the liberal regime and the selectivity of the corporatist type may matter less if in prac-
tice such formal schemes are complemented by more extensive familial, occupational, or 
community-based social security arrangements than elsewhere.
A further possibility is that the ceteris paribus assumption has not been entirely met. 
Although major control factors (demography, national wealth, the business cycle) were 
included in the empirical analyses, it follows from chapter 3 that theoretically other char-
acteristics may influence the benefit volume and poverty rate as well. Differences in the 
administration of the formal rules (e.g. variations in implementation decrees, bureau-
cratic routines, verification procedures, the actual imposition of sanctions, the supervi-
sion and internal structure of the social security organisation) and in the informal insti-
tutions at micro-level (the work ethic of benefit recipients, the ‘culture’ among social 
security officials) have been mentioned in this respect. Theoretically it is likely that such 
processes and informal rules reinforce the effects of the formal institutions, but that 
is not by definition the case; they may also suppress the impact of the regime types on 
the collective output indicators. This would occur, for example, if in equal circumstances 
exponents of the social-democratic regime type generate higher benefit volumes and 
poverty rates because their social security organisation is less efficient than elsewhere, 
the willingness to work among benefit recipients is lower, and so on. Intuitively this may 
seem unlikely, but it cannot be entirely ruled out on the basis of the analyses performed 
here either.
However, at present it is only possible to speculate about the relevance of such poten-
tial shortcomings. Clearer answers require more and better data, as well as further analy-
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ses if these data become available in the future. At this moment it is worthwhile to look 
briefly at another issue: do the social security schemes in the country groups studied here 
resemble their ‘ideal’ type sufficiently well to expect that they will produce wide differ-
ences in collective output?
Real systems and ideal-types
It was pointed out in chapter 4 that Esping-Andersen’s classification portrays theoreti-
cal ideal-types; empirical systems of social security never precisely match the theoretical 
pattern, because they are historical constructs. As such, they reflect the circumstances 
under which they were established: the institutions that already existed, the prevailing 
conflicts of interest, power relations, relative prices and ideals, political alliances, the 
trade-offs during negotiations, etc. Arts & Gelissen (2002) commented in this connection 
that “a significant number of welfare states must be considered hybrid cases: no particu-
lar case can ever perfectly embody any particular ideal-type”.
If the exponents of the regimes analysed here are a long way from their theoretical 
ideal-types, this may offer an explanation for the limited influence of the typology on 
benefit dependency and poverty rates. When the differences between the groups of real 
systems turn out to be much smaller than those between the theoretical ideal-types, we 
should perhaps not expect wide differences in collective outcomes. The actual spread 
in terms of the scope of the social security system and the degree of universalism/par-
ticularism then lags well behind the theoretical dispersion: on ideal-typical dimensions 
the country scores in figure 4.2 would implode, with all real models ending up close to 
the origin. In that case the variance in the independent institutional traits will be too 
small to explain much of the differences in the degree of benefit dependency and poverty 
between countries. An analogous line of reasoning can be followed with regard to the 
real and ideal-typical scores on the benefit dependency boost and institutional poverty 
risk indices.
In order to be able to say something about this, scores must be obtained for the ideal-
typical regimes which can serve as a point of reference. This was achieved in a rather 
straightforward manner in figure 7.1, which shows the outcome of a categorical princi-
pal component analysis (CatPCA) of the same data as those on which figures 4.1 and 4.2 
were based; they therefore relate to the early 1990s. However, in addition to the empirical 
institutions of the eleven countries, four hypothetical systems were included. The latter 
were constructed by theoretically appraising each variable in advance in terms of the two 
main dimensions of the typology (the scope of the social security system and its degree of 
universalism/ particularism). Subsequently three ideal-types were constructed by assign-
ing them on each variable the scores that would be expected on theoretical grounds. 
The pure social-democratic regime, for example, has extremely high replacement rates 
(benefit levels as a percentage of previous earnings) and spends a large amount on active 
labour market policy, whereas the pure liberal regime achieves minimal scores on these 
aspects. Similarly, the ideal-typical corporatist regime has very favourable social secu-
rity arrangements for civil servants and generous arrangements for early retirement by 
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insiders on the labour market, a form of particularism which is theoretically completely 
absent from the social-democratic regime.
The analysis also included a ‘generic hybrid’, a theoretical system which achieves a 
score precisely in the middle for all variables4. This produces a second point of reference: 
the closer empirical systems approach the generic hybrid and the further removed they 
become from their ideal-type, the more they can be regarded as less pure cases.
In the process of coding the theoretical regimes, on each variable the constraint was 
applied that the scores for the ideal-types could never be higher or lower than the extreme 
values that actually occur in the countries studied here. For some variables this restric-
tion is an obvious one: if the coverage or replacement rate of a certain scheme is already 
zero or 100% in any of the systems actually studied, the ideal-type can by definition not 
score lower or higher. Where there are natural dichotomies (a certain provision does or 
does not exist), the values for the ideal-types are also evident. For a number of other vari-
ables, however, higher or lower scores are conceivable. Even so, no categories were added 
for the ideal regime types which were more extreme than those occurring in reality. Such 
peripheral values may not be likely to occur in practice (e.g. an average income tax rate 
of 0% or 100%), and introducing them in the analysis performed here would by definition 
boost the distance between the ideal regime types and their empirical exponents.
The scaling in figure 7.1 is based on the scores assigned to the four theoretical types. 
The eleven empirical systems were treated passively in the CatPCA, which implies that 
they do not attribute to the underlying dimensions. As a result, the distances, unlike in 
figure 4.2, do not reflect the empirical similarities and differences of the countries, but 
rather the degree to which their social security system diverges from the three theoreti-
cally ideal systems and the generic hybrid. A ‘passive’ actual social security system having 
the same scores on all variables5 as the corporatist ideal-type will coincide with the lat-
ter. Conversely, the fewer characteristics a real system shares with a theoretical type, the 
greater the distance between the two will be.
In this analysis, too, the dimensions can be described in terms of scope and universalism/
particularism, and the observations belong to clearly distinct clusters in the presumed 
manner. The empirical types thus not only share many characteristics among themselves, 
but also correspond most closely with their own theoretical ideal-type. They are how-
ever not entirely pure exponents of that ideal-type: the countries come roughly halfway 
between their own theoretical regime type and the generic hybrid, with a few differences 
of emphasis.
On average, the empirical social-democratic systems most closely resemble their ideal-
type and are furthest removed from the generic hybrid. The configuration is somewhat 
different from in figure 4.2: the three empirical systems are now much closer together. 
Denmark comes nearest to the social-democratic ideal-type, followed at a short distance 
by Sweden. Norway is still the least social-democratic country, but is much less periph-
eral than in the earlier analysis. This suggests that the difference found there was due 
partly to the fact that Denmark and Sweden share more characteristics with each other 
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than with Norway. The three Scandinavian countries diverge from their theoretical ideal-
type mainly because each of them sometimes fails to achieve the maximum character-
istic score. This applies in particular for contribution levels and marginal tax rates, the 
gross replacement rates of social assistance benefit after five years of unemployment, 
care leave arrangements and the absence of a minimum wage. Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway also exhibit a number of corporatist traits. For example, the initial level of unem-
ployment benefit is often high, and the wage-indexed unemployment benefit is often 
long-lasting. The separate orphan’s benefits which are sometimes present and the child 
allowances in the income tax system are theoretically also more characteristic of the cor-
poratist than the social-democratic regime type.
The empirical corporatist systems are somewhat further removed from their theoreti-
cal ideal-type on average. As in the earlier analysis, however, they do form a homogenous 
group. Belgium is positioned slightly closer to the fictitious ideal regime than Germany 
and France, and is thus the purist representative of the typical corporatist pattern. The 
differences compared with the theoretical ideal are mainly due to the fact that the three 
countries score lower than expected on marginal tax rates, replacement rates, financial 
provisions for children and the minimum wage protection. The provisions for the elderly 
are also often slightly less than those assumed in the theoretical ideal-type. The scope of 
leave arrangements and government spending on active labour market policy are some-
what greater in the empirical corporatist systems than in their theoretical counterpart, 
moving them in the direction of the social-democratic cluster.
On average, the empirical liberal systems differ most from their theoretical ideal, but 
as in figure 4.2 the spread is fairly wide. The usa and Australia are the purist exponents of 
their ideal-type; they are slightly further removed from their own theoretical reference 
point than Belgium. The United Kingdom and Canada have the most ‘impure’ empirical 
systems; these two come closest of all countries to the generic hybrid. In many respects 
the liberal countries are much more extensive than their theoretical ideal-type, and this 
applies in particular for the United Kingdom and Canada. Frequent anomalies include 
high tax breaks for breadwinners, the existence of a collective pension insurance for all 
residents, the high gross replacement rates for earnings-related pensions, the fairly good 
provisions for surviving dependants of employees, and the rather high social assistance 
benefit level after five years of unemployment (with the exception of the usa). Addition-
ally, many liberal countries have arrangements for maternity leave and formal childcare. 
The means-testing of old age and surviving dependants pensions is often less strict than 
might be expected, and the thresholds for disability benefits are not as high as the theo-
retical ideal-type presumes.
The system in the Netherlands ends up between the social-democratic and corporatist 
ideal-types, with a slight distortion in the direction of the Nordic group. According to 
this analysis, too, therefore, the Dutch system is clearly a hybrid of two models of social 
security. It is generally extensive, as are the two ideal-types it reflects. In around 1990, the 
contribution rates, income provisions for the elderly and coverage of the risque social in 
the event of disability broadly correspond with the social-democratic model. The Dutch 
provisions for surviving dependants, civil servants and formal childcare tended towards 
the corporatist type at that time.
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Although there are clear differences between the empirical institutions and the theoreti-
cal regimes, these are not so large that the real social security systems cannot be regarded 
as exponents of their ideal-type. When the scores in figure 7.1 are subjected to hierarchical 
cluster analyses, the expected grouping emerges once again. In a two-cluster solution, a 
contrast is found between the liberal ideal-type plus the four real liberal systems and the 
rest. The latter group becomes split if three clusters are specified in the model. The cor-
poratist ideal-type and its representatives, plus the ‘generic hybrid’, then form a separate 
cluster, while the remainder consists of the social-democratic ideal-type and the actual 
systems of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. If four clusters are specified 
in the analysis, the Netherlands ends up in its own separate category. Solutions which 
include more clusters lead to a more fragmented picture, but even then the ideal-types 
and their empirical representatives often coincide. For instance, in an analysis where the 
15 cases are attributed to eight clusters, Germany and France still group together with the 
corporatist ideal-type, while Australia joins with the liberal ideal-type. Similar results 
emerge from a number of latent profile models6.
On balance these analyses, despite the sometimes subtantial distances (especially for the 
United Kingdom and Canada), give no reason to conclude that the empirical regime types 
reflect their theoretical ideal-types too weakly to be considered representative of them. 
Set against the ideal-typical dispersion in scope and universalism/particularism, the dif-
ferences between the empirical types do not implode, and they are all placed in the same 
cluster as their theoretical ideal-type.
It would therefore seem that a low dispersion on the ideal-typical dimensions does 
not offer an adequate explanation for the limited effects of the real social security regimes 
on benefit dependency and poverty rates. Their impact could become somewhat greater 
if purer representatives of the theoretical ideal regime types were to be included in the 
empirical analyses – though it is not clear which countries these would be. However, even 
then the contribution of such institutional differences to these forms of collective pro-
duction might not be very large. The nature of the regimes of formal institutions clearly 
matters; but the empirical differences between such abstract types are perhaps less deci-
sive for the degree of benefit dependency and poverty than variations in the more specific 
benefit stipulations and in the socio-historical context in which the rules are applied.
7.4 Some implications
In conclusion, it may be interesting to look briefly at some of the scientific and policy 
implications of the analyses performed here. The study was set up first and foremost as 
an exploration of the significance of recent theory on institutions for the field of social 
security. The institutional perspective has a number of strong points:
1) It emphasises that rights and obligations are not self-evident, but are always con-
structed by rule-making actors, as are the associated conditions and potential sanc-
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tions. They always reflect the circumstances and perceptions prevailing at the time of 
their establishment, and they often build on earlier rules.
2) Institutions are established in order to achieve a collective goal: the actors concerned 
have a reason for assuming that their community will benefit in some way from having 
certain rules (e.g. higher collective wealth, effects on social structuring).
3) Formal and informal institutions can be seen as functionally alternative forms of reg-
ulation. They can supplement and reinforce each other, but they can also exist along-
side each other, or systems can be predominantly informal or formal. The establishing 
or changing of formal and higher rules generally involves higher costs than vesting or 
altering informal and lower institutions.
4) Actors do not follow established rules automatically, but make their own judgment, 
which means that defection is always a possibility. Corporate actors are often con-
fronted with a principal-agent problem in this regard. If institutions are very thick, 
and are deeply embedded in the actors via the process of socialisation, they can how-
ever dictate behaviour to a great extent; but this is less usual in modern, open socie-
ties.
5) The result of established rules cannot be determined in advance, but depends on the 
context in which they are applied, their subjective filtering by actors, and the actual 
course of the interactions between the parties concerned.
Relevance of the institutional approach to social security
Not all these ideas are universally accepted in the current scientific approach to social 
security. Rights and obligations are sometimes apprehended from a one-sided legalistic 
perspective, with the emphasis on what has already been codified (the prevailing laws 
and regulations relating to a limited number of risks) or on what ought to be included 
in the official rules based on considerations of justice and fairness (such as ever better 
protection against human damage). The dominant economic approach tends to empha-
sise that social security arrangements can generate negative effects (less propensity to 
save, labour market distortions, the poverty trap, etc.). In the neoclassical paradigm, 
less social security is almost by definition better social security, thus losing sight of the 
potentially positive functions (combating poverty, providing income continuity, reten-
tion of productive capacity, sustaining demand) of collective social security: “the whole 
purpose of welfare state provision is missing from the theoretical model” (Atkinson, 
1999). The institutional approach makes clear that what is ultimately important is to 
establish which effects different social security arrangements actually have at a certain 
point in time. It is also relevant to assess whether they serve the current goals of the com-
munity and whether, all things considered, they generate positive gains according to the 
prevailing consensus. The first of these is a scientific matter; the second is predominantly 
a policy issue.
The communal verdict on the existing rules may be negative, and may for example 
result in a wide consensus that it is best to constrain social security rights, increase obli-
gations, make conditions more stringent, tighten up sanctions and punish defective 
behaviour more severely. In other cases, by contrast, the conclusion may be that more 
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social security is useful or desirable. If the poverty rate in households with children is 
considered too high, for example, it may be deemed efficient to raise child benefits to 
a level which covers the minimum actual costs of rearing children, so that the material 
conditions for their development do not depend on the parental labour market position. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that other forms of social security are thought to fit 
the present society better. If the community agrees that it is useful for women to work 
more often and more hours, it may be considered a good idea to transform tax breaks 
for non-working partners and child benefit levels that are above the minimum into fiscal 
exemptions for those in work and better leave arrangements.
From the institutional perspective, it is however not automatically the case that the 
new rules will achieve the envisaged results; that will depend on the context in which 
those new institutions are applied (during a recession women may feel discouraged to 
work, or do not get the opportunity to extend their working hours, and tax changes may 
have little impact), and on the way in which actors respond to the newly established rules 
(if poor parents want to avoid means-testing or other conditions, they may not apply for 
the higher child benefit).
The idea that formal and informal institutions are functional alternatives does not fit 
with the paradigm that dominated in the 20th century for a long time in the scientific 
study of social security. Informal arrangements were something that belonged to the 
past: after the American New Deal and the British Beveridge Report, ‘true’ social security was 
a matter of rules laid down in national law or ratified by the government. It is no coinci-
dence that in his inaugural lecture in 1986, Berghman described all forms of non-formal 
regulation as ‘invisible social security’. Over the last two decades, in which governments 
have increasingly stepped back, there has been some reappraisal on this point. Nonethe-
less, in modern, prosperous societies social security still is a predominantly formal set of 
rules. The institutional perspective makes clear that this is not necessary: it is perfectly 
feasible to regulate some forms of social security outside the government sphere more 
than at present, for example by introducing greater individual responsibility for pension 
build-up and covering the risk of work disability. This does need to be qualified with the 
comment that, historically, the transition from informal to formal regulation has not 
been achieved without sound reasons. In some respects the incentive to regulate which 
applied in the past may no longer hold, for example because citizens today are more pros-
perous, better educated and healthier, and are better able to look after their own inter-
ests. On the other hand, people often value a collective protection against major eco-
nomic risks. With regard to social security rights, some degree of paternalism from the 
government is appreciated by many citizens, at least in the Netherlands (see e.g. Hoff & 
Vrooman, 2002). That is probably because rights that are guaranteed by law are felt to be 
more secure than private insurance or individual savings, and because they may involve 
lower transaction costs than a system with a great deal of freedom of choice.
The institutional perspective has also revealed a major drawback of formal regulation: 
the high likelihood of non-compliance. This has to do with the ‘thin’, weakly socialised 
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nature of formal social security rules; but specific characteristics of the institutions also 
theoretically increase the risk of defection. This applies in particular to benefit schemes 
where the rules are complex and difficult to verify, where there are regular mutations 
in the entitlements and many different actors (including a social security organisation 
with a principal-agent problem), and where the endorsement on behalf of the commu-
nity is weak. Formal regulations on social assistance, unemployment, sick leave and 
disability benefits tend to be especially vulnerable in this regard. This can be combated 
to some extent through an intensive anti-fraud policy (for example based on electronic 
data exchange), the imposition of heavy sanctions on culprits, and promoting coopera-
tive behaviour via the instilling of social norms. The institutional approach stresses that 
such attempts can result in high transaction costs, however, and that it is very difficult to 
banish defection altogether. Every regulation of rights and obligations leaves the actors 
some latitude, and some of them will attempt to turn this to their own advantage.
Regimes, science and social policy
This study also sought to establish the influence of the different types of regimes on col-
lective output. Among other things, it can be concluded from this that the regime con-
cept is not merely a notion invented by the “welfare modelling business” (Abrahamson, 
1999) of political science, but refers to real differences between countries in the design of 
their formal social security system and the informal rules supplementing it. The concept 
is also found to have a demonstrable significance for collective output and is therefore a 
scientifically relevant predictor.
In practice, however, very wide differences should not be expected in the results pro-
duced by representatives of the different regime types. This is due to the abstract nature 
of the typology, the fact that all real systems imply a dilution of the ideal theoretical 
principles (precisely because they are socio-historically created systems), and the often 
strong influence of the context in which the rules are applied. From the perspective of 
policy, the question is whether it is worthwhile seeking to bring about some kind of 
regime shift: even where policymakers succeed in circumventing path dependence, the 
effects are likely to be limited, at least as regards the extent of benefit dependency and 
poverty, the outcome indicators that were the central focus here.
Benefit dependency: the potential for data improvements
The degree of benefit dependency is the most direct indicator of the collective effects of 
social security institutions, because it ensues directly from the prevailing attribution of 
rights and obligations. It is therefore all the more striking that this is relatively virgin 
territory in terms of scientific research. The analyses performed here offer a first insight, 
but it would be advisable to repeat them when better data become available, preferably 
at micro-level as well. Linking the records of the social security agencies, as in the Dutch 
Social Statistical Database (ssb), and enriching them with survey data, could enable 
considerable improvements to be achieved in this regard. It would also be desirable to 
include provisions that are not regulated by law. The harmonisation of such ‘census data’ 
in the field of social security between countries would require a great effort, but is likely 
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to offer many possibilities for studying the effectiveness of policy interventions on the 
number of benefits.
An alternative poverty measure
By contrast, poverty is a fairly exhaustively explored terrain in scientific theory and 
empirical research. Yet the analyses performed here have produced several new insights. 
One of the most important is that it is useful to establish a relationship between theoreti-
cal notions and operational criteria. Here, this led among other things to the conclusion 
that the poverty lines that are frequently used in empirical research sometimes have a 
weak theoretical basis. This applies in particular for the widely adopted relative thresh-
old of 60% of median income. In the theoretical definition of poverty chosen here that 
criterion is not valid, and moreover regularly produces outcomes that are not credible 
(e.g. Slovakia has around the same percentage relatively poor people as Germany, while 
Lithuania equals the uk level). This is all the more problematic because this poverty line 
has been agreed upon by policymakers, for example in the ‘Laeken indicators’ which are 
used as a touchstone for social policy in the European Union. The relative poverty line is 
unfit for measuring differences and trends in the poverty rate in the member states, and 
offers therefore no sound basis for policymaking.
The ‘generalised budget approach’ adopted in this study appears to be a suitable 
alternative: it is preferable on both theoretical and practical grounds to existing pov-
erty lines. Here it was found that it not only leads to plausible outcomes in the histori-
cal series of Dutch poverty rates, but also in country comparisons. In order to be widely 
applicable in international comparative research, the instrument would however need 
some further refinement. For example, it would seem sensible to investigate whether the 
‘basic needs’ and the ‘modest but adequate’ living standard of the reference household (a 
single person) is accurately approximated in different countries if the norm amounts for 
the Netherlands are translated directly using purchasing power parities. This demands a 
detailed and consistent analysis of the expenditure that would be unavoidable or highly 
desirable for meeting the minimum level in each country, using the same method as 
that applied by the Dutch National Institute for Budgetary Information, and taking into 
account national differences in consumption patterns, prices, and taxation. It would also 
be necessary to ascertain whether the equivalence scale selected here is adequate for all 
countries. Finally, it is important to investigate whether the ‘Dutch’ mechanism used 
to index the level of the poverty thresholds over time is suitable for use elsewhere and 
(given the differing structure of the various national Household Budget Surveys) can be 
applied consistently in time series analyses across countries. These aspects fell outside 
the scope of this study, but certainly warrant further research.
Rules of relief?
Reference was made in the theoretical analysis to the views of G.H. Mead (1934), who 
argued that institutions are not per se oppressive or conservative, but can also be “flex-
ible and progressive, fostering individuality rather than discouraging it”. Are the institu-
tions of social security, based on the results of this study, ‘rules of oppression’ or ‘rules of 
relief’ for the actors concerned?
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It is not possible to give a general answer to this question. In the Introduction a 19th-
century regulation was discussed which established the conditions for the alleviation 
of poverty in the Dutch town of Den Bosch. Although such forms of social security at 
the time were described as ‘poor relief ’, this should not be understood to mean that the 
arrangements increased the freedom of action of the recipients. On the contrary: in order 
to be eligible for material support which was just barely enough for survival, the needy 
had to meet strict conditions and carry out unpalatable tasks in return. They were also 
subject to the whims of the local officials, and were often disgraced in their own com-
munity. In many countries the rights to social security were formalised partly in order 
to bring an end to such distressful circumstances. Seen in this way, the modern formal 
arrangements thus represent a major step forward. People affected by misfortune nowa-
days can enforce their rights, and those rights guarantee a substantially higher standard 
of living than in the past. The officials of modern social security organisations are trained 
and are expected to deal with their clients in a professional manner. The statutory and 
relatively anonymous character of social security – with no direct contact between ben-
eficiaries and contributors – means that people have less to fear in terms of loss of status 
and being shunned by their community.
Even though modern institutions offer much greater freedom than the old infor-
mal systems, however, they still contain mandatory elements in their terms and condi-
tions. Strikingly, not all benefit recipients are confronted by these elements to the same 
degree. For someone who has taken early retirement in Western Europe, who no longer 
needs to work, who receives a benefit whose net value is barely lower than their previous 
earnings, and who is in good health, social security can indeed be described as a system 
that predominantly brings relief. This person’s income hardly drops, and he gains a huge 
amount of free time. He is also released from the inconveniences that often accompany 
work, such as emotional and physical stress and the hazards of occupational diseases 
and injuries. Dutch research accordingly shows that these people often see their ‘benefit 
dependency’ as a positive experience: on average, such voluntary unemployed are in fact 
happier and more satisfied with life than employed persons (see §3.6.2). Their peers who 
are in receipt of social assistance benefit, by contrast, not only receive less money, but 
generally have to continue looking for work and are frequently confronted with means-
testing and other infringements of their privacy (such as home visits to check that they 
are not cohabiting or out working and earning undeclared income). Such social security 
arrangements erode the freedom of action of the entitled persons and may be experi-
enced by them as oppressive.
It has to be remembered, however, that social security schemes are not established 
in order to maximise the relief of individuals who are facing economic distress. Rules 
of this kind are always intended to achieve certain collective gains that the rule-makers 
perceive at a certain place and time, not to generate individual returns. The rights of the 
entitled persons (benefit recipients) must then always be weighed against the obligations 
imposed on the duty-bound (taxpayers and contributors), and against the transaction 
costs involved in implementing the social security rules.
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Socio-historically, that weighing-up process can have different outcomes. In the cor-
poratist early exit arrangements which came into being in the 1980s, the collective goal 
was a temporary curbing of labour supply, with a view to reducing unemployment and 
giving school-leavers a greater chance of employment (swapping ‘old for young’, avoiding 
the creation of a ‘lost generation’). In practice, the arrangements were often structured as 
an offer elderly employees could not refuse. Precisely because of this attractiveness, early 
exits increasingly came to be seen by the population of many countries as an acquired 
right, even though the schemes soon became fairly expensive for the contributors and 
the original reason for their establishment largely disappeared in the 1990s.
Social assistance regulations were mostly vested in a different socio-historical con-
text, and also served other collective goals. For example, when the Dutch National Assist-
ance Act was introduced in the 1960s it was stressed that the arrangement should make 
possible a ‘dignified existence’. The aim of the founders was to give expression to princi-
ples of fairness and solidarity for all, and to acknowledge that the risk of indigence was 
not an individual matter. Compared with the old Poor Law, the new legislation brought 
a considerable extension of rights, which could moreover be geared to the individual 
circumstances of the recipients. For example, it became easier for women to withdraw 
from the strains of a failed marriage, and to carry on their lives as single mothers on ben-
efit; in this sense the arrangement did indeed bring more relief. However, the take-up of 
social assistance benefit increased over time, and some of that take-up was unintended 
or fraudulent. To prevent the collective costs from rising too high and to maintain suf-
ficient social support for the scheme among taxpayers, the emphasis was shifted more 
and more towards uniform national norms, conditioning of rights, strict monitoring, 
heavier sanctions and more active guidance into paid work. This was partly legitimised 
by pointing out the importance of work as a vehicle for social integration and personal 
growth. As a result, the oppressive elements of the social assistance legislation and its 
implementation gradually came more to the fore.
Examples such as these underline the fact that it cannot be taken as read that mod-
ern social security is liberating and emancipating for the individual beneficiaries, or is 
becoming so to an increasing degree; sociologically, that depends on the goals that a 
community currently wishes to achieve with social security, the institutions that are 
established in order to achieve the collective purposes, and the way in which the rules 
are interpreted and applied by the actors concerned.
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1 Reglement op de verzorging der Huisarmen binnen de Stad ’s Hertogenbosch, met overleg van Heeren Armverzorgers, door het Collegie 
van Regenten over de Armen, beraamd (22 November 1817). The Regulations governed the general care for the poor in 
’s-Hertogenbosch (or Den Bosch), capital of the Province of Noord-Brabant in the south of the Netherlands, for more 
than 35 years, from 1817 to 1853. Wouters (1968: 244-245) presents a more in-depth discussion.
2 Given the standards of the time in which they were written, the rules set out in the Reglement were extremely detailed. 
Despite this, they covered only four folio sheets – a negligible volume when compared with the many thousands of 
pages of legislation and regulations governing modern social security systems, where an average administrative 
decree is longer than this.
3 As a corollary to this, De Swaan (1989: 12-13) therefore believes it to be fairly implausible that the process of the col-
lectivisation of care will continue in the future to an even higher level of aggregation, such as the European Union: 
“An integration beyond the level of national states, for example in a European community, does not of itself lead to 
a social synthesis in which the provision of care is continued at continental level. [...] The states that sustain care in 
an international context stand in the way of an international social policy”.
 It is worth noting here that the number of member states of the European Union has increased greatly in the last 
two decades, and that they have also become much more interwoven with each other. The introduction of the euro 
brought monetary union to the countries which adopted it, and arrangements such as the Schengen Treaty have ren-
dered the sharp delineation of national territories within the Union less important, while Europe’s external borders 
have become all the more crucial. Reference can also be made to the allocation of social security rights to citizens 
from other member states, the growing influence of European social regulations and jurisprudence on national leg-
islation, and the increased importance of the ‘European social agenda’ (objectives and national action plans in rela-
tion to labour market participation, poverty and social exclusion, pension and care systems). On the other hand, De 
Swaan is correct to the extent that the most important welfare arrangements are essentially still a matter of national 
responsibility: benefit levels, pensions policy, labour market regulation, etc. are mostly determined in the national 
parliaments and policy fora, not in Brussels (see also: Vrooman, 2008a).




1 Zijderveld bases this on the work of Malinowski (1944).
2 Giddens (1984: 17, 24, 375) sees institutions as the rules, including the related resources, which determine the behav-
iour of many actors over a longer period. In his approach, not every social rule is an institution; this is only the case if 
the rule (or a complex of rules) is recognised by many actors, has a certain historical continuity, and is accompanied 
by a sizeable deployment of social resources (including collective organisation). Compare: “(Structure refers to) the 
structuring properties allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible 
for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them a ‘sys-
temic’ form. [...] The most deeply embedded structural properties, implicated in the reproduction of societal totali-
ties, I call structural principles. Those practices which have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can 
be referred to as institutions. [...] The most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively involved 
in institutions. Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life [...] (or) chronically reproduced 
rules and resources”. 
 This view is therefore concerned exclusively with collectively important, permanent rules. Interpreting institutions 
in such a way, however, begs all manner of definition-related questions. How many rule-subjects, how much rule-
continuity and how much deployment of resources are needed before rules can be regarded as central? Does an 
institution not exist if there is a deficit on one of the dimensions? And if the threshold values have been exceeded 
in one social system but not another, can one speak of an institution only in the former case? This underlines the 
fact that it may be more sensible to regard all socially constructed rules as institutions, regardless of the number of 
supporters, the historical ‘expiry date’, and the mobilisation of resources that actually occurs. It is however true that 
some institutions are more central than others, an issue which will be explored in §2.6.
3 A social dilemma can be interpreted as a prisoner’s dilemma (pd) with more than two participants. Ross (2006) 
explains the classic prisoner’s dilemma as follows: “Suppose that the police have arrested two people whom they 
know have committed an armed robbery together. Unfortunately, they lack enough admissible evidence to get a jury 
to convict. They do, however, have enough evidence to send each prisoner away for two years for theft of the getaway 
car. The chief inspector now makes the following offer to each prisoner: If you will confess to the robbery, implicat-
ing your partner, and she does not also confess, then you’ll go free and she’ll get ten years. If you both confess, you’ll 
each get 5 years. If neither of you confess, then you’ll each get two years for the auto theft”. 
 The classic prisoner’s dilemma dates from the 1940s and 1950s, when American scientists were studying the possible 
applications for game theory variants in the us nuclear strategy. Characteristic of the classic prisoner’s dilemma is 
that the incentive structure causes a rational actor to adopt egoistical, non-cooperative behaviour. Mutual defection 
is the logical result – partly because it is a once-only choice that the two prisoners have to make simultaneously, and 
it is assumed that they each possess the same information and have the same costs, benefits and preferences, and are 
not able to confer. In later research many variants of the classic prisoner’s dilemma were studied, where a modified 
incentive structure can lead to different results. If there are more than two actors, a volunteer’s dilemma or social 
dilemma may arise. The former occurs when a certain activity requires a limited number of volunteers. Each actor is 
better off if someone else becomes a volunteer, but if the minimum number of volunteers is not achieved the collec-
tive will be worse off. A standard example relates to the bystander effect: if someone is assaulted, people witnessing 
the attack may think the police should be informed, but do not do so themselves because the personal gains do not 
outweigh the possible costs of getting involved in the dispute or a future legal procedure. In the case of the social 
dilemma there is a certain threshold value: if too many farmers graze their cattle on the common grounds, that land 
will be ruined. Theoretically there are two equilibrium states in a social dilemma: universal defection or minimal 
effective cooperation, where the number of co-operators approaches the limit value. Only the latter distribution 
is Pareto-optimal (each actor is at least as well off as with all other solutions, and some are better off ). In order to 
approach this point, the defection must be limited; this entails tackling any ‘free riders’ (people who benefit from 
their defection without intentionally harming the interest of others) and ‘foul dealers’ (people who not only benefit 
through their non-cooperative behaviour, but also seek to put others at a disadvantage). 
 Other game theory variants stress the repetition of the interaction (pd’s may be continuous or iterative), the transpar-
ency of the intentions of the players, and the evolution of certain strategies. Axelrod (1981, 1984) has pointed at the 
effectiveness of the ‘tit-for-tat’ (tft) strategy in computer simulations. This strategy means that the actor in an itera-
tive pd acts cooperatively in the first move, and thereafter follows the behaviour of their opponent: cooperation is 
rewarded with cooperation, defection with defection. According to Axelrod, the tft strategy is successful on account 
of four characteristics: it is ‘nice’, because the actor is never the first to defect; it is ‘retaliatory’, which means it does 
not lead to exploitation if the incentive structure rewards defection; it is ‘forgiving’, as the actor remains capable of 
cooperation if the other player regularly defects; and it is ‘clear’ because of the predictability of the actor’s behaviour. 
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Later variants of the strategy are slightly more efficient, as they take account of the possibility that the other actor 
will sometimes take a suboptimum decision due to an incorrect perception or by accident, and will therefore not 
always repay defectors in kind (‘Generous tft’). However, tft is not necessarily optimal; for instance, in games of 
limited duration, the last players may choose to defect in the final round, thus making retaliation impossible.
4 In the first chapter of this novel McEwan (1997) describes six men, who do not know each other and who due to a “fatal 
lack of co-operation” do not manage to keep a stranded balloon with a child as passenger on the ground. If they were 
to undertake the same joint action (all holding onto the balloon together, lifting out the child who is paralysed with 
fear, deflating the balloon), they could have prevented a gust of wind carrying away the balloon and child. However, 
there is no history of co-operation, no shared morality, and no clear leader. One lets go of the balloon, causing the 
remaining weight of the others to reach a critical point. They see their own lives come under threat, and bring them-
selves out of danger. The most altruistic of them holds on until exhaustion forces him to let go, so that he falls to his 
death.
5 In a zero-sum game a person can only gain by putting another player at a disadvantage. A simple example is noughts-
and-crosses (tic-tac-toe), in which a move that allows player A to win means that player B loses. In such finite zero-
sum games, where both players have perfect information, the solution is equal to the Nash Equilibrium (ne) of their 
respective strategies. This is the case if neither player, given the strategy employed by the other, can increase his yield 
by changing his line of attack. If both players follow a rational strategy in this type of zero-sum game, in which they 
attempt to maximise their minimum gains (maximin) under the assumption that the other player will play as well as 
possible, this leads to a unique solution, which for this type of game is also the only Nash equilibrium. If played well, 
therefore, noughts-and-crosses always ends in a draw. 
 However, games as these are fairly atypical, and not very useful as models for social interaction. Non-zero-sum games 
are more instructive; these often have several Nash equilibria, so that the outcome is less clearly determined from 
the outset. In the classic prisoner’s dilemma (see above), the solution that is optimal for both players is not achieved 
because the Nash equilibrium is not cooperation, but mutual defection (see Ross, 2006).
6 Liebowitz & Margolis (1990) have criticised David’s ‘Fable of the keys’ in a number of ways. First of all they point 
out that the claims for the superiority of alternative keyboards –especially the Dvorak layout– are not convincing. 
The us Navy experiments comparing qwerty and Dvorak in 1944 possibly were flawed; a more rigorous experiment 
conducted in 1956 suggests the gains in typing speed on the Dvorak keyboard are limited and do not outweigh the 
additional training costs (especially for trained typists). According to Liebowitz & Margolis this is corroborated by 
ergonomic studies, which state that optimal typing speed depends on three factors: 
- The loads on the right and left hands should be equalised; 
- The load on the middle row of the keyboard should be maximised; 
- The frequency of alternating hand sequences should be maximised, while the frequency of same-finger typing 
should be minimised. 
 The Dvorak keyboard outperforms qwerty on the first two criteria. But Sholes’s policy to put successively typed keys 
as far apart as possible favours the third criterion, and enables qwerty-users to type rapidly (probably because dur-
ing a keystroke the idle hand prepares for the next). “Thus Sholes’s decision to solve a mechanical problem through 
careful keyboard arrangement may have inadvertently satisfied a fairly important requirement for efficient typing” 
(Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990: 17).  
 Apart from questioning the superiority of alternative keyboard designs, Liebowitz & Margolis (1990: 22) also point 
out that the market situation prevailing in the 1870s may have been less clear than David thinks: “Remington was 
not so well established that a keyboard offering significant advantages could not have gained a foothold”. Finally, 
in their view David has not taken the true complexity of markets into account, by neglecting the role of entrepre-
neurs, guarantees, mergers, advertising, and other institutional factors: “[In] such a sterile model of competition, it 
is not surprising that accidents have considerable permanence, [and] embarking on some wrong path provides little 
chance to jump to an alternative path” (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990: 22).
7 In Australia the Terra Nullius doctrine – at the time of the colonisation the continent was empty and belonged to no-
one – has been used to substantiate the proposition that the government had a right to take the land for itself, and to 
lease land and concessions to farmers and mining companies. Others take the opposing standpoint that such a view 
repudiates the rights of the aboriginals already living in the continent at the time, and that these original inhabit-
ants have a legitimate claim on some form of compensation.
 Even in societies where land is less plentiful, it may be possible to appropriate no man’s land. In Britain, for example, 
areas of land that belong to no-one may be appropriated provided a) these have not been declared to be common 
property pursuant to the Commons Registration Act, b) are permanently fenced, and c) are used without interruption for 
a number of years.
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8 Weber’s analysis is however more sophisticated in several respects. North regards the relationship between these 
informal institutions and the emergence of an efficient capitalist market system as a fairly direct one, whereas in 
Weber’s approach it is an unintended consequence. The restless labour, thrift, sobriety and individual responsibility 
for performing one’s work are, according to Weber, the result of the struggle by Calvinists to achieve their own salva-
tion. Capitalism has evolved as the result of the co-incidence of this culture,  changing market conditions, and the 
interests of the rising bourgeoisie.
9 The formula PD=log10 (1+(1/D)) describes Benford’s Law, named after the physicist who pointed out the striking regular-
ity that is found in all manner of non-uniformly distributed series of discrete numbers, such as tables in newspa-
pers and magazines, population statistics, addresses, mathematical constants, certain sports results, etc. (Benford, 
1938). Just over 30% of the observations in such number series begin with the figure 1, which is much higher than the 
11.1% probability that would be expected if all starting figures were proportionally represented, as in a lottery. To give 
an actual example: of the more than 5,000 computer files created for this study, the size (in bytes) in 31.3% of cases is 
a number that begins with 1 – far more than would be expected in a uniform random distribution, and very close to 
the prediction according to Benford’s Law. The other starting numbers in this series show the expected decreasing 
frequency.
 An intuitive understanding of the mechanism at work here can be obtained by thinking of a stock market index which 
rises in equal steps. If the index starts at 100 and rises by 20% each year, it will be almost four years before the index 
reaches 200 and the starting figure changes. The jump from 200 to 300 takes significantly less time (just over two 
years); the change from 500 to 600 is even faster (precisely one year), while the change from 900 to 1,000 is the short-
est (just over six months). The mechanism then begins over again: the change from 1,000 to 2,000 again takes almost 
four years, that from 2,000 to 3,000 just over two years, and so on. As a result, in such series the figure 1 dominates as 
a starting value, and the other figures occur with a decreasing degree of probability. 
 Hill (1996) provides a mathematical substantiation for this law, which has been used in actual practice for auditing 
purposes, e.g. to detect errors of calculation, computer bugs and tax fraud (Nigrini, 1996). Hill also demonstrates 
that the rule continues to apply when the figures are expressed in different units (e.g. hexadecimal notation). How-
ever, Benford’s Law does not hold for all independent numerical series (e.g. telephone numbers in a certain town, 
which often begin with the same number). The logarithmic pattern emerges whenever “various distributions are 
being sampled in a presumably unbiased way”, in other words in the case of random samples from random distribu-
tions (Hill, 1996: 361).
 The content of a rule such as this is not institutional, because it is not socially constructed. However, its expression 
in the scientific discourse can be regarded as rule-driven, since it is related to accepted language conventions and the 
genesis of mathematical statistics.
10 This view on institutions resembles some of Wittgenstein’s assertions in the Philosophical Investigations (1953). Witt-
genstein presents an analysis on the nature of rules (pi 185 ff.), which he begins with the example of a student who 
makes a mistake in completing an arithmetical series. He links a large number of questions to this, such as: How do 
people learn rules? How do we follow them? Where do the standards come from by which we assess whether or not 
the rule has been followed? Is there a mental representation of the rule and the standards? Is this applied on the basis 
of intuition? Are rules socially learned and enforced? Rather than answering these questions directly, Wittgenstein 
questions the underlying dogmatic ‘pictures’ which give rise to them – his aim is to free philosophy from this strait-
jacket.
 Winch (1958: 24-33) stresses that, in Wittgenstein’s analysis, rules exist by the grace of the reaction of others who, 
because of a certain training, regard them as natural: “One has to take account not only of the actions of the person 
whose behaviour is in question as a candidate for the category of rule-following, but also the reactions of other people 
to what he does. More specifically, it is only in a situation in which it makes sense to suppose that somebody else 
could in principle discover the rule which I am following that I can intelligibly be said to follow a rule at all.” (Winch, 
1958:  30). Another feature of rules is that they are linked to a social recognition of compliance and defection: “The 
notion of following a rule is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake. [...] A mistake is a contravention 
of what is established as correct; as such, it must be recognisable as such a contravention.” (Winch, 1958: 32). For there 
to be a rule, others must be able to check their compliance on the basis of a certain recognised standard. This social 
character of rules does not mean that private rules of conduct cannot exist. In Wittgenstein’s analysis, however, these 
also contain social elements because:
(a) A rule cannot exist if others are in principle unable to understand it and assess whether or not it is being correctly 
observed;
(b) It is doubtful whether someone can develop personal behavioural standards if he has never had experience of 
“human society with its socially established rules” (Winch, 1958: 33).
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 Wittgenstein’s view is also echoed in modern sociology of knowledge, in which it is stressed that scientific truths and 
the pre-eminence of a certain mathematical/philosophical logic are often based on peer consensus, which cannot be 
seen in isolation from the established interests and reputations. In this sense such paradigms can also be regarded 
as institutional.
11 The rational-ethical actor may be both a natural person and a collectivity, generally a society with a government and 
laws. An example of the first is Kantian moral philosophy. According to this scheme of thought, people should act in 
accordance with rules that correspond with the abstract principle that they would want them to become universal 
laws: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law”. 
For example, a rational-ethical actor will believe that others must keep their promises, because he himself or society 
would suffer disadvantage if they do not. He then does not act proper if he does not apply a guideline to himself that 
he considers applicable for others. From this ‘categorical imperative’ it therefore follows that it should be a rule that 
people must keep their promises.
 The theories on distributive fairness posited by Rawls and Nozick, for example, accord central importance to the col-
lective ethic. Rawls (1999 [1971], 1993) adopts two principles of ‘justice as fairness’:
(1) The liberty principle: 
 “Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is com-
patible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to 
be guaranteed their fair value.” 
(2) The difference principle: 
 “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: 
a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society”.
 
 Nozick (1974) takes a liberal-conservative view. A fair distribution need not have a particular form or pattern; the key 
thing is whether the individual actions that have led to the distribution were themselves just. He assumes among 
other things that it is permissible to claim the rights to a disproportionate part of the world if:
a)   This will not worsen other people’s circumstances;
b)   The preceding actions that led to the acquirement and transfer of property rights comply with certain principles 
of justice; or 
c)   Past injustices are corrected via a procedure of rectification.
 Coleman (1990: 53) rejects both the individualistic and the collective variants of normative ethics: “Moral philoso-
phers searching for the right distribution of rights are searching for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow”.
12 In fact the rational conditions cited by Coleman were not met in the collective suicide at the People’s Temple in Jones-
town; see e.g. Johnson (1979) and Hall (1987).
13 Stirner (1971 [1845]) regards Eigenheit (‘ownness’, a specific form of egotism) as the highest goal for which a person can 
strive. This is in agreement with the homo economicus of rational choice theory, but someone who is guided purely by 
his material interests is not genuinely free according to Stirner. He regards Eigenheit as a natural state, which is sup-
pressed in practice by external regulation. According to Stirner, Eigenheit is the only true moral, and in an ideal world 
it would take place of the existing social rules. In his view these are obstacles to this form of egoism and are there-
fore morally reprehensible; complying with them is regarded as a form of weakness of cowardice. In Stirner’s ideal 
world, breaking the rules is defensible if it serves the cause of egoism, even if this involves the committing of serious 
offences such as murder. Although Stirner is often regarded as the inspiration for the later anarchism, he does not 
believe that the State should be overthrown. His ideal society is a ‘Union of Egoists’, consisting of individuals who 
associate voluntarily in order to increase their powers. The egoist, however, must free himself as far as possible from 
government authority, and where possible approach the State instrumentally: “Since the State is the ‘lordship of law’ 
… the egoist, in all cases where his advantage runs against the State’s, can satisfy himself only by crime.” (Stirner, 1971 
[1845]: 151).
 14 In particular the Genocide Convention (1948), the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the Torture Conven-
tion (1984) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).
15 As noted, North (1990) considers institutions in terms of constraints, and not as rules that confer rights. His concept 
of rights is limited to property rights, which are central to his economic/historical analysis. He does not go into 
the relationship between such rights and institutions in any detail, but does regard them as being closely related: 
“Property rights are the rights individuals appropriate over their own labor and the goods and services they possess. 
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Appropriation is a function of legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement, and norms of behavior – that is, the 
institutional framework” (North, 1990: 33). Gaining rights as a function of rules does not differ much from the theo-
retical position adopted in this chapter, with one exception: in the model developed here rights are included in the 
exogenously given rules, which are then interpreted by actors. 
16 Raz (1986: 166) defines this as follows: “An individual is capable of having rights if and only if either his well-being is 
of ultimate value or he is an ‘artificial person’ (e.g. a corporation)”. ‘Ultimate value’ means that something is valuable 
irrespective of its instrumental value, in other words when its value cannot be reduced to the contribution it makes 
to something else (Raz, 1986: 177). Raz’s definition of the potential holders of rights means that dogs, for example, 
are excluded: “Dogs can have no rights though we may have duties to protect or promote their well-being [...] Dogs 
have the same moral standing that many ascribe to works of art. Their existence is intrinsically valuable inasmuch 
as the appreciation of art is intrinsically valuable. But their value is derivative and not ultimate. It derives from their 
contribution to the well-being of persons” (Raz, 1986: 178). This view puts Raz in the middle ground as regards the 
definition of possible ‘rights entities’. Rights philosophers who advocate the Choice Theory of Rights generally believe 
that not only animals, but also young children, people with mental disability, etc., can also not have rights. In this 
view the core of a right is that the holder of the right can exercise a degree of control over the duties of others. 
Owners of dogs or parents of young children have rights, but those without the legal capability of acting do not. 
Proponents of the Interest Theory of Rights, among whom Raz is also included, argue that interests are the only things 
that determine whether someone can have rights, not whether they are capable of action or are able to set in motion 
legal proceedings. A child has an interest and therefore has rights, something which is in fact acknowledged in many 
cases in practice. For example, in assessing the damages to be paid after physical injury has been caused to children 
(e.g. following a traffic accident), the loss to be suffered by the child in its later life is often taken as a yardstick, rather 
than the present suffering caused to the parents. In certain variants of this approach everything and everyone with 
interests in principle also has rights. Not only young children are then potential holders of rights, but also animals, 
landscapes, cultural heritage, the environment, etc. Raz limits the scope of rights to natural and artificial persons.
17 In the philosophy of rights literature this is often illustrated by citing the distinction between ‘claim rights’ and 
‘liberty rights’. According to Hohfeld (1919), a person has a claim right if he can demand that someone else does 
something for him; set against this right is the duty of the other party to act. In the case of a liberty right, a person 
may perform an act; set against this is the duty of the other person not to prevent the owner of the right from doing 
what they wish. Raz (1986) points out that rights and duties need not by definition be so directly linked. 
 The philosophy of rights literature also uses a number of related concepts, such as ‘permissions’ (A has legal permis-
sion to do X), statutory ‘powers’ (A can influence the statutory relationships of B) and ‘immunities’ (B cannot influ-
ence the statutory relationships of A); see e.g. Hohfeld (1919: 65). These topics are the subject of extensive debate. Raz 
(1986: 168), for example, regards ‘powers’ as aspects of rights, and “by extending the same reasoning rights can be 
shown to be grounds of immunities and liberties: they are reasons for not subjecting individuals to duties or powers 
of others”. 
18 Property rights are complete when an actor has the following rights vis-à-vis all others with regard to a good or 
 service:
- liberty of possession: the actor may exercise physical control and exclude others
- liberty to use: the actor may utilise the good or service 
- liberty to abuse: the actor may damage or destroy the good or service 
- claim to income: any gains from the good or service accrues to the actor
- liberty of alienation: the actor may give away, sell or refuse the aforementioned rights.
19 The will theory stresses that rights are created in order to give the holders control over the duties of others; i.e., an 
actor’s right is an instrument for imposing his will on other actors. Each right therefore necessarily implies cor-
related duties; the right-holder is a “small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed” (cf. Hart, 1982: 183). The will 
theory has difficulty in explaining unwaivable rights (entitlements over which the bearer has no control, e.g. the 
right not to be enslaved) and the rights of actors that are not able to exercise sovereignty (infants, mentally insane or 
comatose persons, animals).
20 Raz, and other rights philosophers such as Hohfeld, see power as primarily a consequence of rights: the prerogatives 
to act that ensue from the right. And it is indeed possible that power is encapsulated in the rules, as in Weber’s (1922) 
typology of authority (legitimised power). Sociologists and economists (e.g. Coleman, North), by contrast, assert 
that power is to some extent also a cause of a specific allocation of rights, which leads to a bias in the interests that are 
recognised in the rights structure.
21 In modern legal systems the laws on public decency are often rather liberal. It is a basic principle that the government 
has to apply its police and judicial powers with restraint, and should only infringe the freedom of actors in serious 
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cases. For example, a committee that issued recommendations on the modernisation of the Dutch public decency 
laws stated that, “(It) is not the task of the state to use the criminal laws to impose its views on what constitutes a 
morally good life”. The freedom of private citizens has primacy, and the state may only interfere in that freedom if 
it leads to “unacceptable expressions and consequences vis-à-vis fellow citizens”, and only if the infringements take 
place against the will of the victim (Melai Committee, 1980: 9-10). In such an approach the laws on public decency are 
often limited to the banning of behaviours that are broadly rejected and which involve violation of the interests of 
actors or public order. They then include things such as the prohibition of human trafficking, sexual contacts with 
young children, offensive behaviour in public, offering for sale or possessing certain types of pornography, etc. In 
some cases these have turned into ’complaint-led’ offences: the government only acts as a third party when an inter-
ested party lodges a complaint.
22 As argued earlier, this relativist standpoint is an unavoidable theoretical consequence of the definition adopted here, 
in which institutions are ultimately social constructs. This also implies rejection of ‘value platonism’, of which the 
work of Nicolai Hartmann (1962 [1925]) is the best-known example. Hartmann regards values as the core of ethics. In 
his view they have an objective character, and only need to be historically discovered. He distinguishes four elemen-
tary values: das Gute, das Edle, die Fülle und die Reinheit. He places these at the top of the hierarchy of values, and they are 
a condition for the discovery of specific virtues (spezielle sittliche Werte). Historically this would first have taken place in 
ancient Greek times: the Platonic values of justice, wisdom, courage and control and the catalogue of virtues of the 
intellect and character in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. According to Hartmann, Christianity ‘discovered’ virtues such 
as charity, reliability, faith, humility and “Werte des äusseren Umgangs”. The modern age brought the individual person-
ality, love for the distant other (Fernstenliebe) and between persons and, following on from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the 
“schenkende Tugend” (spiritual giving not because there is a moral obligation or necessity, as with charity, but because 
of a “Drang der Fülle”) (Hartmann, 1962 [1925]: 504). 
 However, the fact that Western religion and philosophy show a certain historical evolution of values does not neces-
sarily mean that it is inevitable. That history could have developed in very different ways, and its reconstruction is 
debatable. Moreover, the articulation of certain values in religious and philosophical idea systems does not neces-
sarily mean that they actually influence behaviour. Imposing any kind of universal hierarchy of values a priori and on 
theoretical grounds is most disputable.
 23 Coleman (1990: 248) also acknowledges the special status of conventions: “In some cases the selection of the focal 
action is largely arbitrary … It is arbitrary whether the action defined as correct is driving on the right or driving on the 
left. Once the convention has been established, however, all are better off if each follows the convention. The interests 
in a particular direction of action depend on whether the action is being carried out by others. If a convention has 
established the direction of a norm, I will call the norm a conventional norm”. Here, preference is given to regarding 
conventions as a separate type of rule, not as a collective custom that translates into a special type of norms.
24 Spelling is conventional, but language also contains normative elements. It is the ultimate institution for imparting 
meaning. Language can create social distinctions (e.g. between ‘high’ and ‘low’ dialects, church and scientific Latin 
versus layman’s language, etc.) and can also embody a shared value (a language as the cultural vehicle of a nation, or 
as a confirmation of the identity and solidarity of minority groups). Aspects such as these are central to sociolinguis-
tics. Searle (1995) regards language as a kind of meta-institution, which makes possible all other rules.
 It is worth noting that in language rules (word meanings, grammar, pronunciation rules), the duties are often more 
explicit than the rights. The latter do occur however, for example when the right to say holy prayers or pronounce 
words of absolution is reserved for priests. Language may also be a condition for the emergence of all manner of other 
rights: the right to enter a place may be regulated by codes (passwords); the right to belong to a group may require 
a command of the argot or professional jargon. The latter may be formalised, as in the case of immigrants where the 
government requires a basic command of the language before granting them the right to settle or work in a country.
 De Swaan (2001) also refers to the central role of language when he argues that all relations between groups take 
place via verbal interactions, which are by definition embedded in a specific language. He also stresses the politico-
sociological and politico-economic aspects of language. De Swaan points to the global, hierarchically arranged lan-
guage system that has arisen in recent centuries. English is the hypercentral language, which is linked to a dozen 
supercentral languages, which in turn are surrounded by central and peripheral languages. According to De Swaan, 
language is a collective good which is used by actors strategically, for example when they have to decide whether 
or not to learn or use a foreign language. On a number of points, De Swaan’s analysis touches on the institutional 
approach adopted in this study. For example, he regards language as collective cultural capital in which the users 
have invested, so that changes can entail high costs for professional users, such as writers, preachers, or politicians. 
This explains why precisely these actors often fight for the preservation of language and culture, and are only willing 
to tolerate path-dependent changes.
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25 Searle (1995: 26, and more extensively in his ‘hierarchical taxonomy of facts’, 120-126), draws a distinction between 
‘brute facts’, ‘social facts’ and ‘institutional facts’. A social fact can be distinguished from a brute fact because it does 
not exist independently of human thought; more precisely, these are facts that are based on a collective intentional-
ity. An institutional fact, according to Searle, is a social fact of a specific type, which is concerned with functions that 
can only be fulfilled “as a matter of collective acceptance or recognition”. The statements ‘this is a screwdriver’ and 
‘this is money’ both refer to social facts, but only the latter can be regarded as an institutional fact. The monetary 
system is based entirely on social recognition of the tender, whereas a screwdriver can still be used even if no one 
acknowledges it as such. 
 It might be expected that Searle would devote some attention in this context to Durkheim, whose views on social 
facts were discussed in the first section of this chapter. This author is however mentioned only in passing, and along 
with Weber and Simmel is immediately discarded, because they “… did not have the necessary tools. That is, through 
no fault of their own, they lacked an adequate theory of speech acts, of performatives, of intentionality, of collective 
intentionality, of rule-driven behavior, etc.” (Searle, 1995: xii). Searle also states that he is not very familiar with the 
work of these classical sociologists.
26 McConnel (2002) discusses the (im)possibility of a hierarchical ranking of behavioural prescriptions in moral dilem-
mas, inter alia on the basis of two familiar examples. The first is taken from Plato’s Republic: “In Book I […] Cephalus 
defines ‘justice’ as speaking the truth and paying one’s debts. Socrates quickly refutes this account by suggesting 
that it would be wrong to repay certain debts – for example, to return a borrowed weapon to a friend who is not in 
his right mind. Socrates’ point is not that repaying debts is without moral import; rather, he wants to show that it 
is not always right to repay one’s debts, at least not exactly when the one to whom the debt is owed demands repay-
ment. What we have here is a conflict between two moral norms: repaying one’s debts and protecting others from 
harm. And in this case, Socrates maintains that protecting others from harm is the norm that takes priority. […] The 
Platonic case strikes many as too easy to be characterized as a genuine moral dilemma. For the agent’s solution in 
that case is clear; it is more important to protect people from harm than to return a borrowed weapon. And in any 
case, the borrowed item can be returned later, when the owner no longer poses a threat to others. Thus in this case 
we can say that the requirement to protect others from serious harm overrides the requirement to repay one’s debts 
by returning a borrowed item when its owner so demands. When one of the conflicting requirements overrides the 
other, we do not have a genuine moral dilemma. So […] in order to have a genuine moral dilemma it must also be true 
that neither of the conflicting requirements is overridden”.
 The second example is from William Styron’s novel Sophie’s choice: “Sophie and her two children are at a Nazi con-
centration camp. A guard confronts Sophie and tells her that one of her children will be allowed to live and one will 
be killed. But it is Sophie who must decide which child will be killed. Sophie can prevent the death of either of her 
children, but only by condemning the other to be killed. The guard makes the situation even more excruciating by 
informing Sophie that if she chooses neither, then both will be killed. With this added factor, Sophie has a morally 
compelling reason to choose one of her children. But for each child, Sophie has an apparently equally strong reason 
to save him or her”. This moral dilemma cannot be resolved by making one rule subordinate to the other, because 
the contradicting duties derive from the same rule. There is no solution to the dilemma, though some ethicists 
defend the standpoint that Sophie must always act in order to save one of her children; that is always better than not 
choosing and losing both of them – just as it is better to save one of two drowning men and not the other, rather than 
allowing both of them to drown. If Sophie cannot think of a justification for her choice, she would do well to take a 
random decision – this will prevent future remorse about the unused possibility of saving one of her two children. 
But this demands a rationality that is difficult to conjure up where there are strong emotional ties.
27 The costs of such a change in the formal traffic conventions are considerable: other rules, such as the right of way, 
also have to change, the signposting and routing of streets has to be modified, public transport has to be adapted 
(e.g. doors, platforms moved to the other side), car manufacturers must supply cars with the steering wheel on the 
other side, and there may initially be an increase in the number of traffic accidents because not all road users change 
their routines immediately. In practice, therefore, such a switch is often the result of a revolution or occupation by a 
foreign power. Driving on the right was introduced in France during the Revolution, and this convention expanded 
to the occupied states of Western Europe during the Napoleonic Wars. The growth of the British and French colonial 
empires meant that the colonised territories began driving on the left or right, respectively, while the German occu-
pation during the Second World War led to the convention of driving on the right being imposed on many countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Lay, 1992: 197-201). Sweden is a special case, in that in 1967 it switched voluntarily to 
driving on the right. Here, however, there was the typical circumstance that the old convention of driving on the left 
also entailed considerable costs. Sweden was surrounded by countries which drove on the right, increasing the likeli-
hood of accidents along the extensive borders; and there was also a fairly large automotive industry which produced 
mainly for countries that drove on the right. This limited the relative costs of switching to the convention of driving 
on the right.
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28 An agreement that is not governed by rules at all is theoretically possible, but not probable. It may arise assuming 
there is no government or community, and actors are a-historical. Empirically this is rare, and actors usually are 
inclined to act in accordance with the procedures, values, norms and conventions they are used to.
29 All manner of further differentiations can be made within groups. For example, it is possible to distinguish pri-
mary groups (personal, emotional and direct relationships, as among family and friends; private life) from second-
ary ones (impersonal, non-emotional, indirect; public life). A distinction is sometimes also made between formal 
and informal groups. The former occupy clear positions based on an official or functional criterion, such as school 
classes or an orchestra; the second type is formed spontaneously, and may for example consist of people who come 
together during a course, or who spontaneously join singing during a music concert. In addition, groups of which a 
person forms part can be contrasted with groups to which he or she would like to belong (the functionalist ‘reference 
group’). 
30 Coleman (1990: 197-240) provides an extensive summary of such forms of ‘collective’ action. He discusses the panic 
reactions exhibited by people during disasters and crises in the financial world and on stock markets, ‘acquisitive 
crazes’ (such as the Dutch speculative trade into tulip bulbs in the 17th century), contagious superstition (believing in 
flying saucers and magical cures), crowd behaviour, fashion rages, and so on. Apart from the fact that many people 
do the same things, Coleman points out that in situations such as these their behaviour can change rapidly, and that 
their actions are mutually interdependent. In his view this is an example of individuals partially and unilaterally 
transferring control of their behaviour to the collective so as to maximise their own utility. If a building has to be 
evacuated in an emergency, there is a need for coordination, and people gain by transferring control. According to 
Coleman, a rational actor will then set a good example (by listening to the person in charge of the evacuation), and 
will subsequently make his behaviour dependent on the actions of others (if everyone begins running, it is necessary 
to do the same in order to minimise the personal risk). 
 This is an interesting attempt to place seemingly irrational actions in a rational choice perspective, yet it has a 
number of weaknesses. Coleman assumes a process of weighing up the pros and cons for which people in such cir-
cumstances often have no time, and also ignores the emotional motivations of actors (their flight response, partly 
driven by biological processes). A single person who looks up to see a rock falling towards him and runs away in 
response is behaving in the same way as a crowd fleeing before a volcano eruption, without being capable of trans-
ferring his behaviour or convictions in a reasoned way to others. Collective phenomena such as these can be more 
easily understood in terms of equal reactions to equal stimuli, in which the actors reinforce each other’s responses; 
it is thus an interaction process that leads to homogeneous outcomes, not collective, rational action.
31 Coleman (1990: 300) regards all manner of relational characteristics within social systems as forms of social capital; 
not only trust, but also relationships of authority and even norms. In his view, economic capital and human capital 
are not relational, but  resources of individual actors.
32 Herrschaft is difficult to translate into English; it refers both to the legitimacy and the possibility of dominating 
through the use of coercive force. The revisers of the 1968 English edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft state that “both 
‘domination’ and ‘authority’ are ‘correct’, although each stresses a different component of Herrschaft” (p. 62), and 
translate the definition as “the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given 
group of persons”.
33 In addition to the economic, sociological and psychological notions mentioned in the main text, Mead’s (1934) 
theory on the social construction of the self is worth noting. He argues that actors place themselves in the roles of 
others, and in a socio-genetic process gradually develop a reflective consciousness (‘mind’) and an identity (‘self’). 
The self is compartmentalised into the ‘me’ (the internalised collective expectations) and the ‘I’ (the individual com-
ponent, which can respond to exogenous expectations and is therefore a source of freedom and innovation). If actors 
learn to take the standpoint of others towards themselves, Mead speaks of the ‘generalised other’. 
 Later sociologists make similar distinctions. Thus Giddens (1984: 5-8), in line with the Freudian distinction of id, ego 
and superego distinguishes the unconscious motives and cognitions of actors, their practical consciousness and 
their reflective consciousness. He regards the practical consciousness as being particularly important in seeking to 
understand the behaviour of actors. This consists of “what actors know (believe) about social conditions, including 
especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively … between discursive and practical 
consciousness there is no bar; there are only the differences between what can be said and what is characteristically 
simply done” (Giddens, 1984: 7, 375). 
 Bourdieu refers in this connection to a ‘habitus’ or a ‘socialised subjectivity’, a cognitive basic structure which gives 
direction to people’s actions. The habitus is a stable, internalised thought pattern, on the basis of which behavioural 
alternatives are categorised and assessed unconsciously or semiconsciously. This is rooted in the experiences of 
individuals, groups and social classes. According to one of Bourdieu’s definitions (1990: 91): “The habitus, which is 
the generative principle of responses more or less well adapted to the demands of a certain field, is the product of 
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individual history, but also, through the formative experiences of earliest infancy, of the whole collective history of 
family and class”. 
 Coleman (1990: 503-528) proposes a distinction between the ‘object self’ or ‘receptor’, and the ‘agent self’ or ‘actua-
tor’. He regards the former as “the storehouse of the person’s values and experiences” and as having interests without 
being able to act. According to Coleman, the ‘agent self’ is comparable to Mead’s ‘I’. It can act but does not itself have 
any interests, serving those of the object self instead. In his view, the same principal-agent problems arise here as 
with corporate actors.
34 Cf. I Corinthians 3: 16, 17: “Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any 
man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are.”
35 For example in the Netherlands Criminal Code, where Sections 293 and 294 prohibit killing a person at their request or 
helping in their suicide, with a maximum sentence of twelve years imprisonment (the perpetrator is themselves not 
liable to prosecution, even if an attempt fails). Since the Euthanasia Act (Wet toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij 
zelfdoding) came into force in April 2001, doctors who help in the performance of euthanasia in the Netherlands are no 
longer subject to prosecution provided they meet a number of strict conditions. The doctor must be of the professional 
opinion that the patient is undergoing unbearable suffering with no prospect of improvement; the patient must be 
able to give informed consent (or, where this is no longer the case, must have issued a written declaration in advance), 
must submit a voluntary and a well-considered request, and must have been informed by the doctor of their situation 
and the prospects. Together, patient and doctor must have reached the conclusion that there was no other reasonable 
solution. The doctor must have consulted at least one other independent colleague, who has seen the patient and has 
issued a written opinion stating whether the conditions have been met. Finally, the ending of life and the provided 
assistance must have been carried out with all due medical care, and the doctor must report it to the local coroner.
36 As the historian Flavius Josephus says: “Let our wives die before they are abused, and our children before they have 
tasted of slavery; and after we have slain them, let us bestow that glorious benefit upon one another mutually, and 
preserve ourselves in freedom, as an excellent funeral monument for us. But first let us destroy our money and the 
fortress by fire; for I am well assured that this will be a great grief to the Romans, that they shall not be able to seize 
upon our bodies, and shall fall of our wealth also; and let us spare nothing but our provisions; for they will be a 
testimonial when we are dead that we were not subdued for want of necessaries, but that, according to our origi-
nal resolution, we have preferred death before slavery.” (The Wars of the Jews, or the History of the Destruction of 
Jerusalem; translated by W. Whiston). Also note that, in a strict sense, there was only one suicide in Masada, though 
even this is a taboo in the Jewish tradition. The other martyrs – according to historical records 959 – were killed by 
their spouses, fathers or comrades, and Josephus does not report whether they agreed with the argumentation of 
their leader Eleazar ben Yair. In addition, based on archaeological research, the historical evidence for the collective 
suicide does not appear strong in all respects (see e.g. Cohen, 1982).
37 For example, only 7% of those who committed suicide in the Netherlands in 2000 had physical disabilities as a motive, 
and could therefore possibly have been rational suicides. In the other suicide motives – including relationship prob-
lems, financial problems, work and study problems – this is less likely.
38 Frijda (2007: 4) gives a more formal definition of emotions: “states of action readiness, and feelings of readiness that 
bear on the aim of achieving or maintaining, or terminating or decreasing one’s relationship to a particular object or 
event; and to have the characteristics of emerging involuntarily, of appearing to be set towards completing the aim in 
the face of delays and difficulties, and to seek precedence over ongoing behavior or interference from other sources”. 
These states are induced by emotional events, and according to Frijda governed by several ‘laws’, e.g.  the laws of 
‘situational meaning’ (emotions are a reaction to the subjective interpretation of an event), of ‘concern’ (events are 
deemed important, because they refer to a motive, need, goal or value), of ‘apparent reality’ (the meanings attached 
to the events are perceived as real; and the higher this sense of realness, the more intense the emotions become) and 
of ‘closure’ (emotions are of prime importance, they are closed to considerations that its aims may be of relative and 
passing importance). 
39 In fact the ‘revolutionary suicide’ of the People’s Temple was legitimised by Jim Jones by references to Durkheim’s 
altruistic type (Hall, 1989: 274-275).
40 In 1999 a controversial case of sati occurred in the federal state of Uttar Pradesh (The Hindu, 3 December 1999), and the 
article The pull of the pyre (The Indian Express, 9 January 2001) makes reference to five proven and successful widow-
burnings between 1979 and 1987. Indian widows frequently did not climb onto the funeral pile willingly, but were 
forced to do so by their relatives. Economic motives also played a role here: widows were frequently not allowed to 
remarry, and their family members often did not wish to be saddled with the costs of maintaining them, or else had 
eyes for the inheritance. According to the latter source:
 “Interestingly, every sati case is followed by nonsensical stories of the widow’s eyes glazing with ecstasy as flames 
envelop her. This contradicts all sati literature which says that the self-immolations were never voluntary. The new 
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widows were pressured into embracing death by in-laws who would crowd around her and tell her to join her dead 
husband. She would be made half-unconscious with narcotics. Invariably, she was tied to the husband’s body and to 
heavy logs to prevent her from breaking free. And when the fire was lit, the spectators would set up a loud religious 
chant to drown out her cries. Yet in Devrala (Rajasthan, 1987), witnesses swear that nobody put a match to Roop Kan-
war and that she was set ablaze by a divine force which approved of her fiery self-sacrifice. […] Writers attribute the 
[historically high] prevalence of sati in Bengal to the worship of goddess Kali and the need to satisfy her bloodthirsti-
ness. Ram Mohun Roy’s explanation was more logical, however. He ascribed sati in Bengal to the Dayabhaga system 
of inheritance which gave the widow a right over her husband’s property. Sati in Uttar Pradesh was rare because a 
Mitakshara law limited a widow’s inheritance rights. So in-laws in up had much less to gain from a widow’s death.”
41 Coleman (1990) clarifies the difference between individual and corporate actors by referring to the development 
of the legal doctrine on the legal position of the English king. From the 15th century onwards, the physical body of 
the king and his body politic were increasingly regarded as two separate personas. On the one hand the king was an 
individual actor or natural person; on the other he was a corporate actor or legal body (Crown). Having these two 
legal personalities enabled the king to perform acts which would not have been permitted as a natural person (such 
as selling land whilst still a minor). In addition, the continuity of the legal person no longer depended on the physi-
cal survival of the king: “The body politic had no birth or death, no age of minority or infirmity. […] The distinction 
made it possible for Parliament to revolt in 1642 against Charles I as a physical person while continuing to uphold the 
Crown. This distinction, which did not exist in France, made it possible for a King to be beheaded while the monarchy 
continued” (Coleman, 1990: 540).
42 Acts are events of a specific type. They are constrained in time, but are not physically limited objects, although they 
can relate to them (physical manipulation of objects). This is not necessary, however; thinking can be a form of 
problem-solving behaviour. 
43 Machines and tools are theoretically not actors, but objects which form part of the resources of actors. They are aids 
(extensions or substitutes) of the actor: an automobile or dishwasher takes over the task of transport or washing-up 
from individuals. This kind of automation can be very extensive, as in the case of robots and sophisticated user inter-
faces. However, machines and tools are not actors in the definition applied here, not because they are not ‘organ-
isms’ – neither is a corporate actor – but because they cannot be carriers of rights and duties. Intentionality also plays 
a role. While it is true that the acts of individuals and legal persons are sometimes also involuntary, machines and 
tools by definition have no intentions with the actions they perform; in the final analysis an actor must desire the 
action (e.g. wanting the washing-up done) and must set it in motion (pressing the start button).
 Animals are borderline cases; some people claim that they cannot perform acts. This follows, for example, from 
the standpoint of Raz (1986) discussed earlier, who believes that animals cannot carry rights and obligations. If ani-
mals are not actors, this implies that they can perform actions, but not acts. Against this it can be argued that the 
intentionality and motivations of the higher animal species (such as primates) differ from human behaviour only in 
degree, while the latter can also be involuntary. If the human knee reflex is an act, is the mutual de-fleaing of apes no 
more than an action, comparable with the cleaning function of a washing machine?
44 The view adopted here means among other things a rejection of the ‘causal approach’ to actions. In this line of 
thought, actions are movements whose cause lies in mental processes (desires, intentions, beliefs) which ration-
alise them. Without this causality, according to this view the events are not actions but ‘happenings’. Frankfurt 
(1997 [1978]) counters this with the argument that, regarded in this way, actions and happenings can only be distin-
guished from each other by the preceding causal chain. The implication – the difference does not lie in the external 
appearance but in what has happened previously – is one that he criticises: “It is integral to the causal approach to 
regard actions and mere happenings as being differentiated by nothing that exists or is going on at the time those 
events occur, but by something quite extrinsic to them – a difference at an earlier time among another sets of events 
entirely” (Frankfurt, 1997 [1978]: 42-43).  
45 In the philosophical debate the intentionality of an act is often assessed on the basis of trying, foresight and skill; 
that is, acts are intentional if the actor was aiming to bring about a specific outcome in a way he knew could be effec-
tive, and if he possessed the ability to perform the act adequately (see e.g. Mele, 2003). Someone who wants to win a 
rifle contest, who aims at the bulls-eye and who has proved able to hit such a target before, is acting intentionally. If 
he participates but is a poor shot who succeeds through sheer luck, some authors consider this a non-intentional act. 
Knobe (2008) has pointed out that in everyday life people intuitively tend to judge intentionality on moral grounds 
as well. Many regard the act of the unskilled rifleman who nevertheless wins the shooting contest as unintentional; 
but if he does not hit the bulls-eye, but his wealthy aunt in order to get hold of his inheritance, folk psychology often 
considers him blameworthy, because his act was intentional.
46 The concept ‘interaction’ can be defined more precisely. If, as argued earlier, acts are regarded as a special form of 
action, it is also logical to make a distinction between interacts and interactions. In that case the former relate only to 
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a series of acts by individual and corporate actors. Interactions are wider in scope: they also include the interactions 
between actors and machines and tools – the exchange of actions when typing or clicking on a pc – and the actions 
that take place between non-actors (two modems which send and receive bits of information using a specific proto-
col). Since all behaviour of actors is generally designated as interaction in sociology, this broader concept is also used 
to indicate the interacts that are the main focus here. However, this choice is based purely on the linguistic conven-
tion.
47 It is also possible to adopt the standpoint that the social act is the basic unit of all action, and that the behaviour of 
individual actors is a component of this. See for example the view of G.H. Mead (1938: viii-ix), as summarised in the 
foreword to some of his posthumous essays: “The basic act is a social act, that is, an act that involves ‘the co-opera-
tion of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act […] is a social object. I mean by a social object 
one that answers to all parts of the complex act, though these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals’. 
The act of an individual organism is an abstracted fragment of such a social act”.
48 Compare: “Because [the stranger] is not bound by roots to the particular constituents and partisan dispositions of the 
group, he confronts all of these with a distinctly ‘objective’ attitude, an attitude that does not signify mere detach-
ment and nonparticipation, but is a distinct structure of remoteness and nearness, indifference and involvement […] 
The stranger who moves on […] often receives the most surprising revelations and confidences, at times reminiscent 
of a confessional, about matters which are kept carefully hidden from everybody with whom one is close” (Simmel, 
1971a [1908]: 145).
49 Corporate actors are left out of consideration here. They acquire rules via their individual agents who act on their 
behalf. This means that the familiar principal-agent problem is also theoretically present in rule acquisition.
50 The differences in educational opportunity between different social milieus, genders and ethnic groups are in fact 
not stable over time. In the Netherlands, for example, the differences in the school achievements between people 
from different social backgrounds have reduced in recent decades. Furthermore girls, who initially lagged a long 
way behind boys in educational achievement, moved ahead of them slightly – although the sex-specific differences 
in the type of education followed remained stubborn (Vrooman & Dronkers, 1986; Dronkers & Ultee, 1995; scp, 1998: 
585-588). Based on research there is a tendency to attribute these changes more to general social processes (rising 
prosperity, women’s emancipation, growing participation in education) than to the specific policy aimed at reduc-
ing social differentials through education (scp, 1998: 584-585; Dekkers et al., 2000; Bosker, 2002). In as far as social 
reproduction through education still occurs it has at the very least altered in character. 
51 Seen from a rational choice perspective, it is not self-evident that socialisation will take place: potential socialisers 
will embark on socialisation only if they expect to derive benefit from it. Coleman (1990: 292-297) outlines an inter-
esting if rather narrow variant of the rational choice perspective on socialisation, focused on the internalisation of 
norms. In his view socialisation relates mainly to the establishing of an internal sanctioning system (conscience, 
superego), which ensures that the behaviour of actors corresponds with the interests of others. If this internalisa-
tion is successful, the socialisees will themselves ensure that they behave in accordance with the rules, or will punish 
defection by suffering from remorse. Coleman sees internalisation as an alternative to external policing, i.e. the 
direct imposition of positive and negative sanctions by the interested parties. The method chosen by an interested 
party depends in his view above all on the relative returns. Creating an internal sanctioning system involves costs for 
the potential socialiser (time, attention), whereas he will receive only a part of the future returns of the rule-com-
pliant behaviour of the socialisee. Coleman therefore assumes that the willingness to socialise by parents reduces 
as children leave home earlier, the social status of the family is lower, the envisaged norm relates to fewer forms of 
conduct, and the behavioural rule is further removed from day-to-day family contacts. According to him, certain 
norms lend themselves better to socialisation than others. For example, parents can monitor characteristics such 
as ‘cleanliness’ in their children easily and it is simple for them to apply direct sanctions. ‘Honesty’, by contrast, is 
difficult to observe, increasing the chance that parents will try to socialise their child on this point.
 According to this view, identification is the chief method of achieving internalisation of norms: “Socialization activi-
ties are attempts to create a new self so that the individual’s actions will be dictated by the imagined will or purpose 
of the actor he has identified with: parents, nation-state, company, religious order, profession, or academic disci-
pline. It is then this will which will generate the internal sanctions for future actions. […] In attempting to internalize 
norms in another actor [a socialising actor] does not attempt to inculcate directly the belief that certain actions are 
right and others wrong. The strategy is to change the self and let the new self decide what is right and what is wrong” 
(Coleman, 1990: 295).
 The strong point of this approach is that the transfer and internalisation of rules is not a premise. It is important to 
indicate the conditions under which actors will perform socialising acts. However, a number of comments can also 
be made about this rational choice perspective on the socialisation process. In the first place, socialisation involves 
more than simply the transfer of norms: it is also about the acquisition of knowledge as a personal resource in later 
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life, and about values and meanings, such as learning the different aspects of language. Moreover, it is doubtful 
whether potential socialisers really make a conscious judgement, over such a long period, and involving all manner 
of possible socialisee behaviour in which they may have an interest now or in the future. The question can also be 
raised as to whether a socialisee must always meekly accept the interventions of his socialisers: can socialisation not 
better be described as more of an interaction, in which the responses of the new actor matter as well? Finally, it is 
unclear in Coleman’s rational choice model under what conditions socialisation attempts will succeed and fail – a 
theme to which he devoted a good deal of attention in his influential early work (Coleman et al., 1966).
52 Erikson (1963), for example, argues in his epigenetic theory that every individual passes through eight ‘ages’: oral-
sensory, muscular-anal, locomotor-genital, latency, puberty/adolescence, young adulthood, adulthood and matu-
rity. Each phase builds on the ego-identity already developed to that point. A fundamental conflict has to be resolved 
in each phase, relating to the tensions between the individual’s own drives and the requirements of their social set-
ting. This results in the development of certain core aspects of their identity. In the first years of life in the family, the 
individual acquires a basic level of trust and autonomy; the early school period is concerned with the idea of initiative 
and producing things. In later youth the prime focus is on the development of the identity, while the three phases 
of adulthood are characterised by the development of a degree of intimacy, love, generativity, caring and wisdom. 
What is rather remarkable is that Erikson expects society to be correlated with these universal stages of personal 
development: “Society, in principle, tends to be so constituted as to meet and invite this succession of potentialities 
for interaction, and attempts to safeguard and to encourage the proper rate and the proper sequence of their enfold-
ing” (Erikson, 1963: 270). Just as sociological theories sometimes tend to regard the socialisee as an epiphenomenon 
of his or her social setting, so such a psychological approach may reduce the macro-level of society to the demands 
placed on it by the ontogenetic process.
53 Simmel spoke in this connection of an unavoidable, tragic tension between ‘individuality’ and ‘cultural forms’ (social 
meanings and rules). The introduction to an English translation of his work summarises his view as follows: “To sub-
ordinate one’s personal growth to the requirements of a boundless stretch of cultural materials is to betray one’s 
individuality; in following that path, the self ‘loses itself either in a dead end alley or in an emptiness of its inner-
most and most individual life’. Yet to abandon those requirements is an equally serious betrayal. One does injustice 
thereby not only to the claims of autonomous cultural forms but moreover, because self-cultivation entails mastery 
of the relevant objective culture, to the claims of individual self-development as well. ‘The situation is tragic: even in 
its first moments of existence, culture carries something within itself which, as if by an intrinsic fate, is determined 
to block, to burden, to obscure and divide its innermost purpose, the transition of the soul from its incomplete to its 
complete state’ ”(Levine, 1971: xli).
54 Of course this does not rule out the possibility that people can acquire a good deal of knowledge about formal regu-
lations with which they come into frequent contact: a good building contractor will have a more than rudimentary 
knowledge of local building regulations; a con man has to know how far he can go without committing a crime; a 
benefit recipient may become very knowledgeable about the rights and obligations that apply to him, etc.
55 This is not to say that such an autonomous decision on the prevailing rules always arises in a balanced way: one 
partner may for example be more powerful, more intelligent or more convincing than the other. And married life 
in particular (at least the visible part of it) is the subject of very strongly informal regulation in some societies and 
communities: the prevailing values, norms and conventions then leave the partners little scope in drafting their own 
informal arrangements.
56 As noted, on this point North (1990) diverges somewhat from the standard nie train of thought. He posits that the 
changing preferences of actors are also important for institutional change, and that relative prices do not change 
solely as a result of exogenous developments, but rather as a consequence of an endogenous process, whereby entre-
preneurs see their transaction costs reduce as their knowledge and experience increases. This would lead them to 
desire and aim for an increasing refining of the rules. North may be overestimating the significance of endogenous 
developments, however: in the economic sphere, too, new actors, who are not bound to existing knowledge and 
experience, can sometimes be the main drivers of rule change.
57 Compare the German edition: “Die wesentliche Bedingung für die Existenz und für die Herrschaft der Bourgeois-
klasse ist die Anhäufung des Reichtums in den Händen von Privaten, die Bildung und Vermehrung des Kapitals; die 
Bedingung des Kapitals ist die Lohnarbeit”, or: “The essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the 
bourgeois class is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of private individuals, the formation and augmentation 
of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour” (Marx & Engels, 1848).
58 Coleman (1990: 133) himself comments that this definition is somewhat circular. Frank (1991: 161) points out that 
this is not necessary, because in the definition of power the ‘value of an event’ does not lie solely in the interests 
of powerful actors: “an event in which many unpowerful people are interested can also have high value”. The word 
‘powerful’ could therefore be left out of the definition, so that it is no longer circular: the power of an individual actor 
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derives from his control over valuable events; the value of an event derives from the interests of all actors in that 
event.
59 In the English translation: “Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. The translators add 
that Weber frequently does not use Chance with a technical/mathematical meaning, so that in those cases it can also 
be understood as ‘likelihood’.
60 Interests will not readily be truly general, in the sense that the well-being of all actors in a community can be secured 
to the same degree via the same rules. Issues that are often described as being in the ‘general interest’ – protecting 
the environment, world peace, emancipation of disadvantaged groups, repayment of the national debt – frequently 
turn out to be difficult to achieve in practice. Concrete rules which seek to secure the general interest often meet 
with resistance from actors who see their specific interests being harmed: owners and employees of environmentally 
harmful businesses, arms dealers, the privileged elite or middle classes, the present generation of taxpayers.
61 Compare for example Thoreau’s famous exhortation against slavery in the us and the war with Mexico: “All men 
recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its 
tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. [...] When a sixth of the population of a nation which has under-
taken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, 
and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes 
this duty the more urgent is that fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army.” 
(Thoreau, 1849: 192)
62 Coleman asserts that revolutionary activities occur on a large scale if many people have an interest in overthrowing 
the ancien régime and believe that this can be achieved: “If revolutionary activity and support for the revolutionary 
activity of others are regarded as rational actions, it becomes evident that such activity will be more likely to occur as 
those who have an interest in seeing the authority system replaced come to have a belief that they will succeed. And 
support for revolutionary activity among those who are committed to neither side but hope to be on the side of the 
winners will increase as their estimation of the revolutionaries’ chances of success increases. It is irrational to revolt 
and dangerous to support those who do if the revolution will almost certainly be suppressed. There is an expected 
gain only when two conditions exist: when the expected gain if the authorities are overthrown is positive and the 
expectation of overthrowing the authorities is high. This can be put more precisely (in particular, it depends also on 
the expected costs of failure so long as there is a nonzero probability of failure), but the point should be clear: the 
likelihood of revolution should increase if either of these two factors increases” (Coleman, 1990: 480). 
 Frustrations can come to light in a major way during revolutionary activity, but this does not mean that they are the 
cause of it, as some believe. Coleman (1990: 484) prefers to see them as a side-effect of a given phase in the revolu-
tionary process: “If opponents of an authority system come to have a strong belief in their power to overthrow the 
regime, one consequence will be a sense of frustration that the regime remains in power. But this frustration will 
be only an epiphenomenon, an incidental consequence of the opponents’ increased belief in their own capabilities. 
The frustration is without consequence, despite its occurrence preceding the revolt. It does serve as a measure for the 
potential of action, but the consequences are not due to frustration, but to the components that give rise to it: the 
existing dissatisfaction with the current authority system, and the newly acquired belief that there is some possibil-
ity of change”.
63 Which does not imply that such pioneers will never be able to derive benefit from institutional change. Their social 
status may rise, they may acquire influential positions for themselves or their relatives, and their children may 
acquire better opportunities. Often, however, such potential gains are a priori uncertain; they will only be realised 
after a certain period of time and generally do not weigh against the high social and material costs that they may 
experience in the short term (being the subject of malicious gossip, social rejection, closed-off career paths, disin-
heritance, etc.).
64 North illustrates this by pointing out that a 17th-century pirate needed a completely different type of knowledge from 
a present-day chemical manufacturer. Such diverging needs may be reflected in a greater demand for, respectively, 
knowledge of maritime technology or theoretical and applied chemical research: “If the basic institutional frame-
work makes income redistribution (piracy) the preferred (most profitable) economic opportunity, we can expect a 
very different development of knowledge and skills than a productivity-increasing (the 20th century chemical manu-
facturer) economic opportunity would entail” (North, 1990: 78).
65 Berting (1978: 477-479) distinguishes the following stratification forms:
- Estates: strata consisting of families who regard each other as equals in terms of standing and honour, and who 
maintain mutual social relations in areas symbolising that equality (connubium, convivium). An ‘estate society’ 
is made up of a ranking of such strata.
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– Castes: permanent social groups to which people belong by birth, with a strict hierarchy and without mobility, 
and which define each other in terms of pure and impure (prohibition of intermarriage, physical contact, certain 
food habits). The members of a caste often specialise in certain occupations.
- Economic classes: social groups that are defined in economic terms. More specifically this may relate to owners of 
the means of production versus the have-nots; or to stratification in terms of opportunities in economic life. The 
latter criterion leads to different distinctions from the former: the economic opportunities of highly educated 
technical specialists are better than those of unskilled factory workers, although in a Marxist sense they belong 
to the same class. A class society is a society in which the dividing lines are drawn on the basis of such economic 
differences.
- Social classes: statistical groups, which are often defined on the basis of empirical research, such as occupational 
prestige ladders.
 The same author also refers to a number of common theoretical explanations for the occurrence of social rankings:
- Paretian: stratification is a result of the variation of individual talents in populations, and is generally not social 
in nature;
- Marxist: the power over the means of production enables those who possess it to claim a large part of society’s 
wealth for themselves;
- Weberian: social hierarchies are a function of differences in economic power, social status, and the domination 
and authority that competing groups are able to acquire in the political arena;
- Functionalist: high social esteem, a high income and privileges motivate people to attain positions that are 
regarded as important; 
- Exchange theoretical: stratification is the result of individual differences in the ability to procure scarce goods 
and services, so that others are able to meet their needs better and more quickly than if these goods and services 
are not offered. Subordination, demonstrating gratitude, honouring and granting senior positions are the things 
that are done in return.
66 There are many possible variants of political institutions which aim to select the ruling class. Strategic positions 
may be passed from father to son, the old leader may designate a new one, or the leader may be chosen on religious 
grounds (as with the Tibetan dalai and panchen lama, who are appointed on the basis of signs of the reincarnation of 
their predecessor in a newborn child). They may sometimes also be legitimately purchased, with the position going 
to the highest bidder. The sale to private persons of the government right to collect certain levies is an example of 
this. 
 Besides this, all manner of election are possible. In democratic societies the usual means of selecting members 
of the legislative assembly (parliament) is through direct elections based on the one man, one vote principle. The 
recruitment rules in the executive power and civil service are often less clear. In principle, general or indirect (for 
example from or by the current mps) elections may be held for influential positions such as ministers, parliamentary 
speakers and committees, state governors and mayors, judges, and top executives. It is however also possible to 
appoint them in accordance with certain conventions or distribution codes. In that case, for example, the biggest 
political party may provide the chairman of the legislative assembly, the number of ministers in a coalition govern-
ment must reflect the distribution of seats in parliament, etc. It may also be that the recruitment forms part of the 
ongoing negotiations between the political actors, which may mean for example that a representative of one party 
may occupy a certain key position in exchange for their support for a bill that is regarded as crucial.
 Co-option from a group of equals occurs for example in the case of the conclave electing a new Roman Catholic Pope 
from their ranks, but also in large companies, where the members of the Supervisory Boards are recruited from a 
limited group of businessmen who are considered to be leading figures in their field. The obverse of this is a broadly 
accessible concours. Here, objectified criteria (e.g. expertise, experience, intellectual and social capacities) are used 
in the selection of candidates. 
 Mixed succession procedures are conceivable as well. The Roman succession system of adoptive emperors combined 
inheritance and designation. In modern democratic countries formal positions are generally no longer for sale, but 
the available campaign funds can nonetheless be decisive during parliamentary or presidential elections. Coleman 
(1990: 738) presents a model of this latter phenomenon. In his view political candidates receive votes from electors 
and money from interest groups in return for promises. The media buy entertainment from artists and supply it 
to the electors. The attention of the electorate can in turn be cashed in by the media from the political campaign 
funds, as candidates need media coverage in order to draw their political programme to the public’s attention and be 
elected.
67 Enarques are graduates of the École Nationale d’Administration, the most important French Grand École . This was founded 
after the Second World War in order to train civil administrators. It is a small, stringently selected group: each year 
around 100 students are admitted after they have completed their university education, have followed one or two 
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years of preparatory study and have successfully completed the admission concours. Graduates can be recruited into 
promising positions in the civil service, with high marks giving access to the most prestigious official Grands Corps. 
The Enarques not only make up a large part of the senior figures in the French civil service, but are also overrepre-
sented among the political and business leaders. Presidents Giscard d’Estaing and Chirac, and the Prime Ministers 
Fabius, Rocard, Juppé, Jospin and Villepin are all ena alumni, for example (Presidents Mitterrand and Sarkozy are 
an exception to the rule). In its design, the ena was meant to be meritocratic: the concours was intended to make the 
course accessible to a broad section of the population. Over time, however, the degree of self-recruitment has been 
shown to be large, and has probably even increased. Roughly two-thirds of the ena students come from the upper 
echelons of society (parents who themselves work in the Grands Corps, the liberal professions or in senior positions 
in industry), so that in reality only a small section of the population supplies the new administrative elite. The Paris 
region (Île-de-France) is strongly overrepresented, and women are in the minority among the new students (cf. Gail-
lard, 1995: 218-219).
68 Middendorp (1978: 102-108; 1991: 60) defines an ideology as “a system of general ideas on man and society, centred 
around one or a few general and fundamental values, which has manifested itself historically as a doctrine adhered 
to by some major groups or categories, and which expressed the interest of some important category, or social class”. 
Here, the preferred approach is not to link ideologies directly to their supporters, or to the interests they encapsu-
late. In addition, their forward-looking aspect is emphasised, not their historical form. A cohesive system of ideas for 
the future is an ideology, even if at a certain moment it has virtually no supporters or represents no clear interests.
69 North (1990: 32) puts it thus: “There is, in fact, an implicit contract between [master and slave]; to get maximum 
effort from the slave, the owner must devote resources to monitoring and metering a slaves output and critically 
applying rewards and punishments based on performance. Because there are increasing marginal costs to measur-
ing and policing performance, the master will stop short of perfect policing and will engage instead in policing until 
the marginal costs equal the additional marginal benefits of such activity. The result is that slaves acquire certain 
property rights in their own labor. That is, owners are able to enhance the value of their property by granting slaves 
some rights in exchange for services the owners value more. Hence slaves became owners too. Indeed it is only this 
ownership that made it possible for slaves to purchase their own freedom, as was frequently done in classic times and 
even occasionally in the antebellum South”.
70 Posner (2000) regards social norms as no more than empirical regularities in behaviour, which potential transaction 
partners deliberately observe or break in order to make clear their ‘discount rate’ to each other. By giving off signals 
such as these reliable, cooperative business contacts, friends, etc. can be distinguished from the ‘bad types’; and 
through signalising people develop a certain reputation. According to Posner norms, in the sense of behavioural 
regularities, arise only if behaviour entails costs, is observable, and is arbitrary in nature. He does not however see 
them as a cause of behaviour: “Social norms describe the behavioural regularities that occur in equilibrium when 
people use signals to show that they belong to the good type. Social norms are thus endogenous: they do not cause 
behaviour, but are the labels that we attach to behaviour that results from other factors” (Posner, 2000:34). Accord-
ing to this view, norm change is primarily the task of competing norm entrepreneurs, who question the existing 
signals and propose new ones. They are motivated to do so by the anticipated individual gain (money, loyalty, fame) 
and certain personal characteristics: “People earn returns when they contribute to shifts in mass behavior […], but 
norm entrepreneurship is risky precisely because one breaks a norm by challenging it. Few people take this risk, and 
those who do either have tastes or values that lie on the extremes of the distribution, or else have immense talent and 
charisma, so people cannot afford to shun them” (Posner, 2000: 32). 
 It is clearly the case that actors often try to signal something to each other, and this is also recognised in sociological 
theories. G.H. Mead (1934: 42-51), for example, building on the psycho-physiological theory of Wundt, sees ‘gestures’ 
as important expressive social actions. Gestures allow people to signal their emotions to each other in a socially 
acceptable way, and to construct meanings by exchanging significant symbols. The fact that people give out signals 
does not however mean that they always do so consciously, and it certainly does not imply that they do so only in 
order to make clear the mutual ‘discount rate’ in social contacts. Above all, it would seem conceptually inaccurate 
to equate such expressive gestures with the social rules which govern them. Wendel (2002), who discusses this and 
other rational choice approaches to social norms in more detail, accordingly criticises Posner by pointing out that 
his theory fails to do justice to the evaluative character of these informal rules: the “normativity of norms” is elimi-
nated from the definition.
71 Other examples include Van Eeden’s ‘Walden’ and Neill’s ‘Summerhill’. Inspired by the work of Thoreau and by social-
ist ideas, the Dutch writer Frederik van Eeden established the idealistic Walden colony in 1898 on the Cruysbergen 
estate near the town of Bussum. The colony focused mainly on horticulture and was based on shared land ownership. 
Its unbusinesslike management resulted in its bankruptcy in 1907, after the community had functioned for a while 
as a consumer cooperative. Alexander S. Neill founded the Summerhill School in 1921, and it continues to exist up to 
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present. It is characterised among other things by the democratic relationships between teachers and pupils, with 
the latter themselves determining the structure of their learning process and their attendance at lessons.
72 In the case of conventions, in particular, the externality is sometimes difficult to demonstrate. Coleman solves this 
by adopting a somewhat laboured reasoning, in which he asserts that in those cases the norm itself generates the 
externalities, in the form of confirmation of the group identity and the social distinction. Compare: “Dress codes 
illustrate a form of conventional norm for which externalities do not exist prior to and independent of the norm. 
They contrast with conventions such as driving on the right, for which negative externalities exist in the absence of 
the norm and the norm provides benefits by reducing them” (Coleman, 1990: 257-258).
73 Durkheim already stressed that institutions have a supra-individual character. This makes it difficult for individual 
actors to decree entirely new norms and conventions. If they nevertheless try to do so, for example because they 
believe they possess the necessary power, they run the risk that the new rules will not be accepted by the community. 
They can then attempt to force compliance by applying stringent sanctions or eliminating dissidents and people who 
fail to sanction deviations from the norm. Such classic dictatorial solutions, however, often do not lead to effective 
social norms, but at most create a situation where people pay lip-service to the new rules. It is equally not a simple 
matter to steer the consensus in the community using democratic means. An example of this is the government 
agencies that seek to enforce informal rules with a view to preventing the erosion of norms in public life. In 2002, for 
example, a Dutch municipality drew up a hierarchy of behavioural rules, based on the views of 3,800 inhabitants who 
responded voluntarily to a municipal survey. The list contained popularly formulated norms such as ‘if you break 
something, you must pay for it yourself’, ‘do not use violence’, ‘hanging around on the streets in an intimidating way 
is antisocial’, and ‘speak Dutch, then we will understand each other’. The expectation encapsulated in the municipal 
policy memorandum was that formulating norms would contribute to compliance with them. In reality, however, 
the rules recognised the existing behavioural expectations of many residents, rather than breaking radically with 
the past. Attempts such as this often ignore two problems. The setting of norms reflects the views of the compliants, 
who were already behaving properly before the rule was promulgated by the local authority. It is doubtful whether 
the defectors, who probably responded in smaller numbers to the municipal questionnaire, will take much notice of 
the new rules. In addition, it is questionable that large-scale unfamiliarity is a problem with such norms. In all likeli-
hood, a large part of the local population already know what is considered appropriate behaviour and what is not, 
but people are less willing than in the past to comply or sanction infringements. Such an attitude cannot be changed 
simply by putting down the rules in writing once more.




1 Section 3.1 is partly new and partly a revision of elements from Geleijnse, Vrooman & Muffels (1993: 13-23) and 
Vrooman (1994, 1995). 
2 Or: “The most perfect system of government is that which produces the most happiness, the most social security, and 
the most political stability.” 
3 In the usa, however, the concept is also used in its more restricted original sense, referring to the various elements 
of the Social Security Act.
4 The eu’s official definition of social protection has been laid down in the manual of the European System of integrated 
Social Protection Statistics, or esspros (Eurostat, 2008). It states that: “Social protection encompasses all interventions 
from public or private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks 
or needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an individual arrangement involved. The list 
of risks or needs that may give rise to social protection is fixed by convention as follows: (1) Sickness/Health care; 
(2) Disability; (3) Old age; (4) Survivors; (5) Family/children; (6) Unemployment; (7) Housing; (8) Social exclusion not 
elsewhere classified.”
5 Despite its universalistic principles, the Beveridge Report does not recommend that social security be entirely the 
responsibility of the government. The coverage provided by the government does not discharge the individual from 
his responsibilities. For example, the individual should take out voluntary insurance over and above the statutory 
minimum: “Social security must be achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual. The State should 
offer security for service and contribution. The State in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, 
responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by 
each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family” (Beveridge, 1942: 6-7).
6 The causality triptych (see Veldkamp, 1984: 22) describes the following actuarial principles:
- the contribution to be paid depends on the risk to which the person is exposed; 
- the level of the benefit or provision is a function of the contribution paid; 
- the level of benefit or provision is proportional to the loss actually suffered (the manifestation of the risk).
7 The full title of the Beveridge Report suggests that social insurance should be at the heart of the ‘Plan for Social 
Security’. Social assistance is a secondary provision which should be used sparsely: “For the limited number of 
cases of need not covered by social insurance, national assistance subject to a uniform means test will be available” 
( Beveridge, 1942: 11). The report lists six principles of social insurance (Beveridge, 1942: 121-122):
- flat rate of subsistence benefit
- flat rate of contribution
- unification of administrative responsibility
- adequacy of benefit in amount and time
- comprehensiveness, in respect both of the persons covered and their needs
- classification, (or) adjustment of insurance to the differing circumstances of (insurance) classes.
 These deviate from the pure principles of social insurance (see table 3.1). Beveridge’s notion of social insurance cor-
responds with them only in a semantic sense; he actually refers to a contribution-based national provision.
8 The European Code of Social Security (1964) contains a similar list of events. It was modeled on ilo Convention 
No. 102, but provides higher benefit levels.
9 Berghman’s concept of social security as a ‘state’ refers to both the macro- and micro-level. On the one hand, quot-
ing Van Kessel (1985), it concerns a “state of society in which every member is assured of help and provisions aimed at 
prevention, restoration and compensation of human damage”. On the other hand, it is a state of individuals, or “social 
security as a subjectively experienced value” (cf. Berghman, 1986: 10-11). In terms of the figural model presented in 
the previous chapter, the macro state can be equated with the entire set of prevailing formal and informal social 
security institutions. The individual state corresponds to the subjective apprehensions of the rules and their conse-
quences by actors, which form the basis of rule-driven social security interactions.
10 The term ‘prevention’ is used here in a narrow sense; it concerns interventions which aim to avoid the occurrence 
of social risks (unemployment, disability, indigence, etc.). In the literature this is sometimes referred to as ‘primary 
prevention’ or ‘risk prevention’. In secondary prevention the risk has already manifested itself; this term refers to 
interventions directed towards restoration, but also to attempts to prevent long-term benefit dependency. Tertiary 
prevention relates to either ‘curative’ or ‘ameliorating’ interventions, or to interventions aimed at preventing per-
manent dependence on social security (Viaene et al., 1990: 34-35; Van den Heuvel & Vrooman, 1991: 12-13).
11 Searle (1995: 111-112) formulates a related elementary rule for the logic of institutions:
 “There is exactly one primitive logical operation by which institutional reality is created and constituted. It has the 
form: We collectively accept, acknowledge, recognize, go along with, etc., that (S has power (S does A)).”
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 While this definition is very generic, a number of objections to it can be made. The formulation implies that rules 
always enjoy general support. However, actors are not always involved in the constitution of rules, and often have no 
choice but to regard the existing rules as a given: they have no power to change them, or only at prohibitive cost. Yet 
they may reject the rules or wish to modify it; but in Searle’s logic of institutions, rule dissent is largely ignored.
 In addition, in this definition rights are seen mainly as freedoms of action (legal ‘power’), or: ‘authorization, permis-
sion, enablement’, with a conventional character (Searle, 1995: 96). This ignores the rights that actors award to oth-
ers, such as those which are central to social security. Duties and sanctions, essential components in the definition of 
institutions because of their effect in regulating behaviour, are left out of consideration; and conditions are regarded 
as merely as an extension of the basic primitive logical operation (Searle, 1995: 111), while they may be crucial to the 
specification of rights. 
12 The potential beneficiaries can be subdivided into entitled actors, or persons who meet the conditions: actual recipi-
ents (users) and those who do not exercise their rights (cases of non-take up); and non-entitled recipients: persons who 
do not meet the conditions, but nonetheless are granted rights (abusers). See Vrooman & Asselberghs (1994: 18-21) for 
a more detailed discussion.
13 The statement ‘Peter is without a job’ is an example of an actor state. Casati & Varzi (2002) point out that states are 
merely one sub-type of events (the occurrence of an eventuality).  Others are activities (‘Peter is writing one applica-
tion letter a week’) and performances, which can in turn be subdivided into accomplishments and achievements (the 
statement ‘Peter has been invited for a job interview’ refers to an intermediate step and is therefore an accomplish-
ment; ‘Peter has found a new job’ refers to a final situation and is therefore an achievement). Events are not the same 
as properties because they are one-off or individual, whereas properties have a universal character: events occur, 
properties recur. Events are sometimes also interpreted as forms of time to which a qualification is linked: “temporal 
instants or intervals during which certain statements hold”. In this terminology, the E and C conditions in the funda-
mental structure of social security institutions can be regarded as events (states, activities or performances) and the 
Q conditions as actor properties.
14 In the demarcation of group B, event conditions (E) and conduct conditions (C) generally do not apply. Of course, it 
may be that the duty-bound are required to perform certain actions in order to secure the rights of the beneficiaries; 
but that is part of their obligations, not a conduct condition which determines whether a person is to be included in 
group B.
15 Of course corporate actors do have an income: the rewards for entrepreneurship (profit) and capital (interest) to 
the providers of these factors (and, in the case of non-profit organisations, the budget that has been allotted); and 
they may experience difficulties hiring the labour force they need. However, it is generally not an objective of social 
security to tackle the lack of profit or interest, budgets that are too low, or staff shortages in firms and intermediary 
organisations.
16 In terms of the logical fundamental structure of social security institutions, in the classical basic income scheme the 
rights R are completely unconditional, apart from the general requirement of citizenship. There is no need for events 
E to occur in order to be entitled; the rules do not specify any risk which generates the rights. Similarly, people do not 
have to comply with Q-type conditions (e.g. having reached a certain age) other than citizenship, or with stipulations 
relating to their conduct (C), such as job search requirements. Even so, the fact that R is hardly conditioned does not 
mean that the classic basic income scheme does not carry any obligations (O) whatsoever. The duty-bound are still 
required to finance the scheme, by paying direct or indirect taxes or through alternative sources (e.g. levies on pol-
luting behaviour or luxury goods). As there are no conditions attaching to the rights, the duty-bound are the only 
ones who may defect, and the possibility of imposing sanctions is limited to this group. This leads to the following 
reduced form of the classic basic income case:
(1) Social consensus  On the basis of prevailing relative prices, powers, interests and ideals there is a sufficient 
    shared understanding that society gains if:
(2) Conditioned rights - A is entitled to R if (A=Q:citizen)
(3) Conditioned duties - B must fulfil O to secure R, or not interfere with A in exercising R, if (B=Q)
(4) Potential sanctions - S- is possible if (B ~fulfils O), or (B interferes with A)
    - S+ is possible if (B fulfils O), or (B ~interferes with A)
 The full unconditional basic income is thus far a theoretical notion; such schemes have not been implemented yet 
anywhere. Partial basic incomes and categorical basic incomes do exist, but these are often of a low level or carry 
E-type conditions (having limited means, reaching a certain age). Examples are systems of earned income tax credits, 
guaranteed minimum state pensions for the elderly, and individual entitlements to a share of the revenues of the 
exploitation of natural resources, as in the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend.
 Proponents of a full basic income stress its egalitarian nature, its simplicity, the reduction of the transaction costs, 
control and alienation brought about by the massive social security administrations, and the abolition of the some-
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times arbitrary nature of the conventional risk demarcation (for instance, it is not considered justifiable to treat 
long-term unemployed and disabled persons differently, as they often experience the same kind of problems). Stand-
ard objections to full unconditional basic income schemes include its presumed allocative inefficiency (people with 
a highly paid job may receive more than they need, while disabled persons with high costs for medical care  may not 
be able to make ends meet), the possibility of unfair outcomes (uniform treatment of unequal cases), high costs 
which may prove prohibitive for individual contributors and society at large, and the labour market disincentives 
that may ensue from it (women with a partner, the disabled, the low-educated, and people with a strong preference 
for labour may not earn enough to make a full-time paid job worthwhile). 
 From a theoretical point of view, the classic basic income scheme has a limited objective, as it does not target deficits 
in terms of labour, health and social participation: it is restricted to the income dimension. Moreover, here the mini-
mum income goal prevails; income continuity is not a primary objective, and may be difficult to attain for people 
with a higher income who lose their jobs.  
17 By relating entitlements to risks it is possible to fine-tune the rights to the severity and the irreversibility of the 
income, labour, health or social participation deficits. Thus the rights of people who are considered permanently 
unfit for work (the elderly, the fully disabled) may be distinguished from those of temporarily unemployed young 
people. The former group could for instance be entitled to high, non-means-tested benefits, while the latter might 
be provided with a combination of means-tested workfare and additional training. From a collective point of view 
this may be considered more efficient than a uniform distribution of rights. If it comes to that, the most vulnerable 
groups would possibly not receive what they need or is deemed just, while the recipients with favourable labour 
market prospects might not be stimulated to obtain a paid job.
 Risk diversification also increases the communal support for social security schemes. It allows for shared notions on 
justice, fairness and the deservingness of various groups to be taken into account, e.g. by placing migrants receiv-
ing social assistance on lower benefits and under stricter behavioural surveillance than disabled war veterans. This 
may increase the contributors’ willingness to fulfil their obligations. Furthermore, actuarial principles are easier to 
maintain if the risks covered are set out clearly. 
18 Not to be confused with the famous Beard Tax imposed by Tsar Peter I in Russia in 1705. This was part of Peter the 
Great’s attempts to modernise and westernise the country. The traditional norms of the Russian Orthodox Church 
encouraged men to grow beards. The Tsar tried to discourage this by prohibiting the wearing of beards; only mem-
bers of the clergy were exempted. People who in spite of this wanted to keep their beard had to pay a special tax, and 
received a token (znak) from the Tsar’s officials to prove they had paid the dues. 
 This regulation did not relate to duty-bound contributors financing a provision, but was a specification of the right 
to wear a beard; the officials had to fulfil a duty in this case.  As such, the Beard Tax was not part of a social security 
scheme but a condition for acquiring a privilege (a right which generally does not apply). A comparison of the follow-
ing two sets of rules shows the distinction: 
Shaving Fund 
- Conditioned rights:  A may (receive reimbursement of shaving bill) if (A visits barber) and (A is male 16+)
- Conditioned duties: B must (pay Shaving Fund contribution) if (B is gainfully employed)
Beard Tax
- Conditioned rights: A may (not wear a beard) if (A is not orthodox clergy) unless (A pays Beard Tax)
- Conditioned duties: B must (provide token) if (A pays Beard Tax) and (B is Tsar’s official)
 In both cases the social consensus and potential sanctions may be specified, following the logical fundamental 
structure of institutions sketched earlier.
19 There are a number of possible exceptions to this. Fire and theft insurance can (partly) be regarded as social security 
if a person works at home and loss of income due to loss of home contents is covered by the insurance; or if someone 
lives in a home belonging to their employer for less than cost (something that can be regarded as income in kind); 
or if the regulation stipulates that the government will assume all or part of the financial responsibility vis-à-vis 
households in the event of disasters with a collective nature (floods, war, terrorism).
20 The maintenance of children is not mentioned explicitly as a ground for poor relief in the Den Bosch Regulations, but 
was taken into account in the setting of the summer and winter relief amounts by the Council of Regents. The death 
of the male breadwinner is not included either, because the Regulations relate only to the poor living at home; at that 
time, surviving dependants generally resided in almshouses and orphanages.
21 These are the three binding legislative instruments in the European Union, which also apply to social security. eu 
regulations are immediately enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously. eu directives require member 
states to realise a particular result without dictating the means it should be achieved by; these usually need to be 
translated into national law. eu decisions only apply to their particular addressee, which may be a member state, 
company or individual. In addition, there are two non-binding instruments: recommendations (views and suggested 
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lines of action, often with the aim to provide an incentive for the preparation of national legislation) and opinions 
(specifications of the view of the eu on a certain issue, without any legal consequences). 
22 According to the Dutch Survey on the Integration of Ethnic Minorities (sim) conducted in 2005, 23% of the Moroc-
can households living in the Netherlands did sent money to their family in Morocco. The reported average annual 
amount was €700; the total of these remittances equalled about €17 million. Such transfers are not made purely out 
of charity, but also because the donors intend to return to Morocco one day and hope to have access to informal sup-
port then.
23 Some authors claim that the existence of an elaborate formal system of social security may even lead to a further 
decline of informal solutions based on authority, mutual trust, reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. The 
latter indicators of social capital would tend to erode in the case of a well-developed welfare state, as they are no 
longer needed for providing social protection (e.g. Etzioni, 1995; Putnam, 2000). However, the empirical evidence 
for this ‘crowding out hypothesis’ is rather limited; for instance, the extensive welfare states of the Nordic European 
countries and the Netherlands also show a high degree of trust in fellow citizens and political institutions, of active 
and passive participation, and of political engagement (cf. Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005: 15).
24 Excluding the rule driven interactions which aim at the acquisition of social security rules, the subject of the previous 
section.
25 Van Loo (1987: 26-27) points out that members of the poor relief boards were recruited from the well-to-do local 
citizenry. For instance, in the Reformed Church community in Rotterdam during the first half of the 19th century, 
roughly half the members were practitioners of one of the liberal professions or “major business figures”. Often they 
were relatively young (below 30), though they also included persons of independent means. For the former group the 
office was often “a sort of training school for later positions in life, […] a first step in a social career”.
26 For instance, the regents of the board sometimes instigated drinking bouts during the meetings in which the poor 
relief was awarded, as illustrated for the Netherlands by Van Loo (1987: 27): “In Den Helder the members of the gen-
eral poor relief board were doing very nicely in around 1850, judging from the amounts spent on wine, cigars and 
bread rolls during the meetings. The furnishing of the poor relief chamber must also have been very luxurious, judg-
ing from the prices paid.” The church social welfare council in the town of Zutphen were even more lavish: “In those 
days [circa 1800-1840], heavy consumption and other excesses were by no means the exception. In one year, so we 
read, 6,000 bottles were drunk. The gatherings were not infrequently marred by coarse exuberance. Brother S., for 
example, threw his plate full of food through the window, which led Brother L. to remark: ‘If that’s how you’re going 
to do things, I can pay for it just as well’, and threw all manner of items to the floor, where drink and food, bottles and 
glasses were scattered in brotherly unison.” Van Loo comments that these were unlikely to be bottles of wine: that 
would be equivalent to a consumption of more than eight litres per person in each weekly meeting. 
27 For instance, an informal occupational system may also be the result of collective bargaining between trade unions 
and employers’ organisations at different levels (companies, trade sectors, national agreements). In that case the 
number of actors and their mutual relationships (including consultations with the rank and file) is greater than in 
figure 3.3. The administration of the system need not be carried out by the firm itself, but may also be outsourced to 
external organisations such as administration offices, private insurance companies or sectoral funds. An interaction 
structure with such intermediate ‘occupational social security organisations’ evidently is more complex than one 
with self-administrators. Finally, the size of the firm and the nature of its activities theoretically also influence the 
structure and course of the interactions in the model. Large companies tend to have more complicated systems: the 
management is likely to be responsible for the content of the informal rules, which are implemented by the person-
nel and salary administration or is outsourced, with the whole process being overseen by an external auditor and a 
supervisory board. Companies where, e.g., hazardous work is performed (such as the construction industry) may 
have a greater interest in regulating working conditions than companies where this is not the case.
28 In addition this fraudster was also claiming four social assistance benefits (scp, 2002: 360).
29 Verheul (1989: 70-71) summarised a number of specific forms of abuse of the demographic schemes. Examples in the 
old-age pension system include stating an incorrect date of birth registered in a foreign country, or failure to disclose 
the death of a claimant abroad, while the benefit is still claimed (on cases of death in the Netherlands the latter is 
difficult, because the population registry automatically notifies the benefits agency). In the surviving dependants’ 
benefit system, the claimant may fail to report that they have remarried or that they are also in receipt of surviving 
dependants’ benefit from another country. “Promoting widowhood by ending the life of a spouse or being complicit 
in such an act” may also occur. Child benefit can be wrongfully obtained by incorrectly stating the number of chil-
dren or their date of birth (especially if they were born or live abroad), simulating situations which entitle them to 
higher benefits (children in education, living outside the home, disability of the carers), or failing to disclose infor-
mation which would end the entitlements (the child having its own means, maintenance by third parties).
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30 The moral hazard notion refers to situations where the likelihood of a risk to occur depends on the behaviour of the 
entitled party, and where it is increased by the fact that it is collectively covered.
31 Transference and compensatory efforts are two other possible behavioural reactions of contributors to the lev-
ies imposed. The former occurs when the contributor succeeds in transferring the costs to someone else, e.g. an 
employer who passes on a contribution increase to the consumer by raising the price of his goods. Employees may 
show a similar response by demanding higher wages if their social security contributions are raised. An example of 
compensatory efforts is the employee who begins working longer hours in order to keep their total income at the 
same level after a rise in contributions.
32 A special form of contributors’ defection occurs when they claim conscientious objections to paying their dues, for 
instance on the ground that their religion forbids them from taking out any insurance against the risks that God vis-
its on human beings. In the Netherlands this possibility is formally laid down in sections 64-67a of the Social Insur-
ance Funding Act (Wet Financiering Sociale Verzekeringen). This does not generally lead to defection and a reduction in the 
total contribution revenue, because the employees and employers concerned are subject to an equivalent additional 
income tax levy.
33 The various tasks can of course be attributed to a more differentiated organisational structure, with separate agencies 
for prevention, job placement, reintegration, possibly with competing organisations for each type of intervention. 
They may also be privatised, with the board of the social security organisation acting as principal for outsourcing.
34 In a strict insurance model benefit recipients are not required to contribute, because the covered risk has already 
occurred.
35 Client organisations usually are not awarded a direct say in the administration of the system – e.g. through a seat on 
the board of the social security organisation – because it is likely they will slight the organisational goals in favour 
of their group interests. They may be expected to propose a generous interpretation of the legal rules, maximisation 
of entitlements, minimisation of duties and a lenient imposition of negative sanctions. As a consequence, client 
organisations often have no more than the right to be heard or to advise, without this imposing any obligation on 
the social security organisation. A number of factors make it difficult to fulfil even this limited role effectively. The 
variation within various groups of clients (unemployed school leavers, single-parent families, older workers) means 
that they may be internally divided. In addition, the number of unemployed people and social assistance benefit 
claimants with the administrative and strategic competence and the willingness to engage in a lengthy process are 
often limited. Moreover, there is generally little continuity in their ranks: capable client representatives have a good 
chance of finding a mainstream job.
36 These ideas are elaborated in the economic models of job competition, of which Thurow’s (1975) labour queue theory 
is an example. According to this latter approach the available jobs are arranged by grade and salary in the labour 
demand queue, and individual job-seekers are ranked according to their qualifications in the labour supply queue. 
An employer who acts strategically will try to recruit the employees with the highest added value: those up front in 
the supply queue. Conversely, rational job-seekers will attempt to select a high-ranking employer in the demand 
queue. Neither possesses full information, so that they are guided by proxy criteria and subjective impressions. The 
likelihood of an unemployed person finding work is determined by their position in the queue of job-seekers, in 
combination with the length of the queue of available jobs. Both correlate with the state of the economy: if this 
deteriorates an unemployed person is likely to have more competitors in front of him in the supply queue, while the 
demand queue will become shorter.
37 For instance, the first national formal social security regulation in the Netherlands (after the Poor Law, 1854 and the 
Law on the Abolition of Child Labour, 1874) related to limiting the maximum of working hours and the introduction 
of a labour inspectorate (Arbeidswet, or Labour Law, 1889). 
38 Or, in the classic formulation: “Into as many houses as I may enter, I will go for the benefit of the ill, while being far 
from all voluntary and destructive injustice… and I will use regimens for the benefit of the ill in accordance with my 
ability and my judgment, but from [what is] to their harm or injustice I will keep [them]” (Hippocratic Oath, translation 
in Von Staden, 1996: 406-408).
39 The peak of the ageing process, however, will in most countries not be reached when the baby-boomers start retir-
ing, but around 2025-2040. This is because the development of the absolute number of pensioners depends not only 
on the number of new beneficiaries (and changes in the pensions coverage ratio), but also on changes in average life 
expectancy and the size of the ‘dying’ cohorts. Moreover, ageing is a relative concept: the percentage of older persons 
has to be set against the total population or the potential labour force. The degree of ageing therefore also depends 
on changes in the size of younger cohorts; and because of the arrival of the contraceptive pill in many countries the 
birth rate fell from the 1970s onwards. The issues of sustainability and adequacy of pensions as a result of ageing 
are even more complicated. This not only depends on the demographic situation, but also on trends in the national 
wealth (gdp, driven by technological and educational changes), the activity rates of males and females and their 
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implication for accrued pension rights, and changes in the pension formula and indexation mechanism (see e.g. ec, 
2006; oecd, 2007; Soede et al., 2004; Vrooman, 2008b).
40 For example, analyses of developments in the Dutch labour market during the last two decades of the 20th century 
showed that jobs at the lower end of the labour market were not lost en masse as is often assumed, although a shift 
from industry to the service sector certainly occurred. However, the falling employment share of traditionally low-
skilled jobs such as blast furnace labourers, timber and paper processing, clothing and shoemakers was largely offset 
by the growth in domestic and shop work, the hospitality industry and transport (De Grip & Dekker, 1993; De Grip & 
Van Loo, 2000; De Grip & Dijksman, 2004, 2008; De Beer, 2001: 31-33). 
41 Van Praag et al. assume that an increase in social security contributions due to an external shock, such as a sud-
den sharp rise in unemployment, leads to a vicious circle which ultimately makes the system untenable. The rising 
contributions imply higher wage costs for employers, who will respond by setting higher productivity targets for 
their employees and/or raising his prices. The former will lead to the dismissal of employees who are not productive 
enough (low educated, low skilled, disabled, too old), the latter to a decline in the effective demand for the goods 
and services of the firms. Both strategies push up unemployment and benefit dependency even further, which in turn 
makes it necessary to raise the level of contributions once again. The cycle continues, and the social security system 
will in theory ultimately collapse entirely.
 The authors themselves concede that this is not a very realistic scenario; a convergence towards a situation in which 
ultimately no-one works is not feasible, because rule amendments inevitably will be made. Van Praag et al. (1982: 
1158-1159)  also admit they ignore a number of factors. For instance, employers may be subjected to institutional 
constraints (they may not be able to simply dismiss employees as they see fit) and may take their hiring and firing 
decisions from a long-term perspective: employees are not laid off immediately as soon as their productivity is below 
a certain threshold value. More importantly, the higher social security costs need not be pushed solely on to employ-
ers; employees may also pay their share (via rising employee contributions) and not be able to realise compensating 
wage demands, and the government may provide some kind of tax relief. And of course, the model does not take into 
consideration the impact of the development of the capital stock and technological progress, which can generate a 
part of the required productivity increases.
42 Habermas in fact uses this term in a more precise sense. He refers to the growing dominance in modern socie-
ties of the politico-economic system, which he regards as a reality sui generis. This leads to the dismantling of the 
communicative infrastructure, the ‘lifeworld’. The ever more complex system thus destroys a key condition for its 
own functioning, and is unable to repair or replace it. Compare: “In entfalteten modernen Gesellschaften […] ist zu 
erwarten, daß die Konkurrenz zwischen Formen der System- und der Sozialintegration sichtbarer als bis dahin her-
vortritt. Am Ende verdrängen systemischen Mechanismen Formen der sozialen Integration auch in jenen Bereichen, 
wo die konsensabhängige Handlungskoordinierung nicht substituiert werden kann: also dort, wo die symbolische 
Reproduktion der Lebenswelt auf dem Spiel steht. Dann nimmt die Mediatisierung der Lebenswelt die Gestalt einer 
Kolonialisierung an” (Habermas, 1981: 292-293).
43 The theoretical limitations of the median voter hypothesis are also evident (cf. Milanovic, 2000). The model applies 
less well if the distribution of preferences is not unimodal, and if there are more than two competing political can-
didates or parties. Furthermore, and in line with the ‘bounded rationality’ perspective discussed in chapter 2, elec-
tors may not have all the information they need for a well-considered choice (e.g. they generally cannot estimate 
their long-term personal social security gains and contributions accurately) and may settle for ‘satisficing’, or cast 
their votes on non-rational grounds (ideals, collective interests, the personal qualities and image of the candidates). 
Media attention and the selective turnout of certain groups at elections can also play an important intervening role 
in voting behaviour.
44 Don & Verbruggen (2006) give an overview of the long tradition in the development of such models at The Nether-
lands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis|cpb. Specific examples are the saffier model, which is used for short-term 
and medium-term forecasting (Kranendonk & Verbruggen, 2007); and the applied general equilibrium mimic model, 
containing detailed modelling of labour market supply and social security institutions (Graafland et al., 2001).  
45 More detailed accounts of the economic effects of social security are to be found in Aaron, 1982; Douben, 1986; Barr, 
1992; Feldstein, 1998: 1-29; Aghion et al., 1999; and Atkinson, 1999.
46 Yet it should be mentioned that the use and non-take-up of social security provisions theoretically are not only driven 
by expected subjective utility. According to Kerr’s (1983) ‘threshold model’ the likelihood of non-take-up increases 
when the potential client is not familiar with the social security scheme, does not need the benefit or provision or 
has not needed it for a sufficiently long time, does not expect to be entitled to it, expects little gains, and has sub-
jective attitudes which hinder application. The latter may relate to the procedures (time, complexity, infringement 
of privacy, dislike of bureaucracy), but also to the anticipated social consequences (the stigma attaching to certain 
types of benefit) and the personal implications (not wishing to be dependent). Van Oorschot (1994) has moreover 
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pointed out that the interaction with the social security administration also is an important theoretical explanation 
of non-take-up. In empirical studies in the Netherlands, awareness of the schemes, expecting to be entitled, and sub-
jective utility indicators (low needs, short expected duration, limited expected amounts) proved to be the strongest 
predictors at the micro-level (cf. Vrooman & Asselberghs, 1994; Wildeboer Schut & Hoff, 2007).
47 In the market sector, the added value consists of the difference between the market value of produced goods and the 
consumption of purchased raw materials, energy, semi-manufactured products and services by other parties. In the 
public sector this is difficult to establish; some government products have no clear price (administration, defence, 
etc.), while so-called ‘merit goods’ (education, cultural facilities) are deliberately provided below cost price. The total 
of the wages and salaries of government personnel is often used as a proxy for the added value of government provi-
sions. Gross domestic product (gdp) is equal to the total added value realised within the national borders within one 
year. The gross national product (gnp) is obtained by adding the balance of the primary incomes from and to other 
countries. If one allows for the depreciation of the capital stock as a result of its use in the production process, this 
leaves the net domestic product (ndp) and the net national product (nnp), respectively. The added value after allowing 
for depreciation can be divided over the production factors: the labour of employees (wages) and businesses (profits), 
the making available of financial capital (interest) or land (lease, rent).
48 The maximum achievable output can be estimated via a production function, which indicates how the available means 
of production of the community are deployed. In a simple Cobb-Douglas variant, the theoretically attainable added 
value is determined by the available capital stock, the potential number of workers and the state of technology:
Y = Kp • L1-p • H
where 
Y  = total output
K  = capital stock 
L  = employment years
H = state of technology
p  = share of profit in the value of output
 Yet for several reasons this production function is too simple for modern societies. It describes a closed economy 
with a single sector of industry and with no government investments. There is no home production, no self-employed 
enterprise, and the labour market is not differentiated. All workers are identical and are fully employed at an equilib-
rium market wage. The capital stock is fully utilised at a given rate of interest. Furthermore, the ‘new growth theory’ 
argues that the three production factors need not develop independently of each other. An increase in the invest-
ments in capital (ΔK) can for example lead to an acceleration in the rate of technological innovation (ΔH).
 The production capacity is not always fully deployed; the actual added value is equal to the maximum production 
capacity multiplied by the degree of capacity utilisation. A difference between theoretical and actual gdp (the ‘output 
gap’) suggests under-utilisation of the capital stock, unemployment, and non-participation by people who could 
work. 
49 The theoretical significance of human capital for collective wealth is developed inter alia by G.S. Becker (1993 [1964]), 
Mincer (1993 [1984]) and Lucas (1988); see Engelbrecht (2003) for a country comparison. 
50 However, this Keynesian perspective needs to be qualified in two ways. The influence of social security on consumer 
demand is selective because beneficiaries spend more on basic needs than on luxury consumer goods. Moreover, a 
large part of the take-up of formal social security arrangements (old age and survivor’s pensions, disability schemes, 
child benefit, structural unemployment) is not tied to the economic cycle (see e.g. Douben, 1980: 71-73).
51 This is the total number of workers in the tax department, the agencies of the unemployment and disability benefit 
schemes, municipal social services, the Social Insurance Bank and the staff of sheltered employment support. It is of 
course possible that in the absence of these social security organisations their employees would perform other work, 
with which they would make a larger contribution to national prosperity.
52 Market clearing refers to the situation where the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded; or to the price 
adjustment process that leads to such a state of affairs.
53 According to neo-classical theory a one-off fall in the output level will occur, but the growth rate will remain con-
stant; cf. Atkinson (1999: 146) “if S/Y were to fall, then over time the capital output ratio falls, and in steady state the 
fall in (K/Y) fully offsets the fall in the savings ratio, leaving the growth rate unchanged”. However, the wealth-reduc-
ing effect of savings depends on the chosen funding method. In fully funded schemes ‘institutional’ savings (i.e. 
enforced by the formal rules) largely may substitute private savings, and only the composition of the total amount 
changes. In pay-as-you-go schemes, however, total savings theoretically will decline. 
54 Cf. the previous discussion of Van Praag et al.’s ‘flywheel effect’ of rising social security contributions.
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55 On the one hand, an increase in social contributions makes it relatively more attractive to consume leisure time, as 
its shadow price falls. This theoretically leads to a decrease in labour supply and collective wealth. On the other hand, 
higher contributions increase the incentive to find work, since households will seek to offset their decline in income. 
If this greater labour supply can be deployed productively collective prosperity theoretically will increase. 
 It is not certain in advance whether the substitution effect or the income effect of higher contributions will domi-
nate. Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001: 98-103) point out that this may vary across social groups. For working people 
(regardless of their income level) and benefit claimants, an increase in the contribution rate will lead to positive 
income effects and negative substitution effects, so that the overall effect is unpredictable. For non-working people 
without benefit the substitution effect dominates: it becomes less attractive for housewives in particular to start 
working. 
56 Atkinson (1999: 9-11) argues in this respect that “there is a tendency for economists to analyze the impact of a hypo-
thetical benefit that differs in essential features from real-world social security. [...] Unemployment benefit provides 
an illustration of the neglect of important institutional structure. Economic models regularly assume that the only 
relevant condition for the receipt of benefit is being unemployed. In fact, in the typical unemployment insurance 
program, benefit is subject to contribution conditions, is paid for a limited duration, and is monitored to check that 
the person is making genuine efforts to seek employment. Benefit may be refused where the person entered unem-
ployment voluntarily or as a result of industrial misconduct, and a person may be disqualified for refusing job offers. 
The conditions for the receipt of unemployment insurance not only reduce its coverage but also affect the relation-
ship between transfers and the working of the economy. The standard job research model, for example, assumes that 
workers can reject job offers that offer less than a specified wage. Such a reservation wage strategy may, however, lead 
to the person being disqualified from benefit.” 
57 These differences, however, partly reflect the impact of other factors. People on disability benefit and people who had 
taken early retirement displayed a stronger work ethic than working people, which can be ascribed to some extent to 
their comparatively high age (the work ethic of older people is generally higher). Unemployed benefit recipients had 
a lower work ethic than those in work, but generally were younger (De Beer, 2001: 168-170).
58 Social security also impacts on the sector income distribution, which is concerned with splitting the rewards over the 
various production factors: the share of the wage bill (salaries and social security charges), profits, interest and rents 
in total income. 
59 The distribution of assets receives less attention in empirical research, mainly because of the scarcity of reliable data. 
This is regrettable, because the inclusion of this factor probably offers a better indication of the overall wealth posi-
tion of actors than their current yearly income alone. Davies & Shorrocks (2000) point out that  a person’s wealth at a 
certain point in time (Wt) can be defined as the sum of previously gathered assets (Wt-1), the interest received on them 
(rtWt-1), current inheritances in a broad sense (It: gifts, legacies, prizes won) and current income (Et), minus current 
consumption (Ct). In a more complete equation, human capital and future entitlements (annuities, social security 
pensions) should be added as well. The same authors tentatively conclude that:
- Wealth generally is distributed less equally than labour income, total money income or consumption expendi-
ture;
- Financial assets tend to be less equally distributed than nonfinancial assets;
- The distribution of inherited wealth is much more unequal than that of wealth in general;
- In all age groups there is typically a group of individuals and families with very low net assets, and at all ages the 
majority have surprisingly low financial assets;
- Wealth inequality has decreased during the twentieth century in most countries, with some reversals (e.g. the us 
since the mid 1970s).
60 Esping-Andersen (2003: 66) points out that in this “early formative epoch of model building”  the dominant elites 
varied in the different countries: “In one large group of nations, the traditional authoritarian, anti-democratic con-
servative forces were already pretty much sidelined and emasculated by the time that the ‘social question’ arose. This 
was so in the Anglo-Saxon nations and, by and large, also the case in Scandinavia. In this same group, the political 
power of the Church – and especially of Catholicism – was marginal or almost nil. Hence, virtually from the very 
beginning of social policy, the axis of conflict was basically one-dimensional: workers’ movements against a liberal-
leaning bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. In other countries, mainly concentrated on the European continent, the 
frontlines were messier because the neo-absolutist forces remained powerful and often decisive. The liberal impulse 
remained feeble and failed to assert itself in any hegemonic way in Germany, Austria, Italy or Spain. Within this 
political matrix, workers movements and conservatives could agree in terms of their shared antipathy to the naked 
cash nexus; and the liberals and socialists in terms of their shared preference for individual rights. On most other 
social welfare issues, the three clashed head on. More often than not, dictatorship helped silence the socialists.”




1 Parts of this chapter are based on the author’s contributions to the scp study On worlds of welfare. Section 4.1 has been 
edited and updated, while the analysis in section 4.2 is a variant of the one performed in the previous work (Wilde-
boer Schut et al., 2001: 5; 7-32). 
2 This ‘Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the eu countries and the eea’ (missoc) is available through 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missoc/index_en.html. A separate extension to incorporate Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries (missceec) can be accessed through the same Internet address.
3 Esping-Andersen uses the expression ‘liberal’ in a classical European sense, referring to a regime which maximises 
individual freedom and limits state intervention. This, of course, is completely at odds with its standard meaning in 
current American English, as Murray (1997: xii) points out: “The correct word for my view of the world is liberal [and] 
the writers of the nineteenth century who expounded on this view were called liberals […] But words mean what peo-
ple think they mean, and in the United States the unmodified term liberal now refers to the politics of an expansive 
government and the welfare state”. Murray proposes ‘libertarian’ as an alternative. That concept, however, may be 
rather confusing as well – at least from a European perspective, in which it usually is associated with individualistic 
variants of anarchism. Throughout this book the word ‘liberal’ is therefore adopted, in its classical meaning and in 
line with the Esping-Andersen nomenclature.
4 Viz. Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadrogesimo Anno (1931).
5 Of course, the regime concept as defined here has nothing to do with the notion of ‘regimentation’, as discussed in 
chapter 2. The latter refers to rules which inevitably force actors to comply. 
6 Goodman (1998) suggests that the historical roots of the Japanese social security system do not stretch as far as is 
often presumed, and that the notion of a traditional Japanese way of providing welfare was actually used to curtail 
the demand for a more extensive system in the post-ww ii period: “The Japanese-style welfare state thesis is a clas-
sic example of what Hobsbawm and Ranger have called ‘the invention of tradition’. It drew on idealised visions of a 
Japan where communities had always lived co-operatively and harmoniously, caring for each other, and especially 
for the aged and the sick. In doing so, it ignored compelling historical evidence of communal violence, rioting, the 
abandonment of the elderly and the culling of the sick or weak. Similarly the emphasis placed on Confucian values of 
filial piety, loyalty, obligation, respect for seniority and so on ignored the fact that until the Meiji period these values 
had very little to do with the lives of the common people of Japan, but were important only to the 6 per cent who 
constituted the samurai class. It was only the so-called ‘samuraisation process’ in the 1870s that led to these values 
being devolved, through state sponsorship and via the education system, to the rest of the population in a conscious 
attempt to construct a Japanese state. There is little doubt, however, that by drawing on the ‘historical’ precedent and 
Confucian ‘tradition’ – in particular the emphasis on care for the aged – the proponents of the Japanese-style welfare 
model were successful in deflating rising social expectations of state-provided welfare rights and citizenship” (Good-
man, 1998: 150). 
7 In Esping-Andersen’s original typology the Netherlands belongs to the corporatist (or conservative) group on the 
basis of its ‘de-commodification score’, which is slightly higher than France’s or Germany’s, but does not reach the 
level of the Nordic countries. Belgium and Austria are on a par with the Netherlands. Esping-Andersen attributes 
this to the political power of the social-democratic labour movement in these three countries during the post-ww ii 
period. In terms of pension benefit schemes, however, Esping-Andersen originally classified the Netherlands as a 
universalistic state-dominated system, rather comparable to Norway, Sweden and New Zealand (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 53-54, 85-87).
 In his later work Esping-Andersen is more pronounced about “the Dutch enigma” and acknowledges the fundamen-
tally hybrid character of the Dutch social security regime: “The original ‘three worlds’ typology focused rather one-
sidedly on income maintenance. Herein lie perhaps the ambiguities of the Dutch case. When we study income main-
tenance, the Netherlands appears ‘social democratic’ in the sense of strong universalism, comprehensive coverage, 
and generous ‘de-commodifying’ benefits. But when we include social service delivery – and when, more generally, 
we examine the role of the family – the Netherlands becomes squarely a member of the ‘conservative’, Continental 
Europe fold” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 88). 
8 Shalev (2007: 300) argues that the multinomial logistic regression approach Esping-Andersen (1999) used in a later 
version of the typology “has the advantage of permitting explanatory weights to vary across different categories of 
the dependent variable. But in the context of cross-national research of this type, the category-specific coefficients 
must be estimated on a ludicrously small number of cases”.
9 CatPCA was formerly known as Princals (Principal components analysis by alternating least squares). The procedure 
is available through the ‘Categories’ module of the spss software package. Gifi (1990) gives a more detailed descrip-
tion; see also the CatPCA algorithm document, available through the spss support site at http://support.spss.com/
tech/default.asp).
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10 To a large extent this is a replication of the analysis in Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001: 17-32). A description of the original 
variables and their coding scheme is listed in the appendix to chapter 2 of that publication. However, seven variables 
have been deleted from the dataset, because they resembled possible outcomes of institutions, rather than institu-
tional characteristics.  They are the labour market participation of women, elderly men (55-64 years), and males aged 
65 or more; the share of the services sector in total employment; and the employment shares of specific segments 
of the services sector (social and community welfare; financial/business/real estate; and wholesale/retail employ-
ment). These have been replaced by three variables with a more ‘institutional’ content. The formal pension age for 
men (coded <65, 65, >65) may partly explain early exits of elderly men. The minimum annual statutory period of leave 
for employees (none; < 4 weeks; 4 weeks;  >4 weeks) could influence labour market supply, especially of women . This 
also may hold for formal child care facilities available for children aged 0-3 years (<10% coverage; 10-30%; 30-45%; 
>45%).  The Employment Outlook (oecd, 2003a: 135) suggests that “an extension of child-care support might increase 
women’s labour force participation”, although the direction of causality is not wholly clear. 
 A further deviation from the previous scaling procedure is that the CatPCA solution has been slightly rotated, in 
order to make the first dimension a clearer indicator of social security scope. In the analysis all variables were ini-
tially scaled on a single ordinal basis. This implies that the quantifications have been accredited in such a way that the 
original ranking of the categories was maintained; the distances between them, however, were free. For a number 
of variables this ordinality restriction resulted in a high loss of fit (more than 0.50 across two dimensions). In such 
cases a better fit may be achieved by making the measurement level less restrictive, through a multiple nominal 
quantification. This means that the original ranking of categories does not have to be maintained during the scaling 
procedure, and quantified categories do not need to be placed on one line in multidimensional space. For four vari-
ables such a quantification was applied in the final scaling, because it led to a meaningful interpretation in terms 
of regimes. They are the intensity of active labour market policy, the disability benefit threshold for the risque social, 
the presence of a collective surviving dependants’ scheme for residents, and the statutory number of weeks leave per 
annum.
11 From a wider theoretical point of view the selection of institutional traits is somewhat limited, bearing in mind the 
social security definition and the interaction models of formal social security that have been outlined in the previous 
chapter. For instance, there are virtually no variables which refer to potential sanctioning, the structure and opera-
tion of the social security administration, differences in auditing actors and appeal procedures, etc. While it would 
be interesting to add such traits, it should be pointed out that these are not key elements of the typology which is 
tested here. In the next two chapters some of these attributes will be included in the construction of theoretical 
institutional indices which predict country differences in benefit dependency and poverty.
12 Together the two dimensions account for 61% of the total variance of the unrotated solution. A supplementary analy-
sis was carried out over five dimensions. The eigenvalues of the three ‘higher’ dimensions were much lower, as was 
their contribution to the proportion of explained variance (0.14 for the third dimension, 0.11 for the fourth and 0.09 
for the fifth). Moreover, this analysis did not produce any new substantive insights. On the first two dimensions the 
component loadings and country clusters were the same, while on the higher dimensions some less easily interpret-
able differences between separate countries were found (cf. Wildeboer Schut et al., 2001: 33-34).
 As a final test, in an additional analysis all variables were scaled on a multiple nominal basis. This is not the obvious 
measurement level, because most original variables run from low to high (or vice versa), which suggests ordinal 
scaling is appropriate. However, such an analysis provides information on the impact of the ordinality restriction on 
the scaling results. In this multiple nominal CatPCA the same clusters of countries and regimes emerged, the main 
difference being that Norway was scaled closer to the Netherlands, and thus became more of a hybrid regime.
13 The low component loadings indicate that this is not a very consistent pattern, however. After optimal scaling, this 
variable shows a dichotomy between Australia and all other countries.
14 This means that several countries operating a ‘liberal’ regime type had high minimum wages, while these were 
absent in social-democratic regimes. One could argue that a statutory minimum wage is especially necessary where 
social security benefits are low, and there are no collective labour agreements between employers and trade unions. 
Some corporatist and social-democratic countries may not need statutory minimum wages, because the benefit 
levels and collective arrangements make the bottom rung of the pay ladder quite high, which in practice may have 
the same effects as a high statutory minimum wage.
15 There is no separate orphan’s pension in Australia, Canada, France and Denmark. The component loading of this 
variable is lowest of all.
16 If one considers these variables over both dimensions, most also have nonzero component loadings on the first 
dimension. This is because corporatist countries often are rather extensive, but it is also a consequence of the score 
of the hybrid Dutch social security regime. If the Netherlands is excluded from the CatPCA-procedure, this group of 
variables falls apart. Most component loadings move closer to the origin of the x-axis, where one would theoretically 
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expect them. A few, however, become more outlying on the first dimension, because some social-democratic nations 
score consistent with countries representing the corporatist regime.
17 The collective pensions of surviving dependants of employees are in the highest category in the three corporatist 
regimes, but also in Canada and the usa. This explains why item no. 33 has a slight bias towards the ‘residualist’ side 
of the first dimension. Survivor’s pensions for dependants of non-employees are included as a nominal variable, and 
therefore do not show up in the plot of component loadings, which are only available for ordinal or interval vari-
ables.
18 The component loading of the collective old age pension for all inhabitants (item no. 40) is lower on the first dimen-
sion, because this trait is not specific to social-democratic regimes, but shared with several countries belonging to 
the liberal type.
19 Full early retirement pensions are something of a borderline case in figure 4.1. After optimal scaling, there exists a 
dichotomy between countries who offered this opportunity (at the end of the 1980s) before 60 years of age and the 
other categories (no possibility of full early retirement, or only between ages 60 and 64). The first category consists 
of nations representing the corporatist and liberal regimes – but not all countries of either type, which explains 
the rather low component loadings. Full early retirement before age 60 was possible in Belgium, France, the uk and 
Australia, and in none of the social-democratic regimes.
20 This concerns the uk, Australia and Denmark.
21 In a hierarchical cluster analysis of the object scores on both dimensions, a two-cluster solution results in a contrast 
between the liberal countries and the rest. The three-cluster solution separates the liberal countries (Australia, Canada , 
uk, the usa) from the corporatist (Belgium, France, Germany) and social-democratic (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) clus-
ters. The Netherlands is included in the latter group; but it emerges as a distinct case in a four-dimensional solution. 
With five clusters the usa split off from the liberal group, and in the six-cluster solution Denmark drops out of the social-
democratic class. With a different measure for clustering (Euclidean or squared Euclidean distance instead of cosine) the 
two- and three-cluster solutions remain the same, but the higher solutions show a reversal: Denmark emerges as a single 
case in the analysis over four clusters, the Netherlands in the six-cluster solution.
 Traditional cluster analysis does not allow the goodness of fit of the various solutions to be tested. This is however 
possible in latent profile modelling, which assesses whether the scores on a set of continuous indicators (in this 
case: the object scores) can be reduced to a single categorical latent variable; and cases are attributed to the classes of 
this latent variable with a certain probability (cf. Vermunt & Magidson, 2002). Latent profile modelling of the object 
scores with two and three clusters result in the same country classifications as the hierarchical cluster analyses men-
tioned above; that is, a distinction between liberal and non-liberal countries, or a separation of the representatives 
of the liberal, corporatist, and social-democratic (plus the Netherlands) regimes. The fit of the two-cluster model is 
not significantly better than the baseline model containing a single cluster; but the three-cluster model differs sig-
nificantly from the baseline and two cluster models. Due to the small number of cases (n=11), latent profile models 
with four or more clusters are not identified (the three-cluster model was only barely so) and could not be tested. 
22 Canada also shows considerable regional variation, as does the usa. Social assistance is partly funded at federal level, 
but provinces and local authorities have a wide degree of freedom in determining the eligibility criteria, the use of 
means tests, and the level of benefits. There is also a separate welfare scheme for ‘native Canadians’ living on the 
reservations. The norm amounts for child benefit vary widely as well: some provinces provide top-ups, or relate these 
benefits to the age and number of children. The system in Quebec, in particular, exhibits corporatist characteristics 
in this respect.
23 The post-war social security regime in the United Kingdom was initially universalistic. The system devised by 
Beveridge which was introduced after the Second World War, with a national social insurance scheme, contribution-
based funding, flat-rate benefits and a limited social safety net, was developed even further in the following decades. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, benefits were increasingly related to earnings. Coverage was introduced for those who had 
not paid sufficient contributions, and entitlements to medical treatments were extended. 
 Under the influence of the economic crisis and the neo-liberal philosophy of the Conservative governments, how-
ever, earnings-related benefits were gradually phased out in the early 1980s, and the conditions for benefit eligibility 
were tightened up – among other things by stating that people had to be available for work. The changes culminated 
in the Social Security Act of 1986, in which the national earnings-related pension provision was abolished, the national 
assistance scheme was restructured, and incentives were built in to encourage a switch from public to private provi-
sions. Eardley et al. (1996: 388-389) describe this development as a shift towards targeting and means-tested social 
assistance, which became the main scheme. This implied a weakening of the universalistic nature of the British 
social security system.
 Esping-Andersen (1999: 87) considers Britain “mainly a problem because the typology does not take into account 
mutation. Had we made our comparisons in the immediate post-war decades, we would almost certainly have put 
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Britain and Scandinavia in the same cluster: both were built on universal, flat-rate benefit programmes, national 
health care, and a vocal political commitment to full employment”. After the changes of the 1980s, however, “Britain 
appears increasingly liberal”. This does not necessarily imply that Britain and the Nordic countries were social-dem-
ocratic in the 1950s, since “the essence of social-democratic welfare regimes emerged in Scandinavia later”.
24 The main difference is that in Shalev’s results Germany loads lower on corporatism, and the uk comes out as less 
residual, which seems quite plausible for this pre-Thatcher period. However, Shalev’s analysis is not wholly compa-
rable to the one reported in section 4.2. He uses fewer variables but more nations; and some of his variables indicate 
the results of regimes, rather than the institutions they are made of (e.g. “full-employment performance”).  Contrary 
to CatPCA, factor analysis assumes an interval measurement level. 
25 In a CatPCA of 85 regime characteristics in 23 countries Soede et al. (2004) find five different clusters: the three pre-
sented here (with Norway at a larger distance from the other social-democratic countries), plus two separate groups, 
one consisting of the Mediterranean countries (with Greece and Spain as somewhat purer examples than Portugal or 
Italy), the other of the four recent larger eu member states of Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia). The Netherlands is once again a hybrid.
 While Soede et al.’s first dimension also indicates the scope of social security (residual-extensive), their second one 
refers to pension schemes rather than corporatism. Pensions are, relatively speaking, rather well-developed in 
Southern European countries, in contrast to their more residual arrangements for unemployment and social assist-
ance. Since these countries do not form part of the analysis in this chapter, this influence does not show up. For the 
corporatist countries included here, it might be that particularistic traits have become less dominant during the 
1990s. A more likely explanation, however, is that Soede et al. (2004) have less indicators for corporatism, while 
their total set of variables is larger (85 instead of 54), especially in terms of pension scheme characteristics. The latter 
seem to have ‘taken over’ the second dimension. This picture is corroborated by the analysis in Soede & Vrooman 
(2008a), where the existence of specific pension regimes in eu member states is explored further. It should however 
be noted that the three analyses do not provide any information on the stability of the between-cluster distances 
over time. In order to assess these, a simultaneous analysis of the same regime traits in different years would need to 
be performed. While the classification as such seems consistent over time, it may be that countries approximate their 
‘ideal-type’ more closely in some years than in others (cf. §5.3.3 and §7.3).
 26 This may apply to the structure of the education system but, following Blossfeld & Shavit (1993), the results in terms of 
educational opportunities and educational attainment of socio-economic strata do not vary systematically between 
the three regime types. Sweden and the Netherlands have accomplished a reduction in educational inequality over 
the years, while this remained fairly stable in eleven other countries. These authors also point out that the dual edu-
cation system has expanded in several countries; not only in corporatist ones like Germany, but in Sweden as well. 
They conclude that this has facilitated the reproduction of the existing stratification: “The expansion of vocational, 
non-college education enabled these systems to incorporate growing proportions of children from lower strata 
who would complete secondary education but would not be considered for further academic education. This led 
to an opening up of secondary education without disturbing the basically exclusive character of higher education” 
(Blossfeld & Shavit, 1993: 20).
27 In practice, however, the French education system also tends to reproduce the social elite to a large extent through a 
process of self-recruitment (cf. the discussion of the Enarques in chapter 2).
28 Arts & Gelissen’s (2001) item on equality refers to the elimination of large inequalities in income between citizens. 
The ‘needs’ question relates to guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothing, 
education, and health. ‘Equity’ is measured by the responses to the statement that a ‘just’ society should recognise 
people on their merits.
29 On preferred solidarity the level-2 modelled variance of the five regime types is 0.24, with only the social-democratic 
and Mediterranean types deviating significantly from the reference category, the liberal regime. On ‘equality’ the 
modelled variance of three regime types – the European Value Study does not contain data on the Antipodes and 
Eastern Asiatic countries – is even higher (0.49); but, as was noted earlier, with coefficients running in an unexpected 
direction. The modelled variance in ‘need’ and ‘equity’ that can be attributed to the regime types is much lower 
(0.08-0.09). The individual characteristics seem to have a limited influence as well, with a total level-1 modelled vari-
ance ranging from 0.02 to 0.09.
30 The analysis by Arts & Gelissen (2001) provides a few examples of this. Based on a review of the literature on welfare 
state classifications they make a distinction between six regime types: liberal countries (usa, Canada, Great Britain, 
Ireland), conservative ones (France and Germany), social-democratic nations (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands), Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy), Antipodean types (Aus-
tralia, New Zealand) and East-Asian communitarian regimes (Japan, the Philippines). Based on the scaling results 
of the previous section Arts & Gelissen’s classification of Belgium may be questioned. Following Soede et al. (2004) 
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this also holds for Austria, which seems to belong to the corporatist/conservative cluster as well. Arts & Gelissen’s 
straightforward inclusion of the Netherlands in the social-democratic group is also open to challenge.
 Within these types, Arts & Gelissen consider some countries as less pure examples. This applies for Great Britain 
and Ireland in the liberal cluster; Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in the social-democratic cluster; Italy in 
the Mediterranean group; and the Philippines in the East-Asian type. In their multi-level models they neglect these 
finer distinctions by using one dummy variable for each type, with the liberal regime as the reference category. Their 
motivation for this decision is not wholly convincing: “Some of these (countries) are close empirical representations 
of the ideal-type and others are hybrid cases, exhibiting traits of two or more regime-types. However, one has to keep 
in mind that, ultimately, even archetypes are not completely pure cases” (Arts & Gelissen 2001: 290). Part of Arts & 
Gelissen’s unexpected results may be due to their specific ex ante definition of regime clusters.
31 Cf. the explanation that Gelissen (2002I: 214) offers in the Dutch summary to his thesis for some of the more singular 
results that were reported in Arts & Gelissen (2001): “Citizens [of the liberal and Mediterranean welfare regimes] may 
have more to gain from government intervention than those of social-democratic and conservative welfare states. 
In the former, people may be predominantly focussed on the benefits of increased state intervention whereas, in the 
latter, they may be more aware of the costs incurred”.
32 This ‘scope bias’ is apparent, for instance, in Svallfors (1997), who studies preferred income differentials and attitudes 
to redistribution. The key dependent variables Arts & Gelissen (2001) analyse – solidarity, equality, needs and equity 
– mainly refer to Esping-Andersen’s first dimension as well.
33 The International Social Survey Programme has been running since the mid-1980s. It consists of topical modules, which 
are harmonised across countries and added to existing national surveys. Currently 39 different countries are taking 
part. The sample size of the ten countries analysed here usually is between 900 and 1400 per wave. This adds up to a 
total of around 11.000-13.000 cases for each wave. More information can be obtained through www.issp.org. 
 The issp data refer to Great Britain, not to the United Kingdom (as in the previous section). For Germany the analysis 
was confined to the western part, because the majority of the inhabitants of the new Bundesländer do not share the 
corporatist legacy, and an explorative analysis showed them to have a different profile on the indicators used here. 
The 1999 data for Denmark and the Netherlands are not included in the regular issp-dataset. The Danish file is avail-
able upon request. The Dutch data were gathered through an access panel instead of a regular survey and are part of 
the 1999 edition of scp’s long-running series on Cultural Changes in the Netherlands (available through the Data Archiving 
and Networked Services (dans) in The Hague, formerly Steinmetz Archives). 
34 On the variables presented in figure 4.3 three countries still have missing values. Denmark and the Netherlands did not 
take part in issp 1996 (two variables), and Australia skipped 1997 (four variables). In the CatPCA-procedure these miss-
ing values were treated passively, in order to avoid extreme scalings. Most variables are expressed in discrete classes of 
response percentages (see the legend to figure 4.3). For instance, item 1 – “should it be the government’s responsibil-
ity to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed?” – is based on the share of respondents answering this 
should ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ be so. Country percentages were divided into four classes: very low (9-13%: Australia and 
the usa), low (17-21%: Germany, France and Canada); moderate (28%: Great Britain) and relatively high (38-41%: Norway 
and Sweden. Two cases (Denmark and the Netherlands) are missing on this variable. It has to be borne in mind that the 
analysis charts the relative differences between countries over such categorised variables. 
35 The CatPCA results of figures 4.3 and 4.4 have been rotated in order to enhance the interpretability of the dimensions 
in terms of the component loadings. The original solution accounts for 79% of the total variance.
36 Features 4 and 10 in figure 4.3 refer to preferred income differentials. The same underlying variables were analysed 
by Svallfors (1997) over a more limited set of countries from the issp-waves of 1987 and 1992. Respondents were asked 
about how much people in nine different occupations should earn (depending on the local custom earnings were 
measured before or after taxes, and weekly, monthly or yearly). For the present analysis, in each country the nine 
variables were concatenated in order to construct a distribution of preferred income differentials. This variable is not 
representative of the entire preferred income distribution, because the chosen occupations reflect earnings at the top 
and at the bottom, neglecting the middle segment of the labour market. Moreover, preferred income from pensions 
and social security is excluded. And of course most countries have more factory workers and shop assistants than 
lawyers, Supreme Court judges or cabinet ministers, while in the constructed variable the latter dominate (since it 
contains responses for six higher and three lower occupations). To take account of this two dispersion measures were 
calculated. The decomposable Theil-coefficient was used to assess the preferred earning differentials between lower 
and higher occupations; and the Gini-coefficient was taken as an indicator for the ‘income inequality aversion’ regard-
ing the higher occupations (since this is less susceptible to extreme top incomes than the within Theil-coefficient).
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 37 Feature 8 is based on the ratio of the shares of female and male respondents who prefer working for the government 
or civil service. The ratio was used to correct for the general prestige of being a ‘part of government’ in a country, an 
indicator which was expected to load on the corporatist dimension (feature 13). It is about 2.0 in Sweden and Norway, 
against 1.1-1.3 elsewhere.
38 Theoretically several hypotheses may be put forward to explain a more lenient rule interpretation in corporatist 
regimes. First, the attitudes towards government may be different. While the state is the embodiment of public 
interes t in social-democratic and liberal regimes (albeit with an entirely different scope), in corporatist ones it is a 
vehicle for group-based interests, controlled by a bureaucratic elite. In such a context, not paying taxes or benefit 
fraud may be more likely to be regarded as a way of ‘beating the system’, rather than as an offence against the com-
mon good. In line with this, solidarity in corporatist regimes is not universalistic, but limited to people in the same 
stratum. This may imply that defection is acceptable, as long as it does not affect the interests of the status group one 
belongs to. A third theoretical explanation is more down to earth. Liberal regimes may tend to enforce rules in order 
to keep the scope of their systems small, social-democratic ones so as to reduce costs and maximise contributions. 
Corporatist regimes, however, may be less inclined to enforce rules. The risk of being caught may thus be lower. Of 
course, factors that are not directly related to the regime types (e.g. varying degrees of secularisation between coun-
tries, a divergent impact of a predominantly Protestant or Catholic ethic) may be relevant as well.  
39 A hierarchical cluster analysis with two clusters resulted in a contrast between the two corporatist countries plus 
the Netherlands, versus the representatives of the liberal and social-democratic regime. A three-cluster model is 
more or less in line with the theoretical expectations: (1) France, Germany, the Netherlands; (2) Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden; (3) Australia, Canada, Great Britain, usa. The latter group is split in the four cluster solution (Australia and 
Great Britain versus the North-American countries). 
 With (squared) Euclidean distances and four clusters a somewhat different classification emerges, consisting of the 
corporatist group (France, Germany), two clusters containing the more pure specimens of respectively the liberal 
(usa, Canada) and social-democratic (Norway, Sweden) groups, and a remaining cluster of less typical countries (the 
Netherlands , Great Britain, Australia, and Denmark).
 It was not possible to perform a meaningful latent profile analysis, as in the additional analyses relating to the formal 
institutions (cf. note 21 to this chapter). Because data for Belgium are lacking, the number of cases (n=10) is too small 
for comparing the goodness of fit for models with three or more clusters.
40 As noted earlier, Australia has four missing values in the dataset. However, Australia’s lower score on the first dimen-
sion cannot be attributed to this completely. Most variables loading high on the x-axis are valid in the Australian 
case; and if the usa values are imputed for the missing variables in Australia, its score on first dimension becomes 
more negative than the British one, but remains rather close.
41 The ‘scope’ dimension of social security regimes in figure 4.1 is similar to Larsen’s ‘generosity’, and the ‘universal-
istic/ particularistic’ contrast resembles his ‘selectivism’. Formal labour market institutions scaled on either of the 
two principal components. Larsen’s ‘job opportunities’ therefore did not emerge as a separate dimension of social 
security regimes, even after extending the CatPCA to a solution with 3 to 5 dimensions.  




1 The standardised total scores on the index for Sweden, Norway and Denmark are then 0.17, 0.46 and 0.65, respec-
tively.
2 The high score for Sweden for unemployment insurance is perhaps rather unexpected, because the ‘Swedish model’ 
has traditionally been associated with low unemployment rates. However, it has to be borne in mind that the benefit 
dependency boost index is concerned with the theoretical risk of a high volume based on the formal institutions with 
regard to unemployment arrangements (see Annex 1). The benefit percentages and the replacement rates at the onset 
of unemployment are high in Sweden. This also applies for the marginal tax rates and average contributions, and 
the duration of unemployment benefits can be long – all factors which theoretically increase the benefit volume. 
In the Swedish philosophy, a generous unemployment arrangement does not lead to high numbers of unemploy-
ment bene fits because of a strict and effective activation policy and the promotion of full employment (among other 
things via the services sector). If the last two objectives cannot be realised, the risk of a substantial unemployment 
benefit volume is theoretically high. The index score reflects this; and the development of the Swedish unemploy-
ment volume in the first half of the 1990s suggests that this is not entirely without foundation.
3 The benefit dependency boost index was calculated as the weighted sum of the volume-boosting score on a number 
of formal institutions (see Annex 1). Theoretically, however, the volume of the various types of benefit is not com-
pletely independent, since substitutions occur. If a country has a financially and socially attractive early retirement 
scheme, for example, this is likely to reduce the number of disability and unemployment benefits (put differently, 
there is hidden disability and unemployment in the early exit  arrangements). The same thing can happen between 
arrangements for disability and unemployment: depending on the entry conditions and the norms and conventions 
of the actors in the administrative process, there may be ‘hidden unemployment’ in the disability benefit system or 
‘hidden disability’ in the unemployment benefit schemes. In the case of the Netherlands in the early 1990s it is plau-
sible that the early exit arrangements depressed the disability and unemployment volume, and that the generous dis-
ability schemes led to less take-up of unemployment insurance. The high theoretical scores on unemployment and, 
to a lesser extent, disability, need not therefore by definition lead to high volumes in practice, because part of the 
theoretically expected high volume may be captured twice. However, as the same substitution mechanisms will also 
occur in other countries, it is difficult to determine in advance to what extent the relative position of the Netherlands 
on the benefit dependency boost index is influenced by this. 
4 These hypotheses assume that there are no countries where the initial volume is very much lower or higher than else-
where, leading to considerable base rate or ceiling effects. For the total benefit volume this assumption seems war-
ranted, because in all countries analysed here the high take-up of old age pensions ensures that the initial number 
of benefit recipients consists of a substantial part of the population. Moreover, the dispersion is limited: while the 
‘growth potential’ of Canada and Australia is higher than that of Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark, the difference is no 
more than about 10 percentage points (cf. the data on 1980 presented in figure 5.2).
 The relationship between the two indicators can be demonstrated as follows:
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 G = growth rate of absolute benefit volume (/100);
 N = absolute benefit volume;
 R = relative benefit volume;
 P = population 15+
5 The most important changes compared with the original Ecorys/nei data  – partially incorporated in oecd (2003a) – 
are:
- the benefit volume above 65 years has been re-estimated for all countries, correcting for recipients living abroad. 
Where this exceeds the number of residents aged over 65 years, the volume is equated to the population size 
above this age limit;
- the volume of unemployment benefits is limited to those who are actually available for work. This means, for 
example, that Dutch unemployed people aged over 57.5 years (who previously were not required to search a job) 
were regarded as having taken early retirement;
- in Belgium, the volume of survivor’s benefits has been greatly reduced through the addition of a new series on 
the actual number of recipients younger than 65 years. The year in which the permitted early retirement age for 
women was raised from 60 to 61 years was also corrected (1997 instead of 1992, as assumed by Ecorys/nei). The 
volume of maternity benefits in 1990 was modified relative to the oecd (2003a: 225);
- the German figures for the number of disabled persons aged below 65 years originally included people above that 
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age limit. This has been corrected, leading to a substantial fall in the disability benefit volume. The volumes in 
the arrangements for widows and orphans in the period 1997-1999 have been adjusted downwards;
- in France, two arrangements have been added: the Allocation de parent isolé (api, a social assistance scheme for non-
working lone-parent families) and the Allocation parentale d’éducation (ape, a benefit for parents interrupting their 
careers to look after young children). The time series for pensioners, surviving dependants and the unemployed 
were also re-estimated, among other things to correct for conjunctures;
- in the Netherlands the early retirement scheme (vut/pre-pension) has been added. Without this, the benefit depend-
ency – and certainly the number of early exits – would be substantially underestimated. At the end of the 1990s 
approximately 130,000 benefit years were involved. nei/Ecorys leaves these arrangements out of consideration 
for formal reasons: they are not established by law, but in the collective bargaining between employers and 
trade unions. In reality, however, the vut early retirement arrangement is at the very least partially ratified by the 
government, since the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment declares the Collective Labour Agreements in 
which it is laid down in most sectors to be ‘generally binding’. Some benefit volumes at the end of the 1990s were 
also adjusted to take account of more recent Dutch figures. In the social assistance arrangements, the relative 
shares of unemployment assistance and other recipients have been estimated from 1996 on the basis of the trend 
in the number of lone-parent families receiving general social assistance;
- two arrangements were added to the Danish time series: the ‘transitional allowance’ (Overgangsydelse), which 
made it possible between 1992 and 1996 for older long-term unemployed to retire early, and the childcare leave 
arrangements  that were introduced in 1994 (Børnepasningsorlov). For 1980-1983 the volumes of survivor’s pensions 
(Enkepension) were added, which were abolished in 1984 and absorbed into the Fortidspension. The share of 66 and 67 
year-old recipients of early exit benefits (Efterløn, Overgangsydelse and Fortidspension) was redetermined, leading to 
a reduction in the benefit dependency in the population younger than 65 years. Finally, a harmonised statistical 
series published by Statistics Denmark was used for social assistance benefit recipients, with a correction for a 
trend break in 1994. For 1980-1983, the mutations in social assistance benefit have been estimated. A correction 
was applied for duplications in the counting of social assistance benefit recipients who were already included in 
the unemployment figures as ‘non-insured unemployment beneficiaries’. The Danish social assistance volume 
roughly halved compared with Ecorys/nei, by taking full time equivalents as a basis and leaving a number of 
provisions out of consideration in the new series (including activation, educational grants, benefits to children 
aged under 18 years and housing benefits);
- the Swedish dataset is virtually unchanged;
- in Great Britain the oecd classified a large number of social assistance beneficiaries as recipients of unemployment 
or disability benefits, a method which is not followed in the decomposition of the benefit volume performed in 
this chapter. In 1999 a small change was made to the share in the population of residents below and above the age 
of 65. As a result, the working age benefit dependency rate in that year is slightly higher than in the oecd calcula-
tion;
- in the usa the time series for the volume of social assistance benefit was corrected, as a result of which it now 
comprises all recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (afdc/tanf), 
the Supplemental Security Income (ssi) and the Food Stamp Program;
- Australia was not included in the original Ecorys/nei dataset, but was added by the oecd. The Veterans Old Age 
Pensions have been included here, with an estimate being made of the share of beneficiaries younger and older 
than 65 years (taking into account cohort effects associated with the military conflicts in which the country was 
involved);
- Canada was also added by the oecd. Here, however, a different series was used for the allowances awarded to 
partners and surviving dependants aged 60-64 years within the context of Old Age Security. Moreover, for Widowed 
Spouses Allowance, only those receiving the maximum amount were included, in order to avoid conjunctures. 
Where lower amounts are paid this benefit is generally supplementary, being received alongside other benefits 
such as the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan.
6 However, to facilitate comparison between countries it was sometimes necessary to deviate from this principle. Eco-
rys/nei and oecd did include the Danish unemployment benefits in the figures, even though this is a non-statutory 
and voluntary insurance operated under the responsibility of the trade unions.
7 For example, supplementary social assistance paid to recipients of retirement pensions are in principle left out of 
consideration, but where they are paid to workers they have been included. 
8 Sweden is an exception, in that social assistance benefits here can be attributed to individuals. It should be noted 
that single persons and one-parent families are counted correctly in all countries, and that couples –who should be 
included twice in a person-based statistic– typically comprise only a minority of all social assistance beneficiaries 
(e.g., in the Netherlands around 2000 only 17% of the recipients lived with a partner). 
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9 oecd (2003a) reports on 16 countries. For the sake of consistency with the country selection in chapters 4 and 6, the 
volume development in Austria, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Slovakia and Spain is left out of consideration here. 
Because Northern Ireland has different social security legislation for which not all volume figures were available, the 
volume figures relate to Great Britain and not to the United Kingdom.
10 The maxim Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem is attributed to the 14th-century philosopher William of Ock-
ham (though this does not in fact appear in this form in his writings). It has been variously translated as “entities 
should not be multiplied beyond necessity” or “Shave off [omit] unnecessary entities in explanations”, or paraphrased 
as “Of two equivalent theories or explanations, all other things being equal, the simpler one is to be preferred”. Ock-
ham’s Razor, also known as the lex parsimoniae (law of succinctness) or the “principle of simplicity”, does not imply that 
the most parsimonious theory is always the best: if an apparently uncomplicated phenomenon is brought about by 
an intricate mechanism, simple explanations are simplistic. Ockham’s heuristic principle merely recommends that 
the theory be selected which postulates the fewest entities and assumptions (cf.  Spade, 2006).
 In modern versions of the maxim, empirical validation is often added as a further condition, and the simplest theory 
is only considered best if it is in line with empirical observation; cf. “The supreme goal of all theory is to make the 
irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation 
of a single datum of experience” (Einstein 1934: 165). 
 Popper (1968 [1959]: 136-145) defines methodological simplicity in terms of the number of logical parameters in a 
theory . He defends the principle of parsimony not on aesthetic or pragmatic grounds, but by pointing out that theo-
ries with fewer parameters tend to be more informative and more general, and can be falsified more easily by obser-
vation: “[To explain] why simplicity is so highly desirable [...] there is no need for us to assume a ‘principle of economy 
of thought’ or anything of the kind. Simple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized more highly than 
less simple ones because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable” (Popper, 
1968 [1959]: 142; italics in the original).
11 The relative figures presented here differ from those in the report by Arents et al. (2000), which is mainly concerned 
with the ratio of the number of benefit recipients to the working population (the inactivity/activity or i/a ratio).
12 The fall which occurs in Australia between 1980 and 1990 is due mainly to the relatively modest growth in the number 
of pension beneficiaries aged 65 years and older, which lags behind the growth in the population in that age category 
(+5% and +34%, respectively; see also Eardley et al., 1996: 33).
13 Note that the very sharp increase in the Swedish benefit volume in the early 1990s is not visible because of the meas-
urement years selected in the graph. Between 1990 and 1994, benefit dependency in Sweden rose from 35.0% to 
39.7%, before falling back again to 37.2% in 1999.
14 The analysis by the oecd (2003a), which includes more countries, shows a similar ranking of the regime types in 1999 
when it comes to benefit dependency among the population of working age. Of special interest are the positions of 
Austria, Ireland and New Zealand. The Austrian system can be regarded as corporatist (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Soede et al., 2004), and in 1990 and 1999 the level of benefit dependency among the population of working age was 
lower than that in France and Belgium. Ireland and New Zealand theoretically belong to the liberal type. According 
to the oecd analysis in both countries the 1980 benefit volume was lower than in the other liberal regimes discussed 
in this chapter. Subsequently, the growth in Ireland and New Zealand was significantly stronger. As a result, in 1990 
and 1999 Ireland has a higher share of benefit recipients than Great Britain, Canada, Australia and the usa. New Zea-
land, which started from a very low base rate in 1980, ends up slightly above the level of the usa in 1990 and 1999, but 
below the other liberal countries (oecd 2003a: 226). As mentioned before, the figures presented here are not wholly 
comparable with those in the 2003 oecd Employment Outlook. 
15 In Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands the  residual category (which is no part of the actual labour force) 
comprises an average of 25-32% of the population aged 15-64 years between 1980 and 1999, compared with 13-23% 
for the representatives of the liberal and social-democratic regimes studied here. This is in line with the corporatist 
philosophy of minimising labour supply.
16 The very high growth figure for Canada in 1982 (13.4%) is largely a result of the strong increase in the number of 
unemployment benefits, which rises by 44% from around 1 million to 1.5 million benefit years. This is consistent with 
the increase in the official Canadian unemployment rate, which rose in that year from 7.6% to 11.0%, a much bigger 
increase than in most other oecd countries. By way of comparison, the unemployment rate in the us also made the 
biggest leap in the whole of the 1980s in that year, but here it increased from 7.6% to 9.7% (oecd, 1996: A24). The peaks 
in Australia in 1983 and 1991 are also due to large increases in the number of unemployment benefits (approximately 
+260,000 benefit years, +60-70%).
17 The classification used here emphasises the type of arrangement, and therefore deviates partially from oecd (2003a), 
which focuses mainly on the composition by risk. This especially makes a difference for social assistance provisions to 
the unemployed and the disabled. The oecd classifies these under the risks ‘unemployment’ and ‘disability’, whereas 
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here they are placed under ‘social assistance’ (with the exception of early exits via social assistance). Both approaches 
are valid. The oecd classification is suitable for ascertaining which portion of the total volume is related to specific 
eventualities. However, when the emphasis is on the residuality and targeting of social security schemes, as here, a 
risk-based classification may make it difficult to assess the importance of social assistance schemes (the distortion in 
the ‘liberal’ direction).
 18 Based on this definition, arrangements can often be unambiguously classified as being or not being social assistance 
benefits, but there are also a few borderline cases. An example is the German Arbeitslosenhilfe, characterised by Eardley 
et al. (1996: 161) as “a hybrid benefit, having some elements of both insurance and assistance”. On the one hand it 
is insurance-like: the benefit is a percentage of previous earnings. On the other hand it has assistance elements: it 
is funded from general resources and is means-tested, although less strictly than the Sozialhilfe.  The Arbeitslosenhilfe 
has been classified as an unemployment insurance here, as is customary in Germany, where it is generally regarded 
as an extension of the Arbeitslosengeld. The eu’s missoc classification also places this benefit under ‘Unemployment’, 
though reference is made to the assistance-like elements. The implication is that a proportion of the volume of the 
German ‘Unemployment Insurance’ could also have been categorised as social assistance.
 In Australia the classification problem is even greater, because virtually all benefits are means-tested and could 
therefore  be classified as social assistance. However, this would not reflect the relatively high exemption threshold, 
especially in the pensions system.  Eardley et al. (1996: 11) comment in this connection: “The means tests in much of 
the Australian system are primarily designed to exclude fairly well-off individuals, not to concentrate benefits on a 
residual group. The crucial fact about the Australian system is that there are no social insurance programmes at all. 
This means it is very hard to define what constitutes social assistance in the Australian (and New Zealand) context. 
At one extreme, it could be argued that virtually all payments are a form of social assistance, and at the other, that 
only the Special Benefit going to around one percent of all recipients is social assistance. Either extreme would be 
misleading, however, since benefits to the unemployed and short-term sick are virtually identical to Income Support 
in the United Kingdom… It is probably more accurate to see the Australian system either as effectively providing a 
form of negative income tax for the elderly and some other groups, or as an integrated system of social assistance 
and partial social insurance. The unemployed and the sick, however, receive payment under conditions similar to 
those applying under Income Support in the United Kingdom …”. On this basis it was decided to equate the Australian 
social assistance volume with those receiving Special Benefit (for people  “in severe financial need, for whom no other 
pension, allowance or other support is available”), the Parenting Payment-Single (for lone-parent families with “pri-
mary care of at least one child under 16 years of age”) and the Unemployment Benefit (with the exception of the category 
‘incapacitated’, which has been included under disability benefits). Recipients of the Australian Sickness Benefit have 
been classified under employees’ dependency, because entitlement is linked to employment.
19 In a few cases supplementary estimates were made for the early exit arrangements. In Germany, unemployment 
arrangements are fairly widely used as an exit route. Part of the volume of Arbeitslosengeld and Arbeitslosenhilfe has 
therefore been transferred to the exit routes, based on estimates taken from Knuth & Kalina (2002) and Brixy et al. 
(2002). In Denmark, the Fortidspension is an important exit route until age 60, but not all recipients are former employ-
ees (widows and the needy are included as well). Estimates of the percentage with an employment history are taken 
from Bingley et al. (2002). The Swedish Förtidspension can also be partially classified under exit routes. Here it has been 
assumed that former employees consist of recipients who receive an earnings-related supplement (Allmän Tillags-
pension) under this arrangement (information obtained from Statistika Centralbyrån). The number of self-employed 
people was then deducted from this. Finally, it would have been more correct to include the disability volume for 
former employees and early exits only to the extent that they are aged over 50. However, since the information in the 
dataset is not broken down by age, this was not possible.
20 Exceptions to these general trends include the fact that the relative volume of exit routes in Australia decreased 
slightly between 1980 and 1990, as it did in Belgium and the Netherlands between 1990 and 1999. In the usa it 
remained virtually unchanged throughout the 1990s. In addition, the share of survivor’s benefits in Germany and 
Canada increased between 1980 and 1990; in the latter country it showed virtually no fall in the 1990s. Finally, the 
relative social assistance volume in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United States was lower in 1999 than in 1990.
21 The comment should be made here that the Belgian social assistance volume may well have been overestimated, 
because it was not possible to apply a correction for the Minimex to take account of partial benefits.
22 Einerhand et al. (1995: 79-90) observe a “sharp and consistent fall” in the German disability volume in the period 
1980-1990, which they ascribe to the tightening up of the entry conditions, in particular the introduction of the 
requirement that disabled persons must have worked for at least three of the last five years in order to be eligible for 
benefit.
 Between May 1984 and December 1988 German employees were able to retire at the age of 58. Until they reached the 
age of 60, they were paid by their employer and the employment agency, after which they could move on to unem-
Rules of Relief_14.indd   499 21-9-2009   15:09:42
500
5
ployment benefit. In 1990 only the latter elements can still be observed: people aged 60-64 years who were still on 
unemployment benefit in that year.
 The volume effect of the special transitional arrangement for older unemployed persons in the former German Dem-
ocratic Republic is also not visible in the data presented here. Benefits paid in the new Bundesländer were only included 
in the series for 1992, and this Altersübergangsgeld was abolished on 1 January 1995. As a result, the group of beneficiar-
ies (a maximum 641,000 in 1993) had virtually disappeared by 1999 (553 cases).
23 France has a means-tested benefit for widows aged below 55 years (Allocation de veuvage); an earnings-related benefit, 
which depends on the number of years that the deceased person was insured, for widows aged over 55 years (Pension 
de réversion); and separate arrangements for widows of disabled persons, victims of occupational accidents and mili-
tary personnel (Pension d’invalidité de veuve/veuf; Rente de survivant de victime d’accident du travail; Pension militair d’invalidité 
reversée). In 1999 an estimated 17% of all survivor’s benefits were paid to people aged below 65 years.
24 Leave arrangements in Australia are generally voluntary, private-sector arrangements and are therefore not included 
here, in line with the methodological principles set out in § 5.2.
25 Compare note 18 in this chapter, which gives more detail on the classification of the Australian social security 
arrangements.
26 In the 1990s the usa replaced the Aid to families with dependent children (afdc) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(tanf). The old scheme was operated by individual states; within federal guidelines, the states could determine for 
themselves who was eligible for the scheme and what level of benefits they would receive. tanf is a federal regulation 
which sets a time limit of 60 months, stresses work requirements, and gives states latitude in designing specific 
programmes. This ‘system fissure’ in us social assistance will be discussed more extensively in the causal analysis.
27 It should be borne in mind that the unemployment benefits paid to people aged 57.5 years and older in the Nether-
lands are not included under exit routes here because since 1984 this group have not been required to look for work 
actively (though since 1999 new cases do have to register with an employment agency and accept work offered). This 
pushes down the volume figure in the category ‘employment insurance’ considerably: it affected 20% of recipients of 
this benefit in 1990, and 28% in 1999. 
 28 The fall in the relative volume in Dutch exit routes between 1990 and 1999 comes about as follows. The absolute 
number of former employees receiving disability benefit declined, while the take-up of pre-pension and unemploy-
ment benefits by people aged 57.5 years and older (no duty to look for work) rose slightly. On balance, the absolute 
number of these benefits remained virtually constant. However, as the number of employees (part of the denomina-
tor) grew strongly at the same time, the relative volume reduced.
 The reduction in the take-up of unemployment insurance not only reflects the favourable employment situation in 
1999, but also the tightening up of the entry conditions and duration of the Werkloosheidswet (Unemployment Insur-
ance Act). The fall in the social assistance volume occurs mainly among unemployment assistance beneficiaries aged 
below 57.5 years (formerly the target group of the Special Government Scheme for the Unemployed, rww). An impor-
tant aspect with regard to employee dependency is the phasing in of financial responsibility for employers for the 
first year of sickness during the 1990s. Since the number of employees rose at the same time, the relative volume of 
the sickness benefits decreased.
29 See also the more detailed discussion of the ‘small-N problem’ in chapter 4. 
30 Five determinants in the model were analysed in terms of annual mutations in percentage points. This concerns 
the participation rates of women and elderly men, the share of the services sector in civil employment, the benefit 
entitlement index and the pension coverage. These five factors are expressed in their original form as percentages. If 
percentage changes were to be used for these variables, the annual mutations may be strongly influenced by the base 
rate (the value in the start year). For example, if the participation rate in a given year rises from 20% to 25%, the per-
centage change is 25% [((25-20)/20)*100]; but if the activity rate were to rise from 80% to 85%, the percentage change 
is only 6.25% [((85-80)/80)*100]. Using annual difference scores, the change in both cases is 5 percentage points.
31 This is the case when the values for the dependent variable correlate over time, for example where high defence 
spending in one year is offset by low spending in the next (negative autocorrelation), or where the prevailing budget-
ary rules effectively prohibit radical changes from one year to the next (positive autocorrelation). The residual values 
in such cases are not randomly scattered. In the case of a first-order auto-regressive process this does not affect the 
parameter estimates, but does render the  standard significance tests unusable (Ostrom 1990: 9-14).
32 The price elasticities in demand models in the economic sciences are a familiar example. With a value of less than 1 
the demand is described as inelastic: if the price goes down by 10% and demand rises by 5%, the price elasticity is 0.50 
and the total revenue reduces (if the price of a good falls from 100 to 90 euros and the demand subsequently goes 
from 100 to 105 sold units, this implies a fall in revenue from 10,000 to 9,450 euros). With a value greater than 1 the 
demand is elastic: price falls lead to proportionately larger demand increases and therefore to rising total revenues. 
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33 The number of lone-parent families in the United States is available annually  in a series published by the us Census 
Bureau, based on the Current Population Survey. The time series for Great Britain is derived from Haskey (1998, 2002), 
with a few interpolations in the 1980s. For Belgium, the figures on lone-parent families are taken from the Nationaal 
Instituut voor de Statistiek. Census material relates to 1981 and 1991, while register data are available for the end of the 
1990s. The intervening years were interpolated. A correction was applied to restrict lone-parent families to the group 
with children aged under 18 years, based on the ‘nuclear families’ series (see nis, 2001). 
 The German data for the years 1991, 1996 and 2001 are drawn from the series ‘Allein Erziehende ohne Partner mit 
Kindern unter 18 Jahren’ from the Mikrozensus (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002). For earlier years, the mutations in a 
longer time series from the Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung were used (BiB, 2003). 
 Algava (2002) reports the number of lone-parent families in France for 1975, 1982, 1990 and 1999. This is a fairly wide 
definition, however, which also includes households with children living at home aged between 18 and 25 years. A glo-
bal correction was applied to produce the envisaged population with children younger than 18 years on the basis of the 
shares listed by Le Gall & Martin (1987) and the website of insee (1999 census). The intervening years were interpolated.
 For Denmark, figures on the number of lone-parent families are available on an annual basis from Statistikbanken. The 
Swedish figures for 1980, 1985 and 1990 are taken from census data. After 1991, register data are available. The Statis-
tika Centralbyrån supplied additional data for 1995, 1996 and 1999. Here again, the missing years were interpolated. 
 The official Dutch series on lone-parent families does not set an upper age limit for children living at home. For this 
reason, the time series from the large-scale Income Panel Survey carried out by Statistics Netherlands was used, in 
which only single adults with children below the age of 18 are counted as lone parent families. These figures are avail-
able for 1977, 1981, 1985 and 1989-1999; the intervening years were interpolated.
34 Estimating the effect of changes in both the number of employed and unemployed persons on the benefit volume 
would make it possible to assess the impact of both factors separately (i.e., ascertain to what extent employee 
dependency falls and unemployment benefit dependency rises in times of recession). However, because changes 
in the volume of employment and unemployment have a strong negative correlation, this would introduce a high 
degree of multicollinearity in the model. For that reason only the unemployment mutations have been included.
 35 Other complications are that the unemployment figures are generally expressed in persons and the volumes in years, 
which generally turn out lower; and that the official tally of the number of unemployment persons may be more 
prone to contamination than the registration of benefit volumes. Unemployed people generally have to register 
with an employment agency, but do not always notify the agency immediately that they have found a job; because the 
benefits administration has a duty of financial accountability, the receipt of benefits and their legitimacy is generally 
verified with more precision (though of course registration errors also occur here).
36 For the Netherlands, a correction was applied for trend breaks in the data gathering in 1987 and 1992. In Belgium and 
the United Kingdom there are no participation figures for the early 1980s. These were estimated on the basis of ilo 
figures and national sources. For Denmark, use was made of two series on participation rates from Statistikbanken. 
37 The specification of the effect of developments in gross participation in the model is partial, because changes in the 
participation rates of young people, men aged 25-54 years and women aged 55-64 years are left out of consideration. 
In order to limit the number of variables it was decided to investigate the mutations in participation in the two 
groups with the largest theoretical impact on benefit volume, and for which Esping-Andersen assumes a relationship 
with the regime type: the exit strategy in the corporatist countries, and the maximisation of the participation rate 
of women in the social-democratic cluster. For young people aged 15-24 years, the changes in the participation rate 
between 1980 and 1999 are limited in many countries. According to the oecd Labour Force Statistics, they fell slightly 
in the United Kingdom, the usa, Germany and Denmark (by between 1 and 6 percentage points), and rather more 
sharply in Belgium, France and Sweden (by between 11 and 17 percentage points). This falling labour participation 
rate of young people is probably connected to increased duration of education. The labour participation rate of this 
age group rose strongly in the Netherlands, especially from the middle of the 1990s. This can be explained by reforms 
in the student grant system, which meant that students began taking up part-time jobs en masse. All in all, there is suf-
ficient reason to assume that the changes in the gross participation figures of young people do not weigh very heavily 
in the development of the benefit volume: the mutations are often limited, and the relationship with the benefit 
volume is rather inelastic, as benefit dependency of young people tends to be low in all social security schemes, with 
the exception of unemployment benefits. 
 The changes in the labour participation rate of women aged 55 years and older are more complex than those for men 
or women aged 25-54 years, due to generation and period effects crossing each other in this group. Compared with 
elderly men, the early exit effect is generally more than offset by the fact that in every new cohort more women go 
to work; France is the only country where the participation rate of older women falls, elsewhere it increases. The 
increase in the participation rate is generally less marked than among women aged 25-54 years, however, as it is held 
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back by the growth in early exits. Such antagonistic mutations imply that the changes in the participation of older 
women have a less marked influence on the total benefit volume than changes in the two selected groups. 
 The participation rate of men aged 25-54 years is above 90% in all countries, and falls only slightly over time. This is 
largely attributable to the increase in the number of men living off their own means or receiving disability benefit. In 
so far as the latter volume increase can be traced back to changes in the participation rate (and not to the growth of 
the labour force), it is ignored in the model.
38 The Danish pension threshold in the period studied was set at 67 years, making it logical to assume that the pension 
coverage for the over-65s is not complete. In Great Britain it was possible to defer retirement by up to five years (for 
men until age 70), with an increase in benefit of 7.5% for each year that those concerned continued to work.
39 As an example, if a system constraint means that all people who under the old rules would have been entitled to dis-
ability benefit receive social assistance benefit in the new situation, the volume effect of the measure is nil. There may 
well however be a price effect: since social assistance benefits are generally lower and are dependent on other income 
and the assets of households, the benefit costs fall. In the short term, this has no impact on the benefit volume.
40 The definition used by the oecd is “the sum of gross value added of all resident producer units (institutional sec-
tors or, alternatively, industries) plus that part (possibly the total) of taxes, less subsidies, on products which is not 
included in the valuation of output”. This definition thus leaves unpaid work and ‘green’ production factors (unpriced 
natural and environmental goods) out of consideration. 
 It should be noted that data on Great Britain were not available for the variables relating to developments in the 
economy and on the labour market; in these cases uk figures have been used. 
41 The benefit entitlement index is the average of the gross replacement rate (gross benefit level divided by previous 
gross earnings) for three types of household (living alone; with partner, not working; with partner, working) and two 
pay levels (average and two-thirds of the average) for three unemployment durations (one year; two to three years; 
four to five years). The benefits concerned are usually unemployment benefits and, where the duration is longer, 
social assistance for people with a duty to apply for work. Other limitations of the index are:
- because gross figures are used, the index may suggest an improvement or deterioration in the benefit levels which 
does not correspond with the actual situation (e.g. if taxes are raised but the net amounts remain the same); 
- the benefit level is only one aspect of the attractiveness of unemployment benefits. The insured population and 
the eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits are equally important. There are wide differences here 
between the different countries, with a very large group of potential unemployed people entitled to benefit in 
Belgium and Denmark, for example, and much lower coverage in the United States and the United Kingdom;
- when calculating long-term benefit entitlements, no allowance was made for renewed periods of unemployment 
for people who participate in a job creation programme. This occurs frequently in Scandinavian countries, and 
may distort the effective replacement rates over a longer period according to the index (where such cases are 
interpreted as new spells of unemployment; cf. oecd 1994: 175).
42 Not all required data on the independent model variables were available for Canada and Australia in the form of a 
detailed time series (e.g. data on lone parent families). The dependent variable is more uncertain than elsewhere as 
well, because some smaller benefit schemes have not been included (e.g. orphan’s benefits in Canada, war widows’ 
pensions in Australia) and the times series relies on estimates to a greater extent (cases of conjuncture, e.g. Quebec 
Pension Plan with social assistance; several Australian schemes in the 1980s).
43 Single observations may be considered influential if they are distant from other cases in multivariate scatterplots and 
have high leverage (which typically occurs on the tails of the joint distributions): “the combination of high leverage with 
an outlier produces substantial influence on the regression coefficients” (Fox 1991: 21).  Such influential points cannot 
be detected by simply inspecting the unexplained part of the dependent variables because “high leverage observations 
tend to have small residuals – a sensible result, because these observations can force the regression surface to be close 
to them” (Fox 1991: 25). Influential outliers can be detected by combining  two indicators, the leverage or ‘hat value’, and 
the Studentised residuals. The indicator for the leverage lies between 0  (no influence on the model) and 1 (determines 
the model). Fox suggests that values with a leverage greater than 2(k+1)/n are suspect (where n is the number of cases 
and k is the number of independent variables). The Studentised residuals (sr) indicate the degree of discrepancy; these 
are obtained by leaving out observations of the estimation one at a time. Fox proposes that values outside the range 
 -2< sr < 2 should be regarded as questionable. In the sensitivity analysis performed here, the leverage and Studentised 
residuals have been plotted, and observations which are above the threshold values on both indicators are regarded as 
influential. This has been checked against the value on the Cook’s Distance measure, which expresses leverage and dis-
crepancy in a single figure; Fox (1991: 34) suggests a cut-off value of 4/(n - k - 1). Points which were influential according 
to both the plot and Cook’s distance have been eliminated from the analysis.
44 The German trend break was synchronised for all model variables, so that the data from 1992 onwards relate to the 
total of the old and new Bundesländer.
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45 The effects of economic growth on female labour participation, and of the benefit entitlement index on the number 
of unemployed, are statistically significant at p<0.15.
46 The unexpected negative effect (-0.22) of the number of 50-64 year-olds on the benefit volume arises due to two clus-
ters of observations. In some countries in the early 1980s there was a combination of juvenescence of the potential 
labour force and a fairly marked increase in the benefit volume, mainly due to the rising number of unemployment 
and social assistance benefits. In the second half of the 1990s the reverse occurred in many countries. The potential 
labour force aged as the post-war baby boom generation reached their fifties, and the number of benefits paid to 
people below retirement age declined as the economy picked up in that period, sometimes reinforced by changes in 
the social security arrangements. These two clusters of observations lead to the observed negative direct effect. If 
they are removed the postulated positive relationship between ageing of the potential labour force and the benefit 
volume is found, though it is weak and not statistically significant.
 The anomalous effect of the ageing variable on the number of unemployed is less strong (standardised coefficient 
-0.08) and not statistically significant. It reflects a combination of juvenescence of the potential labour force and 
rising unemployment in the early 1980s, and of ageing and falling unemployment in the second half of the 1990s. It 
was also found, contrary to expectations, that the change in the labour participation of elderly men had a small and 
insignificant negative effect on the number of unemployed (-0.01). The same applies to the impact of the growth of 
the services sector on the labour participation of women (-0.03).
47 The number of degrees of freedom (df ) is equal to the number of variances and covariances in the observed variables, 
minus the number of model parameters to be estimated. The model parameters consist of the effects operating between 
the variables, the (co)variances of the exogenous variables (X) and the (co)variances of the error terms (disturbances) in 
the endogenous variables (ζ). The latter is the portion of the variance in Y that is not explained by the determinants and 
that has to be attributed to characteristics not included in the model, chance and measurement errors. 
 The number of degrees of freedom is important in determining whether the model is able to generate a unique 
solution. This is connected with the familiar condition that in order to solve an equation, the number of unknowns 
must be equal to or smaller than the number of equations. If df  > 0, the model is over-identified, which implies that 
the parameters can be estimated and that the fit of the model to the data can be ascertained. If df = 0, the model is 
exactly identified; this is known as a saturated model, which by definition has a perfect fit. If df < 0, the model is not 
identified and no unique parameter estimates can be obtained, so that the goodness of fit can also logically not be 
determined.
48 The χ2-test can be applied if the sample size is sufficient and variables are normally distributed. The sensitivity of 
the χ2-test to sample size was already stressed for bivariate associations by Gulliksen & Tukey  (1958: 95-96): “if the 
sample is small then the χ2 test will show that the data are ‘not significantly different from’ quite a wide range of 
very different theories, while if the sample is large, the χ2  test will show that the data are significantly different from 
those expected on a given theory, even though the difference may be so slight as to be negligible or unimportant on 
other criteria”. With regard to the use of this test in determining the goodness of fit in structural modelling, Bentler 
& Bonnet (1980: 591) comment that: “in very large samples virtually all models that one might want to consider would 
have to be rejected as statistically untenable. [...] A non-significant chi-square value is desired, and one attempts to 
infer the validity of the hypothesis of no difference between model and data. [...] This procedure cannot generally be 
justified, since the chi-square variate v can be made small by simply reducing sample size”.
49 The unique effects on the benefit growth rate of changes in the number of pension beneficiaries and in the pension 
coverage was calculated year-on-year for each country using the following decomposition rule (for a formal proof, 
compare: De Beer, 2001: 380):
If C = A • B  then 
∆C = (B' • ∆A) + (A' • ∆B)
where
A' = (At1 + At2)/2
B' = (Bt1 + Bt2)/2
If ∆A = 0 then A' = At1
If ∆B = 0 then B' = Bt1
50 For assessing the elasticity of changes in the size of the potential labour force with benefit dependency growth, the 
starting point was the total number of benefits paid in 1980 to the non-working population (retirement benefits paid 
to people younger than 65 years, social assistance benefits not related to unemployment, survivor’s benefits and 
disability benefits). This was then related to the size of the population outside the labour force in order to obtain the 
initial benefit fraction. Taking this as a basis, the expected absolute changes in the total benefit volume were then 
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calculated for the period 1981-1999. The elasticity was determined by relating the percentage changes in this variable 
to the percentage changes in the size of the potential labour force.
 For the impact of changes in the elderly part of the labour force and the number of lone-parent families, an estimate 
was made for the same four arrangements of the proportion accruing to these two groups in 1980. The absolute 
changes in the two target groups for the period 1981-1999 were then again multiplied by this benefit fraction, to 
arrive at an estimate of the absolute influence on the benefit volume. Here also, the elasticity was calculated by relat-
ing the estimated relative mutation in the dependent variable to the percentage changes in the independent vari-
able. Note that the mutations in these two independent variables have already been ‘cleaned’ for the evolution of the 
total potential labour force, while the series for 50-64 year-olds has also been adjusted for the trend in the number of 
lone-parent families, and vice versa.
51 If the labour participation of elderly men reduces because they use early exits arrangements, the benefit volume 
increases, but this is mitigated by their reduced take-up of unemployment and sickness benefit. The same applies for 
the labour participation of women: if this rises, the take-up of survivor’s benefits and social assistance benefits for 
lone-parent families will fall; against this, there are now more women who could become unemployed, or who could 
claim sickness and maternity benefits. The net impact of these mutations cannot be deduced in advance, but is an 
empirical matter.
52 The stepwise hierarchy for the regressions on the benefit growth (after elimination of the influence of the predeter-
mined variables) was: number of unemployed, labour participation of elderly men, female labour participation, and 
system breaks. The trend in the number of unemployed was first decomposed into demand and supply parts. The 
effects of economic growth, labour costs and the benefit entitlement index were estimated on the demand side of 
unemployment; supply effects are assumed to show in the effects of the two participation variables. Regarding the 
latter, the effect of economic growth was estimated first, followed by the coefficient of the share in the services sector 
and finally that of the benefit entitlement index. 
 The method followed to discover influential points has already been described in note 43 of this chapter.
53 This concerns the effect of economic growth on the two participation variables; the effect of the benefit entitlement 
index on the number of unemployed and the two participation variables; the effect of the share in the services sec-
tor on the labour participation rate of women; and the effect of female labour participation on benefit dependency 
growth (see Annex 2).
54 If the introduction or expansion of, e.g., an early exit scheme means that the benefit volume increases considerably 
and at the same time the employment rate among older workers falls sharply, it may be that the latter variable already 
largely explains the effect. While the system change may have had a major impact on benefit growth, it is not prob-
lematic in terms of the model because the effect has already been captured.
55 In the us, however, the total effect of the population of working age on the volume is stronger (0.52). This is due in the 
first place to the low degree of ageing in the usa in the start year. As a result, benefits paid to the group under the age 
of 65 years weighed more heavily in the total volume, while those paid to the over-65s weighed less heavily than in 
most other countries – a phenomenon that is also visible in the coefficient for the Netherlands. This manifests itself 
mainly in the direct effects on the benefit volume. In addition, although the size of the population outside the labour 
force in the usa in 1980 was comparable with that in other countries (except for the Netherlands and Belgium, where 
this group accounted for a larger share of the population of working age), the benefit dependency in this group was 
higher. This was due to the high take-up of social assistance benefits in this group in 1980, while the number of dis-
ability benefit recipients was also fairly high, and the relative volume of survivor’s pensions and early exits was not 
particularly low in the usa that year.
56 The variance in the unemployment variable is greater in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands because in some 
recession years unemployment increased more strongly than elsewhere. For example, the number of unemployed in 
the Netherlands (after standardisation) increased by more than 45% in 1981 and 1982. In Germany the figure grew by 
over 60% in those years. The unemployment figure exploded in Sweden at the start of the 1990s, reaching a growth 
peak of almost 80% in 1992. Since the variation in the total benefit volume does not show such high peaks – unem-
ployment benefits account for a limited part of the total volume – it is logical that a change of 1% in the number of 
unemployed in these countries has a comparatively smaller effect on the number of benefits.
57 With the caveat that unemployment only begins to fall once a certain level of economic growth is reached. In the 
data used here the turning point lies at a gdp growth rate of 2.2-3.1%. This phenomenon was taken into account in 
determining the estimated influence on the number of benefits by including an intercept in the prediction of the 
number of unemployed.
58 This is a consequence of the relatively strong impact of the size of the services sector on the labour participation 
of elderly men in Denmark. Because the services sector in Denmark increased less than elsewhere, the variance in 
this independent variable is smaller; as the decrease in elderly males’ labour participation was fairly moderate, the 
unstandardised effect becomes rather high.
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 59 Provided the independent variables are not correlated, the expected values in table 5.3 are multiplicative (cf. Hays 
1973: 874).  Thus, in the usa the total expected value of changes in the size of the potential labour force, the popula-
tion aged 50-64 years and the number of lone-parent families is equal to 1.099 * 0.998 * 1.031 =  1.131. This is a legiti-
mate multiplication, because these variables were rendered independent of each other in the model (e.g. the muta-
tions in the number of lone-parent families were corrected for changes in the size of the potential labour force and 
the share of 50-64 year-olds in it). However, it is not possible to multiply all expected values in this way, because the 
outcomes of the intervening variables (number of unemployed, labour participation of elderly men, female labour 
participation) are partly determined by exogenous characteristics, and these expected values therefore are not inde-
pendent. Given their low explained variance in the model, this is not very problematic for the two participation 
variables; but the expected value for the number of unemployed on the benefit volume strongly depends on the pre-
ceding model variables (especially economic growth). If the expected values of economic growth and the number of 
unemployed were to be multiplied, the impact on the benefit volume would be seriously overestimated. The over-all 
prediction of benefit dependency on the bottom row of table 5.3 has therefore been calculated as the multiplication 
of the expected values resulting from the direct effects in the model. Given the decomposition rule cited earlier, the 
expected values following from changes in the pension population and pension coverage are additive; this was taken 
into account in the calculation of the combined impact of all variables.
60 In Germany the labour force aged markedly in the 1980s for two reasons. At the start of the decade, the small cohorts 
born during the First World War left the labour market as they reached retirement age. Because they were replaced in 
the 50+ group by the larger cohorts born in the early 1930s, the share of the elderly in the labour force grew. In addi-
tion, in the second half of the 1980s the fairly large cohorts born in the years before World War ii (1935-1939) reached 
the age of 50. They replaced the smaller cohorts born after World War I (1920-1924), who were then attaining the age 
of 65. In the 1990s the share of 50-64 year-olds subsequently remained fairly constant (here again the influence of 
German reunification is left out of consideration), so that over the period as a whole there is a fairly sharp increase 
in the elderly population of working age: +16%, versus +5% in France, for example. This latter country underwent a 
partially different trend. As in Germany, the number of 50-64 year-olds grew strongly at the start of the 1980s as the 
small World War I cohorts exited from the labour market. However, in the second half of the 1980s there was a relative 
fall; the 1935-39 cohorts were much smaller in France. This decline continued until the second half of the 1990s, when 
the French labour force began to age again (cf. Burricand & Roth, 2000). 
61 Admittedly, a part of the limited impact of the benefit entitlement index in the country-specific models is due to 
the fact that this variable was ‘at the back of the queue’ in the stepwise estimation procedure, after the effects of 
economic growth and other factors had been allowed for. Yet this cannot fully explain the limited impact of the vari-
able. In the ‘free’ model across all countries – were no such stepwise procedure was applied –, the direct effects of 
the benefit entitlement index on the number of unemployed and on the two participation variables were statistically 
insignificant, and the total standardised effect on benefit dependency amounted to only 0.04 (cf. table 5.1).
62 The Allocation parentale d’éducation is a maternity benefit which continues until the youngest child reaches the age of 
three years. The Revenu minimum d’insertion was introduced in 1988 as a general safety net. In addition, France has a 
number of category-specific social assistance arrangements, often in the form of a supplement to social insurance 
benefits.
63 The Invalid Care Allowance can be paid to people below the retirement age who are responsible for caring for a severely 
disabled person for more than 35 hours per week. The carer may not be gainfully employed and may also not be in 
full-time education. The person receiving the care must be in receipt of disability benefit. Eardley et al. (1996: 389) 
also point out that in Great Britain “some improvements and extensions were made to some benefits over the 1980s 
(especially for carers)”. In 1986 and 1987 the take-up of Invalid Care Allowance grew strongly, after which it increased 
more or less in line with the number of recipients of disability benefit (rather self-evident, as this is a criterion for 
entitlement). After allowing for this system break, only a small underestimate remains. 
 There was no need to model other larger system changes in Great Britain (such as the transition to Income Support in 
1988, the introduction of the Job Seeker’s Allowance in 1996), as these were not accompanied by abrupt mutations in the 
take-up of unemployment and social assistance benefits or by large residuals after the estimation procedure. In so 
far as these system changes had an effect, it is gradual and operates over the longer term; the reforms took place at a 
time of economic buoyancy, when the number of benefit recipients was already falling.
64 Denmark introduced many changes in the sickness benefits system in the 1980s (cf. Flora, 1986; Einerhand et al., 
1995). However, the change in 1983 is the only one which was accompanied by a clear dip in the benefit volume, which 
cannot be explained by the other model variables. Before 1983 a much higher proportion of the labour force claimed 
sickness benefit than did so after that year. Part of this difference can perhaps be attributed to a registration effect: 
from 1983 onwards Denmark switched to an electronic system for the administration of sickness benefits. 
 The influence of other system changes in Denmark was also explored, such as the introduction of the Børnepasningsor-
lov in 1994 (a leave arrangement for looking after young children to which working people, students and unemployed 
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people affiliated to an unemployment fund were entitled). This boosted the volume by around 35,000 benefits. How-
ever, this was largely offset by a substitution in social assistance benefit, which fell sharply in that year. The ‘transi-
tional allowance’ (Overgangsydelse) which was introduced in the 1990s and offers long-term elderly unemployed the 
opportunity for early retirement also probably had a limited net influence on the total volume. It was introduced in 
1992 for 55-59 year-olds; from 1994 onwards 50-54 year-olds could also claim this benefit. Entry to the scheme was 
ended in 1996, as a result of which only around 20,000 entitled persons remained in 1999.
65 From December 1988, widowers in the Netherlands gained an entitlement to survivor’s benefit, leading to a rise in 
the total benefit volume of half a percent. The impact of this system expansion was largely cancelled out with the 
introduction of the Surviving Dependants’ Act (Algemene Nabestaandenwet) in 1996. This limited the target group to 
older cohorts (born before 1950) and surviving dependants who were looking after a child or who had an incapacity 
for work of at least 45%. In 1998 an income test was also brought in, whereby higher incomes no longer had an entitle-
ment to the benefit. This led to a volume reduction of 0.9%. 
 In the 1990s, the Sickness Benefits Act was reformed in two steps. In 1994 the first 2 to 6 weeks were made the respon-
sibility of the employer; this was followed in 1996 by full ‘privatisation’ of the first year of sickness (with the excep-
tion of a safety net scheme for pregnant women, sick employees whose employer has gone bankrupt, etc.). Because 
the majority of sickness absenteeism is of short duration, the first step had the biggest impact on the benefit volume 
(-1% versus -0.6%). 
 The reforms of the disability laws in the 1990s did cause the disability benefit volume to reduce, but some of these 
recipients ended up on early retirement, social assistance or unemployment benefits. The remainder is largely cap-
tured in the model by the effect of the sharp rise in the gross labour participation of elderly men. Other system 
changes, such as the complicated Stelselwijziging 1987, various amendments to the Unemployment Act and the intro-
duction of the new Social Assistance Act (1996) did not lead to sudden mutations in the benefit volume which were 
not predicted by the model (for a detailed overview see scp 1998: 421-448). 
66 The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 led to a fall in the number of disabled employees covered by Old 
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (oasdi), among other things because of the introduction of periodic individual 
reviews (see: ssa, 1986). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1981 led to a fall in the number of survivor’s benefits 
because the independent entitlement of ‘children of deceased workers’ who were no longer in high school or who 
were below the age of 19 was gradually phased out. This reform package also ended the oasdi disability benefit for 
partners of disabled workers who were looking after children if the child in question had reached the age of 16 (previ-
ously the threshold was 18 years) (cf. Kollmann, 2000). The combined effect of these measures on the total benefit 
volume in 1999 has been estimated at -2.1%.
67 A further point made by Esping-Andersen refers to the central place occupied by the services sector and female labour 
supply in the social-democratic regime. He argues that the extensive post-industrial employment, especially in the 
(semi-)public sector, is one of the conditions for a high labour participation rate of women (in addition to generous 
sickness benefits and leave facilities). Against this background the theoretical assumption might be that the develop-
ment of the relative size of the services sector and the labour participation rate of women have a different influence 
on the ‘production’ of benefits in Sweden and Denmark than in the other countries. More specifically, it could be 
assumed that: 
a) an increase in the female labour participation rate of women leads to a higher volume in the social-democratic 
countries in particular, due to the greater weight of the employment-related benefits (unemployment benefit, 
sickness pay and leave arrangements). 
b) the growth of the service sector impacts more heavily on female labour participation in the social-democratic 
countries than elsewhere. This translates into a higher benefit volume.
 The model estimates provide little support for these assumptions in the period studied here. In all countries the 
mutations in female labour participation had a negligible influence on the benefit volume. An increase in the per-
centage of women working leads to only slight growth in employment-related benefits: the positive relationship 
via the unemployment variable is not very strong, and is weakened even further by a limited negative direct effect 
(which indicates a reduction of social assistance and survivor’s benefits). The total elasticity of the female labour par-
ticipation rate with respect to the benefit volume is not highest in Sweden and Denmark (cf. Annex 2). Moreover, the 
participation of women in Sweden and Denmark increased only slightly between 1980 and 1999 – rather self-evident, 
given the high base rate. In combination with the low elasticity, this implies that the impact of the changes in female 
labour participation on the benefit volume is in fact the lowest in the social-democratic countries. The model shows 
no clear impact of the growth in the services sector via the labour participation of women either; to the extent that 
this factor is important, it operates via the falling labour participation of older men.
68 The decision to impose the demographic traits of the usa on the other countries is based on a number of considera-
tions. Substantively, it is important that the United States is a relatively pure exponent of one of the regime types, 
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and is often used as a reference point in international comparisons. Technically, the decisive factor was that the time 
series for the four demographic variables on which the countries were equalised are of good quality in the usa (little 
missing data). Belgium, Germany, France and Sweden are less suitable because the time series for lone-parent fami-
lies lacks detail (a limited number of measurement points). In Denmark these data are better, but not available for 
the beginning of the 1980s; an added complication is that in the Danish series a correction had to be applied for the 
65 and 66 year-olds, which in the period analysed here formed part of the labour force. The demographic data in the 
Netherlands and Great Britain are of reasonable quality, but there are some missing years, and these two countries 
are less pure exponents of a particular regime type than the usa.
69 These are the elasticities with respect to the benefit volume of the number of unemployed, the labour participation of 
women and elderly men, the pension coverage and the system changes, as well as of the two participation variables in 
relation to unemployment. The values of the independent variables remain the same, except for the unemployment 
variable (where changes in the values of the predetermining factors lead to a correction of the annual mutations). 
The elasticities do generally change, however, because allowance has to be made for the changes in potential entitle-
ments and total benefit dependency. An example may clarify this. Suppose that in the year that the Revenu minimum 
d’insertion was introduced in France the potential labour force and the number of lone-parent families have grown as 
a result of the imposition of us demography. All other things being equal, the system break will have a greater effect 
on the total French benefit volume: there are more potentially entitled people, and this shows in a higher elasticity. 
If moreover the total number of benefits in France has dropped as a result of the us demography simulation – e.g. 
because there are less aged people, leading to a lower take-up of pensions – the elasticity will increase even further: 
the claims for the new social assistance benefit weigh more heavily in the reduced total volume. It should be noted 
that the elasticity of the population of working age with the number of unemployed is always assumed to be equal to 
1 in the country-specific models, and therefore does not change in the us demography simulation. 
70 Yet there is room for discussion on the question of whether the introduction of the Temporary Aid to Needy Families in 
the usa fits in very well with the residual principles of the liberal regime, or whether it is indicative of a ‘welfare state 
in decline’ (see the earlier discussion on the composition hypothesis).
71 The relatively low score of Germany within the corporatist group is partly due to technical factors. In the extrapola-
tion based on the original model, 1992 was left out of consideration because in that year the effect of reunification 
leads to a sharp rise in the absolute number of benefits. However, this also means that not all changes in the size and 
composition of the population, unemployment and the participation rates of the ‘old’ Bundesländer are reflected in 
the volume estimate. The effect on the benefit volume of this missing year, leaving aside the issue of reunification, is 
estimated at 1.7 percentage points at the end of the time series. If this is taken into account, the index for Germany in 
1999 turns out to 127, much closer to the score of Belgium.
72 It is plausible that the strong volume growth in Canada and Australia can partly be attributed to the population 
increase. The potential labour force in Canada grew by 25% between 1980 and 1999, and in Australia by 33%. In the 
other countries the increase was between 4% (Belgium) and 20% (usa). The differences are even greater in the popu-
lation aged over 65. In the period studied, this group grew by 64% in Australia, and in Canada by 66%. The lowest 
growth among the countries included in the model analysis is 8% (Denmark), the highest (usa) 35%. The number of 
pensions, which weighs heavily on the total volume, therefore rises much more in Canada and Australia than else-
where (also compare the difference between figures 5.2 and 5.3). If us demography were to be imposed upon these 
two countries, the benefit volume would probably grow less strongly.
73 Annex 2 shows that the elasticities with the benefit volume that are related to the over-65s (the effects of the pension 
population and the pension coverage) fall after the us demography simulation. This is because the weight of pension 
benefits in the total volume reduces. The elasticities that relate to the younger population are greater, by contrast: 
the weight of the benefits paid to this growing population group is increased by the simulation.
 The elasticity of the number of unemployed relative to the benefit volume generally rises after the imposition of us 
demography, because:
- there are more unemployed people, since the potential labour force is larger after the simulation. This effect is 
usually mitigated somewhat by the fall in the share of 50-64 year-olds.
- the number of unemployed people weighs more heavily, because the total volume has generally decreased after 
imposition of the us demography, due to the smaller pension population.
 The Netherlands is an exception with regard to this relationship. The elasticity is virtually stable, because the slight 
increase in the number of unemployed is matched by a small increase in the benefit volume.
 The elasticity of the participation of elderly men in relation to unemployment reduces somewhat in most countries, 
because after equalisation with us demography there are fewer men aged 50-64 years. This weighs more heavily than 
the higher unemployment that results from the larger labour force. In the Netherlands and Germany the number of 
elderly men increases due to the standardisation, however, so that the elasticity grows. In Germany this is due to the 
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relatively small World War I cohorts who are still in the labour force at the start of the 1980s. In the us these cohorts 
were larger, therefore the simulation leads to more elderly in Germany.
 The elasticity of the participation of women relative to unemployment shows hardly any change following the simu-
lation, because the share of this group in the total population is virtually the same in all countries; Germany is the 
only exception, with a fall in the elasticity.
74 In the presentation of variants 2-4, the growth in the benefit volume has been related to a standardised base rate. 
This prevents the estimate of the growth – which is the central focus of hypothesis 2 – from being distorted if one 
country has a low starting level and another a high one (a proportionally equal change weighs more heavily in the 
former case than the latter).
75 In the us demography variant, a mutation was also assigned to Germany for 1992. This makes the number of observa-
tions in this variant the same as for the other countries.
 76 These expected values reflect the application of the nairu in the initial unemployment rate and the unemployment 
trend between 1980 and 1999, and the altered effect of the unemployment variable on the benefit volume. In 1980 the 
nairu was well below the cyclical employment level in Great Britain, the usa and Belgium, and substantially higher 
in Germany and the Netherlands. In the first three countries this leads to a lower base rate for the benefit volume; in 
the latter two countries it leads to a higher initial level. 
 In the period 1980-1999 the structural unemployment rate increased strongly in most countries, with the exception 
of Denmark and the Netherlands (virtually constant) and the us, where it fell. However, the drop in us structural 
unemployment was less marked than the fall in cyclical unemployment, which ceteris paribus leads to a higher 1999 
benefit volume. Similarly, in Germany and France the unemployment rate according to the nairu rose less strongly 
than on the basis of the economic cycle, implying less volume growth. In Denmark cyclical unemployment was 
lower in 1999 than in 1980, while structural unemployment rose. In Great Britain cyclical unemployment remained 
unchanged between these two measurement years, but the nairu increased. 
 The relationship of mutations in structural unemployment with the benefit volume has been assessed by estimating 
the effect of changes in the absolute number of structurally unemployed on the incidence of unemployment ben-
efits, social assistance and employee dependency. The usa scores lower than the other countries in this respect (an 
unstandardised effect of 0.61 versus 0.69-0.79) because comparatively fewer unemployed are in receipt of unemploy-
ment benefit. If these coefficients are converted to elasticities, the unstandardised effect of the annual percentage 
changes in unemployment on the volume turns out to have decreased in the nairu variant (0.03-0.10, versus 0.09-
0.18 in the us demography simulation); it is lowest in Sweden. Thus, the elimination of the cyclical unemployment 
component not only smoothes the peaks and troughs in the benefit volume trend, but also implies that changes in 
unemployment weigh less heavily in all countries. 
 Combining these factors, the increase of the benefit dependency growth which occurs in the usa and Great Britain 
in the final simulation mainly results from the combination of a lower base rate and a larger subsequent increase in 
unemployment; this is not fully compensated for by the reduced elasticity with the benefit volume. The decrease in 
the estimated growth in benefits in Sweden, Belgium and France mainly stems from the lower elasticity. In France 
this is reinforced by the smaller unemployment growth according to the nairu.
77 In Denmark the impact of the pension variable is somewhat smaller in this variant (+15%).
78 This is a slightly distorted impression, however, because Canada and Australia have not been included in the simula-
tions. In the 1980s the average growth rate in Canada exceeded that of the Netherlands; and over the entire period 
Canada, France and Australia attain higher averages than the Netherlands.
79 The Danish strategy did not prove to be a recipe for success. Early exits grew strongly in Denmark and benefit depend-
ency among 65 and 66 year-olds rose sharply over time, as indicated by the influence of the pension take-up variable in 
the baseline model. The strategy was therefore abandoned, and in 2004 the retirement age in Denmark was lowered to 
65 years, and as in other countries more attention was given to curbing exits from the labour market below that age, 
among other things by converting the Efterløn into flexible pension arrangements (see e.g. Ebbinghaus, 2003). 
80 In practice, the growing impact of the number of lone-parent families is mitigated to some extent by the reform of 
the American social assistance in the 1990s. This system break is left out of consideration in the fourth variant, how-
ever, for reasons of comparability.
81 Seen in absolute terms, the biggest part of the growth in disability benefits in Great Britain occurs with Invalidity 
Benefit and Disability Assistance. It should be noted that the latter has been included in the category ‘social assistance’ 
in the decomposition analysis in figure 5.6.
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Chapter 6
1 The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 aroused heated public debate in England at the time. Interestingly enough, the 
same arguments were used to some extent as in present policy discussions, for example with regard to the positive 
and negative economic functions of social security (see §3.6.3) and the creation of poverty traps. The 1834 legislative 
amendment limited access to poor relief on the grounds of utilitarian principles. Largely based upon the work of 
Bentham (1948 [1789], 1962 [1838-1843]), the idea gained ground that treating the poor too generously would impose 
a burden on the collectivity, because the incentives for people to look for work, save money or start a business would 
become too weak. In line with this, the revised English Poor Law aimed to deter the poor from claiming relief. It 
stipulated that recipients were no longer allowed to live in family dwellings of their own; they were to be incarcer-
ated in work houses, where the conditions should be less favourable than if people went to work for the lowest wage, 
and where men, women and older children were separated. The administration of poor relief was also revised. The 
previously autonomous parishes were allowed to work together in unions in order to raise funds to establish new 
work houses; but if they did, they came under the supervision of the national Poor Law Commission. This eventually 
led to a centralised bureaucracy, which supervised administration at the local level. The law was later relaxed, partly 
because the work houses did not offer a suitable solution for mass unemployment during periods of recession.
2 Until the Weimar Republic, social assistance in Germany was provided under the jurisdiction of the individual Län-
dern. The first formal regulation appeared in Bavaria in 1811 (Allgemeine bayerische Verordnung, das Armenwesen betreffend). 
The Prussian Armenpflegegesetz from 1842 was more extensive; among other things it stipulated that the state was 
required in the interests of public welfare to organise the provision of social assistance. The state imposed an obli-
gation on organisations dealing with poverty to provide such help. These organisations, however, were not legally 
bound to support all poor individuals, as the latter had no right to social assistance. The first national provision 
in Germany was created in 1924, and consisted of the Reichsfürsorgepflichtverordnung and the Reichsgrundsätze über die 
Voraussetzungen, Art und Maß der öffentlichen Fürsorge. The present German law on Sozialhilfe dates from 1961, and was fairly 
radically overhauled in 2005. It still allows great freedom to the federal states (including with regard to the level of 
social assistance benefits), though coordination does take place on this.
3 Also compare: “Capability is […] a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of 
life or another. Just as the so-called ‘budget set’ in the commodity space represents a person’s freedom to buy com-
modity bundles, the ‘capability set’ in the functioning space reflects the person’s freedom to choose from possible 
livings” (Sen, 1992: 40). Sen does stress that it is desirable from the point of view of evaluation to consider both 
aspects: “The evaluative focus of this ‘capability approach’ can be either on the realized functionings (what a person 
is actually able to do) or on the capability set of alternatives she has (her real alternatives). The two give different types 
of information – the former about the things a person does and the latter about the things a person is substantively 
free to do” (Sen, 1999: 75).
4 According to Sen, a low income is in itself not an indicator for poverty. In his view, the key is whether the income 
is inadequate, given the personal characteristics and the individual’s circumstances: “To have inadequate income is 
not a matter of having an income level below an externally fixed poverty line, but to have an income below what is 
adequate for the person in question. In the income space, the relevant concept of poverty has to be inadequacy (for 
generating minimally acceptable capabilities) rather than lowness (independent of personal characteristics). A ‘pov-
erty line’ that ignores individual characteristics altogether cannot do justice to our real concerns underlying poverty, 
viz. capability failure because of inadequate economic means. Often it will make sense to group individuals into 
certain categories (related to class, gender, occupational group, employment status, and so on).” (Sen, 1992: 111)
5 Sen (1999: 81-85) distinguishes three ways in which capabilities can be measured directly. In the case of a total com-
parison, all possible capability vectors are ranked in terms of a particular criterion (such as poverty or inequality). 
With a partial ranking, a selection of such vectors is ranked, without any attempt at completeness. In a distinguished 
capability comparison, the issue of ranking and weighting does not apply, because only one capability is considered. 
If capabilities (or functionings) have to be weighted, Sen (1999: 78-79) argues that the weights should be established 
via a democratic procedure, though he acknowledges that this can be “extremely messy” compared with a techno-
cratic approach: “In arriving at an ‘agreed’ range for social evaluation (for example, in social studies of poverty), there 
has to be some kind of reasoned ‘consensus’ on weights, or at least on a range of weights. This is a ‘social choice’ 
exercise, and it requires public discussion and a democratic understanding and acceptance”.
 6 Nussbaum (2000: 78-80) presents the following list of ‘central human functional capabilities’: life (being able to live 
to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not 
worth living); bodily health (including being adequately nourished and having adequate shelter); bodily integrity; 
senses, imagination and thought (including an adequate education); emotion; practical reason; affiliation (love and 
friendship); connection with other species (nature, animals); play; control over one’s environment (including politi-
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cal participation, being able to hold property). Nussbaum argues that these capabilities are mutually independent: 
they are separate components, and shortage of one cannot be compensated by a surplus of another. She also argues 
that the list of capabilities is universally applicable, a conclusion that she bases on a combination of Aristotelian eth-
ics and her own comparison of the living conditions of women in the usa and India. 
 This list is not very discriminatory: it encompasses a great many things, and yet the author herself notes that her cata-
logue is not exhaustive (Nussbaum, 2000: 95). This implies that her interpretation of capabilities goes far beyond the 
basic deficits which are often associated with poverty or a socially acceptable minimum standard of living. In addi-
tion, by regarding them as intrinsically unrelated, she implicitly treats all capabilities as equally important. However, 
it is questionable whether one would want to give an aspect such as ‘being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities’ (the ‘play’ capability) the same weight as the physical survival of individuals. Finally, even within prosper-
ous Western societies the ‘universal’ nature of the list is contestable: a town-dweller who never leaves his city, a 
butcher, or someone with a phobia of dogs or an allergy to insect bites probably has a very specific interpretation of 
the capability to ‘connect with other species’. As a result, Nussbaum’s list is susceptible to the sectarism objection.
7 Dworkin argues in this connection that the ‘capabilities’ approach is not a ‘Third Way’, but is a variant of resourcism. 
He interprets Sen’s ideas as follows: “Government should strive to insure that any differences in the degree to which 
people are not equally capable of realising happiness and other ‘complex’ achievements should be attributable to 
differences in their choices and personality and the choices and personality of other people, not to differences in 
the personal and impersonal resources they command. If we do understand equality of capabilities in that way, it is 
not an alternative to equality of resources but only the same set of ideals set out in a different vocabulary. Of course 
people want resources to improve their ‘capabilities’ for ‘functionings’ – that is, in order to improve their power to 
do what they want. But (on this reading of Sen’s position) it is their personal and impersonal resources, not the hap-
piness or well-being that they can achieve through their choices, that are matters of egalitarian concern.” (Dworkin, 
2000: 303). For this reason, Dworkin supports only two fundamentally different approaches in the ‘Equality-of-what’ 
discussion: welfarism and resourcism.
8 In the first edition of A theory of justice (Rawls, 1971), primary goods are interpreted as things which every rational 
person would wish to have, regardless of the life they aspire. Rawls was thinking mainly of goods that are distributed 
by the society in which people live; primary social goods, such as basic freedoms, equal opportunities, income and 
financial assets, and ‘self-worth’ (in so far as this is determined by social circumstances). ‘Natural’ primary goods 
are thus left out of consideration: things such as talents, disabilities, mental states, needs and ‘conversion capaci-
ties’ (i.e. the ability to convert primary goods into what actors want). In the second edition, Rawls opts for a broader 
definition: “Primary goods are now characterized as what persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and 
as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. Interpersonal comparisons for purposes of 
political justice are to be made in terms of citizens’ index of primary goods and these goods are seen as answering to 
their needs as citizens as opposed to their preferences and desires” (Rawls, 1999: xiii).
9 In the extensive literature on poverty the terms ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ are used in different ways. In the sociologi-
cal tradition, and also in the work of Sen, an absolute threshold is one where there is a link to minimal standards (in 
terms of necessities, capabilities, recourses), regardless of the level achieved by others; a relative poverty line is one 
where poverty is established relative to the position of a reference group (see e.g. Mack & Lansley, 1985: 16-20). This 
is the interpretation that is followed here. 
 In the economic tradition the distinction absolute/relative often refers to the way which a certain poverty line is 
adjusted over time (the indexation mechanism). A poverty line is then often regarded as relative if it follows the 
evolution in average prosperity, and as absolute if it does not; or, formulated more precisely: “A relative view is typi-
cally one in which the rules for identifying the poor change as (some) other economic conditions change. […]  An 
‘absolute’ notion of poverty is fixed in terms of the relevant spaces at some point in time and, from that time on fixed 
in ‘absolute’ terms in some space. If the relevant space is real income, then an absolute view implies a poverty line 
that is fixed in real terms” (Jäntti & Danziger, 2000: 313). 
10 This quotation is followed by a number of characteristic examples of the socio-historical variation in minimum 
standards (Smith, 1909 [1776]: 541-542): “A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The 
Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through 
the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the 
want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, no body can 
well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary 
of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them. 
In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of 
women, who may, without any discredit, walk about bare-footed. In France, they are necessaries neither to men 
nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden 
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shoes, and sometimes bare-footed. Under necessaries therefore, I comprehend, not only things which nature, but 
those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other 
things I call luxuries.”
11 Elaborating the argument, Sen notes that a low relative income may be a possible cause of poverty. In wealthier 
societies, one’s relative income position can determine the degree to which a person is able to realise capabilities at 
a minimum level: “Relative deprivation in the space of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in the space of capabilities. 
In a country that is generally rich, more income may be needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social 
functioning, such as ‘appearing in public without shame’. The same applies to the capability of ‘taking part in the life 
of the community’. These general social functionings impose commodity requirements that vary with what others in 
the community standardly have” (Sen, 1992: 115-116; see also Sen, 1985: 671).
12 Rawls’ definition of the two principles was discussed more extensively in chapter 2.
13 This is not to be equated with freedom of choice in general. The capabilities approach is concerned with the freedom 
to be able to decide on things that are important for the life one wishes to live; cf. Sen (1992: 63-64): “Some types of 
choosing can be valuable parts of living, giving us reason to treasure them. But there are other choices that we may 
have no great reason to value, and the obligatory requirement to face and deal with them may impose on us losses of 
time and energy which we may have good reasons to resent. Thus the expansion of some types of choices can reduce 
our ability to choose life-styles that we might treasure. So the conflict here is not really between our freedom tout 
court, on the one hand, and our advantages, on the other, but primarily between different types of freedom – the free-
dom to exercise active choice over a range of (possibly trivial) options and the freedom to lead a leisured life without 
the nuisance of constantly having to make trivial choices.”
14 This counter-argument was put forward in a different form as early as the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas. In the 
Summa Theologica he asks whether the imposition of taxes by a ruler can be described as robbery. The answer is ‘no’ 
as long as it is the collective interest that is being served and no excessive force is being used: “It is no robbery if 
princes exact from their subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, even if they 
use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is” 
(Aquinas, 1947 [1265-1274]: Secunda secundae partis, question 66, article 8).
 15 As well as the more practical point that compensating for self-caused deficits by the government may create a per-
verse incentive, making it attractive to fall back on the collective provisions and pushing up the costs to high levels; 
the moral hazard problem (see chapter 3).
16 It is possible to stretch the argument even further: a condition that is considered fair may in fact lead to unfair 
results. For example, if it is felt that an unemployed benefit claimant should be willing to perform labour, a work 
test can be attached to benefit entitlements: the unemployed person must be willing to work, and must prove this 
by applying for sufficient jobs and accepting work offered to him by the benefits agency. Is this condition still fair if 
the imposed obligation means that unemployed people are forced to perform work in which they are exploited or 
abused, or which puts them in physical danger? Something similar also applies for the imposition of sanctions on 
people who do not meet certain conditions. Suppose an unemployed person has not applied for enough jobs, and 
that their benefit is cut as a result. Is that fair if the income reduction has very negative consequences for dependent 
family members, who cannot help it if their partner or father has behaved irresponsibly? It is possible to refine the 
conditions further in order to avoid such unfair outcomes (for example: people must accept work, but not if it threat-
ens their physical or psychological health); however, this increases transaction costs and may well make the rules and 
their implementation more complex than one would wish.
17 Compare note 6 to this chapter.
18 In New Age metaphysics and its predecessors (theosophy, anthroposophy), dark-brown auras are considered to be 
indicative of egoism, cold-heartedness, dependence, illness and destruction.
19 In §2.7 it was argued that groups and communities are no collective actors; therefore they cannot act themselves, 
but only through their individual members. However, they are important as ‘carriers’ of informal rules: the values, 
norms, and conventions applying within a group or community. Groups are generally smaller than communities and 
are characterised by shared activities. Within a community, many groups may coexist. 
20 Quality of life (QoL) is another notion somewhat related to poverty. Rapley (2003) presents a detailed summary of the 
various QoL approaches (see also e.g. Noll, 2000; Berger-Schmitt & Noll, 2000). In the objective tradition, the concept 
refers to the life situation in countries or communities. This is normally measured using general indicators such as 
life expectancy or leisure time use, or on the basis of specific indicators for fields in which the government can exert 
an influence (e.g. school dropout, crime rates). There are many examples of such ‘states of society’, such as the index 
used by scp since 1974 to describe the life situation in the Netherlands (Boelhouwer & Roes, 2004; Roes, 2008: 107-
113). The recent abundance of life situation indices at the local level (regions, municipalities, neighbourhoods), in 
which notions such as liveability and safety play a central role, also fits into this approach.
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 In a second tradition, QoL relates to the life situation that people subjectively perceive. The aggregate of individual 
opinions is then considered to be indicative for the well-being of the entire population. In the unidimensional vari-
ant, the degree of well-being is established by asking people whether they are happy or satisfied with their lives (see 
e.g. Hagerty & Veenhoven, 2003). The multidimensional variant looks at satisfaction with a large number of areas of 
life (work, family, relationships, housing, health, material possessions), with the answers being summarised in a 
general index score.
 Theoretically the concept of QoL is much broader than poverty, and can refer to all kinds of areas of life. It is not so 
much concerned with deficits in terms of minimal necessities, but can also relate to an optimum or maximum. The 
relationship with the available resources remains indirect. In research practice, poverty is accordingly often treated 
as only one of the indicators for the broader QoL concept. In objective QoL indices, the poverty rate may then for 
example be included, while in multidimensional subjective QoL criteria people’s satisfaction with their financial 
situation is taken into account.
 Recently, approaches of this type have also become popular among economists; see e.g. Layard (2005). It seems as if 
these are not entirely aware of the long tradition of QoL research and the ‘social indicator movement’. Van Praag & 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2006) focus the economic QoL approach on poverty. They distinguish a number of domains 
of subjective poverty, which they measure using satisfaction questions in survey research. In addition to ‘financial 
satisfaction’ they use indicators for ‘non-monetary poverty’: people’s satisfaction with their job, their housing, their 
health, their leisure time use and their environment. These are in turn related to general satisfaction (a survey ques-
tion about satisfaction or happiness) which can be used to determine poverty lines. In this interpretation, poverty is 
interpreted so broadly that it becomes synonymous with QoL.
 In the approach advocated here, however, theoretically these are two different constructs. From a research perspec-
tive, it is more interesting to find suitable operationalisations for both concepts and to investigate their mutual 
relationships than to equate them with each other. A practical objection to regarding QoL aspects as an indicator for 
poverty is that people’s satisfaction largely depends on their individual characteristics (age, personality, biological 
characteristics, physical illness, psychological disorders). Material circumstances influence these aspects to only 
a limited extent: above a certain level of prosperity, in empirical research the correlation between objective QoL 
criteria and subjective satisfaction indicators is generally weak. Cummins (2000: 62) ascribes this to a process of 
‘cognitive homeostasis’: people have “the ability to maintain normal levels of subjective well-being in the presence 
of diverse environmental conditions. In other words, within a considerable range of objective living conditions it 
would be predicted that subjective well-being would be independent”. 
21 Poverty can also impact on the social differentiation within the community. This occurs whenever poor people are 
recognisable as a separate social category. Simmel (1971b [1908]) discussed this in some detail in his classic descrip-
tion of the poor as a ‘social type’ (alongside the stranger, the adventurer, the miser and the spendthrift). 
22 This passage on social exclusion is taken in part from Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2007); see also Jehoel-Gijsbers 
(2004).
 23 Several other distinctions are mentioned in the literature as well (cf. Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman, 2007). Sometimes 
poverty is conceived as something static (a given income situation), while social exclusion is regarded as dynamic (a 
process of lagging behind and a lack of future prospects). However, poverty may very well be analysed in a dynamic 
sense, as a process of impoverishment (Goodin et al., 1999; Jäntti & Danziger, 2000; Vrooman & Hoff, 2004). It also 
happens that poverty is considered as a micro-phenomenon (a lack of resources on the individual or household 
level), whereas social exclusion would derive from a lack of ‘community resources’, including an inadequate social 
infrastructure. The latter contextual aspect, however, can in principle also be included in multi-level analyses which 
relate poverty to various socio-cultural and structural conditions. 
24 In this conceptualisation social exclusion is not a trait of certain communities, or, as in the French tradition, a 
process taking place in society at large. Jehoel-Gijsbers (2004: 33-39) and Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2007) argue 
that such meso- and microlevel aspects better be regarded as context variables. These influence both the process of 
becoming socially excluded, and the state of social exclusion at the individual level.
25 Cultural non-integration, however, did not empirically scale in the same direction as the three other dimensions, 
and was therefore omitted from the general index; see also Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2007).
26 In the European Values Study 1999, for example, respondents were asked whether a just society should guarantee that 
all citizens were assured that their basic needs would be met. In many European countries approximately 90% of the 
respondents concurred with this statement. Findings from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey point in the same direction 
for the elderly; 90-97% of respondents felt that every elderly citizen should have access to a guaranteed minimum 
pension.
 Interesting results have also been obtained in experimental philosophy, a field which supplements traditional philo-
sophical methods of contemplation and thought experiments with actual or quasi-experiments (cf. Knobe & Nichols, 
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2008). Thus, Frohlich et al. (1987) and Michelbach et al. (2003) investigated whether people actually adopt Rawlsian 
principles of distributive justice if they participate in experiments which simulate the ‘original position’ and the ‘veil 
of ignorance’. The former authors conclude that the maximin strategy is not the most preferred one; people choose 
“what Rawls has called an ‘intuitionistic’ principle which attempts to take into account not only the position of the 
worst-off individual but the potential expected gain for the rest of society. The overwhelmingly preferred principle is 
maximizing the average income with a floor constraint” (Frohlich et al., 1987: 1). According to Michelbach et al. (2003: 
523) the maximin principle is not widely upheld either: “a considerable minority prioritize [competing allocation 
principles] consistent with a Rawlsian maximin strategy”. Both these experiments were conducted among groups of 
students, so it is not clear to what extent the results are representative of the views held by the general public. 
27 It emerged from the International Social Survey Programme (issp) that the populations of the countries studied here 
attach great importance to protecting the elderly. In many countries, over 90% of respondents feel that the govern-
ment should guarantee this group a decent standard of living. In two liberal welfare states, the usa and Australia, the 
figure is fractionally lower (87-91%), but here too there is massive support for government responsibility with regard 
to the living conditions of the elderly. The Eurobarometer 2001 survey suggests that the same applies for children: 80% 
or more believe that this group, too, should be assured of a decent standard of living. The picture is more differenti-
ated when it comes to the unemployed: in most of the European countries studied here, 80-93% of respondents in the 
issp believe that the government should offer this group a decent standard of living; however, the figure is consider-
ably lower in Australia and Canada (around 65%) and the us (48%).
28 Empirical research into the support for the conditioning of rights is scarce. To the extent that it is available, the 
phrasing of survey questions seems to influence the degree of support considerably. For example, both in the Euro-
barometer (2001) and in the European Values Study (1999), respondents were asked whether unemployed people should 
have to accept jobs they were offered. In the first case the condition was imposed that the unemployed should have 
to accept work, even if this was beneath their educational qualifications; in the second case the sanction was men-
tioned that an unemployed person would lose their benefit entirely if they refused work. It is little surprise that the 
first formulation received more support in the countries studied here (two-thirds to over three-quarters of respond-
ents) than the second (37-64%). 
 Perhaps telling is the fact that little support was found in Dutch research for income transfers to which no conditions at 
all are attached. In 2004 only 8% of the Dutch were in favour of such an unconditioned partial basic income (Vrooman 
et al., 2004: 336-338, 356). Here again, however, the phrasing plays a key role. A much less specific item in the Euro-
barometer 2001 generated much more support; 68% of the Dutch respondents agreed with the general statement that 
“the government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income”. Set against the outcomes of the national 
survey with detailed questions about the basic income, this is improbably high. It may be that it was made insuf-
ficiently clear to the respondents in the Eurobarometer precisely what the basic income comprises (e.g. the absence of 
a duty to apply for jobs), and that they confused it with the existing social safety net in social assistance and old-age 
pension systems. According to the periodic scp study Cultural Changes in the Netherlands, the latter arrangements often 
receive a great deal of support (see for instance Roes, 2008: 115-116).
29 Ultimately, whether an operational criterion is a good translation of a theoretical concept cannot be established 
unambiguously: these are epistemic correlations which cannot be determined objectively. It can however be stipu-
lated that any observable criterion should be a plausible and logical conversion of the intended theoretical concept, 
given the current status of the scientific debate. For this discussion, see e.g. Dessens & Jansen (1987).
30 Many empirical studies of ‘the perception of poverty’ do not focus on what meaning people attribute to the concept, 
but rather on the perceived causes of poverty among the population. Such ‘lay attributions of poverty’ may consist 
of laziness, misfortune, social injustice, government policy, the state of the economy, modernisation of society, etc. 
(see Van Oorschot & Halman, 2000; Gallie & Paugam, 2002; Larsen, 2006; Lepianka, 2007).
31 Over 80% of the Australian respondents felt that poverty is best described by statements such as “Not having enough 
to buy basics like food, housing or clothing”, “Having to struggle to survive each and every day” and “Not having 
enough money to make ends meet”. Only a minority supported a definition in terms of “Not having enough to be 
able to live decently”, “Not having enough to buy what most others take for granted”, “Having a lot less than everyone 
else” and “Not being able to afford any of the good things in life”.
32 A fairly large residual group see poverty mainly as an imbalance between income and expenditure. This ‘difficulty 
in making ends meet’ category (13%) associates poverty with things such as “being short of money at the end of the 
month”. Strictly speaking, such a criterion would imply that very wealthy households are also to be regarded as poor 
if they spend too much. 
 As a corollary to this, there is also a group who link poverty to specific financial problems, such as high fixed costs, 
problematic debts and payment arrears (2%).
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 There were also quite a number of respondents who did not give a personal opinion of what they understand by pov-
erty, but referred to official criteria. The largest section of this group (9%) referred to policy norms and to groups that 
are identified using statutory criteria: people with an income below the minimum wage, single mothers on social 
security benefit, etc., are poor. A small group (1%) measure poverty using research-based definitions, such as those in 
the Dutch Poverty Monitor (Vrooman et al., 2007a). 
 There are only a small number of ‘poverty deniers’: just 2% of respondents believe that genuine poverty does not exist 
in the Netherlands, but is a phenomenon only to be found in distant countries (Africa is often cited as an example). A 
limited group (6%) were unable or unwilling to answer the survey question.
33 This classification is concerned with the operational poverty criteria with a scientific basis. It ignores policy-based or 
‘official’ poverty lines, such as the threshold based on 105% of minimum benefits which sometimes is used in Dutch 
poverty research (see for a critical discussion: Vrooman & Snel, 1999).
34 It was pointed out earlier that in the economic literature on poverty the terms ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ sometimes 
refer to the method of indexation of the poverty line (whether or not it is corrected for price inflation or the evolution 
of wealth).
35 Cf. Sen (1981: 26-28): “In identifying the poor for a given set of ‘basic needs’ it is possible to use at least two alternative 
methods. One is simply to check the set of people whose actual consumption baskets happen to leave some basic need 
unsatisfied. This we may call the ‘direct method’, and it does not involve the use of any income-notion, in particular 
not that of a poverty-line income. In contrast, in what may be called the ‘income method’, the first step is to calculate 
the minimum income p at which all the specified minimum needs are satisfied. The next step is to identify those 
whose actual income fall below that poverty line […] The ‘direct method’ and the ‘income method’ are not, in fact, two 
alternative ways of measuring poverty, but represent two alternative conceptions of poverty. The direct method identi-
fies those whose actual consumption fails to meet the accepted conventions of minimum needs, while the income 
method is after spotting those who do not have the ability to meet these needs within the behavioural constraints 
typical in that community. Both concepts are of some interest on their own in diagnosing poverty in a community, 
and while the latter is a bit more remote in being dependent on the existence of some typical behaviour pattern in the 
community, it is also a bit more refined in going beyond the observed choices into the notion of ability”.
36 Poverty lines based on consumption or possession are especially useful when the information on the available 
resources cannot be measured reliably (e.g. because people refuse on a large scale to reveal their income and assets), 
where there is a large informal economy, a high level of home production, or extensive material support from the 
social network. In these circumstances, such criteria may be the most suitable proxy indicator for poverty.
37 The median income is the amount whereby one half of the population has a higher income and the other half a lower 
income. This criterion is more suitable than the average, since it is less susceptible to outliers (very high or very low 
incomes).  
38 A variant of this approach, which is not often used in research, is based not only on the possession of such goods, 
but also on the ability to replace them if they are irreparably damaged. In this approach, households which possess a 
washing machine, television, etc., but would not be able to replace it are poor.
39 Townsend (1979: 273) also developed a ‘deprivation standard in poverty’, which derived from his relative depriva-
tion index. This criterion classifies people as poor if their income is below the level at which deprivation begins to 
increase disproportionately. At the end of the 1960s, more than a quarter of the British population were identified as 
poor in this way.
40 Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004: 295) illustrate this point by assuming that disposable income is distributed in a 
lognormal way. This is the case when the logarithms of the incomes are normally distributed. The original incomes 
do not then have the characteristic ‘bell shape’ of the normal distribution, but are skewed: a relatively large group 
of people with lower incomes, and a long tail with decreasing frequencies as income rises. Based on this rather 
common assumption, they show that the poverty rate depends exclusively on the standard deviation, which can be 
regarded as a measure for income inequality. In practice, incomes are not distributed in a precisely lognormal way; 
for example, there may be more peaks in the lower segment due to the various social assistance norms for differ-
ent types of households. Often, however, the lognormal distribution provides a good approximation of the actual 
income distribution; for the Netherlands, see e.g. Pommer et al. (2003: 51). Neal & Rosen (2000) discuss the theoreti-
cal principles underlying the “characteristic skew of earnings distributions”, and point out that “observed income 
distributions tend to have tails that are thicker and longer than the lognormal”, and that the Pareto distribution 
often fits better for the higher incomes.
41 If average income is taken as a reference point instead of median income, this focus problem is greater. In that case 
the poverty line also moves upwards when the incomes of rich people rise in real terms while those at the lower end 
of the income distribution remain constant. Jännti & Danziger (2000: 327) rightly observe that “it does not seem 
reasonable to let an increase in Queen Elizabeth’s income raise the poverty line and our assessment of the extent of 
poverty in the uk”.
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42 In Ireland, gdp per head of the population rose by 61% between 1987 and 1997, while inflation during that period 
stood at 29%. Households at the lower end of the income distribution benefited rather less from economic growth 
than the higher income groups. The consequence was that relative poverty based on the 60%-norm increased - from 
29% to 36% -, despite the substantial income gains for the bottom groups (cf. Layte et al., 2000). 
 In addition, there is a phasing problem with the relative income threshold. It is not necessarily the case that as soon 
as the median income rises, the poverty line should increase proportionally (and it is probably even less obvious that 
the poverty line should fall immediately when median income declines).
43 This occurs if there are no observations between 60-100% of median income. Empirically, this rarely occurs. How-
ever, it can be tempting for policymakers when using this criterion to keep the median incomes as low as possible 
and to fix the guaranteed minimum income by law at 61% of the median. This will limit the observed relative poverty 
rate and minimise social assistance expenditure. Of course, such an approach does not rule out the possibility that 
a large group of people with an income above the relative threshold lack the means to meet the expenses that are 
unavoidable within their community. 
44 A possible alternative is to base the threshold on 60% of the median income across all eu member states. While this 
has the obvious advantage that poverty rates are measured by the same yardstick in all countries, it does not solve 
some of the other problems. Such a relative eu-wide poverty line is also ‘fetishistic’, because no link is made to the 
living standard people can actually attain with 60% of the median eu income. In the richest countries the threshold 
amount is likely to be low, thus leading to low poverty rates; but it may be that the amount is not sufficient to pay all 
the indispensable costs for a considerable part of the population. By contrast, in the less prosperous member states 
60% of median eu income may imply a level which the middle classes find hard to attain, hence a very high poverty 
rate; but such a threshold could be well above the level that is actually needed for unavoidable expenses in these 
countries. 
 A further complication is that the poverty rate in each member state becomes dependent on prosperity growth else-
where. If the income distribution remains constant in all countries, but Germany experiences a sharper increase in 
median income than the other eu member states, poverty rates in the latter will rise (this is exacerbated by Germany’s 
large share in the total eu population). And if Turkey were to join the eu, the median income across member states 
would decline, leading to decreasing poverty rates.
45 For most of these 11 countries, all six measurement points in the echp or lis were available, with the exception of 
Denmark and Belgium (no observations in the early 1980s) and Canada (no observation after 2000).
46 The researcher can attempt to resolve this by refining the questionnaire: a different formulation of the items (a hot 
meal rather than meat every other day), follow-up questions which assess whether people do not have things or are 
unable to perform certain activities as a result of their financial deficits. It cannot however be taken for granted 
that this will produce a more reliable picture; e.g., it may be that respondents who cannot afford certain items will 
state they prefer to do without, in order to hide their poverty. And however meticulous, honest and competent the 
researcher may be, discretionary elements will always remain in this approach.
47 This problem of establishing the threshold value also occurs when the index is not determined as a sum score of the 
individual items, but via factor analysis or an optimal scaling technique. A choice can then be made for a statistical 
criterion, e.g. by classing all respondents with a factor score with one standard deviation from the average as poor. 
Whilst such a limit may appear more sophisticated, it is still arbitrary. Only when it is demonstrated that people 
below that specific threshold value experience more material hardship (home evictions, etc.), feel poor en masse, etc., 
does it acquire any substantive meaning.
48 The ‘get along-question’ reads as follows: “What is the smallest amount of money a family of four (husband, wife, and 
two children) needs each week to get along in this community”?
49 The central idea with the subjective poverty line is that the answers to the miq correlate with actual income levels and 
household size: the greater these are, the higher the amount that respondents say they need. Goedhart et al. (1977: 
514) assume that changes in income levels tend to spark off a process of adaptation. If someone has a relatively high 
income which falls, they will adjust downwards their norm for the required minimum in the miq as they become 
accustomed to the lower income. The reverse applies for someone with a lower income whose earnings increase: 
they begin seeing the newly attained standard of living as normal, and this will be reflected in a higher amount in 
response to the miq. There is however one point where this ‘misperception’ does not occur, and that indicates where 
the poverty line lies. This point can be interpreted as the level at which people generally feel that they are not able to 
make ends meet. Technically, this is estimated using the regression formula:
log Ymin = a0 + a1 log Y + a2 log Fs
 where Ymin is the answer to the miq, Y is the actual income and Fs is the size of the household. The amounts cited in 
response to the miq and the actual income are logarithmically transformed to obtain a linear relationship. By equat-
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ing Ymin and Y, poverty lines are obtained for different household types (see e.g. Van den Bosch, 2001: 90-91). In a 
more elaborate variant, the spl is calculated by also taking into account the average income and household composi-
tion in a reference group (Kapteyn et al., 1988; Van den Bosch, 2001).
50 The most frequently used version of the Income Evaluation Question is:
 Please try to indicate what you consider to be an appropriate amount of money for each of the following cases. 
Under my (our) conditions I would call an after-tax income per week/month/year (please encircle the appropriate 
period) of:
 about … very bad
 about … bad
 about … insufficient
 about … sufficient
 about … good
 about … very good
 These response categories are numerically mapped onto a scale ranging from 0 (‘very bad’) to 1 (‘very good’). In the 
numerical transformation, the verbal qualifications are regarded as the midpoints of six intervals (0 - 1/6, 1/6 - 2/6, 
etc.). ‘Bad’ thus corresponds with 0.250, ‘insufficient’ with 0.417, and ‘sufficient’ with 0.583 (see Van den Bosch, 2001: 
93-98). A welfare level of 0.4 (between ‘bad’ and ‘insufficient’) or 0.5 (just below ‘sufficient’) is often regarded as 
indicative for a situation of poverty. The Leyden Poverty Line (lpl), like the spl, is established by estimating a regres-
sion equation across all respondents, whereby the amounts corresponding to various welfare levels are related to the 
household composition and the actual income level.
51 There are two main variants of the Income Satisfaction Question. The first runs “With your current household 
income, how can you make ends meet?” and generally offers response categories ranging from ‘very easy’ to ‘very 
difficult’. The second formulation is more general: “How do you feel about your standard of living/income?” and is 
generally evaluated on a 5 or 7-point scale (ranging from ‘delighted’ to ‘terrible’).
52 The Minimum Spending Question reads “In your opinion, how much would you have to spend each month (/year) in 
order to provide the basic necessities for your family? By basic necessities I mean barely adequate food, shelter, cloth-
ing and other essential items required for daily living”. Another option is not to compare the poverty line obtained 
in this way against the actual outlays, but to set it against the income of the respondents. This produces a ‘subjective 
budget method’ which falls into the same category as the Subjective Poverty Line (spl) and the Leyden Poverty Line 
(lpl). This approach is not ideal, however, because people can call on other sources to fund expenditure (for example, 
people may have put money aside in advance to cover school and tuition fees for their children). Garner & Short (2005: 
6) accordingly conclude that, “comparing expenditure outlays is likely the appropriate resource measure to compare 
to a msq threshold”. 
53 As stated, when using the spl and lpl methods, a correction is sometimes applied for reference group effects, for 
example by level of education. Although this introduces ‘relative’ elements into the assessment of poverty, that 
is different from deriving the threshold in principle from the subjectively required income deficit. The spl and lpl 
indicate the absolute income level at which people have difficulty making ends meet or which they qualify as bad or 
insufficient; and the miq and ieq do not ask about the income deficit of this group compared to others.
54 With the income ruler method, survey respondents are asked to estimate the incomes of a number of occupational 
groups and categories of benefit recipients, and then to indicate how high they believe those incomes should be. A 
similar question was included in several waves of the International Social Survey Programme (issp); it was used in 
§4.3 for the analysis of informal social security rules. The ratio between the average desirable income of the group 
with the lowest preferred level (usually social assistance benefit recipients) and that of a common occupation, such 
as a policeman or a self-employed plumber, can be used to define a means-based subjective-relative poverty line. For 
the Netherlands in the 1980s, Szirmai (1986: 107) arrived at a ratio of 0.40-0.46%, while according to Hermkens & Van 
Wijngaarden (1987: 102) the figure was 0.45-0.49%. To date, however, such a method has not been used to determine 
the percentage of poor people.
55 This is because in prosperous societies there is usually a strong correlation between the percentage of people who 
consider a good or service indispensable and the rates of possession and consumption. There are only a few excep-
tions to this rule. The percentage of people who are able to save is often substantially lower than the share who 
consider this necessary. The reverse occurs with the items “new, not second hand clothes” and “a roast meat joint or 
its equivalent once a week”: the share of people who consider this necessary is much lower than the percentage who 
actually have it (Van den Bosch, 2001: 50-51, 58).
56 Apart from the issue of its validity, the Minimum Spending Question suffers from similar reliability problems as 
income-based survey methods. However, cognitive psychological research has shown that people are able to indicate 
fairly accurately which expenses are necessary for them, including situations where they have to economise. In this 
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sense, this type of method may be somewhat more reliable than subjective methods based on income assessments 
(Stinson, 1997, 1998). The strict nature of the question also means that the poverty rate measured via the msq is gen-
erally lower than via the miq. 
57 Mack & Lansley’s method based on consensual necessities has also been applied in a number of other countries; 
Van den Bosch (2001: 49-86) discusses studies from Denmark, Ireland and Belgium. The obvious advantage of this 
approach is that it seeks its basis in the perception of poverty among the population, even though the input (the list 
of goods and services that respondents have to assess) is provided by experts. Moreover, in all countries studied the 
same goods consistently turn out to be considered necessary by a majority, and there are no large ‘vertical’ differ-
ences between social groups in the assessment of the basic necessities: it is not the case that poor and rich people, 
taxpayers and benefit claimants have a completely different view of necessities – something which would make it 
difficult to construct a general criterion for measuring poverty using this method.
 Yet here again operationalisation problems arise. In the first place, there is no clear empirical dividing line between 
goods that are indispensable and those that can be done without. Mack & Lansley posited a threshold where an item 
was defined as a consensual necessity if at least 50% of the respondents regarded it as indispensable. This ‘demo-
cratic’ threshold appears to be on the low side, however: in order to be able to speak of a consensus, more is probably 
required than a simple numerical majority. However, if a stricter threshold is taken (e.g. 85%), few consensual neces-
sities remain, while with a lower threshold (15%) few items are considered superfluous. For the majority of the items, 
therefore, it is not possible to speak of an evident consensus.
 Furthermore, even while there is no great variation between social strata, a number of ‘horizontal’ differences, 
between demographic groups, do occur. In most studies the evaluation of necessities varies between age groups 
and household types. This makes it difficult to construct a universally applicable consensual standard. Moreover, 
the correlations between the various necessities are not high: they do not form a clear and reliable scale. Van den 
Bosch (2001) does not consider the latter a problem; in his view no underlying dimension ‘degree of indispensabil-
ity’ is assumed on which respondents must score consistently. Yet his final conclusion is negative: “there is not a 
well-defined public consensus on the minimum standard of living. The reason is not so much that there are strong 
disagreements about this matter, but rather that individuals are apparently uncertain about the necessity of a range 
of items for modern living. Secondly, depending on a person’s circumstances and characteristics, perceptions of 
necessities differ, indicating that the minimum standard of living is composed of different items for different groups 
in society” (Van den Bosch, 2001: 83). These reliability issues make the method ill-suited for measuring poverty.
58 In principle, the direct measurement of an informed consensus makes the consensual budget method an inter-
esting approach. Through the explication of meanings and the subsequent discussion, panel members agree on a 
shared conceptualisation of poverty and translate this into a joint operational poverty line. There are however also a 
number of disadvantages, as a result of which consensual budget standards have to date been used to only a limited 
extent. As with expert budget standards, this approach is very labour-intensive, and it is therefore difficult with this 
method, too, to develop and update the standard for a large number of different household types. In addition, the 
‘citizen’s panel’ should reflect the assessment of a wide cross-section of the population and contain more than just a 
small group of experts as in the traditional budget approach. But there are limits to this: the consensual method can 
never be based on as many observations as a traditional representative survey. This can cause the budget to become 
dependent on chance characteristics of the selected panel members – not only in terms of their moral opinions and 
cognitive frames, but also in terms of differences between the participants as regards their financial knowledge, 
budgeting skills and their ability to persuade others of their opinion. Finally, it is also possible that the interaction 
does not lead to a shared consensus (though it has to be said that in the studies carried out using this method to 
date that consensus has been fairly strong). In that case, it may be that there is no unanimity on the definition of 
poverty in the population at large, as already suggested by Walker (1987: 222): “failure to reach a consensus among a 
relatively small number of people must seriously call into question the likelihood of achieving consensus among the 
many”. However, a lack of consensus in the citizen’s panel may also be due to its coincidental composition, or rather 
accidental aspects of the interaction process. Because of these objections, it is questionable whether the consensual 
budget method in itself can generate a reliable poverty line, though at the very least it is an interesting supplemen-
tary indicator which deserves wider testing.
59 Minkman & Van Praag (1997) posit that the answers to the ieq are ‘calibrated’, whereas those to the miq are not. They 
suppose that the precision in determining the poverty threshold is increased, because the respondents have to enter 
amounts for a number of hierarchically arranged verbal qualifications. In practice, however, it is found that pairs 
such as ‘good/bad’ and ‘sufficient/insufficient’ are not placed on a single dimension by everyone: “For some, these 
two scales ask very different questions: ‘good/bad’ is seen as a judgment about the quality of life, and ‘sufficient/
insufficient’ as a judgment about what is absolutely necessary for survival. A ‘very bad’ income might yet be ‘sufficient 
for survival’ (Garner et al., 1998: 45).
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60 Garner et al. (1998: 45) observe the following in this connection: “Original dollar estimates were often much too low, 
and some respondents had real trouble figuring out what would be sufficient for survival, especially if they never had 
experienced hardship. Some proved totally unable to generate dollar amounts, and others did so only in very gross 
terms, often in increments of $1,000. The process of determining expenses is not always dependent upon the income 
level or family structure of the respondent, but may hinge upon knowledge of the family’s finances. If the respond-
ent happened to be the designated bill payer in a household, lists of expenses and dollar estimates were likely to be 
different from those of family members who did not pay bills. In one family, for instance, the bill payer’s estimate of 
monthly expenses was twice that of the spouse who did not pay the bills”.
61 Van den Bosch (2001: 297-298) points out that in international comparative research generally various organisations 
are responsible for the fieldwork for surveys incorporating the miq and the ieq. This leads to differences in ques-
tionnaire design and interview procedures and makes it difficult to ensure that the phrasing of the questions in 
the surveys is identical. The most important factor, however, are the language and cultural differences: “Assuming 
that ‘making ends meet’, ‘de eindjes aan elkaar knopen’ (Dutch) and ‘joindre les deux bouts’ (French) have the same 
meaning in standard-of-living terms seems rather heroic. Of course, they will mean roughly the same thing in all 
countries. The question is at which point roughly becomes too rough. The finding that in 1985 the spl in The Nether-
lands was almost 20 percent below the Belgian spl, even though median disposable household income in the Neth-
erlands was higher, producing a 16 percent point difference in low income rates, suggests that that point sometimes 
is exceeded”. For the spl, this author reports an increase in the Italian poverty rate from 9% to 33% between 1979 and 
1987, whereas in Belgium the poverty rate rose from 4% to 25% in the period 1979-1985. Based on the lpl, the poverty 
rate in the Netherlands increased from 16% in 1979 to 29% in 1985 and 36% in 1986, which “would seem to indicate 
an ongoing and accelerating social disaster […] or a very strong rise in aspiration levels” (cf. Van den Bosch, 2001: 
104, 106). 
62 The lpl generally produces higher poverty rates than the spl. Van den Bosch (2001: 157-158) reports on ten studies in 
which the spl is compared with the lpl at a welfare level of 0.4 (cf. note 50 to this chapter). In eight cases, the poverty 
rate according to the spl is lower (by more than 2% on average). Comparison with the lpl at a welfare level of 0.5, 
which logically detects more poverty, is possible for 12 countries. With two exceptions, the poverty rate according to 
the spl is then lower than according to the lpl (by an average of 9%).
63 Booth (1902 [1889]) divided the population of London into eight groups based on the level and the regularity of their 
income, their labour market position, their living circumstances and their behaviour. He regarded the lowest four 
classes (according to his estimate 31% of the population) as poor, by which he meant that people were living “under a 
struggle to obtain the necessities of life and make both ends meet” or “in a state of chronic want” (Booth, 1902 [1889]: 
33-62).
 Seebohm Rowntree (1901: 86-118) defined a line for ‘primary poverty’ based on the necessary outlays for food, hous-
ing, clothing, lighting, fuel and other “minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency”. His 
threshold for ‘secondary poverty’ referred to people who in principle had sufficient income to realise the physical 
efficiency that was desirable for the factory workers of York, “were it not that some portion of it was absorbed by other 
expenditure, either useful or wasteful”. Using this method – and based on one of the first ever large-scale empiri-
cal surveys (more than 11,000 households) – Seebohm Rowntree estimated that 28% of the population of York were 
poor, and that roughly a third of these people were living below the primary poverty line. He stressed that this crite-
rion referred to a very frugal way of life, with no scope whatsoever for discretionary expenditure: “And let us clearly 
understand what ‘merely physical efficiency’ means.  A family living upon the scale allowed for in this estimate must 
never spend a penny on railway fare or omnibus.  They must never go into the country unless they walk.  They must 
never purchase a halfpenny newspaper or spend a penny to buy a ticket for a popular concert.  They must write no 
letters to absent children, for they cannot afford to pay the postage.  They must never contribute anything to their 
church or chapel, or give any help to a neighbour which costs them money.  They cannot save, nor can they join sick 
club or Trade Union, because they cannot pay the necessary subscriptions. The children must have no pocket money 
for dolls, marbles or sweets.  The father must smoke no tobacco, and must drink no beer. The mother must never buy 
any pretty clothes for herself or for her children, the character of the family wardrobe as for the family diet being 
governed by the regulation, ‘Nothing must be bought but that which is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of 
physical health, and what is bought must be of the plainest and most economical description’. Should a child fall ill, 
it must be attended by the parish doctor; should it die, it must be buried by the parish. Finally, the wage-earner must 
never be absent from his work for a single day. If any of these conditions are broken, the extra expenditure involved is 
met, and can only be met, by limiting the diet; or, in other words, by sacrificing physical efficiency” (Seebown Rowntree, 
1901: 133-134).
64 Doyal & Gough (1991) developed a theory of universal human needs they considered to be objective. They posit that 
each actor has two universal basic needs: ‘physical health’ and ‘personal autonomy’. This follows from their neo-
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Kantian argumentation that individuals can only act (and in this sense ‘exist’) if they are physically and mentally 
capable of doing so. The former means that their physical survival must be guaranteed, the latter that people must 
have a degree of freedom to make choices: “since physical survival and personal autonomy are the preconditions for 
any individual action in any culture, they constitute the most basic human needs – those which must be satisfied to 
some degree before actors can effectively participate in their form of life to achieve any other valued goals” (Doyal & 
Gough, 1991: 54). In addition, they identify 11 ‘intermediate needs’, which the actor must satisfy at at least a minimal 
level in order to meet the two basic needs. The requirements for physical health are: adequate nutritional food and 
water; adequate protective housing; a non-hazardous work environment; a non-hazardous physical environment; 
and appropriate health care. And to ensure personal autonomy, six intermediate needs must be satisfied: security 
in childhood; significant primary relationships; physical security; economic security; safe birth control and child-
bearing; and basic education. Doyal & Gough (1991: 210-212) regard poverty as an aspect of economic security. This 
would seem to be too narrow an interpretation: things such as enough food, suitable housing and the ability to 
afford basic healthcare and educational opportunities for children are things that prosperous societies will read-
ily want to include in a definition of poverty. If actors really have to meet all these intermediate needs to a certain 
degree, it would be necessary to include the monetarisable part in the poverty line. There is then a clear risk that this 
will be on the high side.
65 According to Sarlo (2001: 9-10), the non-sustainable subsistence level refers to a living standard “which is unhealthy and 
will compromise long-term physical well-being. It will lead to illness and an early death. Non-sustainable subsist-
ence implies having food that is just enough to keep one alive (for the time being), likely obtained from charitable 
sources (e.g. food bank or soup kitchen), and, if purchased, the least expensive foods at grocery stores (bread, rice, 
potatoes and reduced items). Shelter is likely to be inadequate, unhealthy, or non-existent. People who are intermit-
tently or usually homeless would be in this category. Clothing and any other possessions are likely to be very limited, 
donated from charitable sources, and often inadequate for wide changes in weather”. Sarlo estimates that a single 
Canadian in 2000 needed approximately cad 2,000-4,000 per year for this (or the equivalent in donated goods). 
 At the sustainable subsistence level people can “survive day-to-day in a way that does not compromise their long-term 
physical health. The food would be nutritious and balanced and fulfil all requirements of healthy eating. Shelter may 
be Spartan, crowded, and inexpensive but not unhealthy. It may be a room in a house or in an institution or it may be 
accommodation shared with two or more people. Clothing, whether obtained from charitable sources or bough at a 
store, is just adequate to meet seasonal requirements”. Some migrants can be placed in this group (new arrivals and 
illegal immigrants), but also people living in certain institutions (prisons and care homes, depending on their living 
circumstances) and members of religious orders who have taken a vow of poverty. It is estimated that this requires an 
amount of cad 5,000-6,000 for a single person.
 Sarlo regards the basic needs level as the central criterion for measuring poverty. This living standard “includes food 
providing a nutritious diet that satisfies all norms of energy, balance and palatability and that is purchased in grocer-
ies stores using no savings strategies; shelter that consists of apartment accommodation that is not subsidized and 
is appropriate in size for the family and includes all the usual furnishings and appliances; clothing purchased new at 
popular department stores; a telephone with a local telephone service; all necessary household supplies; household 
insurance; laundry requirements; public transportation; personal care; any out-of-pocket health care needs; and a 
small amount for school supplies and correspondence”. Sarlo estimates the budget required by a single person at cad 
8,900 per year.
 At the comfort level, items are also included which are not necessary at the minimum level but which are desirable. They 
include “a range of items that many consider to be amenities: recreation expenditures, long-distance telephone, 
ability to give gifts, travel, tobacco and alcohol, cable television, meals in restaurants, and expenses for pets”. To 
achieve this level, a single person in 2000 needed cad 12,000-16,000. 
66 The prescriptive method discussed here needs to be distinguished from the descriptive method. The latter merely 
aims to describe the actual patterns of expenditure of different household types, of which many national statis-
tics offices regularly publish summaries (based on household expenditure survey data). In the prescriptive method, 
empirical differences in expenditure patterns are taken into account, but it is ultimately the researcher who deter-
mines the budget standard. This normative character was one of the reasons for the American Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics to stop compiling prescriptive budgets at the end of the 1980s, bringing to an end a time series that began in 
1908/1909 (Johnson et al., 2001).
67 With poverty lines based on food ratios, the necessities are interpreted very narrowly: as long as the proportion of 
food remains constant, the poverty rate does not change, even if things such as rent or electricity prices rise sharply. 
In addition, preferences may distort the picture with this criterion: if people with a high income eat in expensive 
restaurants every day, they may be classed among the poor on the grounds of their high food ratio. The food ratio 
criterion can also prove to be unstable over time if large price changes occur (failed harvests, price falls due to the 
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elimination of import duties). Moreover, no allowance is made for changes in living standards. If the level of prosper-
ity rises, the food ratio will fall, but the norm for what is the minimum necessary is also likely to increase. The food 
ratios threshold then leads to an overestimation of the decline in poverty because it takes no account of the changing 
nature of the necessities.
 If the fixed costs ratio is taken as a basis, diseconomies of scale are a distorting factor. Single persons generally have 
high fixed costs because they cannot share them, and according to this criterion a comparatively large share of this 
group tends to be classed as poor. Here again, preferences can be problematic: if people on higher incomes voluntar-
ily choose to live in expensive housing, their fixed costs ratio rises and they may end up below the poverty line. 
 A similar complication arises with the total expenses approach: households with very high incomes are regarded as 
poor in this approach as soon as they spend more than they earn. Moreover, the poverty rate depends on the financial 
behaviour of those concerned; if two people have the same means, but one of them does not mind being overdrawn 
while the other does everything in their power to ensure that they do not get into debt, the first person will be classed 
as poor while the second will not. This implies that a deteriorating payment morality will lead to an increase in the 
observed poverty using this criterion. Finally, dissaving need not always be an indication of poverty. There are for 
example pensioners who deliberately address the private assets they have built up. It appears far-fetched to regard 
such ‘private dissavers’ as poor, but not people who have built up assets via a pension fund and receive periodic pay-
ments from it.
 This is not to say that the information provided by food ratios, fixed costs and total expenditure is not relevant, but 
only that these are not very suitable criteria for measuring poverty. Even so, if the aim is to map out the degree of pov-
erty, it is for example useful to investigate when debts become precarious, and which types of debt are considered the 
most problematic from the perspective of poverty. In the Dutch Poverty Monitor (Vrooman & Hoff, 2004; Vrooman et 
al., 2007a) this is used as a supplementary indicator. Following the reasoning of Jehoel-Gijsbers (2005), the ‘survival 
debts’ (made in order to buy indispensable items) probably imply a greater underlying poverty problem than ‘adapta-
tion debts’ (which occur when people experience a sudden income deterioration, e.g. because they lose their job or 
as a result of divorce), ‘overspending debts’ (due to the purchase of luxuries people cannot afford) or debts ensuing 
from ‘handicapping tastes’ (such as drug addiction). 
68 Two types of budget are commonly used at international level. The first focuses on essential necessities, and is 
referred to as a ‘low cost’ or ‘basic needs’ budget. The second type is higher, but is still below the level at which public 
opinion regards people as living ‘in luxury’. This is described using terms such as ‘modest but adequate’ or ‘some 
comfort’. In 1909, the us Bureau of Labor Statistics introduced two (descriptive) budget standards based on a study of 
the living conditions of cotton-mill workers, which they named ‘a minimum standard of bare essentials’ and ‘a fair 
standard of living’. The same Bureau published a ‘modest but adequate’ budget standard for an urban working family 
in 1947 (Johnson et al., 2001). More recent examples include the ‘low cost but acceptable’ and ‘modest but adequate’ 
budgets that are compiled on a regular basis by the Family Budget Unit of the University of York for various types of 
families (see http:// www.york.ac.uk/res/fbu/publications.htm). Sarlo (2001) notes the ‘basic needs poverty line’ that 
has been applied in Canada. In Australia, the Social Policy Research Centre developed both types of budget. Here, 
the ‘low-cost budget standard’ has been described as “a level of living which may mean frugal and careful manage-
ment of resources but would still allow social and economic participation consistent with community standards 
and enable the individual to fulfil community expectations in the workplace, at home and in the community, cor-
responding to a standard of living which is achievable at about one-half of the median standard”. The ‘modest but 
adequate budget standard’ is fairly high in this study, being defined as “one which affords full opportunity to partici-
pate in contemporary Australian society and the basic options it offers … lying between the standards of survival and 
decency and those of luxury as these are commonly understood … (falling) somewhere around the median standard 
of living experienced within the Australian community as a whole” (Saunders et al., 1998: 438). The Australian study 
also refers to budget approaches in the Scandinavian countries, Germany, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Malaysia. 
Often these are descriptive, and they are not always used for assessing poverty. In the Netherlands, the National 
Institute for Budgetary Information compiles similar budgets (Nibud, 2008); and for Belgium, see for instance Van 
den Bosch (1997). 
69 Soede (2006: 65-71) also provides the reference budgets for couples with and without children. Since the implicit 
equivalence scales in the Nibud method are not the same as those published by Statistics Netherlands (Siermann et 
al., 2004), this leads to slightly different results. Soede also discusses a number of other reference budgets, which for 
example incorporate a more generous clothing allowance and the costs of smoking.
70 The indexation mechanism is derived from the recommendations by Citro & Michael (1995), but the initial threshold 
amounts and the equivalence scales are not. This does not alter the fact that the report by the us National Academy of 
Sciences has been an important source of inspiration for the scp poverty line. The nas report was compiled in a bid to 
find a solution to the shortcomings of the official poverty threshold used in the us, introduced at the end of the 1960s 
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as part of the ‘War on Poverty’ (see Fisher 1992, 1997). The us poverty threshold is based on the work of the econo-
mist Orshansky (1963, 1965). Budget research at the time had shown that families of three or more people spend 
roughly a third of the total household budget on food. Based on this fact, the poverty threshold was determined as a 
generalised food ratio: a sparse food budget for this family type was multiplied by a factor of three. To allow for dis-
economies of scale, it was decided to use a slightly higher multiplier (3.7) for couples; and the poverty line for single 
persons was set at 80% of the budget for couples. Using this technique, Orshansky defined a large number (more than 
a hundred) of different poverty thresholds, which depended on the size and composition of the household.
 One objection to the official American poverty line is that its basis has remained unchanged since the 1960s, whereas 
consumption patterns have changed considerably. In the middle of the 1990s, an average family was spending only 
a seventh of the total household budget on food, so that the multipliers were no longer correct. The question was 
also raised as to whether the costs of other necessary items (such as energy and housing) – the weight of which 
had logically increased over time relative to food – should not be taken into account when establishing the poverty 
threshold. This points to a more general problem: the trend in prosperity and changes in the composition and living 
circumstances of the population imply that the official statistic is probably no longer an accurate reflection of pov-
erty in the us. This problem is all the more pressing because the entitlements of American citizens to grants and pro-
visions under anti-poverty programmes often are linked to their distance from the official threshold. This may imply 
that the target groups of the poverty policy are no longer being adequately reached due to the ‘fossilised’ nature 
of the us poverty line. Citro & Michael (1995: 43) concluded: “it is dangerous to let a key social indicator become so 
frozen in place that, when societal conditions change, it can no longer adequately reflect what it was designed to 
measure”.
 Citro & Michal (1995) advocated monitoring the development of poverty over time by using the indexation mechanism 
that also has been adopted here (see main text). An important difference compared with the scp method is however 
that the nas evades the issue of the precise level of the initial poverty threshold somewhat. The authors state that in 
principle, the expenditure on “food, clothing and shelter (including utilities), plus a little more” should determine this 
level (Citro & Michael, 1995: 50-58). A general social consensus on the necessity of these three cost items is assumed: 
“We selected food, clothing and shelter because they represent basic living needs with which no one would quarrel. 
That is, people may quarrel about the need for specific kinds of food, clothing and housing – such as whether air 
conditioning is essential – but not about the need for food, housing and clothing in broad terms”. The operational 
poverty line put forward by the nas was however not drawn up in accordance with this principle. Based on an analysis 
of the norm amounts in a number of existing poverty thresholds, the nas fairly arbitrarily opts for a poverty threshold 
of between usd 13,700 and usd 15,900 (1992 prices). The lowest amount is at the 30th percentile of expenditure on food, 
clothing and shelter in the us budget data, with a multiplier of 1.15 for the other necessary items. The highest amount 
corresponds to the 35th percentile in the expenditure distribution, with a multiplier of 1.25. 
 In practice, this makes the nas threshold somewhat fetishistic: it is unclear which standard of living the initial 
threshold makes possible. Other differences compared with the method advocated here are that the nas takes a dif-
ferent reference household as a starting point (a couple with two children) and applies a steeper equivalence scale. 
The method proposed by the nas was elaborated for the usa in subsequent years (see e.g. Short et al., 1999; Short, 
2005), but to date has not been implemented.
71 Obviously, the universalism/particularism dimension can also be given more weight than the scope, and in that 
case the institutionally determined poverty risk would theoretically be greater in the corporatist countries than the 
liberal group. This would for instance be plausible if among the representatives of this regime type, large groups 
were not covered by social insurance and had no access to social assistance. The fact that the levels for those who are 
covered (the ‘insiders’) are generous would then not be enough to prevent large-scale poverty.
72 In §6.1, reference was to the argument of neoclassical economics that redistribution via the social security system 
tends to reduce the level of prosperity. If this line of reasoning is taken further, one could posit that per capita gdp 
should be seen as an endogenous trait of the various regime types. From that point of view, the extensive social-
democratic and corporatist regimes ultimately must combine flat income distributions with limited national wealth 
(and therefore low household incomes): small differences, but high levels of poverty. Similarly, the liberal regimes 
inevitably bring about larger income differentials and greater collective prosperity; and the latter will translate into 
low rates of poverty. It was argued in §3.6.3, however, that the influence of social security arrangements on the 
prosperity of a community is not theoretically fixed. Other factors (such as natural resources, the infrastructure, 
the education level of the population, developments in the world economy) can have a bigger impact on a country’s 
level of wealth than the institutional setup. Whether an extensive welfare state holds back or promotes prosperity is 
an empirical matter, to which the available research was found not to provide a final answer. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that the collective prosperity in the countries studied here does not correlate directly with the regime type 
– at least not in the direction that would be expected on the grounds of the neoclassical theory. In 2000, per capita 
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gdp in the six countries with an extensive social-democratic or corporatist regime was 5% higher on average than 
in the four representatives of the liberal regime. The latter group includes both the usa, the second wealthiest of all 
the countries studied here (Norway has a higher per capita gdp) and Australia, the country with the lowest collective 
prosperity.
73 However, figure 6.1 also shows a number of corporatist observations with ‘social-democratic’ poverty rates,  though 
no clear line or pattern can be discerned: Belgium in 1985 and 1998, Germany in 1981, 1989 and 2000, and France in 
2002. 
74 The analyses have been performed on the data of lis wave 5, release 1. Poverty figures are based on the equivalised 
net disposable income as standardly calculated in the lis project. The construction of this and a description of the 
underlying variables can be found at http:// www.lisproject.org/ techdoc.htm. The monetary value of some near cash 
benefits, such as food stamps, housing benefits and education benefits are taken into account. Non-cash benefits 
such as free school meals or medical care are however generally not included in net disposable income in the lis.
 In the variable used, the very high incomes have been removed in accordance with the standard lis routine for top-
coding. At the bottom end, a lower limit of eur 2,000 of the equivalised net disposable income was applied. This 
eliminates negative and zero incomes, in particular.
 In all countries, persons in households consisting of students living outside the parental home were left out of 
consideration. This group often has a high risk of poverty, but this is generally attributable to unobserved income 
components (student grants and loans, parental contributions, provisions in kind, such as student housing). Moreo-
ver, students generally have favourable future prospects, so their poverty tends to be temporary in nature. In the 
unweighted data sets, the proportion of persons living in such student households varied between 0.1% (Belgium) 
and 2.1% (Sweden).
 Specific adjustments were made for two countries. In the Netherlands, households with incomplete sets of ques-
tionnaires were left out of consideration, as recommended by the lis. The original data set of Australia does not 
include children aged younger than 15 years; normally these are taken into account via the weighting factor. Since 
the multivariate analyses performed here require physical records, for each Australian child a synthetic case has been 
compiled, based on information on the household composition. To this end, the record of the head of household was 
copied as many times as the number of children aged younger than 15. The position in the household was converted 
for these cases from head to child. Their age was taken as 8 years, the class average of the 0-14 year-olds. Gender was 
randomly assigned to the individual synthetic children, based on the proportion of 51.1% boys and 48.9% girls which 
applied for the Dutch population aged 0-14 years in 2000. The education level was set at ‘in education’, the labour 
market position at ‘not in labour force’. The other person variables were set at missing for the Australian children. 
 Detailed information on the lis project and of the national data sets used is available at http://www.lisproject.org.
75 The Dutch norms for 2000 were converted for the other countries using the oecd purchasing power parities for actual 
individual consumption. In three countries, however, the data used did not relate to the year 2000. In the United 
Kingdom (1999) and Australia (2001) the norm amounts for 2000 were corrected by applying the index of expenditure 
on basic budget items according to the National Accounts. For the Netherlands (1999) the amounts given by Soede 
(2006) and Soede & Vrooman (2007, 2008b) were used.
76 There are also a number of other theoretical problems with the econometrically determined equivalence factors:
- only equivalent incomes are considered; the welfare impact of time that is not spent on acquiring a market 
income is left out of consideration (leisure, care and household production);
- it is not self-evident that all members of multiple-person households will experience the same welfare or utility 
from a given equivalised income;
- only the equivalences in a given year are considered, whereas it may be more logical to look at spending patterns 
over a longer period and in relation to the phase of life.
77 Note that all persons younger than 18 years who are not the head of the household or a partner are regarded as chil-
dren in these analyses, and the appropriate equivalence factor is accordingly applied. This differs from the practice 
followed by Eurostat, for example, with the ‘modified oecd scale’, where the age limit for children is set at 14 years. 
From the perspective of parental responsibility and the attainment of full legal capacity, this appears to be on the 
young side.
78 The steady increase in the poverty rates deviates from the outcomes generally obtained when a sensitivity analysis 
such as this is performed on the basis of a relative income threshold (e.g. 60% of the median). The pattern is then 
often non-linear, with the highest poverty rates at the two extreme parameter values chosen. Coulter et al. (1992) 
discuss three effects which underlie this. The first effect is that the poverty rate rises as the parameter values increase: 
because the threshold amounts for non-single households are higher, more observations fall below that threshold. 
In addition, the form of the income distribution below the poverty line changes with higher parameter values: the 
poverty deficits and the dispersion of those deficits tend to increase (effect 2). Thirdly, higher parameter values imply 
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that the median equivalised income falls, and the poverty line therefore also moves downwards. The latter works in 
the opposite direction to the first two effects, and explains the non-linear pattern often seen in a sensitivity analysis 
of equivalence scales with relative income thresholds: “A U-shaped curve … will occur if the third effect outweighs the 
first two at some values of θ but not others” (Coulter et al., 1992: 1076). With the poverty line adopted here, the third 
effect does not occur: the threshold amount of the reference household does not change if the parameter values of 
the equivalence scale are increased. Theoretically, therefore, it would be expected that the headcount ratio gradually 
increases. If a composite poverty measure is used which is also sensitive to the deficits and the dispersion of those 
deficits, the increase will be even greater.
79 A similar sensitivity analysis was performed for the median deficits of poor households. This often is slightly non-
linear: the low equivalence scales generate fairly high deficits, but at first these become smaller if higher parameters 
are chosen. From a certain point median deficits start to rise, and fairly sharply for variants 17 and 18.
 Of all the countries studied, the variation in the median deficits when different equivalence scales are used is greatest 
in the Netherlands. This is probably due to the specific composition of the poor population, which in the Nether-
lands contains comparatively few single elderly persons. The number of households in which the income changes 
as a result of the standardisation is higher (compare the second effect of Coulter et al. (1992) discussed earlier). As a 
consequence, the position of the Netherlands in the ranking of median deficits is not stable. With the basic needs 
criterion, the Netherlands occupies first place (highest median deficit) according to the equivalence scale compiled 
by Statistics Netherlands, but fifth position according to the Oxford scale. Based on the modest but adequate variant, 
the Netherlands occupies second and eighth position, respectively. The positions of the other countries are more 
stable if these different equivalence scales are applied, with the exception of France according to the basic needs 
criterion (a drop of six places).
80 Sen (1976) and Jäntti & Danziger (2000) state that composite measures of poverty should preferably meet the follow-
ing theoretical requirements:
(1) they should depend on poor incomes alone ( focus axiom: if the income of non-poor persons changes, this should 
not affect the degree of poverty)
(2) they should be sensitive to the average income among the poor (monotonicity axiom: if poor people become less 
poor, or pass the poverty line, the degree of poverty should decrease )
(3) they should be sensitive to the distribution of income (transfer axiom: a transfer of a poor to a less poor person 
increases the degree of poverty)
(4) they should not be affected by a reordering of persons or households (symmetry)
(5) they should not be affected by an identical proportional increase in the number of units with each income level 
(replication invariance).
 The composite measures used here are defined as:
Intensity index:  H • I
Sen index:  H • ((I + (1- I)) • G • (q/q + 1))
Shorrocks index: H • (I(2 - H) + H(1 - I) • G)
where 
H = headcount ratio (= incidence, poverty rate)
I  =  median income deficit of poor persons (as % of poverty threshold)
G = Gini coefficient of income deficits 
q  = number of observations
 
 The intensity index only complies with axioms 1-3, the Sen index with 1-4. The Shorrocks index meets all five condi-
tions. Zheng (1997) discusses a wider array of axioms and aggregate poverty measures.
81 In the subsamples used here (cf. below), there are between 55 and 292 poor people per country, a total of more than 
1,700 observations. If a balanced design (the same number of observations in each country, as in the analysis of the 
poverty incidences) were used in such models, this figure would fall further, to just over 600 observations across 
11 countries. A multi-level analysis of the country scores on the composite indices is hampered by the fact that the 
contributions of the individual cases to this macro-figure are unknown.
82 In version 10 of Stata, more hierarchical levels can be analysed, but this version was not available when the calcula-
tions were carried out on the lis computer system. If it had been, there would still have been a weighting problem. 
In principle, multi-level weights are preferable in such an analysis (see e.g. Pfeffermann et al., 1998; Grilli & Pratesi, 
2004). However, the sampling probabilities are not known in the lis for all three levels (persons in households in 
countries); and the available software needed to calculate these weights could only handle two hierarchical levels (cf. 
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Chantala et al., 2006).
83 These ‘physically weighted’ subsamples were drawn as follows in each country:
-  all persons were first sorted on a random variable, implying households and their members were placed in an 
arbitrary order;
-  a stratified random sample was drawn from this, in proportion to the decile categories of the original weighting 
factor in the poor and non-poor groups. The number of sampled cases in each stratum was 4-5 times greater than 
was ultimately needed;
-  these sampled cases were then sorted by country, poor/not poor and household number;
-  in order to minimise the number of cases from one and the same household, a systematic random sample was 
then drawn, in which a case was selected from the sorted file every 4-5 persons. This meant that multiple persons 
from the same household could only be selected in case of very large households.
 The physically weighted subsamples replicated the poverty rates from the larger original weighted samples to an 
accuracy of between 0 and 0.2 percentage points. There were only 1% of households from which more than one 
household member was selected. If a multi-level analysis is performed with the household number as the second 
level (disregarding the country differences), the standard errors at the first level hardly increase and the conclusions 
remain the same. Skipping the household level from the multi-level analysis therefore has virtually no influence on 
the estimated results in this set of samples, because the number of respondents who are clustered in some way is now 
very small. In addition, the shares of the various categories of the independent variables (age, education, sex, etc.) in 
the physically weighted subsamples at no point deviate substantially from the original distributions. This is gener-
ally also the case with the poverty incidences for each of these categories, although there are some larger deviations 
at country level (for example, the poverty risk for families with lots of children is five percentage points lower in the 
physically weighted sub sample in Canada than in the original sample). This often has to do with the small numbers 
in the physically weighted subsamples, so that a difference of just a few poor observations in the constituent groups 
can weigh fairly heavily at the country level. 
84 For three countries it was not possible to reproduce the isced classification accurately in the lis data, and proxy vari-
ables were used instead. In the United Kingdom it was assumed that those who had left full-time education at age 15 
or lower had achieved isced-levels 1 and 2. For Canada the group up to and including the level ‘11-13 years elementary 
and secondary school (but not graduated)’ was selected. Australia was the most problematic. The only selection 
that could be made here was the group with no ‘higher/bachelor degree’ or ‘other post-school qualifications’. This 
category with no additional qualifications probably also contains a number of people at isced-3 level. Set against the 
official data (oecd, 2006: 37), the proportion of low-educated people appears on the high side in the Danish lis data 
set in particular. This also applies to a lesser extent for the United Kingdom and Australia, two countries with a proxy 
variable. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the proportion of low-educated people in the lis data set is somewhat lower 
than according to the official figures.
85 The empirical correlation between gdp per capita and regime type is in fact limited within the group of countries 
studied here; see note 72 to this chapter.
86 The analysis was also performed with poverty according to the basic needs criterion as the dependent variable, using 
different physically weighted subsamples (because the poor/non-poor groups are not the same). This did lead to very 
similar conclusions. However, at level 1 the effect of the single-parent family is no longer significant. At level 2 the 
effects of all regime variables are fractionally weaker, but generally remain equally significant. The only exception to 
this is the effect of the dummy variable for the corporatist regime type in model 7, which is now only significant at 
p<.10 (formerly at p< .05).
87 In a multi-level logistical regression model no estimate is obtained of the explained variance, as is the case in a nor-
mal regression analysis. Here, the method proposed by Snijders & Bosker (1999: 225-229) was followed, an extension 
of the R2 criterion put forward by McKelvey & Zavoina (1975). The underlying idea is that with a dichotomous classifi-
cation, an explained proportion variance can be calculated if it is assumed that the contrast (here: poor/not poor) is 
the result of exceeding threshold values in an underlying continuous process. The explained variance across the two 
levels is equal to the variance of the linear predictor. In a logistical model, the level-1 variance is by definition equal 
to Π2/3, or 3.29 (in a probit model the level-1 variance is equal to 1). The level-2 variance is estimated in the model. 
88 In an extra model, in which only the level-1 determinants were incorporated, the proportion of unexplained variance 
was 0.36. Compared with the empty model 1 in table 6.6, the unexplained variance at level 1 logically falls. However, 
the unexplained variance at level 2 also reduces, from 7.5% to 4.0%. This is due to the correction for compositional 
differences between the countries in terms of the level-1 variables. The introduction of per capita gdp in model 2 
leads to an additional reduction compared with the extra model in the unexplained variance at level 2 (from 4.0% 
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to 2.9%). The improvement in the fit (Δ –2 Log Likelihood, ΔWald χ2) in model 2 compared with the model with only 
level-1 variables is statistically significant at p<0.10.
 89 The likelihood ratio test can be used in a multi-level logistical model if the computer program is based on numerical 
integration, as here; see Snijders & Bosker (1999: 220). 
90 Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification scores were based on 12 characteristics of old age pensions, unemployment 
benefits and sick leave benefits. For each characteristic, the countries were classified into three levels (low/medium/
high de-commodification), on the grounds of their standard deviation from the mean. The coded categories were 
then added up and weighted with the take-up rate of the pensions and, respectively, the coverage of the unemploy-
ment and sick leave benefits among the labour force.
91 When the constituent indices are added together directly (without a weighting factor), the threefold division 
between the regime types (cf. figure 6.3) remains clearly present. Individual countries do however move up or down 
in the rankings: Norway and France, for example, then have a higher poverty risk because the relatively good pension 
provisions weigh less heavily in the total; the reverse occurs in the United Kingdom. In principle, it seems better to 
apply the weighting factor; otherwise the same weight is for instance implicitly attached to survivor’s benefits as to 
old-age pensions, whereas in practice the latter are important for a much larger group and are therefore theoretically 
much more influential determinants of the poverty risk.




1 The summaries at the end of the individual chapters look in more depth at the questions raised in the Introduction.
2 No volume data were available for Northern Ireland. The volume growth in Great Britain was higher than expected, 
partly because of the sharp increase in the number of people on disability benefit, which does not fit in with the 
liberal regime type.
3 The labour market participation rate of elderly men fell in Sweden to a much lesser extent than in Belgium, Germany 
and France. In Denmark, the volume of early exit benefits grew strongly in the period studied, as it did in the corpo-
ratist group, but this was offset to some extent by the higher Danish statutory retirement age (67 years).
4 For variables with an even number of categories, an additional middle code was assigned for the generic hybrid.
5 Unlike in the analysis in chapter 4, where four characteristics were nominally scaled, all variables were quantified 
ordinally here. To obtain a consistent interpretation of the dimensions, the solution was rotated.
6 In latent profile modelling an estimate is made for each case of how great the likelihood is of falling within a given 
cluster. The technique also makes it possible to test whether the fit of various models differs (see also chapter 4). Due 
to the limited number of cases (n=15), models with four clusters or more could not be tested in the present analysis; 
these were not identified. A two-cluster latent profile model proved to fit the data significantly better than the base-
line model, in which all empirical systems and ideal-types are placed in the same cluster. The fit of the three-cluster 
model is higher, but not to the extent that the difference becomes statistically significant (p=.15). Both the two-clus-
ter and the three-cluster models produced virtually the same outcomes as the determinist hierarchical cluster analy-
ses. Here again, a two-cluster solution reveals an opposition between liberal/non-liberal, while the three-cluster 
model (where the fit is not significantly better) confirms the distinction liberal/social-democratic/corporatist. The 
Netherlands once more scale with the social-democratic cluster, albeit with a lower likelihood of that classification 
than the Scandinavian countries. The only difference compared with the outcomes of the hierarchical cluster analy-
sis is that in both latent profile models the generic hybrid ends up in the liberal group. The empirical systems are 
however consistently placed in the same cluster as their theoretical ideal-types, with a very high degree of probability 
(p > .90).
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In deze studie staan de maatschappelijke gevolgen van instituties op het terrein van de 
sociale zekerheid centraal. Anders dan in het alledaagse taalgebruik heeft het begrip 
‘instituties’ hier geen betrekking op organisaties die richting geven aan de samenleving 
(zoals de kerk, het gezin, het onderwijs) of een hoger doel dienen (bijvoorbeeld culturele 
instellingen). In navolging van Durkheim (1901) verwijst de term naar de regels die een 
gemeenschap hanteert om het gedrag van haar leden in een gewenste richting te beïn-
vloeden. Dat is ook de betekenis die er in het ‘nieuwe institutionalisme’ in de sociale 
wetenschappen aan wordt gehecht. Een belangrijke premisse van die stroming is dat de 
regels die een samenleving opstelt medebepalend zijn voor de collectieve resultaten die 
zij behaalt. Die veronderstelling dat instituties ertoe doen is in deze studie uitgewerkt en 
onderzocht voor de regels van de moderne sociale zekerheid.
Aan de hand van een literatuurverkenning is eerst nagegaan wat onder instituties 
kan worden verstaan, en hoe zij in de samenleving zijn ingebed (hoofdstuk 2). Op basis 
daarvan werd een institutionele visie op de sociale zekerheid ontwikkeld (hoofdstuk 3). 
De empirische onderdelen van de studie richten zich op de maatschappelijke effecten 
van een bepaald soort instituties: sociale zekerheidsregimes. Dat zijn abstracte modellen 
van stelsels van wettelijke sociale zekerheidsregelingen, gericht op de verwezenlijking 
van uiteenlopende collectieve doelen. Eerst is nagegaan of de feitelijke inrichting van 
de sociale zekerheidsstelsels in elf landen zodanig uiteenloopt dat men kan concluderen 
dat de regimetypen die in de theorie worden onderscheiden in werkelijkheid bestaan 
(hoofdstuk 4). Vervolgens is onderzocht of de landen die uiteenlopende sociale zeker-
heidsregimes vertegenwoordigen in twee opzichten verschillende collectieve resultaten 
teweegbrengen: in de mate van uitkeringsafhankelijkheid en armoede (hoofdstukken 
5 en 6). In het slothoofdstuk zijn de aangetroffen verbanden nader geduid en worden 
enkele implicaties geschetst voor het wetenschappelijk onderzoek en het sociaal beleid.
1  Institutionele theorie
Instituties zijn sociaal geconstrueerde regels die de rechten en plichten van actoren afba-
kenen. Zij duiden ook de condities aan die zijn verbonden aan het toekennen van de rech-
ten en het opleggen van de plichten, en welke sancties er mogelijk zijn. Instituties zijn 
erop gericht het gedrag van actoren zo te sturen dat de gemeenschap er naar verwachting 
per saldo baat bij heeft. Ze proberen bijvoorbeeld economische handelingen, sociale 
contacten en politieke selectieprocessen te beïnvloeden omdat men denkt dat dit de wel-
vaart of de sociale stabiliteit zal bevorderen. Zo kan het toekennen van uitkeringsrechten 
voorkomen dat de gemeenschap wordt geconfronteerd met massale armoede, epide-
mieën, verlies van menselijk kapitaal, sociale onrust, een vermindering van onderlinge 
betrokkenheid en dergelijke. Als de positieve collectieve opbrengsten voldoende groot 
worden geacht kan dat het opleggen van belastingen en andere plichten rechtvaardigen.
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Instituties kunnen zich richten op natuurlijke personen, maar ook op rechtsperso-
nen en hun vertegenwoordigers. In beginsel zijn al deze actoren geen slaafse navolgers 
van de vigerende regels; ze filteren deze, en hebben zodoende een actieve, assimilerende 
rol. Zij baseren hun gedrag op de eigen interpretatie van de instituties, en die hangt 
samen met de eerdere ervaringen, hun hulpbronnen en een aantal motivaties (zie figuur 
2.1). Bij rechtspersonen doet zich de complicatie voor dat de oogmerken, ideologische 
visie, belangen en motivaties van de individuen die hen vertegenwoordigen niet overeen 
hoeven te stemmen met die van de organisatie, het ‘patroon-agent’-probleem.
Het sociaal geconstrueerde karakter van instituties impliceert dat ze nooit van 
nature gegeven zijn, of onontkoombaar volgen uit bepaalde religieuze, ethische of filo-
sofische beginselen (de Regula Benedicti, Kantiaanse ethiek, nutsmaximalisatie). Socio-
logisch bezien kunnen de rechten, plichten, condities en sanctiemogelijkheden die in 
een gemeenschap gelden uitsluitend worden beschreven, en kan worden gezocht naar 
verklaringen voor het bestaan van specifieke configuraties van regels. Er zijn echter geen 
universele imperatieven: instituties zijn altijd endogeen, hun rechtvaardiging ligt uit-
sluitend binnen de gemeenschap waarin ze worden toegepast. Die justificatie kan zijn 
ingegeven door hogere beginselen, maar dat is niet noodzakelijk; er is sociologisch 
gesproken geen “juiste verdeling van rechten” (Coleman, 1990).
Rechten, plichten, condities en sanctiemogelijkheden
Een recht houdt in dat het iemand is toegestaan iets te doen, te bezitten of te verkrijgen; 
en dat anderen hem daarbij niet mogen hinderen. Het toekennen van rechten aan de één 
houdt vaak in dat de ander plichten krijgt opgelegd: “rechten zijn redenen tot verplich-
ting bij anderen” (Raz, 1986). Zowel de rechten als de plichten berusten uiteindelijk op 
een sociale consensus; als ze niet langer gedragen worden door de gemeenschap, vervalt 
de grondslag voor het toekennen van aanspraken en het opleggen van verplichtingen.
Aan rechten en plichten kunnen condities verbonden zijn in de vorm van bepaalde 
gebeurtenissen die zich moeten voordoen (zoals werkloos raken), kwalificerende ken-
merken van de belanghebbenden (een bepaalde leeftijd, gezinssamenstelling, opleiding 
etc.), of gedragingen (bijvoorbeeld actief zoeken naar nieuw werk).
Sancties zijn beloningen wanneer de regels worden nageleefd, en bestraffingen in 
geval van overtreding. Ze zijn niet per se ‘heroïsch’, dat wil zeggen: het is niet nodig dat 
er één actor is die eenmalig bestraft en beloont, sancties kunnen ook collectief en incre-
menteel worden opgelegd. Het is ook niet noodzakelijk dat ze van buitenaf worden toe-
gediend; individuele actoren kunnen de gedragsvoorschriften hebben geïnternaliseerd, 
waardoor zij gevoelens van schuld, schaamte of superioriteit ervaren als zij de regels 
overtreden of naleven, en zodoende zichzelf bestraffen of belonen.
Soorten instituties
Instituties kunnen een formeel of informeel karakter hebben. Formele regels worden 
afgekondigd of bekrachtigd door de overheid. Een eerste type betreft de metaregels, die 
aangeven welke rechten en plichten er gelden bij het vestigen van formele instituties 
(zoals de grondwet, kieswetten). Dan zijn er regels voor het voortbrengen van goederen 
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en diensten door de overheid, zoals wetten over de inrichting van het publieke onderwijs, 
de nationale defensie, de politie etc. Die leggen ook de rechten en plichten vast die voor 
andere actoren aan deze overheidsproductie verbonden zijn (belasting betalen, leerplicht, 
militaire dienstplicht). Een derde vorm betreft de bekrachtiging door de overheid – als onaf-
hankelijke derde partij – van de rechten en plichten van burgers en private bedrijven. 
Bepalingen uit het Burgerlijk Wetboek (bijvoorbeeld het huwelijksrecht) of het handels-
recht (zoals de termijn waarbinnen bedrijven rekeningen moeten voldoen) zijn hiervan 
voorbeelden. Ten slotte zijn er formele contracten tussen private partijen: overeenkomsten die 
zijn ingebed in wettelijke bepalingen, zoals de eigendoms- en erfrechten die mensen bij 
het aangaan van een huwelijk vastleggen.
Informele instituties zijn volledig gebaseerd op de sociale consensus in groepen of 
gemeenschappen, en komen eveneens in vier vormen voor. Waarden zijn algemene prin-
cipes van gewenst gedrag, die niet aangeven wat mensen in concrete gevallen moeten 
doen of laten. Sociale normen doen dat wel. Dit zijn gedragsvoorschriften voor specifieke 
omstandigheden, die veelal te beschouwen zijn als een uitwerking van de beginselen 
die in de waarden zijn vervat. Omdat sociale normen (anders dan waarden, waarop men 
uitsluitend meer of minder betrokken kan zijn) overtreden kunnen worden, bevatten zij 
ook de mogelijkheid tot het opleggen van sancties. Conventies lijken in veel opzichten op 
normen, maar zijn niet waardegeladen: het zijn arbitraire gedragsverwachtingen met een 
neutraal karakter, die er vooral op gericht zijn gedrag op een efficiënte manier te coördi-
neren en het lidmaatschap van groepen of gemeenschappen te bekrachtigen (zoals kle-
dingvoorschriften). Soms kunnen conventies ook worden gecodificeerd; ze krijgen dan 
een formeel karakter (bijvoorbeeld wettelijke verkeersregels, de officiële spelling van een 
taal). Informele contracten zijn beloften en afspraken over de rechten en plichten van acto-
ren, die niet door de overheid bekrachtigd zijn, maar volledig stoelen op hetgeen binnen 
een gemeenschap gebruikelijk is.
Institutionele hiërarchie
Hoewel formele en informele instituties vaak hiërarchisch zijn gerangschikt, is het niet zo 
dat de lagere regels slechts op één manier uit de hogere kunnen volgen. Er is geen logisch 
dwingende afleiding: de manier waarop hoge beginselen of metaregels op de lagere 
niveaus worden ingevuld is sociaalhistorisch bepaald. Zo kan de overheid, gestuurd door 
supranationale regels van de Europese Unie of de Verenigde Naties, in de grondwet aan 
behoeftige mensen een recht op ondersteuning toekennen. Dat wordt mogelijk uitge-
werkt in een bijstandswet, en verder ingevuld in uitvoeringsbesluiten en de onderlinge 
informele gedragsverwachtingen van de betrokken personen. De afleidingen tussen die 
hiërarchische niveaus berusten onveranderlijk op consensuele interpretaties. Het consti-
tutionele recht op sociale bijstand kan daarbij decennialang onveranderd blijven, terwijl 
de ‘lagere’ wetten in de loop der tijd wel een ruimere of striktere invulling krijgen, al naar 
gelang de veranderende inzichten van politici, beleidsambtenaren en burgers.
Instituties kunnen onderling sterk samenhangen. Dit doet zich vaak voor in geslo-
ten gemeenschappen (sekten, kloosterorden, een standenmaatschappij of verzuilde 
samenleving), waar de waarden op een onontkoombare manier doorwerken in precieze 
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gedragsvoorschriften, met zware en gekende sancties in geval van overtreding. Zulke 
‘thick institutions’ zijn echter minder kenmerkend voor welvarende democratische 
samenlevingen.
Het ligt voor de hand dat formele en informele regels die op hetzelfde type gedrag 
betrekking hebben tot op zekere hoogte met elkaar corresponderen. Informele institu-
ties kunnen een uitwerking of aanvulling zijn op de formele regels, die nooit alle omstan-
digheden die zich in de praktijk voor kunnen doen af kunnen dekken. Omgekeerd kun-
nen formele rechten en plichten niet meer dan een wettelijke vastlegging zijn van regels 
die mensen onderling toch al hanteerden. Een dergelijke correspondentie spreekt echter 
niet vanzelf: het is ook mogelijk dat de informele regels waar mensen naar leven op grote 
schaal afwijken van wat wettelijk bepaald is (zoals in landen waar belastingontduiking de 
alledaagse norm is), of in delen van de gemeenschap sterk van de officiële regels verschil-
len (joden in de diaspora, christenen onder het communisme). Of informele regels domi-
neren over de formele, of andersom, is uiteindelijk een empirische, sociaal-historische 
kwestie.
Het ontstaan en veranderen van instituties
Instituties ontstaan en veranderen altijd door handelingen van actoren. Theoretisch 
wordt het proces van regelontwikkeling gestuurd door veranderingen in relatieve prij-
zen, machtsverhoudingen, belangentegenstellingen en de steun voor idealen. Als de 
sociaal gewogen som hiervan zich wijzigt, kunnen actoren een impuls krijgen om nieuwe 
instituties te vestigen of bestaande regels aan te passen.
Actoren reageren niet automatisch op zulke prikkels, maar wegen zelf af of deze voor 
hen nieuwe regels wenselijk maken. ‘Padafhankelijkheid’ werkt daarbij als een rem op 
verandering: mensen kunnen zich nieuwe regels niet altijd voorstellen, en belangheb-
benden kunnen van mening zijn dat regelveranderingen met te lage opbrengsten of 
grote sociale of economische kosten gepaard zullen gaan. Bij het vestigen en wijzigen 
van instituties wordt daarom gewoonlijk voortgebouwd op de reeds bestaande regels. 
Nieuwe actoren – jongeren, opkomende tegen-elites, nieuwe organisaties, individuele 
‘normative entrepreneurs’ – spelen vaak een belangrijke rol in het proces van regelveran-
dering. Zij ervaren de bestaande gang van zaken minder snel als vanzelfsprekend, en bij 
hen overtreffen de baten van wijzigingen eerder de lasten.
Dit houdt niet in dat breed gewenste veranderingen in de regelgeving zonder slag 
of stoot tot stand komen. Bij formele instituties vergt dit dikwijls complexe vormen van 
‘regelinteractie’, waarvan de besluitvorming over nieuwe wetgeving in parlementaire 
democratieën het kenmerkend voorbeeld is. Informele instituties komen doorgaans niet 
tot stand in zo’n min of meer rationele uitwisseling van argumenten op een platform voor 
regelinteractie, maar ontstaan en veranderen in een proces binnen de gemeenschap.
In het algemeen kunnen zowel bij de formele als informele instituties lagere regels 
(uitvoeringsbesluiten, conventies) gemakkelijker worden aangepast dan hogere (de 
grondwet, bepaalde kernwaarden). Bij de laatste zijn de kosten van veranderingen veelal 
groter, en zijn ingrijpende modificaties voor de betrokken actoren vaak moeilijker voor-
stelbaar.
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Gevolgen van instituties
Instituties worden in beginsel opgesteld om bepaalde collectieve doelen te verwezenlij-
ken. In theorie kan de toepassing van regels doorwerken op verscheidene ontwikkelin-
gen in de gemeenschap: de mate van technologische en wetenschappelijke innovatie, 
het economische proces, de gelaagdheid van de samenleving, de vorming van idealen, en 
trends in de opbouw van de bevolking (zie figuur 2.1). Het verband tussen instituties en 
maatschappelijke omstandigheden is echter dialectisch. De geldende instituties zijn niet 
alleen van belang voor de collectieve resultaten, maar de genoemde maatschappelijke 
omstandigheden fungeren ook als een ‘context van regeltoepassing’ die de uitkomsten 
beïnvloedt. De instituties kunnen verschillend uitpakken al naar gelang ze worden toe-
gepast in een hoog- of laagconjunctuur, bij een bevolking die een vergrijsde of verhou-
dingsgewijs jonge samenstelling kent, etc.
2  Sociale zekerheid en de institutionele benadering
Hoewel het type regelingen waarnaar de term ‘sociale zekerheid’ verwijst een lange 
geschiedenis heeft (de armenzorg, Bismarck’s sociale verzekeringen) werd de uitdrukking 
vóór de Amerikaanse New Deal uit de jaren dertig van de vorige eeuw slechts sporadisch 
gebruikt. In de recentere wetenschappelijke literatuur treft men zowel smalle als brede 
definities aan. In enge zin heeft de sociale zekerheid als doel inkomensbescherming te 
bieden; zij garandeert een sociaal minimum of – tot op zekere hoogte – behoud van de 
verworven levensstandaard. De instrumenten die worden ingezet om dit te verwezenlij-
ken bestaan uit de bij wet ingestelde sociale verzekeringen (bijvoorbeeld ouderdomspen-
sioenen voor werknemers) en nationale voorzieningen, zoals een bijstandswet. Op basis 
van die regelingen worden uitkeringen en hulpmiddelen in natura verstrekt wanneer zich 
duidelijk omschreven risico’s voordoen (ouderdom, het overlijden van de kostwinner, 
werkloosheid, arbeidsongeschiktheid, etc.). De enge opvatting van de sociale zekerheid 
is vrij gangbaar, maar heeft als nadeel dat ze gelijk wordt gesteld aan formele inkomens-
regelingen die zich richten op specifieke en traditionele risico’s; maatregelen om, bij-
voorbeeld, de financiële en sociale gevolgen van echtscheiding tegen te gaan vallen er 
niet onder.
In de brede afbakening richt de sociale zekerheid zich niet alleen op inkomensbe-
scherming. Zekerheid van werk, gezondheid en sociale participatie worden ook belang-
rijk geacht. Het instrumentarium beperkt zich niet tot wettelijke overheidsregelingen, 
maar omvat ook de ‘onzichtbare’ sociale zekerheid: belastingkortingen en aftrekposten, 
vergoedingen en verzekeringen gekoppeld aan de dienstbetrekking, en besparingen en 
verzekeringen die mensen zelf regelen (fiscale, beroepsgebonden en private voorzienin-
gen). De interventies betreffen niet alleen het gedeeltelijk vergoeden van een terugval-
lend of te laag inkomen; preventie en herstel zouden in beginsel prioriteit moeten krij-
gen. Ook richt de sociale zekerheid zich in de brede benadering niet op de traditionele 
risico’s, maar op alle vormen van menselijke schade; dus bijvoorbeeld ook op ecologische 
achteruitgang, of op verliezen die zich pas na vele jaren manifesteren. De brede benade-
ring heeft als nadeel dat de sociale zekerheid alomvattend dreigt te worden: de gehele 
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verzorgingsstaat valt eronder, plus alle voorzieningen die buiten de overheid om getrof-
fen kunnen worden. Een ander bezwaar is dat de benadering nogal a-sociologisch is. Er is 
weinig aandacht voor de sociaalhistorische context waarin de regels tot stand komen en 
veranderen (zoals de doelen en belangen die ermee gemoeid zijn), en voor de gevolgen 
die de sociale zekerheid heeft voor de samenleving als geheel.
Sociale zekerheid in institutionele zin
In deze studie is het begrip daarom vanuit een institutioneel perspectief afgebakend. 
Sociale zekerheid werd gedefinieerd als het geheel van collectief vastgelegde rechten, 
plichten, condities en sanctiemogelijkheden, dat erop gericht is positieve maatschappe-
lijke resultaten voort te brengen door individuele actoren tegen economische tekorten 
te beschermen. Het gaat dus om een verzameling van regels die binnen een gemeen-
schap zijn geconstrueerd, ofwel om instituties. Deze hebben betrekking op tekorten bij 
individuen die economisch gewaardeerd kunnen worden (te weinig inkomen, verlies van 
arbeid, de kosten van medische voorzieningen of sociale participatie). De toekenning 
van rechten en plichten dient een hoger doel: de verwachting dat de regels per saldo posi-
tieve resultaten voor de gemeenschap zullen genereren (meer collectieve welvaart of een 
eerlijker verdeling daarvan, een gezondere bevolking, minder sociale spanningen, tegen-
gaan van armoede).
Volgens deze institutionele definitie omhelst sociale zekerheid meer dan de traditi-
onele sociale verzekeringen en nationale voorzieningen. Anderzijds is ze niet zo veelom-
vattend dat het begrip analytisch niet meer valt te onderscheiden van de verzorgingsmaat-
schappij. Collectieve regulering van het onderwijs, de gezondheidszorg, de woningmarkt 
etc. wordt niet tot de sociale zekerheid gerekend, afgezien van de onderdelen die gericht 
zijn op de economische aanspraken van personen of huishoudens (studiefinanciering, 
ziektekostenverzekering, huursubsidie).
De toepassing van regels in de sociale zekerheid
Voor de sociale zekerheid zijn de manieren waarop regels het gedrag van actoren kun-
nen beïnvloeden geschetst in zes theoretische modellen van regelgestuurde interactie. 
Drie daarvan hebben betrekking op informele sociale zekerheidsstelsels, de overige op 
formele. Familiale systemen (figuur 3.1) richten zich gewoonlijk op het tegengaan van 
acute bestaansnood bij verwanten door materiële hulpverlening. De interactie beperkt 
zich tot het bijdragen en ontvangen van steun in geld of natura, en er zijn weinig typen 
actoren bij betrokken (ouders, kinderen, mogelijk grootouders en andere verwanten). Ze 
wordt gestuurd door de informele verwachtingen die er in de familie bestaan, en die zijn 
gewoonlijk ingebed in de instituties van de gemeenschap. Desondanks zijn de regels vaak 
tamelijk vaag en slechts zwak geïnternaliseerd. De betrokkenen hebben zodoende een 
aanzienlijke handelingsvrijheid, waardoor rechten en plichten moeilijk afdwingbaar zijn 
en niet altijd worden nagekomen. Het risico op het laatste is groot indien de onderlinge 
verbondenheid gering is of wanneer veel familieleden tegelijk worden getroffen (bijvoor-
beeld in tijden van massale werkloosheid).
Kenmerkend voor communale systemen (figuur 3.2), die beogen materiële nood op het 
niveau van de locale gemeenschap te lenigen, is het bestaan van intermediaire sociale 
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zekerheidsorganisaties (zoals de kerkelijke charitas, het gemeentelijke armenhuis). 
Anders dan in de familiale opzet doet zich hierbij al snel een patroon-agent probleem 
voor. De regels laten het bestuur, de verzorgers en de inners van bijdragen veel vrijheid.
In stelsels van informele beroepsgebonden sociale zekerheid (figuur 3.3) zijn de rechten en 
plichten gekoppeld aan een arbeidsrelatie, zonder dat de overheid die bekrachtigt (bij-
voorbeeld uitkeringen in het gildesysteem, noodfondsen voor werknemers).
Bij de formele systemen is het interactiemodel van de demografische regelingen (wettelijke 
of door de overheid bekrachtigde ouderdoms- en nabestaandenpensioenen, kinderbij-
slag; figuur 3.4) het eenvoudigst. Naast de ontvangers en betalers is hier sprake van een 
belangrijke ‘corporate actor’: de sociale zekerheidsorganisatie, belast met de inning van 
contributies, het toekennen en uitbetalen van uitkeringen, en de controle op de recht-
matigheid. Ook is er een toezichtraad die het uitvoeringsproces bewaakt, en een sociaal 
zekerheidshof dat oordeelt over juridische bezwaren. Door deze gecompliceerder struc-
tuur is het patroon-agent probleem hier groter dan in de informele stelsels. Het onper-
soonlijke en indirecte karakter van de interactie (die veelal schriftelijk verloopt) maakt 
bovendien de kans op misbruik door de ontvangers groter.
Die is nog groter bij de interactiestructuur die kenmerkend is voor formele werkloos-
heids- en bijstandsregelingen (figuur 3.5). Er is een extra type actor (werkgevers die mensen 
in dienst nemen en ontslaan), er zijn meer en complexere uitkeringsvoorwaarden, en 
cliënten kunnen de rechten deels zelf bewerkstelligen of bestendigen, bijvoorbeeld door 
niet actief te solliciteren; het ‘moreel risico’ is theoretisch groter.
De meest gecompliceerde interactiestructuur komt in principe voor in formele rege-
lingen voor ziekteverzuim en arbeidsongeschiktheid (figuur 3.6). Het vaststellen van het recht is 
vaak complex en vergt het oordeel van medische deskundigen (huisarts, specialist, keu-
ringsartsen). Dit vergroot het patroon-agent probleem: de beroepscode van de medische 
professionals kan op gespannen voet staan met de wettelijke bepalingen en de interne 
voorschriften van de sociale zekerheidsorganisatie.
Collectieve gevolgen van de sociale zekerheid
De instituties van de sociale zekerheid werken theoretisch vooral door in de sociale struc-
tuur en het economisch proces. Sociale zekerheidsregelingen kunnen nieuwe sociale 
categorieën tot stand brengen (aow’ers, bijstandsmoeders), maar ook doorwerken in de 
positie van sociale groepen op de stratificatieladders. In een democratie is het ook moge-
lijk dat het stemgedrag van uitkeringsontvangers en gepensioneerden, en het belang dat 
de bevolking hecht aan sociale zekerheidskwesties (de uitkeringshoogte, de wettelijke 
pensioenleeftijd) van invloed zijn op de selectie van de politieke elite.
De effecten op het economisch proces hebben vooral betrekking op het niveau, de 
groei en de verdeling van de collectieve welvaart. Ze kunnen zowel positief als negatief 
zijn. Theoretisch kan men positieve welvaartseffecten verwachten omdat de sociale 
zekerheid bijdraagt aan economische efficiëntie (instandhouding van het productief ver-
mogen, tegengaan van sociale onrust) en het afwenden van vraaguitval. Voorbeelden van 
negatieve economische effecten zijn de mogelijke afname in de geneigdheid tot sparen 
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en investeren, en de ontmoediging die sociale zekerheidsregelingen op de arbeidsmarkt 
teweeg kunnen brengen (bijvoorbeeld een gering arbeidsaanbod door hoge uitkeringen). 
Of de economische functies dan wel de disfuncties van de sociale zekerheid domineren 
kan niet op theoretische gronden worden vastgesteld; dat is een empirische kwestie, 
waarbij de uitkomst afhangt van de precieze aard van de instituties, de context waarin de 
regels worden toegepast, en de percepties en preferenties van de betrokken actoren.
3  Regimes van sociale zekerheid
In het theoretische deel van deze studie werd de sociale zekerheid in algemene zin vanuit 
het institutionele perspectief afgebakend. De empirische analyses waren gericht op de 
effecten van bepaalde soorten formele instituties. Omdat moderne vormen van sociale 
zekerheid overwegend een nationale opzet kennen, ligt het voor de hand de werking ervan 
te onderzoeken via een landenvergelijking. Voortbouwend op het invloedrijke werk van 
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) zijn elf landen geselecteerd die naar verwachting uiteenlo-
pende typen sociale zekerheidsregimes vertegenwoordigen. Het begrip ‘regime’ verwijst 
naar verschillende typen van samenhangende formele instituties op nationaal niveau, 
die zijn ontworpen om specifieke collectieve doelen te verwezenlijken. In zulke regimes 
is de kern vervat van de formele regels met betrekking tot de overheidsproductie.
Drie ‘werelden’, en een hybride
Esping-Andersen beschrijft een aantal typen, door hem aangeduid als de “three worlds 
of welfare capitalism”. Theoretisch is de collectieve, wettelijke sociale zekerheid in zijn 
liberale regimetype beperkt van opzet. De uitkeringen zijn laag en kortdurend, ze zijn in 
sterke mate gericht op de meest behoeftigen, er zijn geen collectieve voorzieningen voor 
de kosten van kinderen, etc. Er is echter wel een goed ontwikkeld systeem van private ver-
zekeringen dat zich vooral richt op de middenklassen. De ‘de-commodificatie’ (de mate 
waarin mensen een aanvaardbare levensstandaard kunnen bereiken, onafhankelijk van 
hun marktwaarde) is in dit systeem laag. Dat verscherpt de sociale stratificatie: het werkt 
in de hand dat er een driedeling ontstaat van bijstandsontvangers en werkende armen, 
de middenklassen, en de geprivilegieerden. Van de hier geselecteerde landen behoren 
volgens Esping-Andersen de stelsels van de Verenigde Staten, Canada, Australië en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk tot dit type.
Het sociaaldemocratische regimetype is juist zeer uitgebreid. Uitkeringen zijn niet gere-
serveerd voor de kanslozen en kansarmen, maar beschikbaar voor alle burgers. Ze zijn 
genereus en duren zo lang het risico zich manifesteert. Om de kosten te beperken en de 
sociale integratie te bevorderen wordt echter wel geprobeerd uitkeringsontvangers zo 
snel mogelijk aan werk te helpen via maatregelen gericht op activering. Het financiële 
draagvlak wordt verder vergroot door de hoge arbeidsdeelname van vrouwen, die voor 
een groot deel in de niet-commerciële dienstverlening (onderwijs, zorg) werken. Door 
de omvangrijke collectieve sector zijn hoge heffingen noodzakelijk en is private verzeke-
ring in dit systeem minder van belang. Het sociaaldemocratische regime kent een hoge 
mate van de-commodificatie en probeert de bestaande sociale verschillen te verkleinen. 
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Zweden, Denemarken en Noorwegen bieden voorbeelden van landen met een dergelijk 
stelsel.
Het corporatistische regimetype is theoretisch eveneens extensief, maar het heeft een 
meer selectief karakter. De rechten zijn vaak gekoppeld aan de betaalde premies en de 
opgedane arbeidservaring. Ze zijn ook niet voor alle sociale groepen gelijk; zo hebben 
ambtenaren zeer gunstige regelingen, passend bij hun verheven status als dienaar van 
het hoogste gezag in deze samenlevingen. De rechten zijn opgebouwd rond het kost-
winnersmodel: er zijn goede sociale verzekeringen voor gezinnen met kinderen, maar de 
economische zelfstandigheid van beide partners is niet gegarandeerd. De arbeidsdeel-
name van vrouwen is daardoor gering. Er bestaan goede voorzieningen voor ouderen en 
gehandicapten, die er echter toe leiden dat ook zij betrekkelijk weinig aan het arbeidspro-
ces deelnemen. De mate van de-commodificatie is laag, en corporatistische regimes zijn 
er veelal op gericht de bestaande hiërarchie tussen statusgroepen te bestendigen. België, 
Duitsland en Frankrijk zouden exemplarisch voor dit type regime zijn.
Nederland is volgens Esping-Andersen een hybride: een “regime met een Januskop”, 
dat zowel sociaaldemocratische als corporatistische trekken heeft.
De regimes in de praktijk
Om de empirische status van de typologie vast te stellen werd een categorische prin-
cipale componentenanalyse (CatPCA) verricht over 54 aspecten van de formele sociale 
zekerheid, zoals die rond 1990 in de elf geselecteerde landen bestonden. Hierin waren 
institutionele kenmerken van alle belangrijke collectieve regelingen opgenomen. Deze 
variabelen blijken tot twee onderliggende dimensies te kunnen worden herleid. De 
eerste geeft de reikwijdte van de sociale zekerheidsinstituties weer, de tweede de mate 
waarin de regelingen een universele of particularistische opzet kennen (figuur 4.1). Op 
deze dimensies vallen de landen in de verwachte clusters uiteen (figuur 4.2). De Verenigde 
Staten, Australië, Canada en het Verenigd Koninkrijk vormen een liberale groep, waar-
bij de eerste twee landen dit type het duidelijkst representeren. Denemarken, Zweden 
en – iets minder uitgesproken – Noorwegen komen terecht in een sociaaldemocratische 
groep, terwijl België, Duitsland en Frankrijk een homogeen corporatistisch cluster zijn. 
Nederland belandt tussen de sociaaldemocratische en corporatistische groepen in en 
heeft zodoende inderdaad een hybride stelsel. Enkele soortgelijke studies die de situatie 
rond 1980 en 2000 in kaart brachten maken het plausibel dat Esping-Andersen’s indeling 
empirisch stabiel is voor de laatste decennia van de 20e eeuw.
In een aanvullende CatPCA werd onderzocht of de landen ook systematisch verschil-
len in hun informele sociale zekerheidsregels (zoals opvattingen onder de bevolking over 
de gewenste ongelijkheid en overheidsinterventies; figuur 4.3 en 4.4). Hieruit kwamen 
dezelfde dimensies en landengroepen naar voren, en de correlatiecoëfficiënt tussen de 
formele en informele instituties van de landen bleek hoog: 0.84 op de eerste dimen-
sie, 0.85 op de tweede. De analyses in hoofdstuk 4 voeren tot de conclusie dat Esping-
 Andersen’s typologie zowel bij de formele als bij de informele sociale zekerheidsregels 
een stevige empirische basis heeft.
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4  Uitkeringsafhankelijkheid en de regimetypen
Vervolgens is nagegaan of het type regime samenhangt met de maatschappelijke resul-
taten die de landen bereiken. De mate van uitkeringsafhankelijkheid in de periode 1980-
1999 is de eerste indicator voor de collectieve ‘output’ (zie hoofdstuk 5). Dit uitkeringsvo-
lume is voor een samenleving van belang, omdat zij kan doorwerken in de differentiatie 
in herkenbare sociale groepen (aow’ers, bijstandsmoeders), in de sociale status van men-
sen die tot die groepen behoren, en in de groei en verdeling van de collectieve welvaart.
Theoretische verwachtingen
Eerst zijn de institutionele kenmerken van de nationale stelsels rond 1990 opnieuw geana-
lyseerd vanuit het gezichtspunt van de ‘uitkeringsproductie’. Alle landen zijn gescoord op 
een index die aangeeft in welke mate de formele regels het uitkeringsvolume in theorie 
opstuwen. Op grond daarvan werd de verwachting uitgesproken dat het hybride Neder-
landse regime het ‘slechtste van drie werelden’ in zich verenigde en daarom de meeste 
uitkeringen zou voortbrengen, zowel in termen van het relatieve volume (het aantal uit-
keringen op de bevolking van 15 jaar en ouder) als voor wat betreft de procentuele groei 
in de hoeveelheid uitkeringen. Naar verwachting zou de corporatistische groep meer 
uitkeringsafhankelijkheid genereren dan de sociaaldemocratische, die op haar beurt het 
liberale cluster zou overtreffen.
Ook werden hypothesen opgesteld met betrekking tot de samenstelling van het uit-
keringsvolume bij de bevolking jonger dan 65 jaar. In de corporatistische groep zouden 
naar verwachting verhoudingsgewijs veel uitkeringen wegens vervroegde uittreding, 
werkloosheidsverzekeringen en nabestaandenpensioenen voorkomen. Het sociaalde-
mocratische cluster werd een omvangrijk volume toegedicht in de regelingen voor werk-
nemers (ziekteverzuim, verlofregelingen) en de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen 
voor mensen zonder eerdere werkkring. In de liberale groep zou de afhankelijkheid van 
bijstandsuitkeringen hoog zijn, terwijl het hybride Nederland naar verwachting bij al 
deze regelingen bovengemiddeld zou scoren.
Empirische resultaten
Of deze theoretische veronderstellingen sporen met de feiten is nagegaan met behulp 
van administratieve gegevens over gerealiseerde uitkeringsjaren voor tien landen (voor 
Noorwegen was de informatie niet in dezelfde vorm beschikbaar). Omdat de informatie 
alleen op geaggregeerd niveau voorhanden is, kan de invloed van kenmerken van indivi-
duele uitkeringsontvangers (bijvoorbeeld geslacht, arbeidsverleden) op het volume in de 
hier verrichte empirische analyses niet worden vastgesteld.
Het bivariate verband van de regimetypen met het relatieve volume is vrij zwak. Gemiddeld 
blijkt het aandeel uitkeringen in de bevolking in de sociaaldemocratische landen hoger 
dan in de liberale groep, zoals vooraf ook werd aangenomen. De andere verschillen zijn 
echter minder uitgesproken. In de potentiële beroepsbevolking was het relatieve volume 
vanaf 1990 in de corporatistische groep wel omvangrijker dan in de sociaal-democrati-
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sche; maar eerder, en onder de gehele volwassen bevolking (dus met inbegrip van de pen-
sioenontvangers) ontbrak dit veronderstelde verband. Nederland had in de periode 1980-
1990 weliswaar een vrij hoog volume, maar daalde in de jaren negentig op de ranglijst, en 
nam in de onderzochte jaren nooit de verwachte toppositie in.
Ook bij de volumegroei werd bivariaat een vrij onduidelijk verband met de typologie 
aangetroffen. De corporatistische landen maakten tussen 1980 en 1999 weliswaar een 
consistent hogere groei door dan de sociaaldemocratische groep; maar de overige hypo-
thesen werden in de rechtstreekse vergelijking niet bevestigd. Opmerkelijk waren vooral 
de onverwacht hoge groeicijfers in Frankrijk, Australië en Canada, en de lage procentuele 
toenamen in Nederland.
De hypothesen ten aanzien van de volumecompositie vonden echter wel steun in de gege-
vens. De corporatistische landen hadden in alle jaren zoals verwacht verhoudingsgewijs 
veel ontvangers van werkloosheidsverzekeringen en van prepensioenen. Bij de nabe-
staandenuitkeringen was hun toppositie echter minder duidelijk; dat geldt vooral voor 
Frankrijk.
In het algemeen scoren de twee Scandinavische landen inderdaad het hoogst op 
ziekteverzuim en verlof bij werknemers en op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkeringen aan 
niet-werknemers. In andere opzichten wijken ze echter af van het verwachte profiel. Zo 
had Zweden in het begin van de jaren tachtig veel nabestaandenuitkeringen, terwijl in 
Denemarken het volume van de werkloosheidsverzekering en de prepensioenen door-
gaans het corporatistische niveau benadert.
De landen in de liberale groep genereren zoals verwacht de meeste bijstandsuitke-
ringen. In de Verenigde Staten wordt deze kenmerkende vertekening in de loop der tijd 
echter steeds minder, wat vooral verband houdt met de beperking van de toegang tot de 
Amerikaanse bijstandsregeling. In 1999 is daardoor het patroon in de vs plus libéral que les 
libérals geworden: het uitkeringsvolume is in alle regelingen laag, zelfs in de bijstand.
Omdat het voor de hand ligt dat het uitkeringsvolume niet alleen wordt bepaald door de 
formele regelstructuur is vervolgens gekozen voor een multivariate benadering. Er is een 
causaal model ontwikkeld (zie figuur 6.5) dat de groei van het uitkeringsvolume relateert 
aan een aantal aspecten van de ‘context van regeltoepassing’: demografische trends, eco-
nomische ontwikkelingen, en veranderingen in de institutionele structuur, met inbe-
grip van systeemwijzigingen. Het model is eerst getest voor acht landen tegelijk (Canada 
en Australië bleven buiten beschouwing vanwege databeperkingen) en bleek goed bij de 
empirische gegevens te passen. Vervolgens is het model gebruikt om de invloed van de 
regimes beter te kunnen vaststellen, door de afzonderlijke landen op een aantal punten 
gelijk te schakelen. In enkele simulaties kregen alle landen de demografische structuur 
en ontwikkelingen van de vs opgelegd, zodat de volumina werden gecorrigeerd voor de 
gevolgen van verschillen in de bevolkingssamenstelling. Ook werd in sommige landen 
de invloed van systeemwijzigingen en van het stijgende aandeel pensioenontvangers 
geëlimineerd. Ten slotte is uitgegaan van structurele werkloosheidscijfers, waardoor de 
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groei van het aantal uitkeringen niet meer wordt vertekend door schommelingen in de 
economische conjunctuur.
Na deze simulaties is de spreiding in de ‘uitkeringsproductie’ van de landen veel klei-
ner. Als men de minder zuivere casussen in de analyse (Nederland en Groot-Brittannië) 
buiten beschouwing laat, worden de verwachte verschillen tussen de regimetypen zicht-
baar, maar ze zijn niet heel groot. In gelijkgeschakelde omstandigheden is de jaarlijkse 
volumegroei in de sociaaldemocratische landen gemiddeld 0,1 procentpunt hoger dan in 
de vs, en 0,4 procentpunt lager dan in het corporatistische cluster. Over de gehele onder-
zoeksperiode komt dat overeen met verschillen van respectievelijk 3 en 7 procentpunt.
Deze beperkte discrepanties kunnen echter wel aan institutionele verschillen worden 
gekoppeld. De vs kennen een minder sterke groei dan Zweden en Denemarken doordat 
werklozen minder kans op een uitkering (met inbegrip van de bijstand) hebben, en door-
dat er minder gebruik wordt gemaakt van prepensioenregelingen. Op hun beurt komen 
de sociaaldemocratische landen gemiddeld lager uit dan België, Duitsland en Frankrijk 
door de beperkter uitkeringsafhankelijkheid van eenoudergezinnen en de afwijkende 
regulering van vroegtijdige uittreding – in Zweden is het laatste veel minder gebruike-
lijk, in Denemarken komt het frequent voor maar wordt het effect op het totale volume 
enigszins gedrukt door de hoge wettelijke pensioenleeftijd (67 jaar).
Onder het Nederlandse hybride regime groeide het volume in werkelijkheid in de 
jaren tachtig vrij sterk, terwijl in de jaren negentig de toename de minste van alle landen 
was. In gelijkgeschakelde omstandigheden bleek de groei in het eerste decennium echter 
nauwelijks hoger dan in de corporatistische groep. Dit duidt erop dat Nederland in de 
jaren tachtig eerder een slachtoffer van zijn afwijkende demografische omstandigheden 
was – een relatief jonge bevolking die sterker in omvang toenam en meer vergrijsde dan 
elders, veel eenoudergezinnen met een uitkering – dan van instituties die het ‘slechtste 
van drie werelden’ in zich verenigen.
5  Armoede en de regimetypen
De tweede indicator voor de maatschappelijke resultaten van de regimetypen die hier 
is onderzocht betreft de mate van armoede (hoofdstuk 6). Op grond van een kritische 
analyse van theoretische politiek-filosofische en sociologische literatuur werd de term 
gedefinieerd als “een individuele actor is arm indien hem consistent de middelen ontbre-
ken om te kunnen beschikken over hetgeen in zijn samenleving minimaal noodzakelijk 
is”. Dit houdt onder meer in dat armoede altijd verwijst naar een situatie van personen; 
een collectieve actor, groep of gemeenschap kan niet arm zijn, hooguit niet de middelen 
hebben om alle individuen die ertoe behoren te vrijwaren voor gebrek. Die situatie heeft 
een zekere bestendigheid (iemand die één maand niet uitkomt met zijn geld is niet arm) 
en een absoluut karakter: als men wil vaststellen of iemand arm is doet het er niet toe in 
welke positie anderen (of referentiegroepen) verkeren. In een ander opzicht is armoede 
echter wel ‘relatief’: de standaard voor het minimaal noodzakelijke kan naar tijd en plaats 
verschillen, deze hangt af van de gemeenschap waarin de actor verkeert. Ten slotte drukt 
de definitie uit dat het bij armoede gaat om de mogelijkheid de geldende minimumstan-
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daard te bereiken, niet om het daadwerkelijke bezit of de consumptie ervan. Iemand die 
het minimaal noodzakelijke ontbeert, doordat hij aan dingen die gewoonlijk niet als 
onontbeerlijk worden beschouwd (een uitgebreide wijncollectie, wekelijks operabezoek) 
meer uitgeeft dan zijn budget toelaat, is niet arm.
Een gemeenschap kan arme mensen compenseren voor hun tekorten door hen onder 
bepaalde voorwaarden het recht op een uitkering of andere vormen van materiële steun 
toe te kennen. In de literatuur wordt vaak gepleit voor een door de overheid gegaran-
deerd sociaal minimum omdat dit voor de samenleving nuttig is, de vrijheid vergroot, of 
rechtvaardig is. Sociologisch bezien bestaat er echter geen juiste verdeling van rechten, 
en is er dus ook geen universeel ‘beste’ manier om het armoedeprobleem aan te pakken. 
De toekenning van rechten aan de armen kan niet los worden gezien van de problemen 
en ontwikkelingen waarmee een gemeenschap wordt geconfronteerd en van het eerder 
gekozen institutionele pad.
Operationele armoedegrenzen
Nadat het begrip op deze wijze is afgebakend zijn de operationele armoedegrenzen die 
in empirisch onderzoek worden gebruikt beoordeeld aan de hand van vier criteria: hun 
validiteit, betrouwbaarheid, gemak van toepassing en sociaal-politieke relevantie. Dit 
voerde tot de conclusie dat alle bestaande instrumenten tekortkomingen vertonen. Rela-
tieve armoedecriteria, zoals de grens ter hoogte van 60% van het mediane inkomen die 
in de Europese Unie wordt gehanteerd, zijn in termen van het hier gehanteerde theore-
tische begrip niet valide. De mate van armoede hangt immers af van de positie van de 
referentiegroep. Ze zijn bovendien niet in alle opzichten betrouwbaar of normatief over-
tuigend. Subjectieve inkomensgrenzen passen beter bij het theoretische concept maar 
gaan vaak mank aan meetproblemen (uiteenlopende interpretaties van enquêtevragen 
door respondenten), wat ten koste gaat van hun geloofwaardigheid (o.a. instabiele en 
zeer hoge armoedepercentages). Objectieve expert-budgetmethoden zijn valide, redelijk 
betrouwbaar en normatief overtuigend, maar zeer bewerkelijk in de onderzoekspraktijk, 
zeker waar het internationale vergelijkingen betreft.
Om die reden is gekozen voor een uitwerking van de ‘gegeneraliseerde budgetbenade-
ring’ die het scp eerder voor de Nederlandse situatie ontwikkelde (Vrooman & Snel, 1999; 
Soede, 2006; Soede & Vrooman, 2007, 2008b). Deze methode gaat uit van twee gedetail-
leerde referentiebudgetten voor een alleenstaande, vastgesteld op grond van normbedra-
gen van het Nibud. Het ‘basisbehoeften’-niveau is genoeg om een zelfstandig huishou-
den te kunnen voeren, maar karig; het omvat de vrijwel onvermijdelijke uitgaven voor 
voeding, kleding, huisvesting in ruime zin (huur, verzekeringen, energie, water, telefoon, 
meubilair, woningonderhoud en locale belastingen) en een beperkt aantal andere posten. 
Het ‘niet-veel-maar-toereikend’-peil voorziet daarnaast in enkele uitgaven die het strikt 
noodzakelijke te boven gaan (ontspanning, lidmaatschappen en abonnementen, een 
huisdier), maar niet in enige luxe, zoals een auto of buitenlandse vakantie. Voor Nederland 
zijn de normbedragen voor andere typen huishoudens bepaald met behulp van empiri-
sche equivalentieschalen. Alle bedragen worden in de loop der tijd geïndexeerd met het 
driejaarlijks voortschrijdend gemiddelde van de mediane uitgaven aan basale budget-
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posten: voedsel en niet-alcoholische drank, kleding en huisvesting. Op die manier stijgen 
de grenzen gewoonlijk sneller dan de inflatie, en weerspiegelen zij gedeeltelijk de wel-
vaartstoename.
De gegeneraliseerde budgetbenadering is valide in termen van de hier gehanteerde 
definitie, kan gemakkelijk worden toegepast, en bleek in Nederlands onderzoek vol-
doende betrouwbaar. Opinieonderzoek duidt erop dat een dergelijk armoedecriterium 
waarschijnlijk ook geloofwaardig voor burgers en beleidsmakers is.
Theoretische verwachtingen
A priori ligt niet vast welk regimetype in theorie de meest effectieve strategie heeft om 
armoede te lenigen. Het kan zijn dat de ruimhartiger sociaaldemocratische en corporatis-
tische systemen de beste bescherming tegen armoede bieden; maar het is ook denkbaar 
dat die stelsels negatieve externe effecten teweegbrengen (minder welvaart en banen), 
waardoor mensen uiteindelijk onder een liberaal regime het beste af zijn. Daarom is 
eerst getracht vast te stellen in hoeverre de concrete formele instituties van de elf lan-
den de kans op armoede naar verwachting verkleinen. Op grond van een theoretische 
index voor het institutioneel bepaalde armoederisico werd de hypothese geformuleerd 
dat landen met een liberaal sociaal zekerheidsregime (vs, Australië, Canada, en Verenigd 
Koninkrijk) meer armoede produceren dan de corporatistische groep (België, Frank-
rijk en Duitsland). De laatste zouden naar verwachting de sociaaldemocratische landen 
(Denemarken, Noorwegen, Zweden) in armoede overtreffen, en die komen op hun beurt 
in theorie hoger uit dan het hybride regime van Nederland.
Empirische resultaten
Bij toepassing van de gegeneraliseerde budgetbenadering in comparatief onderzoek zou 
men zich willen baseren op goed vergelijkbare en gedetailleerde nationale budgetgege-
vens, waardoor rekening kan worden gehouden met verschillen tussen de landen in prij-
zen, consumptiepatronen en heffingen. Die zijn echter niet voorhanden. Daarom is er 
voor gekozen om de totale kosten, die een alleenstaande voor de twee referentiebudget-
ten in Nederland rond het jaar 2000 moest maken, met behulp van koopkrachtpariteiten 
om te zetten in normbedragen voor de tien andere landen. Voor de overige typen huis-
houdens zijn de normen bepaald via equivalentiefactoren, die werden gekozen op grond 
van een gevoeligheidsanalyse van verschillende schalen.
Als men de grensbedragen vervolgens afzet tegen de gegevens over de 11 landen in 
de Luxembourg Income Study (ca. 2000) blijkt uit de bivariate resultaten enige steun voor 
de hypothesen. Zowel volgens de ‘basisbehoeften’-definitie als het ‘niet-veel-maar-toe-
reikend’-criterium was het armoedepercentage in de liberale landen gemiddeld groter 
dan in de corporatistische (ongeveer +3 procentpunten); dit kwam vooral door de hoge 
incidentie in Australië. De corporatistische groep overtrof zoals verwacht het sociaalde-
mocratische cluster (+6 procentpunten). Nederland had echter niet de laagste incidentie, 
maar belandde te midden van de sociaaldemocratische landen, die gemiddeld lager uit-
kwamen (-1 procentpunt).
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Vervolgens zijn enkele multi-level logistische regressiemodellen opgesteld, met de 
armoede-incidentie op grond van het ‘niet-veel-maar-toereikend’-criterium als te verkla-
ren variabele. Een groot deel van de variantie bleek niet op het niveau van de landen te 
liggen, maar moest worden toegeschreven aan verschillen tussen de individuele respon-
denten. De beperkte macro-variantie werd echter wel in aanzienlijke mate verklaard door 
de landenkenmerken die in het model als determinanten waren opgenomen. Deels betrof 
dit het effect van de vrij grote welvaartsverschillen tussen de landen; zo is het bruto bin-
nenlands product per hoofd van de bevolking binnen de liberale groep in de vs veel groter 
dan in Australië. Als daar rekening mee wordt gehouden, gaan alle ‘pure’ onderlinge ver-
schillen tussen de regimetypen en de hybride in de theoretisch verwachte richting; maar 
alleen dat tussen de liberale en de corporatistische groep bleek statistisch significant.
6  Reële typen en ideaaltypen
Esping-Andersen’s typologie is in beginsel ideaaltypisch. Ook al komen feitelijke stel-
sels van sociale zekerheid er mee overeen, ze voldoen nooit precies aan het theore-
tisch patroon, omdat het historische constructen zijn. Als zodanig weerspiegelen ze de 
omstandigheden waaronder ze werden gevestigd: de al bestaande instituties, de vige-
rende belangentegenstellingen, machtsverhoudingen, relatieve prijzen en idealen, de 
politieke allianties en de uitruil van agendapunten in de onderhandelingen, etc.
Wanneer de regimes die hier geanalyseerd zijn ver van hun ideaaltype verwijderd zijn, 
biedt dat mogelijk een verklaring voor de beperkte empirische invloed van de typologie 
op uitkeringsafhankelijkheid en armoede. De variantie in de onafhankelijke institutio-
nele kenmerken is dan mogelijk te klein om veel van de verschillen tussen landen in de 
mate van uitkeringsafhankelijkheid en armoede te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 7 is nagegaan 
of deze verklaring hout snijdt door de feitelijke stelsels af te zetten tegen fictieve, die 
volgens theoretische ideaaltypische patronen op dezelfde kenmerken werden gescoord. 
De uitkomsten van deze analyse duiden erop dat de empirische stelseltypen niet alleen 
onderling veel kenmerken delen, maar ook het meest overeenkomen met hun eigen ide-
aaltype, al zijn ze geen volstrekt zuivere exponenten van het theoretisch patroon (figuur 
7.1). Een te grote afstand tussen reële typen en ideaaltypen lijkt dus geen afdoende ver-
klaring te kunnen bieden voor de niet al te sterke empirische verbanden tussen sociale 
zekerheidsregimes en hun maatschappelijke output.
7  Enkele implicaties
Tot besluit is het interessant kort stil te staan bij enkele wetenschappelijke en beleidsma-
tige implicaties van deze studie. Het institutionele perspectief dat in hoofdstuk 2 werd 
geschetst heeft een aantal sterke punten:
1) Het benadrukt dat rechten en plichten niet vanzelf spreken, maar altijd worden gecon-
strueerd door regelmakende actoren, evenals de eraan gekoppelde condities en sanc-
tiemogelijkheden. Ze weerspiegelen altijd de omstandigheden en percepties ten tijde 
van hun stichting, en vaak liggen ze in het verlengde van eerder bestaande regels.
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2) Instituties worden gevestigd om een collectief doel te bereiken: de betrokken actoren 
hebben reden om aan te nemen dat hun gemeenschap op één of andere manier baat 
zal hebben bij bepaalde regels (o.a. meer collectieve welvaart, gevolgen in termen van 
sociale structurering).
3) Formele en informele instituties zijn op te vatten als functioneel alternatieve vormen 
van regulering. Ze kunnen elkaar aanvullen en versterken, maar het is ook mogelijk 
dat ze naast elkaar bestaan, of dat regelsystemen overwegend informeel of formeel 
zijn.
4) Actoren volgen gevestigde regels niet vanzelf; ze maken een eigen afweging, waardoor 
afvalligheid altijd mogelijk is. Rechtspersonen worden hierbij vaak geconfronteerd 
met een patroon-agent probleem. Als instituties heel ‘thick’ zijn, en via de socialisatie 
diep in de actoren zijn verankerd, kunnen ze het gedrag in hoge mate afdwingen. In 
moderne, open samenlevingen is dat echter minder gebruikelijk.
5) Het resultaat van gevestigde regels staat niet op voorhand vast, maar hangt af van de 
context waarin ze worden toegepast, de subjectieve filtering door actoren, en het fei-
telijk verloop van de interacties tussen de betrokkenen.
Het belang van een institutioneel perspectief op sociale zekerheid
In de gangbare wetenschappelijke benadering van sociale zekerheid zijn niet al deze 
ideeën vanzelfsprekend. De rechten en plichten worden soms benaderd vanuit een een-
zijdige juridische of economische logica, waarbij het accent ligt op dat wat is gecodifi-
ceerd, of op de veronderstelde gevolgen voor de overheidsbegroting en de werking van de 
arbeidsmarkt. De institutionele benadering maakt duidelijk dat het belangrijk is vast te 
stellen wat de oorspronkelijke doelstellingen van sociale zekerheidsregels waren, welke 
oogmerken de gemeenschap er op een zeker moment aan verbindt, en welke effecten ze 
in een bepaald tijdvak daadwerkelijk teweegbrengen.
De gedachte dat formele en informele instituties functionele alternatieven zijn 
strookt niet met het paradigma dat in de wetenschappelijke bestudering van de sociale 
zekerheid in de 20e eeuw lange tijd dominant was. Informele regelingen waren iets van 
het verleden: na de Amerikaanse New Deal en het Britse Beveridge Report ging het bij ‘echte’ 
sociale zekerheid om wettelijke, door de staat geïnstigeerde of bekrachtigde regels. Het 
is niet voor niets dat Berghman in zijn inaugurele rede uit 1986 elke vorm van niet-for-
mele regulering aanduidde met de term ‘onzichtbare sociale zekerheid’. De laatste twee 
decennia is, met de terugtred van de overheid, op dit punt een zekere herwaardering 
opgetreden. Desondanks is de sociale zekerheid in de moderne welvarende samenlevin-
gen overwegend formeel van opzet. Het institutionele perspectief maakt duidelijk dat dit 
niet noodzakelijk is: het is goed denkbaar bepaalde vormen van sociale zekerheid meer 
dan thans buiten de overheid om te regelen, bijvoorbeeld door een grotere individuele 
verantwoordelijkheid toe te kennen voor de opbouw van pensioenen en het risico van 
arbeidsongeschiktheid.
Intussen wijst het institutionele perspectief ook op een nadeel van formele regulering: de 
grotere kans op afvalligheid. Die houdt deels verband met de ‘dunne’, zwak  gesocialiseerde 
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aard van dit type regels, maar ook met specifieke kenmerken van de formele instituties. 
Misbruik en oneigenlijk gebruik worden in de hand gewerkt door complexe en moei-
lijk te verifiëren uitkeringsvoorwaarden, een groot aantal condities en verplichtingen, 
regelmatige mutaties in de rechten, veel verschillende actoren (waaronder een sociale 
zekerheidsorganisatie met een patroon-agent probleem) en een zwakke bekrachtiging 
vanuit de gemeenschap. Dat maakt vooral de formele regelingen voor bijstand, werkloos-
heid, ziekteverzuim en arbeidsongeschiktheid kwetsbaar voor afvalligheid. Dit kan deels 
worden tegengegaan door een intensief antifraudebeleid (bijvoorbeeld via elektronische 
gegevensuitwisseling), het opleggen van zware sancties aan overtreders, en het bevorde-
ren van coöperatief gedrag via sociale normering. Het institutionele perspectief bena-
drukt echter dat zulke pogingen met hoge transactiekosten gepaard kunnen gaan, en 
dat het heel lastig is om afvalligheid volledig uit te sluiten. Iedere regulering van rechten 
en plichten laat de actoren handelingsvrijheid, en sommigen zullen proberen die in hun 
eigen voordeel te benutten.
Regimes, wetenschap en beleid
Verder was de studie gericht op het vaststellen van de invloed van de verschillende typen 
regimes op de collectieve productie. Hieruit kan onder meer worden geconcludeerd dat 
de regimenotie niet louter een hersenspinsel van de “welfare modelling business” van 
de comparatieve beleidswetenschappen is, maar verwijst naar reële verschillen tussen 
landen in de opzet van de formele sociale zekerheid en in de informele regels die het 
stelsel ondersteunen. Het begrip blijkt ook een aanwijsbare betekenis te hebben voor de 
collectieve output en is daarom een wetenschappelijk zinvolle predictor.
Men moet echter in de praktijk geen heel grote verschillen verwachten in de resul-
taten die representanten van de uiteenlopende typen voortbrengen. Dat houdt verband 
met het abstracte karakter van de typologie, met het feit dat alle reëel bestaande syste-
men een verwatering van de ideaaltypische principes inhouden, en met de vaak sterke 
invloed van de context waarin de regels worden toegepast. Vanuit het oogpunt van het 
beleid is het de vraag of het de moeite loont te streven naar een ‘regimewisseling’: als het 
al lukt de padafhankelijkheid te omzeilen zullen de effecten vermoedelijk vaak beperkt 
zijn, in ieder geval waar het de mate van uitkeringsafhankelijkheid en armoede betreft, 
de collectieve resultaten die hier centraal stonden.
Uitkeringsvolume: betere gegevens bieden meer mogelijkheden
Het aantal verstrekte uitkeringen is de meest directe indicator voor de collectieve effec-
ten van sociale zekerheidsinstituties, want dit vloeit rechtstreeks voort uit de geldende 
toekenning van rechten en plichten. Het is daarom des te opmerkelijker dat het gebied 
wetenschappelijk nogal onontgonnen is. De analyses die hier zijn verricht bieden een 
eerste inzicht, maar het is aanbevelenswaardig ze te herhalen wanneer betere gegevens 
beschikbaar zijn, bij voorkeur ook op microniveau. Door in ieder land de registratiegege-
vens van de sociale zekerheidsorganisaties te koppelen, zoals in het Nederlandse Sociaal 
Statistisch Bestand, en te verrijken met enquêtegegevens, kan hier een aanmerkelijke ver-
betering worden bereikt. Het zou wenselijk zijn ook de niet bij wet geregelde voorzienin-
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gen hierin te betrekken. De harmonisatie van zulke ‘volkstellingen’ op het gebied van 
de sociale zekerheid tussen landen vergt een grote inspanning, maar biedt vermoedelijk 
veel mogelijkheden om de effectiviteit van beleidsinterventies op het aantal uitkeringen 
te onderzoeken.
Een alternatieve manier om armoede te meten
In de wetenschappelijke theorie en het empirisch onderzoek is armoede juist een tame-
lijk afgegraasd terrein. Toch hebben de hier verrichte analyses enkele inzichten opgele-
verd. Een van de belangrijkste is dat het ook bij deze materie zinvol is een verbinding te 
leggen tussen theoretische ideeën en operationele criteria. Hier voerde dat onder meer 
tot de conclusie dat de armoedegrenzen die frequent in empirisch onderzoek worden 
gebruikt soms een wankele theoretische basis hebben. Dat geldt in het bijzonder voor de 
in zwang zijnde relatieve inkomensgrens ter hoogte van 60% van het mediane inkomen. 
De relatieve armoedegrens is principieel ongeschikt om de verschillen en trends in de 
mate van armoede bij de lidstaten van de Europese Unie in kaart te brengen, en men zou 
er dus ook geen beleid op moeten willen stoelen.
De hier uitgewerkte ‘gegeneraliseerde budgetbenadering’ lijkt een geschikt alter-
natief: op theoretische en praktische gronden valt dit criterium te prefereren boven 
bestaande armoedegrenzen. Hier is gebleken dat ze ook in landenvergelijkende analyses 
tot plausibele uitkomsten leidt. Om breed toepasbaar te zijn in het laatste type onder-
zoek moet het instrument overigens nog wel enigszins worden verfijnd. Zo zou het wen-
selijk zijn rechtstreeks na te gaan wat het ‘basisbehoeften’-niveau en het ‘niet-veel-maar-
toereikend’-levenspeil van het referentiehuishouden in uiteenlopende landen inhouden. 
Ook moet worden bezien of de gebruikte equivalentieschaal en de manier waarop de 
armoedegrenzen volgens deze benadering in de loop der tijd worden geïndexeerd voor 
internationaal-vergelijkend tijdreeksonderzoek optimaal zijn.
8  ‘Rules of relief’?
G.H. Mead (1934) stelde dat instituties niet noodzakelijk een onderdrukkend of conser-
vatief karakter hebben, maar ook “flexibel en progressief, individualiteit eerder bevor-
derend dan ontmoedigend” kunnen zijn. En inderdaad, vergeleken met de traditionele 
Armenwetten zijn de instituties van de moderne sociale zekerheid eerder ‘rules of relief’ 
dan ‘rules of oppression’. De rechten zijn voor de getroffenen afdwingbaar en ze garande-
ren een aanmerkelijk hoger levenspeil dan vroeger. De uitvoerders van de moderne soci-
ale zekerheid zijn geschoold en dienen professioneel met hun cliënten om te gaan. Door 
het wettelijke en betrekkelijke anonieme karakter van de regeling – er is geen directe 
band meer tussen ontvangers en betalers – hoeven mensen minder te vrezen dat ze van-
wege hun afhankelijkheid aan status inboeten en door de gemeenschap met de nek wor-
den aangekeken.
Toch zijn ook de tegenwoordige sociale zekerheidsinstituties niet vrij van dwang. Zo 
moeten bijstandontvangers actief naar werk zoeken, en worden ze frequent geconfron-
teerd met een middelentoets en met inbreuken op de persoonlijke levenssfeer (bijvoor-
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beeld huisbezoeken om te controleren of men niet samenwoont). De laatste decennia zijn 
dergelijke gedragscontrolerende elementen in de bijstandswet en de uitvoering ervan in 
veel landen gaandeweg meer op de voorgrond getreden: een sterkere conditionering van 
rechten, striktere controle en sanctieoplegging, meer begeleiding naar betaald werk. Die 
omslag werd gelegitimeerd onder verwijzing naar de noodzaak tot kostenbeheersing, het 
tegengaan van de armoedeval, het behoud van een breed maatschappelijk draagvlak voor 
de regeling, en de waarde van werk als vehikel voor sociale integratie en persoonlijke ont-
plooiing. Dit onderstreept dat het niet vaststaat dat de moderne sociale zekerheid bevrij-
dend en emanciperend is, of dat in toenemende mate zal worden. Sociologisch gesproken 
hangt dat af van de doelen die de gemeenschap er op een gegeven moment mee nastreeft, 
de instituties die ze vestigt om die oogmerken te verwezenlijken, en de manier waarop de 
regels door de betrokken actoren worden geïnterpreteerd en toegepast.

